



## To the PRINCE.

**S**IR:

**H**aving ended this taske of Obseruations, and according to your gracious pleasure & command, supplied such parts as were wanting to make vp the Totall of these Commentaries: it doth return again, by the lowest steps of humblenesse, to implore the high patronage of your Princely fauour; Emboldened specially because it carieth Cæsar and his Fortunes, as they come related from the same Author: which, in the deepe Iudgement of his most excellent Maiesty, is preferd aboue all other profane histories; and so, commended, by his sacred Authoritie, to your reading, as a cheefe paterne and Maister-peece of the Art of warre. And herein, your admired wisdome, may happely the rather deeme it capable of freer passage, in that it is not altogether vnproper for these happie dayes; as knowing, that Warre is neuer  
so

ΒΑΣΙΛ-  
ΚΟΝ ΔΩ-  
ΡΟΝ.




so well handled, as when it is made an Argument of discourse in times of sweete and plentious peace. The blessings whereof, may euer crowne your yeares; as the soueraigne good of this temporarie life, and the chiefeſt Ornaments of Princely condition.

The humbleſt

of your Highneſſe ſeruants,

4 DE 65

CLEMENT EDMONDES.



*In Clementis Edmondi de re militari ad Iul. Cæſaris Commentarios Obſervationes.*

**C***ſi creperos motus, & aperto prælia Marte  
Edmondus nobis pace vigente reſert?  
Cur ſenſus mentisq; Ducum rimatur, & efferit?  
Diſertæque Anglos bellica multa docet?  
Scilicet, ut mediâ medietur prælia pace,  
Anglia bellipotens, nec moriatur honos.  
Prouidus hæc certè patria depromit in uſus,  
Vt patria pacem qui cupit, arma parat.*

Guil. Camdenus, Cl.

*To my friend, Maiſter Clement Edmonds.*

**W***Ho thus extracts, with more then Chymique Art,  
The ſpirit of Bookes, ſhewes the true way to finde  
Th' Elixer that our leaden Parts conuert  
Into the golden Metall of the Minde.  
Who thus obſerues in ſuch materiall kinde  
The certaine Motions of hie Prætiſes,  
Knowes on what Center th' Actions of Mankinde  
Turne in their courſe, and ſees their fatalnes.  
And hee that can make theſe obſeruances,  
Muſt be about his Booke, more then his Pen,  
For, wee may be aſſurd, hee men can gheſſe,  
That thus doth CÆSAR knowe; the Man of men,  
Whoſe Work, improv'd here to our greater gaine,  
Makes CÆSAR more then CÆSAR to containe.*

Sam. Danyell.

*To his worthy friend, Maiſter Clement Edmonds.*

**O***bſeruing well what Thou haſt well Obſerud  
In CÆSARS Worker, his Warres, and Discipline;  
Whether His Pen hath earn'd more Praise, or Thine,  
My ſhallow Cenſure doubtfully hath ſwerv'd.  
If ſtrange it were, if wonder it deſerv'd,  
That what He wrought ſo faire, Hee wrote ſo fine;  
Me thinks, it's ſtranger, that Thy learned Line  
Should our beſt Leaders lead, not hauing ſerv'd.  
But hereby (Clement) haſt Thou made thee knowne  
Able to counſaile, apteſt to reſorde  
The Conqueſts of a CÆSAR, of our owne;  
HENRY, thy Patron, and my Princely Lord.  
Whom (O!) Heav'n proſper, and protect from harmes,  
In glorious Peace, and in victorious Armes,*

IOSVAN SYLVESTER.

TO MY FRIEND, MAISTER  
CLEMENT EDMONDES.

*Epigramme.*

**N**ot *Cæsar*'s deedes; Nor all his honors wonne  
In these West-parts; Nor, when that warre was done,  
The name of *Pompey* for an Enemy;  
Cato to boote; *Rome*, and her libertie;  
All yeelding to his fortune; Nor, the while,  
To haue ingrav'd these Acts with his owne stile;  
And that so strong, and deepe, as might be thought  
He wrote with the same spirit that hee fought:  
Nor that his Worke liv'd, in the hands of foes,  
Vn-argu'd then; and (yet) hath fame from those;  
Nor all these, *Edmondes*, or what else, put to  
Can so speake *Cæsar*, as thy Labors doo.  
For, where his person liv'd scarce one iust age,  
And that 'midst many and Parts; then, fell by rage;  
His deedes too dying, saue in bookes: (whose good  
How few haue read! how fewer vnderstood!)  
Thy learned hand, and true Promethean Art,  
As by a new creation, part by part,  
In euerie councill, stratageme, designe,  
Action, or Engine, worth a note of thine,  
T' all future time, not only doth restore  
His Life: but makes, that hee can dyc no more.


*Ben. Ionsen.*

*Another, of the same.*

**W**ho, *Edmondes*, reads thy booke, and doth not see  
What th antique Souldiers were, the moderne be?  
Wherein thou shew'st, how much the latter are  
Beholden, to this Master of the Warre:  
And that, in Action, there is nothing new,  
More: then to varie what our Elders knew.  
Which all, but ignorant Captaines, will confesse:  
Nor to glue *Cæsar* this, makes ours the lesse.  
Yet thou, perhaps, shalt meete some tongues, will grutch  
That to the world thou shouldst reueale so much;  
And, the nce, deprauce thee, and thy Worke: To those  
*Cæsar* stands vp, as from his vrne late rose  
By thy great Art: and doth proclame, by mee,  
They murder him againe, that enuie thee.

4 DE 65

*Ben. Ionsen.*



READING AND DISCOVERS

are requisite, to make a Souldier perfect in the Arte  
Militarie, how great soeuer his knowledge may be, which  
long experience, and much practice of  
Armes hath gained.



**W**HEN I consider the weaknes of mans iudgement, in censuring things best knowne vnto it selfe, and the disabilitie of his discourse, in discouering the nature of vnacquainted objects, choosing rather to hold any sensible impression, which custome hath by long practice inured, then to hearken to some other more reasonable perswasion: I do not maruell that such Souldiers, whose knowledge groweth onely by experience, and consisteth in the rules of their owne practice, are hardly perswaded, that historie and speculatiue learning, are of any vie in perfecting of their Arte, being so different in nature from the principles of their cunning, and of so small affinity with the life of action; wherein the vse of Armes and atchieuements of war, seeme to haue their chiefest being. But those purer spirits, embelished with learning, and enriched with the knowledge of other mens fortunes (wherein varietie of accidents, affordeth varietie of instructions, and the mutuall conference of things happened, begetteth both similitudes and differences; contrarie natures, but yet ioyntly concurring to reason our iudgement with discretion, and to enstall wisdom in the government of the mind) These men, I say, mounting aloft with the wings of contemplation, doe easily discover the ignorance of such Martialistes, as are onely trained vp in the Schoole of practice, and taught their rudiments vnder a few yeeres experience, which serueth to interpret no other author, but it selfe, nor can approoue his Maximes, but by his owne authoritie; and are rather moued to pittie their hard fortune, hauing learned onely to be ignorant, then to enuie their skill in matter of warre, when they oppose themselves against so manifest a truth as this: that A meer practical knowledge, cannot make a perfect soldier.

A i.

Which

Which proposition, that I may the better confirme, give me leave to reason a little of the grounds of learning, and dispute from the habitude of Artes and Sciences; which are then said to be perfectly attained, when their particular parts are in such sort apprehended, that from the varietie of that individualitie, the intellectuall power frameth generall notions and maximes of rule, vniuing tearmes of the same nature in one head, and distinguishing diuersities by differences of properties, aply diuiding the whole body into his greatest and smallest branches, and fitting each part with his descriptions, duties, cautions, and exceptions. For, vnlesse the vnderstanding be in this sort qualified, and able by logiticall discourse, to ascend, by way of composition, from singularity to catholike conceptions; and returne againe the same way, to the lowest order of his partitions, the mind cannot bee saide to haue the perfection of that Arte, nor instructed in the true vse of that knowledge: but guiding herselfe by some broken precepts, feeleth more want by that shee hath not, then benefite by that shee hath.

VVhereby it followeth, that a Science diuided into many branches, & consisting in the multiplicite of diuers members, being all so interessed in the Bulk, that a Maime of the smallest part, causeth either debilitie or deformitie in the bodie, cannot be said to be thoroughly attained, nor conceiued with such a profiting apprehension as feeleth the mind with true iudgement, and maketh the Scholler, Master in his Arte, vnlesse the nature of these particularities be first had and obtained.

And forasmuch as no one Science or faculty whatsoever, in multitude and pluralitie of parts, may anie way be comparable to the Art Militarie, wherein euery small and vnrespected circumstance, quite altereth the nature of the action, and breedeth such disparitie and difference, that the resemblance of their equall participating properties, is blemished with the dissimilitude of their disagreeing parts; it cannot bee denied, but hee that is acquainted with most of these particular occurrences, and best knoweth the varietie of chances in the course of warre, must needs be thought a more perfect souldier, and deserueth a title of greater dignitie in the profession of Armes, then such as content themselves with a fewe common precepts and ouer-worne rules: without which, as they cannot be said at all to be souldiers; so with them and no more, they no way deserue the name of skillfull and perfect men of war. Now whether meere experience, or experience ioyned with reading and discourse, doe feast the minde with more varietie and choice of matter, or entertaine knowledge with greater plentie of nouelties, incident to expeditions and vse of Armes, I will vse no other reason to determine of this question, then that which Franciscus Patricius alleadgeth in his Parallely, where he handleth this argument which I intreat of.

He that followeth a warre (saith he) doth see either the course of the whole, or but a part only. If his knowledge extend no farther then a part, he hath learned lesse then he that saw the whole: but admit he hath seene and learned the instructions of one whole warre; he hath notwithstanding learned lesse then he that hath seene the proceeding of two such warres. And hee againe hath not

seene

seene so much as another that hath serued in three severall warres: and so by degrees, a souldier that hath serued tenne yeeres, must needs knowe more then one that hath not serued so long. And to conclude, hee that hath received a yeeres stipend (which was the iust time of seruice amongst the Romans before a Souldier could be dismissed) hath greater meanes of experience then another, that hath not so long a time followed the Campe, and cannot challenge a discharge by order and custome. And hence it consequently followeth, that if in one, or more, or all these warres, there haue happened few or no actions of seruice, which might teach a souldier the practice of Armes; that then his learning doth not counteruaile his labor. And if the war through the negligence, or ignorance of the chiefe Commanders, haue bin ill caried, he can boast of no knowledge, but that which acquainted him with the corruptions of Militarie discipline: if the part which he followed, were defeated and ouerthrowne, hee knoweth by experience how to lose, but not how to gaine. And therefore it is not only experience and practice which maketh a souldier worthy of his name; but the knowledge of the manifold accidents which rise fro the varietie of humane actions; wherein reason and error, like Marchants in traffick, enterchange contrary euents of Fortune, giuing sometime copper for silver, and balme for poyson, and repaying againe the like commoditie as time and circumstances doe answere their directions. And this knowledge is onely to be learned in the registers of Antiquitie and in histories, recording the motions of former ages.

Caius Iulius Caesar (whose actions are the subiect of these discourses) after his famous victories in France, and that he had gotten the Prouinces of Spain, broken the strength of the Romaine Empire at Pharsalia, was held a souldier surmounting enuie and all her exceptions: and yet notwithstanding all this, the battell he had with Pharnaces, king of Pontus, was like to haue buried the glorie of his former conquests, in the dishonourable memorie of a wilfull overthrow: for, hauing possessed himselfe of a hill of great aduantage, he beganne to encampe himselfe in the toppe thereof. Which Pharnaces perceiuing (being lodged likewise with his Camp vpon a Mountaine confronting the Romaines) imbatellled his men, marched down from his camp into the valley, and mounted his forces vp the hill, where the Romans were busied about their intrenchments, to giue them battell. All which, Caesar tooke but for a brauado: and measuring the enemy by himselfe, could not be perswaded that any such foolhardines could carry men headlong into so dangerous an aduventure, vntil they were come so neere, that he had scarce any time to call the legions from their worke, and to giue order for the battell. Which so amazed the Romaines, that vnlesse as Caesar himselfe saith, the aduantage of the place, and the benignitie of the Gods had greatly fauoured them, Pharnaces had at that time reuenged the overthrow of Pompey & the Senat, and restored the Romaine Empire to liberty. Which may learne vs how necessary it is (besides experience, which in Caesar was infinite) to perfect our knowledge with varietie of chances; and to meditate vpon the effects of other mens aduentures, that their harmes may be our warnings, and their happy proceedings our fortunate directions.

And albeit amongst so many decades of History, which pregnant with haue

preferred to these later ages, we seldom or neuer meet with any one accident which iumpeth in all points with another of the like nature; that shall happen to fall out in managing a warre, or setting forth of an Armie; and so doe seeme to reape little benefit by that wee read, and make small vse of our great trauell: Yet we must vnderstand, that in the Audit of Reason, there are many offices, which through the foueraigne power of the discursive facultie, receiue great commodities, by whatsoeuer falleth vnder their iurisdiction, and suffer no action to passe without due triall of his nature, and examination of his state; that so the iudgement may not be defrauded of her reuenues, nor the mind of her learning. For, notwithstanding disagreeing circumstances, and differences of formes, which seeme to cut-off the priuiledge of imitation, and frustrate the knowledge we haue obtained by reading: the intellectuall facultie hath authoritie to examine the vse, and looke into the inconueniences of these wants and diuersities, and by the helpe of reason, to turne it to her aduantage; or so to counterpoise the defect, that in triall and execution, it shall not appeare anie disadvantage. For, as in all other Sciences, and namely, in Geometry, of certaine bare elements, and common sentences, which sence admitte to the apprehension, the powers of the soule frame admirable Theoremes and Problemes of infinite vse, proceeding with certaintie of demonstration, from proposition to proposition, and from conclusion to conclusion, and still make new wonders as they goe, besides the strangenesse of their Architecture, that vpon such plaine and easie foundations, they should erect such curious and beautiful buildings: so in the Arte Military, these examples, which are taken from histories, are but plaine kind of principles, on which the mind worketh to her best aduantage, and vseth reason with such dexterity, that of inequalities, shee concludeth an equalitie, and of dissimilitudes most sweet resemblances; and so she worketh out her owne perfection by discourse, and in time groweth so absolute in knowledge, that her sufficiency needeth no further directions. But as *Leonardo da Vinci* the Milinise, in that excellent worke which hee writ of picturing, saith of a skilfull Painter; that beeing to draw a portraiture of gracefull lineaments, will neuer stand to take the symmetry by scale, nor marke it out according to rule: but hauing his iudgement habituated by knowledge, and perfected with the varietie of shapes and proportions; his knowledge guideth his eye, and his eye directeth his hand, and his hand followeth both, with such facilitie of cunning; that each of them serue for a rule whereby the true measures of Nature are exactly expressed: The like may I say of a skilfull Souldier, or any Artizan in his facultie, when knowledge hath once purified his iudgement, and tuned it to the key of true apprehension.

And although there are many that will easily admit a reconciliation of this disagreement, in the resemblance of accidents being referred to the arbitrement of a well tempered spirit; yet they will by no means acknowledge, that those monstrous & inimitable examples of valour & magnanimity (whereof antiquity is prodigall, & spendeth as though time should neuer want such treasure) can any way auail the manners of these daies, which if they were as they ought to be, wold appeare but counterfeit to the lustre of a golden age, nor yet comparable

ble to silver or brasse, or the strength of yron, but deserue no better title then earth or clay, whereof the frame of this age consisteth. For, what resemblance (say they) is between the customs of our times, & the actions of those ancient Heroes? They obserued equity as well in war as in peace: for, vertue rather flourished by the naturall disposition of men, then by lawe and authoritie; the tenure of their Empire was, valour in war, and concord in peace; the greatest treasure which they esteemed, were the deedes of Armes which they had achieved for their country, adorning the temples of their gods with pietie, and their priuate houses with glory, pardoning rather then prosecuting a wrong, and taking nothing from the vanquished but ability of doing iniury: But the course of our times hath another bias; for, couetousnesse hath subuerted both faith and equity, and our valour affecteth nothing but ambition, pride and cruelty tyrannize in our thoughts, and subtilty teacheth vs to carrie rather a faire countenance, then a good nature; our meanes of getting are by fraud & extortion, and our manner of spending is by waste and prodigality; not esteeming what we haue of our owne, but couering that which is not ours; men effeminated & women impudent, vsing riches as seruants to wickednesse, and preuenting Natures appetite with wanton luxurie; supplanting vertue with trechery, & vsing victory with such impietie, as though *iniuriam sacre, were imperio viti*: and therefore the exemplary patterns of former times wherein true honour is expressed, may serue to be gazed vpon, but no way to be imitated by this age, being too subtilty to deale with honesty, and wanting courage to encounter valour. I must needs confesse, that he that compareth the historie of *Liue* with that of *Guichardine*, shall find great difference in the subiects which they handle; for, *Liue* triumpheth in the conquests of vertue, and in euery page erecteth trophes vnto valour, making his discourse like *Cleanthes* table, wherein vertue is described in her entire Maiestie, and so sweetened with the presence & seruice of the Graces, that all they which behold her are rapt with admiration of her excellency, and charmed with the loue of her perfection: but *Guichardine* hath more then *Theseus* taske to perform, being to winde through the labyrinths of subtilty, and discover the quaint practices of politicians: wherein publike & open designs are oftentimes but shadows of more secret proiects, and these againe serue as foiles to more eminent intentions; being also discoloured with dissimulation, and so insnared in the sleights of subtilty, that when you look for war, you shall find peace; and expecting peace, you shall fall into troubles, dissensions and wars: So crabbed and crooked is his argument in respect of *Liues* fortune, and such art is required to vnfolde the truth of these mysteries.

But to answer this obiection in a word, and so to proceed to that which followeth, I say those immortall memories of vertue which former time recordeth, are more necessarily to be knowen, then any stratagems of subtler ages: for, equitie and valour being truly apprehended, so season the motions of the soule, that albeit in so corrupt a course, they cannot peraduenture stir vp imitation; yet they oftentimes hinder many malicious practices, and diuclish deuises, when euill is reprobued by the knowledge of good, and condemned by the author.

6 authority of better ages. And if we will needs follow those steppes which the present course of the world hath traced, and plaie the Cretian with the Cretian; this objection hindereth nothing, but that historie, especially these of later times, affordeth sufficient instructions to make a Souldier perfect in that point.

Let not therefore any man despise the sound instructions which learning affordeth, nor refuse the helps that history doth offer to perfect the weakness of a short experience; especially when no worth can counteruaile the waight of so great a businesse: for, I take the office of a chiefe Commander, to be a subiect capable of the greatest wisdom that may be apprehended by naturall meanes; being to manage a multitude of disagreeing mindes, as a fit instrument to execute a designe of much consequence and great expectation, and to qualifie both their affections and apprehensions according to the accidents which rise in the course of his directions; besides the true iudgement, which he ought to haue of such circumstances as are most important to a fortunate end: wherein our providence cannot haue enough eyther from learning or experience, to prevent disadvantages, or to take holde of opportunities. Neither can it be denied, but as this knowledge addeth perfection to our iudgement, so it serueth also as a spur to glory, and increaseth the desire of honour in such as beholde the atchiuevements of vertue, commended to a perpetuall posteritie, hauing themselves the like meanes to consecrate their memory to succeeding ages, wherein they may serue for examples of valour, and reap the reward of true honour. Or to conclude, if we thirst after the knowledge of our owne fortune, & long to foresee the end of that race which wee haue taken, which is the chiefe matter of consequence in the vse of Arms; what better coniecture can be made, then to looke into the course of former times, which haue proceeded from like beginnings, and were continued with like meanes, and therefore not vnlikely to fort vnto like ends?

And now if it be demanded whether reading or practice haue the first place in this Art, and serueth as a foundation to the rest of the building? Let Marius answer this question: who enuying at the nobilitie of Rome, saith thus; *Qui postquam consules facti sunt, acta Maiorum & Gracorum militaria precepta legere ceperint: homines praposteri, nam legere quam fieri, tempore posterius, re & usu prius est.* Whereas (saith he) reading ought to go before practice (although it follow it in course of time; for, their is no reading, but of something practiced before), these preposterous men, after they are made Consuls and placed at the helme of government, begin to read, when they should practice that which they had read; and so bewray their insufficiencie of knowledge, by vsing out of time that, which in time is most necessarie. This testimonie gaue Marius of reading & book-learning, being himselfe an enemy to the same, soasmuch as al his knowledge came by meer experience. But how soeuer; his iudgement was good in this poynt: for, since that all motion and action proceedeth from the soule, and cannot well be produced, vntill the Idea thereof be first imprinted in the minde, according to which patterne the outward being and sensible resemblance is duely fashioned; how is it possible that any action can be well expressed,

fed, when the minde is not directed by knowledge to dispose it in that sort, as shall best agree with the occurrents of such natures, as are necessarily interested both in the means and in the end thereof? And therefore speculative knowledge as the Tramontane, to direct the course of all practice, is first to be respected.

But that I may not seeme partiall in this controuersie, but carrie an equall hand betweene two so necessarie yoke-fellows, giue me leaue to conclude in a word, the benefite of practice, and define the good which commeth from experience; that so nothing that hath beene spoken may seeme to come from affection, or proceed from the forge of vniust partiality. And first it cannot be denied, but that practice giueth boldnesse and assurance in action, and maketh one expert in such things they take in hand: for, no man can rest vpon such certainty, through the theorike of knowledge, as he that hath seene his learning verified by practice, and acknowledged by the testimonie of assured proof: besides, there are many other accomplishments gotten onely by practice, which grace the presence of knowledge, and giue credit to that which we haue read as first to learn the vse & aduantage of the Arms which we beare; secondly, by frequent aspect & familiarity of dangers, and accidents of terror, to learne to feare nothing but dishonour, to make no difference between heate and colde, sommer and winter, to sleepe in all places as on a bed, and at the same time to take pains & suffer penury, with many other difficulties which custom maketh easie, and cannot be gotten but by vse and practice.

And thus at length, I haue brought a shallow discourse to an abrupt end, wishing with greater zeale of affection then I am able with manifest proof of reason, to demonstrate the necessitie, that both these parts were by our soldiers so regarded, that neither practice might march in obinare blindness without learned knowledge; nor this againe be entertained with an idle apprehension without practice: but that both of them may be respected, as necessarie partes to make a compleat nature; wherein knowledge as the intellectuall part giueth life and spirit to the action, and practice as the materiall substance maketh it of a sensible being, and like a skilfull workman expresseth the excellency, which knowledge hath fore-conceiued: wishing no man to despaire of effecting that by practice, which the Theorike of knowledge commendeth. For, *Cur despes nunc posse fieri, quod iam toties factum est?*

THE



THE SUMME OF THE FIRST  
BOOKE OF CÆSARS COMMENTARIES;  
WITH OBSERVATIONS VPON THE  
same, discovering the excellencie of  
*Cæsars Militia.*

THE ARGUMENT.

**I**N this first booke, are contained the specialities of two great warres, begun and ended both in a Summer: the first, between Cæsar & the Heluetij; the second, between him & Ariouistus, king of the Germans. The history of the Heluetians, may be reduced to three principall heads: vnder the first, are the reasons that moued the Heluetians to entertaine so desperate an expedition, & the preparation which they made for the same. The second, containeth their defeat by Cæsar: and the third, their returne into their Country. That of Ariouistus, divideth it selfe into two parts: the first giueth the causes that induced Cæsar to vndertake that war: the second, intreateth of the war it selfe, and particularly describeth Ariouistus ouerthrow.

*Switchers.*

CHAP. I.

Gallia described: the Heluetians dislike their native seate, and propound to themselves larger territories in the Continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this humour, for his owne advantage.



**G**ALLIA is all divided into three parts; whereof the Belges do inhabite one, the Aquitanes another, & those which they call Celtes, & we, Galles, a third: all these do differ each from other in manners, language, & in lawes. The riuer Garun doth separate the Galles from the Aquitanes, and Marne & Seine doe bound them from the Belges: of these the Belges are most warlike, as furthest off the ciuilitie & politure of the Prouince, & lesse frequented with Merchants, or acquainted with such things as are by the imported to effeminate mens minds: as likewise being sited next to the Germans beyond the Rhene, with who they haue continuall wars. For which cause also the Heluetians doe

*Matrona.  
Sequana.*

B.

doe

doe excell the rest of the Galles in deeds of Armes, being in daily conflicts with the Germaines, for defence of their owne territories, or by invading theirs. The part inhabited by the Galles, beginneth at the riuer Rhene, and is bounded with Garun, the Ocean, and the confines of the Belges; and reaching also to the Rhene, as a Linet from the Sequans & Heluetians, it stretcheth northward. The Belges take their beginning at the extreame confines of Gallia, and inhabit the Country which lieth along the lower part of the Rhene, trindling to the North, and to the East. Aquitania spreadeth it self between the riuer Garun & the Pyrenean hills, and butteth vpon the Spanish Ocean, between the West and the North.

Amongst the Heluetians, Orgetorix did far exceed all others, both for noble descent and store of treasure: & when M. Metellus and M. Piso were Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a kingdom, he moued the Nobilitie to a commotion; perswading the State to goe out of their confines with their whole pouer: as an easie matter for them, that excelled all other in valour & prowess, to seize vpon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather perswade them, for that the Heluetians were on euery side shut up, by the strength & nature of the place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the riuer Rhene, which diuideth their Country from the Germaines; on the other side, with the high ridge of the hill Iura, which runneth between them & the Sequans: & on the third part, they were flanked with the lake Lemanus, & the riuer Rhone, parting their territories from our Prouince.

Hence it happened, that being thus straightened, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make war vpon the bordering Countries: and thereupon, being men wholly bent to Armes and war, were much grieved, as hauing too little elbow-roume for their multitude of people, and the renowne they had got of their valor; their whole country containing but 211 miles in length, & 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these inducements, and moued specially with the authority of Orgetorix, they resolved to make prouision of such things as were requisite for their expedition; bought great number of Carres, and horses for carriages; sowed much tillage, that they might haue plentie of Corne in their iourney; made peace and amity with the confining Countries. For the perswading and supply of which things, they tooke 2 yeers to be sufficient; and in the third, enacted their setting forward by a solemne Law, assigning Orgetorix to giue order for that which remained.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**H**E that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transigrations and sittings of other Nations, shall find some vnexampld particularities in the course of their proceeding: for, first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people utterly abandoned that Country which Nature or prouidence had allotted the, vnlesse they were driuen thervnto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbor nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or some

some other vniuersall, which made the place inhabitable, and the people willing to vndertake a voluntarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a Countrey were so multiplied, that the place was ouer-charged with multitudes of offspring; and like a poore father, had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new fortunes in forraigne Countries, and to possesse themselves of a resting feate; which might recompence the wants of their native Country, with a plentious reueue of necessary supplements. And in this sort, we read that Rome sent out many Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire. And in this manner the ancient Galles disburdened themselves of their superfluitie, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the lands of the Baltick sea, & in Sulla his time, swarmed ouer Germanie: besides many other Nations, whose transigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsooke their Country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same; from whence, as from a fountaine, succeeding ages might deriue the streame of that ouer-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moued them vnto it. For, their manner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to diuide themselves into two or three parts, equall both in equalitie and number: for, after they had parted their common people into euen companies, they diuided their Nobility with as great equalitie as they could, among the former partitions: & then casting lots, that part which went out to seeke new aduentures, left their lands & possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industrie, they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawne vpon them. And this was the meanes, which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of scarcitie and famine.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**H**E that would prognosticate by the course of these seuerall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better successe, hath greater reason to foretell happinesse to these which I last spake of, then to the Heluetians; vnlesse their valour were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and enuie would cast vpon them: for, an action which saoureth of necessitie (which was alwaies vnderstood in sending out a Colonie) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion. For, as men can bee content to tolerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gaine to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselves against the other.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Rgetorix, thirsting after princely dignitie, discovereth the humour of vaine-glorie. For, not contented with the substance of honour, beeing already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, & ordering the affaires of the State by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the marks and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of Maiestie are annexed: not considering that the best honor, sitteth not alwaies in imperiall thrones, nor weareth the Diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it selfe in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles.

For prooffe whereof, to omit antiquitie, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particularlie, Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest Potentates of their time, beeing themselves but priuate Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoeuer; the opportunitie of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouation: but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature, can bee content to attribute a great part of their happinesse, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly interested, to an eminent Leader; & in that vniuersall extasie of ioy, will easilie admit an alteration of their State: so, if the issue be in any respect vnfürfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie; but, euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some object, a chiefe director is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be throwne; and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

## CHAP. II.

Orgetorix practices are discovered: his death. The Heluetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.



Rgetorix, thereupon, undertook imploiment to the adioyning States; and first perswaded Casticus, the sonne of Catamanalides, a Sequan (whose father had for many yeeres reigned in that place, and was by the Senate and people of Rome, stiled with the title of a Friend) to possesse himselfe of the Signiorie of that State which his Father formerly inioyed: and in like manner, dealt with Dumnorix the Heduan, Diuitiacus brother (who at that time was the onely man of that Prouince, & verie wellbeloued of the

the Commons) to imitate the like there; and withall, gaue him his daughter in mariage: shewing them by liuely reasons, that it was an easie matter to effect their desires: for that he being sure of the soueraignie of his State, there was no doubt but the Heluetians would doe much throughout all Gallia, and so made no question to settle them in those kingdoms, with his power and forces. Drawne on with these inducements, they gaue faith and oath each to other, hoping with the support of the soueraignie of three mightie Nations, to possesse themselves of all Gallia.

This thing beeing discovered, the Heluetians (according to their customes) caused Orgetorix to answer the matter in Durance: whose punishment vpon the attaint, was to be burned alive. Against the day of triall, Orgetorix had got together all his Family, to the number of ten thousand men, besides diuers followers, and others far indebted, which were many; by whose meanes hee escaped a iudiciall hearing. The people, there vpon, being much incensed, agreed, the Magistrate should execute their lawes with force of Armes, and to that end, should raise the Country: but in the meane time, Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceined) that he himselfe was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his death, the Heluetians did pursue their former designe of leaving their Country: and when they thought themselves readie prepared, they set fire on all their Townes (which were in number 12) together with foure hundred Villages, besides priuate houses, and burnt likewise all the Corne, saue that they caried with them; that al hope of returne being taken away, they might be the readier to undergoe all hazards: And commaunded that euery man should carie so much Meale with him, as would serue for three Months.

Moreover also, they perswaded the Rauraci, the Tulingi and Latobrigi, their neighbour borderers, that putting on the same resolution, they would set fire on all their habitations, and goe along with them. And likewise tooke vnto them the Boj, which had dwelt beyond the Rheine, but were now seated in the Territories of the Norici, and had taken the capitall towne of that Country. There were onely two waies which gaue them passage out of their Country: the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, betweene the Hill Iura, & the Riner Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce passe; and had a high hill hanging ouer, that a small force might easily hinder them. The other, was through our Prouince, farre easier and readier; forasmuch as the riner Rhone, running betweene the Heluetians and the \* Allobroges (who were lately brought in obedience to the people of Rome) did giue passage in diuers places by Foordes.

\* Sauoyens.

The utmost towne belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth vpon the Heluetians, is Geneva; whereunto adioyneth a bridge leading to the Heluetians; who doubted not but to perswade the Allobroges (that seemed as yet to cary no great affection to the people of Rome) or at least, to force them to giue them passage. Things beeing now ready for their iourney, they assigned a day when all should meete together vpon the banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of Aprill, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius.





mission Helue- expedi-  
S these prouisoes were all requisite; so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of: which was, to haue concealed by all meanes the time of their departure. For, all the beasts of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lions roused themselves out of their dennes; and be then very watchfull of their safetie when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needs bee offered to appease their furie. Or at the least, it behooued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treatie, that such as were likeliest, and best able to crosse their designements, might haue been no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their Countrey by which they might goe; the one narrow and difficult, betwene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the Countrey of the Sequani: the other through Prouence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romaines. But how-so-euer; their error was, that after two yeeres prouision to goe, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to goe, when they came to the point, they knew not what way to goe.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Heluetians passage through the  
Romane Prouince: he fortifieth the passage  
betwene the hill Iura, and the  
lake of Geneva.



ar. me.  
S soone as Cæsar was aduertised, that their purpose was to passe thorough our Prouince, he hasted to leaue the \*Cittie, & posting by great iourneys into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And inrolling great forces throughout all the Prouince, for that there was but one legion in those parts, he brake downe the bridge at Geneva.

The Heluetians, hauing intelligence of Cæsars arriual, they sent diuers of the best of their Nobility, Embassadors vnto him, whereof Numerius & Veredoctus were the chiefe; to giue him notice, that they had a purpose to passe peaceably through the Prouince, hauing no other way to goe: & therein to pray his suffe-  
rance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembering how Lu. Cassius the Consull was slaine, his Armie beaten, and the souldiers put vnder the yoke, did not hold it conuenient to grant their request. Neither did hee thinke that men so ill affected, could forbear to offer wrongs & insolencies, if leaue were giuen them as was required. Howbeit, for the better gaining of time, and getting such forces together as were caused

to be inrolled, he answered the Commissioners that he would take a time of deliberation; and to that end, willed them to returne againe by the Ides of Aprill. And, in the meane time, with that legion he had ready, and the souldiers that came out of the Prouince, he made a ditch, and a wall of sixteene foot in height, from the lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the hill Iura, that diuideth the Sequans from the Heluetians, beeing in length nineteene miles; and disposed guarizons and fortresses along the worke, the better to impeach them, if happily they went about to breake out by force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadors returned, for a resolution, he utterly denied to giue any leaue to passe through the Prouince; hauing neither custome nor president from the people of Rome, to varrant him in that kind. And if they should endeaunour it by force of Armes, he would oppugne them.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His manner of prolonging of time, to renforce the troupes or get some other aduantage, as it was then of great vse to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practised to good purpose; so doth it discover to a circumspect enemy, by the directions in the meane time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inuirteth him with greater courage, to take the opportunitie of that present aduantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other: which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the action.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He request of the Heluetians seemed to deserue a facile answer; be-  
ing in effect no more then Nature had giuen to the riuer Rhone: which was to passe through the Prouince, with as much speed & as little hurt as they could. But Cæsar, looking further into the matter, and comparing things already past, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maiettie of the Romane Empire to be interested in the answer; beeing either to maintaine her greatnes, by resisting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient vertue, by gratifying such as sought her ruine: which in matter of State, are things of great consequence. And further, hee knew it to be an vn safe course, to suffer an enemy to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to load him with further wrongs whom hee hath once iniured: not but that he could peraduenture be content to end the quarrell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not, vntill he haue added a bloody end to an iniurious beginning.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Concerning this marvellous fortification, between the hill & the lake, how serviceable such works were vnto him in all his wars; in what fort, and in how small a time they were made; I will deferre the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Alecia, where he gaue some ground of that hyperbolical speech: *An me deleto, non animaduertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quam non solum vobis obfistere sed etiam cælum diruere possent?*

## CHAP. IIII.

The Heluetians, failing to passe the Rhone, take the way through the Countrey of the Sequani. Cæsar hasteth into Italie, and there inrolleth more legions; and returning, ouer-throweth part of them at the riuer Arar.



He Heluetians, frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with boats coupled together, others with Flats (whereof they made great store) the rest by foords and places where the Riuer was shallowe, sometimes in the day, and oftentimes in the night, to breake out: but being beaten back by the helpe of the fortification, and the concourse of soldiers, and multitude of weapons, they desisted from that attempt.

There was onely another way left, through the Sequans, which they could not take, by reason of the narrownesse therof, but by the fauour of the Countrey. And forasmuch, as of themselves they were able to preuaile little therein, they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his mediation, they might obtaine so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through fauour and bountious carriage, was of great power in his Countrey, much affecting the Heluetians, by reason of his marriage with Orgetorix daughter: & drawne on with a desire of a kingdom, gaue his mind to new projects; labouring to gratifie many States, to tie them the rather to fauour his courses. And there-upon, undertaking the business, got the Sequans to giue the Heluetians leaue to passe through their Confiners, giuing each other Pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Heluetians in their iourney: nor they, offer any iniury to the Countrey.

It was told Cæsar, that the Heluetians were determined to passe through the Territories of the Sequans and Heduans, on the confines of the Santons, who are not farre from the borders of the Tholesans, a people of the Prouince: which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be, to haue a warlike Nation, and such as were enemies to the people of Rome, to come so nere them; and to haue the aduantage of an open and plentiful Countrey.

For

For which causes, he left T. Labienus a Legat, to command those works, and he himselfe made great iourneys to get into Italy; where he inrolled two legions, and tooke 3 more out of their wintering Camps, neer about Aquileia: and with these five legions, went the next way ouer the Alps, into the further Gallia. Where, by the way, the Centrons, Garocles, and Caturiges, taking aduantage of the open ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage: but being beaten and put off by many skirmages, they came in seauen daies from Ocellum, a towne in the furthest parts of the neerer Prouince, into the confines of the Vocontij, a people of the further Prouince: from whence he led them into the territories of the Allobroges; and so vnto the Sabusians; that are the first beyond the Rhene, bordering vpon the Prouince.

By that time, the Heluetians had caried their forces through the straights, and frontiers of the Sequans into the Dominions of the Heduans, and began to forrage & pillage their Countrey. Who, finding themselves unable to make resistance, sent Messengers to Cæsar, to require aide; shewing their deserts to be such from time to time of the people of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect, then to haue their Countrey spoiled, their children led into captivity, their townes assaulted and taken, as it were in the sight of the Romaine Army. At the same instant likewise, the Ambarri, that had dependancy & alliance with the Heduans, aduertised Cæsar, that their Countrey was vitterly wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their townes. In like manner also, the Allobroges, that had farmes and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Cæsar, complaining that there was nothing left them but the soile of their Countrey.

With which aduertisements, Cæsar was so moued, that he thought it not conuenient to linger further, or expect vntill the fortunes of their Allies were all vusted, and that the Heluetians were come vnto the Zantones. The riuer Arar, that runneth through the confines of the Heduans and Sequans, into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stilnesse, that by view of the eye, it can hardly be discerned which way the water taketh. This riuer did the Heluetians passe ouer, by Flotes, & bridges of boats. When Cæsar was aduertised by his Discoverers, that three parts of their forces were already past the water, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the riuer; about the third watch of the night he went out of the Camp with three legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet gotte ouer the riuer, slew a great part of them: the rest fled into the next woods.

This part was the Tigurine Canton: and the Heluetians being all parted into foure diuisions, this Canton alone, in the memory of our fathers, slew L. Cassius the Consull, and put his Army vnder the Yoke. So, whether it were by chaunce, or the prouidence of the Gods, that part of the Heluetian State, which gaue so great a blowe to the Romaine people, was the first that did penance for the same. Wherin, Cæsar tooke reuenge, not onely of the publike, but of his particular loss; forasmuch as the Tigurines, had in that battell, with Cassius, slaine L. Piso, the Grandfather of L. Piso, his father in law.

\* Soane.

Zuricke.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**His defeat being chiefly a service of execution, upon such as were taken at a dangerous disadvantage, which men call unware, containeth these two advices. First, not to neglect that advantage which Sertorius by the haire of his horse taile hath proved to be very important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficultie to overcome the whole. Secondly, it may serve for a caveat, so to transport an Armie over a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so severed from the bodie of the Armie, that advantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselves. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Armie over a river, is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troopes of horse and foot, to defend the Armie from suddaine assaults, as they passe over the water; and thus went Cæsar over the Rhene into Germanie, two severall times.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning the circumstance of time, when Cæsar went out of his Campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must understand, that the Romans divided the whole night into 4 watches, every watch containing three houres: and these watches were distinguished by severall notes and sound of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diversitie thereof, it might easily be knowne what watch was sounded. The charge and office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefe Centurion of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio; at whose pavilion the Trumpeters attended, to be directed by his houre-glasse.

The first watch began alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres (I understand such houres as the night contained, being divided into twelue: for, the Romans divided their night as well as their day into twelue equall spaces, which they called houres): the second watch continued untill midnight; and then the third watch began, & contained likewise three houres; the fourth was equall to the rest, and continued untill sunne-rising. So that by this phrase *de tertia vigilia*, we understand, that Cæsar went out of his Campe in the third watch; which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in historie.

CHAP.

## CHAP. V.

Cæsar passeth over the river Arar: his horsemen  
incountred with the Helvetians, and were  
put to the worse.



**A**fter this overthrow, he caused a bridge to be made over the river Arar, and carried over his Army, to pursue the rest of the Helvetian forces. The Helvetians, much daunted at his suddaine coming, that had gotte over the river in one day, which they could scarce doe in twentie, sent Embassadors unto him, of whom Dinico was chiefe, that commanded the Helvetians in the warre against Cassius: who dealt with Cæsar to this effect; That if the people of Rome would make peace with the Helvetians, they would go into any part which Cæsar should appoint them: but, if otherwise he would prosecute warre, that he should remember the overthrow which the people of Rome received by their valour; and not to attribute it to their owne worth, that they had surprized at unawares a part of their Army, when such as had passed the river could not come to succour them. They had learned of their fore-fathers, to contend rather by valour, then by craft and devices; and therefore, let him beware, that the place wherein they now were, did not get a Name, or carie the marke to all future ages, of an eminent calamity to the people of Rome, & of the utter destruction of his Army.

To this, Cæsar answered; That he made the lesse doubt of the successe of these businesses, in that he well remembred and knew those things, which the Helvetian Commissioners had related: and was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it happened without any cause or desert of the people of Rome; who, if he were guiltie of any wrong done unto them, it were a matter of no difficultie to beware of their practices: but therein was his error, that he could thinke of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to feare: neither could he feare without occasion. And, if he would let passe former insolencies, could hee forget those late & fresh injuries? in that they had attempted to pass through the Province by force of Armes, sacked and pillaged the Heduns, Ambars, & Allobrogians? that did so insolently vaunt of their victorie, admiring that these injuries were suffered so long time to rest unreuenged; came all in the end to one passe. For, the immortall Gods were wont sometimes to give happinesse and long impunitie to men; that by the greater alteration of things, the punishment should be the more grievous for their offences. Howbeit, if they would give Hostages for the performance of those things which were to be agreed upon, and satisfie the Heduns and Allobrogians, together with their Allies, for the injuries they had done unto them, he would be content to make peace with them.

Dinico replied, that they were taught by their Ancestors, to take Hostages, rather then to give them, whereof the people of Rome were witnesses: and there-

Cæsar.

upon

upon departed. The next day they remooued the Campe, and the like did Cæsar, sending all his horse before, to the number of foure thousand (which he had raised in the Province, and drawne from the Heduans, & there Associates) to vnderstand which way the Enemy tooke: vvhich, prosecuting the reare-ward ouerhotly, were forced to undertake the Heluetian Cavalry, in a place of disadvantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The Enemy, made proud with that encounter, hauing with five hundred horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head with more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to sally out of the Reareward, and assault our Partie. Cæsar kept backe his men from fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keepe the Enemy from spoiling and harrying the Country: and went on for fifteen daies together, in such manner, as there were but five or sixe miles between the first troopes of our Armie, and the Rearward of theirs.

## OBSERVATION.



His example of the Heluetians, may lesseon a Commaunder, not to waxe insolent vpon euery ouer-throwe which the enemie taketh, but duely to weigh the true causes of a victorie gotten, or an ouer-throwe taken; that apprehending the right current of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind victorie, nor be dismaied at a caluall mishap.

And heerein, let a heedfull warinesse so moderate the sequells of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and ieaousie to keep still that sweet founding fame on foote, may as farre surpass the industrie which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the continuance of happinesse doth excede the beginning of good fortunes. For, such is the nature of our soule, that although from her infancie, euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which shee lusted after: yet when shee meeteth with a counterbuffe to check her appetite, and restrain her affections from their satisfaction; shee is as much troubled in that want, as if shee had neuer receiued any contentment at all: for, our will to euerie object which it seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite: which is not satisfied with a former quittance; but either seeketh present payment, or returneth discontentment vnto the mind.

And, as our soule is of an euertlasting being, and cannot thinke of an end, to her beginning: so shee seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such things which shee lusteth after: which hee that meaneth to hold Fortune his friend, will endeouour to maintaine.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the aduantage of a hill, and so to giue the Heluetians battell: but was put off by false intelligence. The opportunitie beeing lost, hee intendeth prouision of Corne.



In the meane time, Cæsar pressed the Heduans from day to day to bring in Corne, according to their promise: for, by reason of the cold temperature of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it happened not onely that the Corne was farre from being ripe; but also, that there was scarce forrage for the horses. And, the prouisions which were brought along the river Arar, stood him in small steed at that time, forasmuch as the Heluetians had toke their iourney cleane from the Riuer, and that he would by no means forsake them.

The Heduans, putting it off from one day to another, gaue out still it was upon coming. But, when Cæsar found the matter so long delayed, & that the day of meeting out Corne to the souldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Heduans, of whom he had great numbers in his Campe, and amongst them, Dinitiacus and Lifcus, vvhich for that time were the soueraigne Magistrates (vvhich they call Vergobret, being yeerely created, & hauing power of life & death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corne from them, the Enemy being so neere, and in so needfull a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields: especially, when for their sake, and at their request, he had undertooke that warre. Whereat hee was the rather grieved, because he found himselfe forsaken of them.

At length, Lifcus, moued with Cæsars speech, discovered (which before hee had kept secret) that there were some of great authority amongst the Commons, and could doe more being priuate persons, then they could do being Magistrates. These, by sedicious and bad speeches, did deser the people from bringing Corne: shewing it better for them, sith they could not attaine to the Empire of Gallia, so vndergoe the soueraigntie of the Galles, then the Romaines: for, they were not to doubt, but if the Romaines vanquished the Heluetians, they would bereaue the Heduans of their libertie, with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsells, or vvhatsoeuer else is done in the Campe, made knowne to the Enemy: neither were they able to keepe them in obedience; but knew well withall, what danger hee fell into, by acquainting Cæsar vvith these things; which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar, perceiued that Dammorix, Dinitiacus brother, was shot at by this speech of

Cæsar.

of Liscus: but, forasmuch as hee would not haue those things handled in the presence of so manie, hee speedilie brake off the Councell, and retaining Liscus, asked priuately after those things which he had delinered in the Assembly; whereunto he spake more freely and boldly then before. And inquiring secretlie of others, he found it to be true, that Dumnorix was of great courage, and singularly fauoured for his liberalitie of the Common people: Desirous of newelties and changes, and for many yeeres, had kept at a lower rate, the Taxes and Impositions of the Heduan. forasmuch as no man durst cōtradict what he would haue done. By which courjes, he had increased his priuate estate, and got great meanes to be liberrall: for, a great number of horsemen, did onely liue vpon his entertainment, and were continually about him, beeing not onely powerfull at home, but abroad also, amongst diuers of the neighbour States. And for this cause, had married his Mother to a great Rich man, and of a Noble house, in the Country of the Bituriges; himselfe had tooke a wife of the Heluetians, had matched his sister by his Mother, and others of his kinne, into other States. For that affinity, hee fauoured and wisied well to the Heluetians: and on the other side, hated the Romaines, and specially Caesar, of all others; for that by their comming into Gallia, his power was weakened, and Dinitiacus his brother restored to his ancient honour and dignitie. If any misfeasualtie happened to the Romaines, his hope was to obtaine the Principallitie by the fauour of the Heluetians: where-as the seueraigntie of the Romaines, made him not onely despaire of the kingdome, but also of the fauour, or what other thing sooner he now inioyed. And Caesar had found out by inquirie, that the beginning of the flight, when the Cavalrie was routed, came from Dumnorix, and his horsemen: for, hee commaunded those troopes which the Heduan had sent to aide Caesar, and out of that disorder, the rest of the Cavalrie tooke a fright.

Which things beeing discovered, forasmuch as these suspicions were seconded with matters of certaintie, in that hee had brought the Heluetians through the confines of the Sequans, had caused hostages to be giuen on either side, and done all those things, not onely without varrant from the State, but without acquainting them there with. And lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the Heduan, hee thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to commaund the State to doe iustice vpon him. One thing there was which might seem to oppugne all this; the singular affection of Dinitiacus, his brother, to the people of Rome; the great loue he bare particularly to Caesar; his loyalty, iustice & temperancie: and therefore he feared, least his punishment might any way alienate or offend Dinitiacus sincere affection. And therefore, before hee did anie thing, hee called Dinitiacus, and putting aside the ordinarie Interpreters, hee spake to him by M. Valerius Procillus, one of the principall men of the Prouince of Gallia, his familiar friend, and whom hee specially trusted in matters of importance, and tooke notice what Dumnorix had uttered in his presence, at a Councell of the Galles, shewing also what informations hee had priuately receiued concerning him: and therefore, by way of aduice, desired, that without any offence to him, either hee himselfe might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

Diniti-

Dinitiacus, embracing Caesar, with many teares besought him, not to take anie seuerer course vwith his brother; hee knew vwell that all those things were true, neither was there any man more grieved thereat then himselfe. For, where-as he had credit and reputation, both at home and amongst other States of Gallia, and his brother beeing of small power by reason of his youth, was by his aide and assistance, growne into fauour and authoritie, hee used those meanes as an aduantage, not onely to weaken his authoritie, but to bring him to ruine: And yet neuer thelesse, he found himselfe ouer-ruled through brotherly affection, and the opinion of the common people. And if Caesar should take any strict account of these offences, there was no man but would thinke, it was done vwith his priuie, considering the place he held in his fauour; where vpon, would consequently follow, on his behalfe, a generall alienation, and distaste of all Gallia.

As hee vttered these things, with many other words, accompanied vwith teares, Caesar, taking his right hand, comforted him, and desired him to intreat no further: for, such was the respect hee had vnto him, that for his sake, and at his request, he forgauē both the iniurie done to the Common-wealth, and the displeasure which hee had iustly conceiued for the same. And therupon, called Dumnorix before him, and in the presence of his brother, shewed him wherein hee had deserued much blame and reproofe; told him what hee had vnderstood, & what the State complained on; aduised him to auoide all occasions of mistlike for the future; that which was past, hee had forgiven him, at Dinitiacus his brothers intreatie. Howbeit, he set espialls vpon him, to obserue his courjes, that he might be informed what hee did, and with whom hee conuersed.

The same day, vnderstanding by the Discouersers, that the Enemie was lodged vnder a Hill, about eight miles from his Campe, he sent some to take a viewe of the Hill, and of the ascent from about the same. Which was found, and accordingly reported vnto him to be very easie. In the third watch of the night, hee sent away T. Labienus the Legat, vwith two legions, and those Guides that knew the way; commaunding him to possesse himselfe of the toppe of that Hill. Himselfe, about the fourth watch, marched on after the Enemie, the same way they had gone, sending all his horsemen before.

P. Causidius, that was held for a great souldier, first, in the Army of L. Sylla, and afterwards vwith M. Crassus, was sent before, with the Discouersers. At the breaking of the day, when Labienus had gotte the toppe of the hill, and himselfe was come within a mile and a halfe of the Heluetian Campe, vwithout any notice to the Enemie, either of his or Labienus approach (as was afterwards found by the Captiues) Causidius came running as fast as his horse could driue, and told him, that the Hill vwhich Labienus should haue taken, was held by the Galles; vwhich hee perceived plainelie by the Armes and Ensignes of the Heluetians. Whereupon, Caesar drew his forces to the next Hill, and imbatteled the Armie.

Labienus (according to the directions hee had from Caesar, not to fight, vnlesse hee saw his forces neere the Enemies Campe, that they might both at the same time assault them from diuers parts at once) when he had tooke the Hill, kept his men from battell, expecting our Armie.

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At length, when it was farre in the day, Cæsar understood by the Discoverers, that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also, that the enemy was dislodged, & that Causidius was so astonied with feare, that he reported to haue seene that which he saw not. The same day, he followed the Enemy, at the distance hee had formerly vsed, and incamped himselfe three miles from them. The day following, forasmuch as the Army was to be paid in Corne within two daies next after, & that he was but eightene miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Heduans, hee turned aside from the Heluetians, and made towards Bibract.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He getting of this hill, as a place of aduantage, was marvellous important to the happy successe of the battell: for, the aduantage of the place is not onely noted as an especiall cause of easie victorie, throughout this historie; but in all their warres, from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies frō all difficulties, to what extremities sooner they were put. The first reason may bee in regard of their Darts & Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heauy deadly weapon, could not any way bee so auailable, being cast countermont or in a plaine leuell, as when the decliuitie and down, fall of a swelling banke, did naturally second their violent impression. Neither can the shock at handy-blowes bee any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the iniurie of a rising Mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course.

And to conclude, if the battell succeeded not according to their desire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof, they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all chaunces. If it be demanded, whether the vpper ground be of like vse, in regard of our weapons: I answer, that in a skirmish of shotte, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for, the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the noise of the peece is lower then the breech, it must needs lie at randome, and be altogether vneffectuall: but when the noise shall be raised vppward to the side of a hill, the bullet being rammed in with his owne waight, shall lie with greater certaintie and furie; considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stoppt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the shooke and encounter, to be aduantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserue as great respect, if the controuerfie were decided by these weapons, as sildome times it is.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**B**Y Causidius his demeanour, we see that verified which Phytitions affirme, that Nothing will sooner carrie our iudgement out of her proper seate, then the passion of feare: and that amongst souldiers themselves, whom custome hath made familiarlie acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flock of sheepe into a Squadron of Corselers, & a few canes or Officers, into Pikes and Lanciers. Which may serue to aduise a discreet Generall, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfite a discipline, and so experienced in the seruice of three famous Chieffes, was so surprised with feare, that hee could not discerne his friends from his enemies: but I will speake more of this passion, in the war with Ariouistus.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**I**N euery relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first words are commonly these, *Reframentaria comparata*; as the foundation & strength of euery expedition, without which no man can manage a war, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art Military. but must be forced to relieue that inconuenience, with the losse of many other aduanrages of great consequence. Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni, that famous Admirall of France, amongst other Oracles of truth, wherewith his mind was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying; that He that wil shape that beast (meaning war) must beginne with the belly. And this rule was diligently obserued by Cæsar, who best knew how to expresse the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion & liuely resemblance.

The order of the Romans was, at the day of measuring, to giue corne to euery particular souldier, for a certain time, which was commonly defined by circumstances: and by the measure which was giuen the, they knew the day of the next payment; for, euery footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for, if they had paid the their whole stipend in money, it might haue bene wasted in vnecessary expenses: but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; & the sequell of the war, was proudly cared for by the Generall.

The Corne being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they caried alwaies with them, & made into hasty cakes, dainty enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their seruants. Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for, Salust reckoneth this vpon amongst other dishonours of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their corne, which was giuen the by the Treasurer; & bought their bread by the day. And this manner of prouision had many speciall comodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualling: for it is impossible, that victualers should

C 3.

should

Their manner of victualling

should follow an Armie vpon a seruice, in the Enemies Countrey, twentie or thirtie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes, the Generall cannot attend aduantages & fittest opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered; but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vnequall rearmes, or to found an vnwilling retireit.

And whereas the Victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the souldiers on the other side, carelesse of the morrow, and prodigall of the present in that turbulent mar-market, where the seller hath an eye onely to his particular, & the buyer respecteth neither the publique good, nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion: Where-as the Romans, by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publique good vpon the chiefe Commaunder, whose dutie it was to prouide store of Corne for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euery priuate souldier, whom it especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the Common-weale had in plentifull manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not bee wasted through negligence or prodigalitie: which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their Prouinces, & the next confederate States, furnished their Armies continually with Corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for prouision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui: and, when they were in the Enemies Countrey, in the time of haruest, the souldiers went out to reape and gather Corne, and deliuered it thre shed and cleansed to the Treasurer, that it might be kept untill the day of paiment.

But, to leaue this frugall and prouident manner of prouision, as vnpossible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our historie, and see how the Heluetians were ledde, by a probable error, to their last ouerthrowe.

## CHAP. VII.



The Heluetians follow after Cæsar, and ouertake  
the *Rereward*. He imbattaileth his legions vpon the  
side of a hill: and giueth order for  
the Battaile.



Hereof the Enemy beeing aduertised, by certaine fugitives of the troope of horse, commanded by L. Emilius presently; whether it ouere that they thought the Romaines did turne away for feare (and the rather, for that the day before, hauing the aduantage of the upper ground, they refused to fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from prouision of Corne, they altered their purpose, and turning back againe, beganne to attack our men in the Reare. Which Cæsar perceiuing, hee drew his forces to the next hill, and sent the Cavalrie to sustaine the









the charge of the Enemy: and in the meane time, in the midst of the hill, made a triple battell, of foure legions of old souldiers; and vpon the highest ridge thereof, he placed the two legions which he had lately inrolled, in the hither Gallia, together with the associate forces; filling the whole front of the hill with men, and stowing the cariages in one place: which he commanded to be fenced & guarded by those that were in the vppermost battalions.

The Heluetians, on the other side, conuaid their cariages and impediments into one place; and hauing beaten back Cæsars horsemen, with a thick-thronged Squadron, they put themselves into a Phalanx, & so pressed under the first battell of the Romaine legions.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the true sense of this triple battell, which Cæsar made vpon the side of the hill, I vnderstand it according to the ancient custome of the Romaines; who in the infancie of their Militarie discipline, diuided their Armie into three sorts of souldiers, *Haslati*, *Principes*, and *Triarij*: for, I omit the *Velites*, as no part of their standing battels; and of these they made three feuerall battels, from front to back. In the first battell were the *Haslati*, and they possessed the whole front of the Armie, and were called *Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes*, in like sort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*: and lastly, in a like correspondent distance, were the *Triarij* imbattelled, and made *Aciem tertiam*.

Their legion consisted of tenne Companies, which they called cohorts, and euery cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Haslati*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarij*, as I will more particularly set downe in the second booke. And as these three kinds of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to backe: so was euery battell diuided into his maniples; and these were diuided by little allies and waies, one from another, which were vied to this purpose: The *Haslati*, being in front, did euer begin the battell: & if they found themselves too weak to repell the enemy, or were happely forced to a retreat, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battell, betweene the maniples of the *Principes*, into the space which was betweene the *Principes* and the *Triarij*; and there they rested themselves, whilst the *Princes* tooke their place, and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise, if the Commanders found it needfull, they fild vp those distances of the *Principes*: and so vnited with them into one body, they charged the enemy all in grosse; and then, if they preuailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarij*, and so they gaue the last assault, all the three bodies being ioyned all into one.

Now, if we examine by the current of the history, whether Cæsar obserued the same order and diuisions in his warres, we shal find little or no alteration at all: for, first, this *triplex Acies* heere mentioned, was no other thing but the diuifi-

The manner  
of their im-  
battelling.

By triplex  
Acies.



diuision of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarii*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dreame of that ordinary diuision, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that sense he might say to haue made *triplicem Aciem*, let him vnderstand, that the circumstances of the diuision haue no coherence with that diuision: for, in that hee saith of the Helueticus, *successerunt Aciem primam*, pressed neere the first battell or Vanguard, hee maketh it cleare that the Armie was diuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for, otherwise, hee would haue said, *successerunt dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*: for so were the partes of that diuision tearmed. Againe, in the retrait which the Helueticus made to the hill, when he saith that the first and second battell followed close vpon the enemy, and the third opposed it selfe against the *Boii* and *Tulingi*, & stood ready at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the back; It is manifest, that no other diuision can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.

But that place in the first of the Ciuill warres taketh away all scruple of controuersie, where he vseth the verie same tearmes of *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia Acies*: for, beeing to iocampe himselfe neere vnto Afranius, and fearing least his souldiers should be interrupted in their work, he caused the first and second battell to stand in Armes, & keepe their distance, to the end they might shroud & couer the third battell (which was imploied in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbattelling, Cæsar obserued in most of his fights: by which it appeareth, that he vseth the very same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romaines.

Concerning the auncient names of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, which Ramus in his Militia Iulij Cæsaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole historie, I grant they are sildome vsed in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for, the *Hastati*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the legionarie souldiers. The *Principes*, were the lustie and able bodied men: and the *Triarii* the eldest, and best experienced. But in Cæsars Campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeeres, betwene the *Hastati*, *Principes* or *Triarii*; which hee nameth, *Prima*, *Secunda*, and *Tertia Acies*: and therefore, were neuer tearmed by those names, in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding, in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that vertue might be rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthy place, the said distinctions and tearmes were religiously obserued: for, in the battell with Petreius at Ilerda in Spaine, hee mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, *ex primo Hastato legionis quartæ decimæ*: and in the ouerthrowe at Dyrrachium, he saith, that The Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, commended the safetie of his Ensigne to the horsemen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort beeing slaine, *præter principem Priorem*. And for the *Triarii*, there is no tearme more frequent in Cæsar, then *Primi pili*: which name, by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefeest Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarii*: whereby it appeareth, that the man-  
piles

Lib. 1. de bello  
Ciuili.

Lib. 3. de bello  
Ciuili.

ples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peraduenture the *Hastati* were as good souldiers, as either the *Principes* or the *Triarii*.

As touching the spaces betwene the maniples, whereinto the first battaile did retire it selfe if occasion vrged them, I neuer found any mention of them in Cæsar. Excepting once heere in England, where, in a skirmish the Brittaines vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Romaine Camp, that Cæsar sent out two other Cohorts to succour them; who making distance betwene them as they stood, the court of guard retired it selfe in safetie, through that space into the Campe: otherwise, we neuer find that the first battell made any retreat into the allies, betwene the maniples of the second battell; but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them: as appeareth in the battell following with Ariouistus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vse of this triple battell, what can be said more then Lipsius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof, as farre forth as a speculative iudgement can discerne of things so far remote from the vse of this age, which neuer imitareth this triple battell, but onely in a march: for, then commonly they make three companies; a vanguard, a battell, and a reuerward: but in imbattelling, they draw these three Companies all in front, making two cornets and the battell, without any other troops to second them. Let let this suffice concerning Cæsar his manner of imbattelling, and his *triplex Acies*, vntill I come to the second booke; where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commoditie of their small battalions.

Lib. 5. de mi-  
lita Romana

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He Macedonian Phalanx, is described by Polybius, to be a square battell of Pikemen, consisting of sixteene in flanke, and five hundred in front; the souldiers standing so close together, that the pikes of the first ranke, were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell: the rest, whose pikes were not seruiceable, by reason of their distance from the front, couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stood before them; and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward, to hold vp the sway or giuing backe of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and vnresistible.

A Phalanx  
described.

The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the Art Militarie, which containeth order and disposition in imbattelling: for they maintained publike professors, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach & instruct their youth the practice and Art of all formes conuenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici*, found by experience, that sixteene in flanke, so ordered as they were in a Phalanx, were able to beare any shock, how violent so-euer it charged vpon them; which number of sixteene, they made to consist of foure doubles: as first vnitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number & pluralitie; but vnitie doubled, maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled  
again,

again, maketh the second order, of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time, maketh eight, and this doubled, maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnite; and in it they staid, as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is foure the Quadruple, in regard of both the extreames: for euery one of these places, the *Tactici* had seuerall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short obseruations. Hee that desireth further knowledge of them, may read Elianus, that liued in the time of Adrian the Emperour: and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo, Imperator; where he shall haue the diuisions of *Tetralangia* *diphalangia*, *Phalangia* vnto a vnite, with all the discipline of the Grecians. The chiefest thing to be obserued, is, that the Grecians, hauing such skill in imbattelling, preferd a Phalanx before all other formes whatsoeuer; either because the figure in it selfe was very strong: or otherwise, in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But, whether Cæsar teamed the battell of the Heluetians a Phalanx, in regard of their thicke manner of imbattailing onely, or otherwise, forasmuch as besides the forme, they vsed the naturall weapon of a Phalanx, which was the pike, it remaineth doubtful. Brancatio, in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no cōtrouersie, but that euery souldier carried a pike and a target. The target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensive weapons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that manie of the legionarie souldiers were wounded through the cart-wheeles, with *tragulas* and *materas*, which are commonly interpreted Speares and Iauelins: and I take them to be weapons longer then common darts; but whether they were so long as the Sarissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoeuer; this is certaine, that the Heluetians haue ever been reputed for the true *Phalangite*, next vnto the Macedonians; and that in their thicke and close imbattailing, they failed not at this time of the forme of a Phalanx: for, they roosed it so thicke with targets, that Cæsar saith they were sore troubled, because manie of their targets were fastened and tied together, with piles darterd through the. Which argueth, that their Phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatsoeuer their weapon was.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away al the horses of ease; exhorteth his men; and beginneth the battell.



Cæsar, to take away all hope of safety by flight, first caused his own & then all the priuate horses of ease to be carried out of sight; and so using some motives of courage, began the battell. The souldiers casting their Piles, with the aduantage of the hill, did easily breake the Heluetians Phalanx, & then with their swords betook themselves to a furious close.

THE

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



The ancient Sages found it necessary, to a faithfull and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the vnlawfulness of the cause, or of aduantage against the Enemie: for, if at any time that saying be true, that *Oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For, a donatiue or liberance, can but procure a mercenarie indeauour, euery yielding to a better offer, and doe oftentimes breed a suspition of wrong, euen amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their seruice with loyaltie: yea, oftentimes of friends to become enemies. But inasmuch as speech discloseth the secrets of the soule, and discouereth the intent and drift of euery action, a few good words laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iustice controlled by iniquitie (for, it is necessary that a Cōmander approve his Cause, and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seeme probable which so many offer to defend with their blood; when indeed euery man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre vp their minds in the seruientness of the cause, that euery man will take himselfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of Equitie; and the rather, for that it iumpeth with the necessity of their condition. For, men are willing to doe well, when well-doing agreeth with that they would doe: otherwise, the Act may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by assent.

And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement, was neuer omitted by Cæsar in any conflict mentioned in this historie: but hee still vsed it as a necessary instrument to set vertue on foote, and the onely meanes to stir vp alacritie. Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident, as they were at Gergobia, & at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dyrrachium; he neuer would aduenture to giue battell, vntill he had encouraged them againe, and confirmed their minds in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a speech in this key, found it neuer so grauely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessarie a part, hath bred at length such an *inutile pudorem* in our chiefe Commanders, that they had rather lose the gainc of a great aduantage, then buy it with words to be deliuered in publike.

Speeches of encouragement before they gave battell.

Lib. 7. de bello Gallico.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



In this Chapter we may further obserue the violence of the Romane pile, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectual against a Phalanx, or any other thicke and close battell, or where-

The Romane Pile described.

wherefoeuer elle, the stroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the cafter: for, in fuch encounters, it fo galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answer the affault with a resisting counterbluffe. By which it appeareth, that the onely remedie againſt the Pile was, to make the ranks thinne; allowing to euery fouldiour a large podifme or place to ſtand in, that ſo the ſtroke might of it ſelfe fall without hurt, or by fore-ſight bee prevented; as it ſhall plainly appeare by the ſequell of this hiftorie, which I will not omit to note, as the places ſhal offer themſelues to the examination of this diſcourſe.

But as touching the Pile, which is fo often mentioned in the Romaine hiftorie, Polybius deſcribeth it in this manner; A Pile, ſaith he, is a caſting weapon, the ſtaffe whereof is almoſt three cubites long, and it hath *palmarem diametrum*, a hand breadth in thickneſſe. The ſtaues were armed with a head of iron, equall in length to the ſtaffe it ſelfe: But in that fort, that halfe the head was faſtened vp to the middle of the ſtaffe, with plates of iron, like the head of a Halbert; and the other halfe ſtucke out at the end of the ſtaffe, like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thickneſſe, and ſo decreaſing leſſe and leſſe, vnto the point, which was barbed. This head was ſo ſlender toward the point, that the waight of the ſtaffe would bend it as it ſtucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called *Pilum*, as Varto noteth of *Pilum* a Peſtell, *quod Hoſtes feriret ut pilum*. Lipſius, finding that *Palmarem diametrum*, was too great a thickneſſe to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the ſtaffe were either round or ſquare, for they had of both ſorts, and ſo hee maketh it very manageable; but nothing anſwerable to the deſcription, giuen by Polybius, either in ſonne or waight.

Patricius, in his Paralleli, maketh the ſtaffe to haue *palmarem diametrum* in the butte end, but the reſt of the ſtaffe he maketh to decreaſe taper-wiſe, vnto the head of iron, where it hath the thickneſſe of a mans finger; and ſo it anſwereth both in forme and waight to a Peſtell, as may be ſeene by the figure, and I take it to bee the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place ſetteth downe foure diſcommodities of the Pile. Firſt, a furious and hot ſpirited enemy will eaſily preuent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and ſpeedy cloſe: And ſo wee read, that in the battell which Cæſar had with Ariouiftus, the Germans came ſo violently vpon them, that the ſouldiers caſt away their piles, and beooke them to their ſwords. And likewiſe, in that woorthy battell betwene Cæſarine and Marcus Petreius, they caſt away their piles on either part. The ſecond diſcommoditie was, that the piles being ſo heauie, could not be caſt with any aime, or as they ſay, point blanke. And laſtly, the ſouldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them: which might eaſily diſorder their troopes, if they were not very well experienced.

THE

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**He laſt thing which I obſerue in this ſpecialitie, is, that the legionarie ſouldiers had no other offenſiue weapon, but one pile or two at the moſt, and their ſwords. By which it may bee gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes; for, they came alwaies ſo neere before they caſt their pile, that they left themſelues no more time then might conueniently ſerue them to draw their ſwords: neither would their Armes of defence, which was compleat, beſides a large target which they caried on their left arme, ſuffer them to make any long purſuit, or continued chafe, whenſoeuer a light armed enemy did make any ſpedie retrain; as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

## CHAP. IX.

The Heluetians, fainting in the battell, retire to a Hill: the Romans follow after, and the battell is continued.

(..)



**T**was a great hinderance to the Gallies in their fight, that manie of their Targets were ſtrooke through, and tied together vvith one fall of a pile: for, ſo it happened, that it could neither be pulled out by reaſon of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they uſe their left hand for the defence of themſelues. Whereby it fell out, that many of them (after a vveariſome toile) did caſt away their targets, and fought naked, and vnarmed. At length, fainting vvith wounds, they began to giue place, and retrained to a Hill a mile off.

The Hill being taken, and the Legions following on to driue them fro thence, the Boij and Tulingi, to the number of fifteene thouſand, beeing in the Reare of the Enemy, to guard the lagge of their Army, ſetting on our men, as they vvore in purſuit of the reſt, did charge them vpon the open ſide, and beganne to incloſe them about: which, the Heluetians, that had got the Hill, perceiuing, beganne againe to ſal vpon our men, & renewed the battell. The Romaines diuiding themſelues, turned their Enſignes two vvayes; the firſt and ſecond Armie fought againſt the Heluetians that returned from the Hill, and the third battell tooke charge of them that ſtood ready to incloſe them about. And heere the fight vvvas doubtfull and furious for a long time; vntill at length they were no longer able to indure the violence of the legionarie ſouldiers: and ſo one part betooke themſelues as at the firſt, to the Hill, and the other, to the place where their Carſ and baggage were lodged.

D.

And

Caſar.


Lib. 3. de militiâ Romana

Lib. 5.


Saluſt.

And hitherto there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe in all conflict; although the fight continued from the seauenth houre vntill the evening.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

 Concerning the Ensignes of the Romaines; wee are to vnderstand that the chiefest Ensigne of every Legion, was an Eagle: which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile or chiefe Centurion of the said Legion. The Ensigne of a Maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a Woolfe or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of historie) the Columnne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the Ensignes are figured, with their purtraitures: so that these Ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore-parts alwaies caried that way which the legions were march, or where they were to fight. And therefore in this history, by the adiect and carying of the Ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this place it is said, that the Ensignes of the first and second battell, were caried towards the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retreat; & the Ensignes of the third battell looked another way, towards the *Boij* and *Tuengi*, which stood on the foote of the hill. By which is signified, how the legions were diuided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

 Concerning the time of the day: wee are to vnderstand, that the Romaines vsed not the same diuision of the day as we commonly doe: for, they diuided their artificiall (which is the space betwene sunne rising and setting) into twelue equal parts, which the Astronomers called vnequall or planetarie houres. The first houre of the day beganne alwaies at sunne rising; the sixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was sunne setting. And, as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these houres were either greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now vsed, but onely at the *equinoctium*: so that by this manner of reckoning, *ab hora septima ad vespertinum*, is meant, the battell beganne about one of the clocke, according to our computation, & continued vntill the euening. The like we must vnderstand, throughout this whole historie, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

CHAP.

## CHAP. X.

The Heluetians continue their fight at the cariages: but at length they left the field, and marched towards Langiers.

(..)




In like manner, the fight was kept on foote at the cariages, vntill it was farre in the night; the place beeing fortified with Cartes in steed of a Rampier: and the Enemy casting their weapons from the upper ground, and with darts and laurelins, vnder the waggons, and from between the wheelles, did wound and gall many of our men. After a long conflict, our souldiers tooke their cariages and their Campe: wherein Orgetorix daughter, and one of his sonnes were taken. There were sau'd out of that battell, about one hundred and thirtie thousand persons; who marching continually all that night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the confines of the Lingones: for, by reason of the souldiers hurts, and the battail of the same, wherein there was spent three daies, there was no pursuit made after them.

Cæsar.

Langiers.

## OBSERVATION.

 If we consider the nature of the action, and looke into the true cause of their ouerthrow, as farre as the right sense of the historie shall direct our iudgement, wee shall find valour not to be wanting in the Heluetians, but rather superlatiue abounding in the Romans. For, that vehement opinion of their valiancie and manhood, which caried them out of the streights of the Country, to seek larger fortunes in other kingdoms, was not so abated with the losse of the fourth part of their Host at the riuer *Arar*; nor with the terrible furie of those veteran legions: but it yielded this effect, which Cæsar in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for five houres space or more, there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe. Their maner of imbatailing, had not the Romaines been the enemy, was vnrresistible. For, beeing cast into a Phalanx, which in the Plaines of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre surpass any other forme of imbatailing (supposing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is diuided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force & motion of his parts, when it is diuided into smaller cantons. For, as in a phalanx, many particular souldiers are by a close & compact order incorporated into one entire body: so their severall vertues are gathered into one head, & are as parts vnited into one general force; which easily shal oweth vp the ability of many other lesser quan-

D 2.

fer quan-

quantities, into which a greater strength is equally diuided.

The advantage of the place which they got by retreat, & the double charge herewith they engaged the Romaines, both in front and flank, was able in an different conflict, to haue made Fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their de: or at the least, so to haue steemed the swelling tide of victorie, which carred the Romaines so violently in the chafe, that they might haue beene equall harers in the honor of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage, could not so allay the heat of the Heluetians furie; but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when it came to the place here their cariages were laid, and cost much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for, they fought with that spirit and industrie, as though they meant to make triall, whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the day.

The ouerthrowe of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the lesse to be maruelled at, considering they had no chiefe Commander as wee read of) then from any defect of valour: for, the rules of Militarie gouernment, require especial care in passing ouer a water; for, then especially, an Armie is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and diuided. And therefore the Romaines atchiued this victorie by the horrible vigilancy (as Tully calleth it) of their Commander: who alwaies watched *opportunitates rei bene gerenda*, as necessary and speedy meanes to overcome in all his warres.

## CHAP. XI.

Cæsar, after three daies respite, followeth after the  
*Heluetians: he taketh them to mercy, and*  
sendeth them backe againe to the  
Country.

Cæsar.



*Cæsar sent Letters and Messengers to the Lingones, forbidding to supply them, either with Corne, or any other thing; which if they did, hee wouold esteeme of them as of the Heluetians. Himselfe, after three daies respite, followed after with all his forces. The Heluetians, pressed with the want of all necessarie provisions, sent Commissioners vnto him, to treat of their reddition. Who, meeting him on the way, cast themselves at his feete; and with humble words and teares, desired Peace. Being commanded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obaied. Cæsar, being come vnto them, required hostages, together with their Armes and seruants; as also the fugitiues that were fledde vnto them.*

While

*While those things were sought out, and brought, in the night time, six thousand men or thereabouts, of the Canton, called Verbigene, whether moued through feare of being executed, after their Armes were giuen up, or induced with hope of escaping (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of people, that were there to be rendered, their flight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the night, leaue the Heluetian Camp, & made towards the Rhene, and the confines of the Germanies.*

*Cæsar, understanding through whose territories they passed, commanded them to seeke them out, and bring them back againe, if they would be blamelesse in that behalfe: And being brought back, dealt with them as enemies. All the rest, after Hostages, Armes and fugitiues were giuen in, hee receined to mercie; and commanded the Heluetians, Tulinges, and Latobriges, to returne into their Country from whence they came. And forasmuch, as hauing lost all their provision of Corne, there remained nothing at home to satisfie hunger, hee gaue order to the Allobroges to supply them with Corne; and willed the Heluetians to redifie their Townes and Citties, that they had before destroyed & forsaken. Which he did specially for this cause; that the Germanies inhabiting beyond the Rhene, might not be invited with the richnesse of that soile, to seate themselves so neer neighbours to the Province of Gallia, and the Allobroges. The Boij, at the mediation of the Hedunans, as knowing them to be men of great valour, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gaue lands and possessions, and receined them into the same liberties and immunities, as they themselves inioyed.*

*In the Heluetian Campe was found a List, or Register, writ in Greeke, and brought to Cæsar, containing by pole, the whole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to beare Armes: & in like manner, the boies, old men and women, were inrolled apart by themselves. The summary whereof was, that the whole number of the Heluetians, amounted to 263 thousand, the Tulinges to 36 thousand, the Latobriges to 14, the Rauracks to 23, the Boij to 32. Of these there were that bare Armes, 192 thousand. The totall of all, were 368 thousand. A view being taken by Cæsars appointment, of those that returned home, there were found 110 thousand.*

## OBSERVATION.



*The directions concerning their rendry & returne, were very sound, and of good consequence. For first, in that he commanded them to attend his coming, in the place where they were; hee tooke away all motions of new trouble, which often remoues might haue caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe, that their aboad in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; considering that the Lingones, in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Cæsars displeasure, furnish them with any necessities in that extremitie. Touching the securitie, which the Romaines required, of the loyaltie of such people as they conquered; their maner was to take as hostages, a sufficient number of the men*

children of the chieft men of that Nation : whose liues depended vpon their rents fidelitie, and ended with the first suspicion of their rebellion. Which come, besides the present good, promised the like or better securitie to the next age; when as those children by conuersation and acquaintance should be affected to the Romaine Empire, that returning to their own country, their inclinations might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be preiudiciall to the same. And, least the loue of libertie and freedome, should preuaile more with them, then that affection which Nature had inioyned them to beare to their children; he did what hee could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes & weapons as were there present: and so to become furtable to that petition of peace which they had made.

The summe of all is this; he corrected the insolencie of a furious people, and reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnesse. He kept them from lacking the possessions of many thousands, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them back againe to continue their name and Nation, in the place where they first inhabited; which continueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no way to head-strong, nor to back with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subiect to correction and controulement.

## CHAP. XII.

**The States of Gallia congratulate Cæsars victorie: they call a councill, and disouer their inward griefe, concerning Ariouistus and his forces.**

**H**ie Heluetian warre being thus ended, the Princes and chiefe men of all the States of Gallia, came to Cæsar, to congratulate the happinesse of this victorie; insomuch as they well understood, that albeit the people of Rome, had by the course of this warre reneged the iniuries which here-tofore they had done vnto them: yet neuertheless, the issue thereof did redound no lesse profitable to the peace of Gallia, then to the Romaine Empire; forasmuch as the Heluetians, left their houses and Country, abounding with all plenty and prosperitie, for no other purpose, but to inuade the whole Country of Gallia, & to bring it in subjection to themselves; and, chusing out of that large Continent, some fitte, and fruitfull place of habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries: and required further, that with his good leaue they might call a generall assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of Gallia, forasmuch as they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired (with a common consent)

to prefferre to his consideration. Which being graunted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath, not to reueale the causes of their assembly, but to such as should be designed by common Councell.

The Parlement being broken up, the same Princes returned to Cæsar, and desired that they might in secret treat with him, of the safety of themselves, & all the rest: which being granted, cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feete, contending with as great earnestnesse, that those things which they deliuered, might not be reucaled, as they did to haue their petition graunted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discouerie of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull vpon them most grieuous afflictions.

Dinitiacus the Heduan, in the name of the rest, deliuered; that Gallia was diuided into two factions: the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two States, contending many yeeres for the principallitie, the Auerni, with the Sequans their Clients, hired the Germanes to take their part; of whom, at first, there passed ouer the Rhene some fiftene thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous people, hauing tasted the plentie & ciuilitie of the Galles, drew ouer many more, that now there were no lesse then one hundred & twentieth thousand. With these, the Hedui & their Clients, had once or oftener fought; but the successe sorted to their owne calamitie, & the utter ouerthrowe of their Nobilitie and Senate: with which losses, they were so broken and decayed, that where-as heretofore, as well by their owne credit, as by the fauour of the people of Rome, they strooke a great stroake throughout all Gallia, they were now driuen to deliuer the chieft of their State, as pledges to the Sequans, and to binde themselves by oath, neuer to seeke their release or freedome, nor to implore the aide of the people of Rome, nor to seeke meanes to free themselves from their seruage; onely himselfe, of all the Heduans, could not be brought to take that oath, or to giue his children as hostages: for which cause he fled to Rome, and besought helpe of the Senate, being no way obliged to the contrary, either by oath or hostages.

But it so fell out, that the victorie became more grieuous to the Sequans then to the Heduans; for that Ariouistus, king of the Germanes, was planted in their territories: and being already possessor of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all Gallia, did now require the Sequans to forgoe another third part, for that a few months before, there were come vnto him twentysoure thousand Harudes, to whom lands and possessions were to be allotted, whereby it would come to passe within a few yeeres, that all the Galles would be driuen out of their dwellings, and all the Germanes would come ouer the Rhene; for, there was no comparison betwene Gallia and Germanie, either in richnesse of soyle or fashion of life.

Concerning Ariouistus, after he had once defeated the Galles in a battell, neer Amagetobrig, he caried himselfe very cruelly, and insolently, requiring the children of all the Nobility for hostages, & shewing strange examples of torture vpon them. If any thing were done, not according to his command or desire, hee would easilie shew himselfe to be a barbarous, fierce and hasty man, whose tyranny they could no longer indure: and vntil there were help to be found in Cæsar and



and the people of Rome, all the Galles must as the Heluetians did, forsake their country, and seeke new houses, and seats of habitation, farre remote from the Germanes, and try their fortunes, what-euer befell them. If these things should appely be discovered to Ariouistus, he would doubtlesse take a severe reuenge of the pledges in his custodie. Cæsar might by his owne authority, or the presence of his Armie, or by the renoune of his late victory, or by the countenance of the people of Rome, keepe the Germanes from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the iniuries of Ariouistus. This spech beeing deliuered by Dinitiacus, all that were present, with much weeping besought Cæsar to giue them reliefe.

Cæsar obserued, that onely the Sequans of all the rest, did no such matter, or were so affected as the others were; but with their heads hanging downe, looked pournfully vpon the ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorrow. And hauing oftentimes iterated his demaund, without gaining any word of answer; Dinitiacus the Heduan, replied, that the state of the Sequans, was herein more miserable and grieuous then the rest; that they of all others, durst not complaine, or implore aide, although it were in secret: as hauing before their eyes the crueltie of Ariouistus being absent, no lesse then if he were present. And he rather, for that other men had safe meanes of flying away: but the Sequans, hauing receiued Ariouistus into their Country, and made him Maister of their owne, were necessarily to undergoe all miseries.

These things being knowne, Cæsar incouraged the Galles with good words, and promised them to haue a care of that matter, as hauing great hope, that by his meanes and power, Ariouistus should bee forced to offer no further iniuries. And there vpon dismissed the Councill.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**N this relation, there are diuers points woorthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to bee directed by other mens misaduentures. As first, into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirsty fauourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soule, and setting such vnbridled motions on foote, as carry men headlong into most desperate attempts. For, as it had deserued commendation in either faction, so to haue caried their emulation, that by their owne meanes & strength applied to the rule of good gouernment, their authoritie might wholly haue swaied the inclination of the weaker states: so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in Straine forces, to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor; and in the end, were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrell which ciuill dissension hath broched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastly, the often discontentments of these

these States shew the force of a present euill, which possesseth so vehementlie the powers of the soule, that any other calamitie, either already past, or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tolerable and easie, in regard of that smart which the present grieue inflicteth.

So the Sequani, chose rather to captiuate their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage Nation, then to indure the Hedui to take the hand of them. And againe, to make themselves vassalls to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping crueltie of the Germanes. And finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and Country, then to suffer the taxes & impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present euill in mens affecti- ons, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgement.

## CHAP. XIII.

## The reasons that moued Cæsar to vndertake this warre.



Any were the inducements which moued him to take that businesse to hart; As first, that the Heduans, who were oftentimes stiled by the Senate with the title of Bretheren, Cousins and Allies, were in the seruitude and thraldome of the Germanes, and that their hostages were with Ariouistus and the Sequans: which in so great a soueraigntie of the people of Rome, he tooke to be very dishonourable, both to himselfe and the Common-weale; as also, for that hee saw it very dangerous for the Roman Empire, that the Germanes should accustome, by little and little, to flocke in such multitudes into Gallia. Neither did he thinke he could moderate or restraine such fierce & barbarous people; but, that hauing possessed all the Continent of Gallia, they would, as the Cimbri and Teutons had done before, breake out into the Prouince, and so into Italy: especially the Sequans; beeing diuided from the Prouince but with the riuer Rhone.

These things he thought fitte with all speede to prevent: and the rather, for that Ariouistus was growne to that pride and arrogancie, as was not to be suffered. For which respect, he thought it expedient to send Embassadors vnto him, to appoint some indifferent place for parlee; for that he had to treat with him, concerning publike affaires, and some matters that did much import both of them.

## OBSERVATIONS.



May heere take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the authoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be very large; considering that Cæsar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Senate & people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this historie)

did

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The authoritie of the Roman Generals.



nd undertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legions, e Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia.

Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allotte the ouernment of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend to him, the carefull managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that regiment. For, considering that such causes as may trouble a ell ordered gouernment, are as well externall and forraigne, as internall, and red within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose, to haue ien him onely authoritie, to maintain a course of whole some gouernment : home; and no meanes to take away such oppositions, which forraigne acci- ent might set vp against him. And so we see, that Cæsar vnderooke the Hel- etian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: and this againe with A- ouistus, least the Germans should so multiply in Gallia, that the Prouince it se might at length bee endangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie ely to vndertake these warres: but the absolute disposition also of the whole ourle thereof, whether it were to reat, capitulate, compound, or what els ey thought conuenient for the aduancement of the Common-weale, did holly rest vpon their direction; *repub. bene gesta*, beeing the stile of the war- ur for all their actions.

Neither may we thinke, that any subordinate or depending authoritie, can e so powerfull in the course of businesse, as that which abolutely commaun- th without controlement, and proceedeth according to the opportunitie of ne and occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. nd therefore, whensoever the Romaine affaires were distressed, and driuen to exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an abso- te commaund, that whatsoeuer power rested either in the Consuls, or in the tribunes, in the Senate, or in the people, it gaue way to the greatnesse of that agistrate; that there might bee no let or retracing power to weaken that urse, which nothing but an absolute commaund could establish, for the good the Common-weale. And yet notwithstanding this absolute gouernment, ey attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the pu- shment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnsfortunate Leaders, they emed to acknowledge, that no man, how circumspect soeuer, could promise ore then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as farre forth as his eanes and industry could achieve it. For, old M. Fabius, pleading for the e of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigour of Papyrius the Dictator, ith examples of antiquitie, saith: *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omni- rerum esset, ne iram quidem unquam atrociorum fuisse in eos qui temerita- atque insecitia exercitus amississent, quam ut pecunia eos multaret: capite an- iustum ob rem male gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse*. The peo- e, saith he, in whom the soueraigne power of things consisteth, neuer shewed eater displeasure against such, as had lost an Armie, either by rashnesse or uskfulness, then imposing a fine vpon them: but, to bring the life of a Gene- ill in question for failing in his indeauours, was neuer heard of to that day.

The condition of the inferiour Officers of their Campe, was farre other wise in

in regard of Militarie discipline: for, prescription guided them in all their serui- ces, and the chiefe part of their ductie was obedience; although they saw e- uident reason to the contrarie, and found their directions vnperfect in that be- halfe: and therefore Cæsar saith vpon that occasion: *Alia sunt legati partes at- que imperatoris: alter omnia agere ad prescriptum, alter liberè ad summam re- rum consulere debet*. The office of a Legate or Lieutenant, differeth from that of a General: the one doing all things by prescription; & the other freely deli- berating of whatsoeuer may concerne the cause. And this course the Romans held, concerning the authoritie of their Generals.

## CHAP. XIII.

Ariouistus his answere: a second Embassage, with the succeſſe thereof.

(. . .)



That Embassage, Ariouistus answered; That if his occasi- ons had required Cæsars assistance, he would haue furthe- red them with his owne presence: and hee thought it as rea- sonable, that if it were in his meanes to please the Ro- mans, Cæsar ought not to thinke much of the like labour. For his owne part, hee durst not come into those parts of Gallia which Cæsar possessed, without an Armie; nor could draw an Armie to a head without great trouble & expence. The thing that he most wondered at, was, that the Romaines, or Cæsar, had to doe in that part of Gallia, which the law of Armes had made his inheritance.

Vpon the returne of this aunswere, Cæsar framed a second Embassage; the purport whereof was: Forasmuch as he thus requested the honour vberewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignity (for, in Cæsars Consulship, the authoritie of their Empire had vouchsafed to esteeme of him, as a King in his do- minions, & as a friend vnto their State) & that he disdained to admit of a Par- lee, concerning the comon good: let him knowe, that these were the things that he required to be performed by him: First, that hee should not suffer any more troopes of Germanes to be transported ouer the Rhene into Gallia. Secondlie, that he should deliuer vp those Hostages which hee had of the Heduauns and Se- quans; & should cease to molest them further with war or other iniuries. These things if he did performe, Cæsar would assure him of a gratefull acceptance on the behalfe of the people of Rome: otherwise, forasmuch as in the Consulships of M. Messala, and L. Piso, the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtaine the gouernment of the Prouince, should as neere as it would stand with the good of the Common-weale, indeauour the defence of their Associates and Friends: therefore he would not neglect the iniuries done vnto the Heduauns.

To these Mandates, Ariouistus replied: The law of Armes kept this tenure a- mong

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mongst all Nations; That a Conquerour might governe a subdued people, according as he thought best for his owne safetie. The people of Rome, did not direct the course of their government, by another mans prescript, but by their own arbitrement: and, as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The Heduns, hauing tried the fortune of vuarre, were by right become his Stipendaries: wherein Cæsar offered great wrong, for that his coming thither, had made their tribute much lesse vnto him then before. Touching their Hostages; his purpose was still to retaine them. Neither would hee make any vniust warre vpon any of their Associates, if they observed the Articles of agreement, and paid their yeerly tribute: but if they failed in that, the fraternity of the Romaines would come too late to their succour. If Cæsar would needs undertake their quarrell; Hee was to let him knowe, that no man euer contended with Ariouistus, but to his owne destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germanes, that for foureteene yeeres space, were neuer couered with other roose then the Heauens.

## OBSERVATION.



And thus farre proceeded Cæsar with Ariouistus, in debating the wrongs and agrievances of the Hedui. Wherein appeareth the difference betweene a matter handled according to morall ciuilitie, in tearmes of mildnesse and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, & dependeth rather vpon the plainnesse of the project, then suted with words fitte for perswasion. For, that which Ariouistus alledged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrary vrged by Cæsar.

But as the Lacedæmonian said of one, That hee spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariouistus aunswere, that it wanted that sweetening humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it selfe; forasmuch as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to controll the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true iudgements; but rather, seasoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth covertly complaine of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing deliuerie. And therefore, how great focuer the controuersie be, that partie which exceedeth not the boundes of modestie, but maketh mildnesse his chiefeft aduocate, will so preuaile in any auditorie, that albeit equitie doth disallow her title; yet the manner of his carriage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he vseth the sequels of innocencie, to proue his interest in that which he demaundeth. But to leaue this circumstance, as onely to be noted, let vs proceed to the vuarre it selfe, which I made the second part of this historie.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XV.

The Treuiri bring newes of one hundred towneships of the Sweni, that were come to the Rhene. Cæsar taketh in Befanson: his souldiers are surpris'd with an extreame feare of the Germanes.



The same time, as this answere was returned to Cæsar, there came likewise Embassadors from the Heduns and Treuirs. The Heduns complained, that the Harudes, lately transported into Gallia, did depopulate and waste their borders, and that they could not buy their peace of Ariouistus, with giuing of hostages for their allegiance. The Treuirs brought newes of one hundred towneships of the Sweni, that were come to the riuer Rhene, to seeke a passage into Gallia, conducted by Nasua and Cimerius, two brethren. Whereat, Cæsar being exceedingly mooued, thought his best meanes of preuention to consist in celeritie, lest the difficulty of resisting should growe greater, when those new forces of the Sweni, were ioyned with the power which was already with Ariouistus. And therefore, hauing provided Corne, hee made haste to seeke the Germanes. And hauing gone three daies iourney on his way, hee had intelligence, that Ariouistus with all his forces, was gone to take in Befanson, the greatest towne of the Sequans; and that hee was three daies iourney on his way already.

Cæsar, knowing how much it imported him to preuent that disadvantage (forasmuch as the Towne abounded with all necessarie provisions for vuarre, and was so sited, that hee that commaunded it, might prolong the warre at his owne pleasure: being incircled with the riuer Alduabis; excepting a small space of six hundred foote, which was fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foote whereof did at each end ioine vnto the Riuer and the Hill strengthened with a wall, and so ioyned to the towne, made all the haste hee could to take the towne, and there left a garrison. And as hee rested there a few daies, to make provision of Corne, and other necessities, the Romaines inquiring of the Galles and Marchants, concerning the qualitie of the Germanes; vnderstood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage invincible, and of great practise and experience in seates of Armes; whereof the Galles had oftentimes made triall: For, when they incountered them, they were not able to indure so much as the sternenesse of their countenance, or the fiercenesse of their looks. The whole Armee conceived such a feare thereof, that all mens minds were wonderfullie appalled. This feare beganne first among the Tribunes and Commanders of horse, and such others as for friendship sake followed Cæsar from Rome, & had small or no skill in matter of vuar. These men, saining some one excuse, & some another, of very earnest business, which called the home, desired leaue to depart. Some others who shame would not suffer to forsake the Campe, bewraied the like

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passion in their countenances & hauiour: for, hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their destinie secretly to themselves, or otherwise, with their acquaintance and familiar friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into; so that throughout the vobole Campe, there was nothing but making and signing of Testaments. And through the talke and fearefulness of these men, the old souldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Campe, beganne by little and little to apprehend the terrour wherewith they were amazed: and those that would seeme to be lesse fearefull, said, they feared not the enemy, but the narrownesse of the waies, & the greatnesse of the woods, that were betwene them and Arionisus; or otherwise they cast doubts vwhere they might haue prouision of Corne. And many stuck not to tell Cæsar, that vwhensoever he should giue commaundement to march forward, or aduance the Standarts, the souldiers would refuse to doe it.

## OBSERVATION.

**W**Herein, for that we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that courage, which a late gotten victorie doth vsually breed in noble spirits; it shall not bee amisse, a little to insift vpon the qualitie of the accident, and to gather such breefe instructions from their weakenesse, as may best serue to qualifie the amasement of horrour, and mitigate the frensie of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature, cannot promise any such learning, as may discover the true meanes and secret motions, whereby a fore conceiued feare doth trouble the senses, and astonish the mind; yet sith the history offereth it to our scanning, giue me leaue onely to note the strangenesse of the circumstance, and rudely to delineate the portraiture of a beast oftener scene then wel knowne, vsing the vniuersall pile for my pensile, and suting my speech to a warlike auditorie. I knowe not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receiue intelligence of an eminent euill, which may either dispossesse the soule of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein shee resteth; the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their soueraigne Mistresse, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secret pavillions of the body, where the chiefe part of the soule is most resident: & so they leaue the frontier quarters of her kingdome, naked and vnguarded, the better to strengthen that capitall Citie of the heart, out of which the life cannot flie, butto the vtter ruine and destruction of the whole bodie. For, feare is not onely a perturbation of the soule, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some euill to come: but it is also a contraction, and closing vp of the hart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outward partes, to assist that place which giueth life and motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of humours and spirits, when the multiplicite of faculties (which otherwise require an ord nate distinction in their seruice, and by the order of nature, should bee disposed into severall instruments, and be dilated throughout the bodie)

body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these aduertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many aduertall properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our iudgement, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate vniformitie of place which nature requirith in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazednesse and astonishment, which so daunteth the harts of men, when they are taken with this passion, that because the soule giueth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremitie of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read, that Theophilus the Emperour, in an ouerthrowe which he had giuen him by the Hagerans, was stricken with such an excesse of feare, that hee could not betake himselfe to flight (*Adeo paucior etiam auxilia formidat*) vntill one of his chiefe Commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death, if he would not prevent the ruine of the Empire, by vsing that meanes which was onely left for his safetie.

Again, in that turbulent consistory, the spirits chance distinctly to receiue any apprehension proceeding from the forging facultie of the soule, they carie it presently to execution, before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemencie, that they leaue no place for better aduice and reknowledge. And this is the cause, that oftentimes through extremitie of feare, to auoid one euill, we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the meanes wee vse to auoid a lesse; because reason did not first trie the apprehension, before it was deliuered to extrinall Agents. And so we find in the battell betwene Germanicus and the Almaines, that two grosse troopes of souldiers were driuen into such an extasie of feare, that taking contrarie courses to auoid one and the same danger, they either of them fledde to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they bee aduised by each others flight, that the places which they fought after, afforded them no remedie.

And, albeit reason be called to counsell, whe a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of it selfe concludeth to betray vertue to dishonour; and so to purchase peace, with the losse of the soules chiefe treasure: which ought ever to bee estimated at a higher rate, then any other happinesse which can beide the mind. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused feare, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there any miserie greater, or any bondage more shamefull, seruile, or vile, then this, which maketh men very abiects of all other creatures, to redeeme the euill which the danger threatneth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggravate the burthen of the sinne with losse of the disgrace, and penitent discontentment; adding oftentimes Aloes to Wormewood, and making the end grieuouser then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed feare, and feare yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame beeing alwaies mingled with wrath & anger, reuengeth it selfe vpon it selfe, & bringeth more perrill then the first danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another: so, on the contrarie part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for, as enuie, hatred, & anger, rise oftentimes of loue, so is ioy lessened with griefe, enuie with mercie, and feare with shame.

But, forasmuch as all such perturbations, proceede of ignorance and inconsideration, whereby we thinke that the euill is greater then indeede it is; let vs consider what disposition of our iudgement, best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first, touching the passages, whereby the soule receiueh her aduertisements, as they are of diuers natures, the chiefeſt whereof are the eye and the eare: so are their auisors different in qualitie, and require a seuerall consideration to be rightlie discerned. The intelligence by the eye, is more certaine then that which commeth by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the eie is a witness it selfe of euery action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceiued in her proper object: and therefore, the iudgement is not much troubled, to determine definitiue how great or how small the danger is, when the relations carie alwaies that certaintie. And, albeit the eare in like manner bee not deceiued in her proper object; for it faithfully giueth vp that sense, which sound hath deliuered vnto it: yet, forasmuch as the fantasie hath greater scope to coine her vaine conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessary, that the discourſing facultie, bee called for an assistant, before the iudgement can truly determine: and then it will appeare, that the truth doth not alwaies aunſwere the report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased spirits, will not stick to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themselves are tuned. And therefore, this first commeth to be considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of theſe two senses the first intelligence was receiued. But concerning the iudgement it selfe, this is most certaine, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soule. And againe, the purer the iudgement is, & the higher it is lifted vp from earthly natures, being no further interested therein, then to hold a resolution of well dooing; the fewer and lighter are the affections, which trouble and molest it: for, then it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or euill that is in things.

To redresse this inconuenience, Cæsar betooke himselfe to the fittest & most proper remedie: which was by the authoritie of his speech, to restore reason to her former dignitie, and by discourse, which feare had interrupted in them, to put downe a ſurping passion, which had so troubled the gouernment of the soule; recalling it to the meane of true resolution, which was to moderate audacitie with warinesse, but not to choake valour with beastly cowardice: for, these Oratorie inducing perswasions, were not the least point of their discipline; considering how they framed the inward habite of the mind (being the fountaine and beginning of all motion) to giue life and force to those actions, which the feueritie of outward discipline commanded. For, as lawes and constitutions of men, inforce obedience of the bodie: so reason, and perswasions, must winne the soules consent: according to that saying; *Homines duci volunt, non cogi.*

CHAP.

## CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Arinie, concerning  
this feare.

Cæsar being informed of these things, he called a Councell of warre, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees or orders soeuer, vnto the same: And, being thus assembled, he greatly blamed them; First, that any man should be so inquisitiue, as to imagine to himselfe, whither, and vpon what seruice they were caried. Concerning Ariouistus, he had in the time of Cæsars Consulshippe, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome: and why then should any man misdeeme, that he should so vnadvisedly goe back from his dutie? For his owne part, he was verily perswaded, that if Ariouistus once knew his demaunds, & vnderstood the reasonable offers that he would make him, he would not easily reiect his friendship, or the fauour of the people of Rome. But if he were so made, as to make warre vpon them, why should they feare him? or why should they despair, either of their own prowess, or of Cæsars diligence? For, if it came to that point, the enemy that they were to incounter, had bene tried what he could doe twice before: first, in the memorie of their fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army merited no lesse honour then the General: and now of late againe, in Italie, at the insurrection of the bondmen; who were not a little furthered through the practice and discipline they had learned of the Romaines. Whereby it might be discerned, how good a thing it is to be constant & resolute; inasmuch, as whom for a time they feared without cause, being naked and vnarmed, the same men afterwards (although well armed, and Conquerors withall) they nobly ouercame. And to be short, these were no other Germanes, then those whom the Heluctians had vanquished in diuers conflicts; and not onely in their owne Country, where the Heluctians dwelt themselves, but also euen at home at their own doores: and yet the same Heluctians were not able to make their party good against our Armies.

If any man were moued at the sight and overthrowe of the Galles, vpon inquirie he should find, that being wearied with continuall warres (after that Ariouistus had for many monethes together kept himselfe within his Campe, in a boggie and fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of battell, he suddenly set vpon them as they were dispersed, and so ouercame them, rather by policie then by force. Which, although it tooke place against sauaige and vnskillfull people, yet was not Ariouistus so simple, as to thinke that hee could inſare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that fained the cause of their feare, to bee the difficultie of prouision of Corne, and the dangerousnesse of the way, they seemed very arrogant in their conceits, in presuming to direct their Generall, as if he had not knowne what pertained to his dutie. The Sequans and Lingons, had vnderooke that charge; besides that, Corne was almost ripe euery where in the fields: and what the waies were, should shortly be scene.

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Where-as it was given out, that the souldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor aduance their Standarts, he little valued it; for, he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought to be unfortunate in his enterprises; or else, for-that he was notoriously committed of Avarice: but the whole course of his life, should witnesse his innocencie; and the overthrow of the Heluctians, his happinesse. And therefore, that which he was minded to haue put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand; for, the night following, at the fourth watch, hee would dislodge from thence: that without further delay, he might vnderstand, whether shame, and respect of their dutie, would preuaile more vwith them, then feare or cowardise. And though he wist that no man else would follow him; yet notwithstanding, he would goe with the tenth legion alone, of whom he had no doubt or suspicion, and would take them as a guard to his person. Cæsar had chiefly fauoured this legion, and put much trust in them for their valour.

Vpon the making of this speech, the minds of all men were wonderfully changed; for, it bredde in every one a great alacritie and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to giue him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them; assuring him of their readinesse to set forward to the warre. And then likewise, the rest of the legions made meanes, by the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to giue Cæsar satisfaction; protesting, they neither doubted nor feared, nor gaue any censure of the issue of that warre, but alwaies left it to the wisdom of the Generall.

Their satisfaction being taken, and a view being made of the waies by Dinitiacus (whom of all the Galles, he best trusted) and report being by him made, that in fetching a compasse of fiftie miles, hee might carie his Armie in open and champaigne Countries; in the fourth watch of the night, according to his former saying, he set forward.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N the speech it selfe, are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and Militarie instructions, which deserue examination; amongst which I note, first, the extraordinary number admitted to the Councell; *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: Where-as there were vually no more admitted to their councell of warre, but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first Orders; which I vnderstand to be the first *Hastate*, the first *Princeps*, and the first *Pilum* of every legion. And this is manifestly prouoed out of the first Commentarie, where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix: in which, amongst other, there were two valiant Centurions, Puffio, and Varenus; betweene whom, there was euery yeere great emulation for place of preferment: *Et iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by degrees, through the lower orders of the legion and were very neere the dignitie of the first cohort; wherein, as in all the rest, there were three maniples, and in euery maniple, two orders.

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## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**F the first motiue which he vseth to recall their exiled iudgement, discovered their breach of discipline: for, contrarie to the course of Militarie government, they had presumed not onely to make inquirie, but to giue out, whether, and vpon what seruice they were carried; which in the rigour of Camp-politie, could not passe without due punishment: for, what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer to bee measured with the vulgar conceit? or weighed in the balance of such false iudgments? especially, when those weake Censors are to be Actors, and Executioners of the desiggnie: for, then, euery man will sute the nature of the action according to his owne humour; although his humour be led with blindness, & haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehension of profit, or disadvantage.

And in this case, there cannot be a better president then Nature hath prescribed: for, as naturall Agents, whilst they concur to produce a worke of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look vpon; but yield themselves to be guided by a Moderator of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent Captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the losse of many particulars, with the health and safetie of the publique good. For, if euery man should prescribe, who should obey: *Tam ne scire quam milites, quam scire oportet*, saith Otho in Tacitus, vpon the like disorder: and againe, *Parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando, res militares continentur*. Which proueth, that the greatest vertue which is required in a souldier, is obedience; as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**I**N the reason which he vseth to proue their disparitie of valour, in regard of the Romans, being superiour to the Heluctians, that had oftentimes overthrowne the Germans; hee strengtheneth the argument with the aduantage of the place: and saith, that the Heluctians had put them to the worst; not onely where the Heluctians dwelt themselves, but euen in their owne Country, and at home at their owne doores: as though an enemy were charged with greater furie in the presence of a mans owne Country and dearest friends, then in a strange & vnknowne land.

This question was handled in the Romaine Senate, by Fabius Maximus, & Scipio, surnamed Africanus, when they sat in councell how to ridde their Country of that sturle Carthaginian, that for sixteen yeeres space, had fierced like a canker the beaurie of Italie, wasted the land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their dutie, overthrowne their Armies, slaine their Consuls, and threatened their imperiall Citie with ruine and destruction. Fabius, vpon the motion to make warre in Africa,

Whether men  
haue greater  
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their owne or  
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frick, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let war be set on foote in Africk; and first let them be without feare themselves, before they went about to terrifie others: for, those forces afforded little hope of victorie in another kingdom, that were not able to free their owne Country from so dangerous an enemy. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian Common-weale with the like counsell: and concerning Hanniball, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a forer enemy in his own Country, then in another kingdom.

Scipio, on the other side, caried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for, he shewed that Agathocles, the Syracusan king, being a long time afflicted with the Punick warre, auerted the Carthaginian from Cicily, by transporting his forces into Africk: but how powerfull it was to take away feare, by retorting danger vpon the Oppressor, could there bee a present example then Hanniball? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betwene the spoile and waste of a strangers Country, and to see their owne native Country wasted with sword and destruction: *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsi.* For, he that inuadeth anothers kingdom, easily discovereth both the aduantage which may be taken against the enemy, and the strength wher-vpon he resteth. And amongst the variable euents of war, many vnexpected occasions arise, which present victorie to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these, and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then importance, was handled by two famous & worthy Captaines, whose minds (as it seemed) were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their owne humour, then to determine in sinceritie of iudgement, vpon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrarietie of their positions. But, to leaue other commodities or disadvantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will onely set down some reasons, to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a warre of that nature. And first, this cannot be denied, the testimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the proprietie of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victorie, and hope conceiuerh such spirits as usually follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becommeth hardie and resolute in victorie: so on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed feare, and feare so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that vertue and honour giue place to distrust, and yield vp their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidence and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth vp an enemy in a strange countrey, and so preuenteth such attempts as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giuerh life vnto action, and stealeth his enterprise with resolution. For, besides the commoditie of leauing when he list, and proce-

proceeding as farre forth as hee shall find his meanes able to fortunate his attempts; he knoweth that the strife & controuersie is not for his native Country, which he quietly enioyeth, & is referred at all times to entertaine him, how focuer Fortune shall fauour his designs: but, for a Strangers kingdom, which his ambition thirsteth after, wherein, so far as the riches and wealth of that State, are laid before them, as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is achieved thereby, euery mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased, without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But, when a Prince shall be assaulted in his owne kingdom, and in the sight of his subiects haue his land consumed with ruine and destruction; the danger will so disturbe the powers of the soule, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogative of aduising how the enemy may be best resisted; when as euery man shall apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his soule, as the pietie and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution; yet the motives are of such weight, as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth, as vnusufficient to maintaine so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true honour affecteth: so far as the terrour and feare of so great a danger, will present a greater measure of woes to their mind, then the hope of victorie can afford them ioy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference, between him that seeketh to maintaine that estate which he hath in possession by force of Armes; and an other, that seeketh to increase his meanes by valour. For, the former is presented with the danger of losing all his estate; which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him: and the other looketh vpon the aduantage which hee gaineth by ouercomming; which much increaseth his valour, without any losse or disadvantage, if hee chance to bee put to the worst. And therefore, there is alwaies great odds betwene him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that meanes become desperate, hauing nothing further to lose; and another, that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to lose it: for, feare will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his owne abilitie, then entertaine a resolution of valour.

To proue this, wee neede not seeke other examples, then those imperiall Citties, in whose cause this controuersie was first moued. For, when Hanniball was come into Italie, and had defeated Sempronius the Consull at Trebeas, the Romaines were driuen into such an extasie of terrour, that they believed verily, that the enemy was then comming to assault the City; neither had they any hope or aide in themselves, to keep or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africk, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the Cittie had bene already taken: neither could the opinion of victorie, which Hanniball by a conquering Arme in Italie had confirmed for sixteene yeeres together, preuaile in the apprehension of so imminent

nent a danger. And then that which Fabius borrowed of Nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their owne, before they seeke other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for, with all speed they sent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therefore other things bee correspondent (as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either Nation to be considered) I take it much better for a Prince to invade an enemy in his own country, then to attend him at home in his owne kingdome.

## THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



He last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it selfe peraduenture as faultie as any other: wherein he shewed great Art and singular Wisdom. For, he that hath once offended, & is both burdened with the guilt of conscience, and vpbraid with the reproache of men, can hardly be perswaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but still remaineth, to cast dishonour vpon the offender, and to accuse him of disloyaltie.

And therefore, it oftentimes happeneth, that an errour beeing once rashlie committed, through despaire of remission, admitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere scelus luendum est*; or maintaineth his errour by wilfull obstinacie: as it is said of the Lion, that beeing found by Hunters in a Cave, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his propertie is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cacus, exeundo protervus*. This did Cæsar wisely preuent, by clearing the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Armie; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, inasmuch as they were witness to themselves of a common errour: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacritie in the sequell of the warre, and to deserue more then the iudgement of the Emperour had imputed to their fellowes.

## CHAP. XVII.

## The treatie betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.


Cæsar.



He seauenth day, as bee continued on his march, his Espialls brought him word, that Ariouistus with all his forces, was within twentie foure miles of that place: who as soone as he understood of Cæsars comming, sent Embassadors vnto him; Declaring that forasmuch as bee was come some what neerer, and that he might doe it without danger, he was content









tent to admit of a parlee. Caesar refused not the offer; thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his owne accord, what he had formerly denied at Caesars request: and thereby was in good hope, that understanding what was required, he would in the end, consider of the many fauours he had received from the people of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The first day following was appointed for the Treatie. In the meane time, there passed often Messages reciprocally betweene them. Ariouistus required, that Caesar would not bring any footmen to the parlee, for that hee feared to be circumvented by treacherie; and therefore thought fitt, that either partie should come onely with their Cavalrie: otherwise he wvould not giue meeting.

Caesar, not vvoling to put off the Treatie for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himselfe in trust to the French horse, thought it most conuenient to leaue the French Riders behind him; and to set the souldiers of the tenth legion (whom he best trusted) upon their horses: that if he stood in need, he might haue a faithfull guard of his friends about him. Where vpon, one of the souldiers said prettily, that Caesar had doome more for them then he had promised; for, hee had said before, he would make the tenth legion as a guard to his person, and now he had inrolled them all for horsemen.

There vvvas a great and open Plaine, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, vvvhich was almost in the mid-way, betweene both the Campes: and thither, according to the agrement, they came to parlee. The legion vvvhich Caesar had brought vvith him on horsebacke, hee placed two hundred paces from the said Mount: and likewise the horsemen of Ariouistus, stood in the same distance. Ariouistus requested, they might talke on horseback, and bring each of them tenne persons to the conference. At their meeting, Caesar beganne his speech vvith a commemoration of the fauours and benefites the Senate had done vvnto him; in that hee vvvas by their authoritie, intituled by the name of a King and a Friend: & ther vpon, had receined great gifts. Which fauour sell but vvnto a few; and vvvas by the Romaines giuen onely to men of great desert: Whereas hee, vvwithout anie occasion of accessse vvnto them, or other iust cause on his behalfe, had obtained those honours, through his curtesie, and the bountie of the Senate.

Hee shewed him further, vvwhat ancient and reasonable causes of amitie, tied them so firme to the Hednans: What Decrees & orders of Senate, had oftentimes been made in their fauour and behoofe: That from all antiquity, the Hednans had held the principalltie of Gallia; and that, long before they vvvere in amitie vvith the Romaines. The people of Rome had alvvayes this custome, not onely to indeanour that their Allies and Confederates should not lose any thing of their proper; but also, that they might increase in dignitie and reputation: and therefore, vvwho could indure to see that forced from them, vvvhich they quietly possessed, vvhen they entered league vvith the Romaines?

In like manner, he required the performance of such things, vvvhich he had formerly giuen in charge to his Embassadors; that hee should not make vvarre, either vvpon the Hednans, or their Associates. That he should restore their hostages: and if hee could not returne any part of the Germanes backe againe ouer the Rhene, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Country.

Ariouistus



Arionius made little answer to Cæsars demands, but spake much of his owne vertues and valour; That he was come over the Rhene, not out of his owne desire, but at the mediation and intreatie of the Galles; that hee had not left his house and kindred but with great hope of high rewards; the possessions hee had in Gallia, were given him by themselves; their hostages were voluntarily delivered unto him; he tooke tribute by the law of Armes, which was such, as Conquerours might lay upon the vanquished; he made no war upon the Galles, but the Galles made warre upon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight against him, and had put themselves into the field; whose forces were in one battell all dispersed and overthrowne. If they were desirous to make another triall, he was ready to undertake them; but if they would haue peace, it were an injury to re-tract that tribute, which of their owne accord they had paid untill that time. He expected that the Amitie of the people of Rome, should be rather an honor and a safety, then a losse unto him, and that he had sought it to that end; but if by their meanes the tribute due unto him should be retracted, hee would as willingly refuse their friendship as he had desired it. In that hee had brought so many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, then of any purpose to subdue the Country as might appeare, by that he had not come thither but upon intreatie, & set no war on foot but for his own defence. He was seated in Gallia before the Romaines came thither; neither had the people of Rome before that time, carried their Army beyond the bounds of their Province: and therefore he knew not what he meant to intrude himselfe into his possessions. This was his Province of Gallia, as that was ours: and as it was not lawfull for him to command in our quarters; so it was not fitting, that they should disturb his government.

In that hee alleaged, the Heduans were by decree of Senate adopted into the amitie of the people of Rome; he was not so barbarous, or unacquainted with the course of things, as to be ignorant, that in the last warre of the Allobroges, they were ayding and assisting to the Romaines: and in the quarrell the Heduans had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner assisting unto them. Whereupon he had good occasion to suspect, that Cæsar, under pretence of league & amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his ruine and destruction: and that if hee did not depart and withdraw his Army out of those Countries, hee would no longer take him for a friend, but for an enemy. And if his fortune were to slay him, hee should performe a very acceptable service to many noble & cheefe men of Rome: as he had well understood by Letters and Messengers he had received from them, whose favour and amity hee should purchase, by taking away his life. But if hee would depart, and leaue him the free possession of Gallia, hee would gratifie him with great rewards: and what war soever hee desired to be undertaken, should be gone through withall, without his perill or charge.

Many things were spoken by Cæsar, to shew why he could not desist from that course; for neither was it his use, nor the custome of the people of Rome, to forsake their well-deserving Associates: neither could he think, that Gallia did rather belong to Arionius then the Romans. The Aruerns and Rutenes, were in due course of war subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: who the people of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Province, or made them stipendaries. And if anti-

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quitie were looked into, the people of Rome had good claime to that Country: but, forasmuch as the intention and will of the Senate was, they should remaine a free people, they were suffered to be governed by their owne lawes, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former conquest by force of Armes.

Whilst these things were treated of in parlee, it was told Cæsar, that Arionius his horsemen did approach neerer to the Mount, and that accosting our men, they assaulted them with stones and other weapons: whereupon he brake off, and betooke himselfe to his Party, commanding them not to cast a weapon at the enemy. For, albeit hee well perceived, hee might without perill of that cleift legion, give battell to his Cavalry; yet he thought fit to reframe, least it should be said, he had intrapped them with a parlee, contrary to faith made, and agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar souldiours, how arrogantly Arionius had carried himselfe in the treaty; forbidding the Romaines to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assaulted our men, and that thereupon the parlee brake off: the Army was possessed with a greater alacrity and desire to fight, then before. Two daies after, Arionius sent Messengers to Cæsar, signifying, that he desired to treat with him, concerning those things which were left unperfit, & therupon willed him to appoint another day of meeting, or if he liked not that, to send some unto him with authority, to conclude of such things as should be foud expedient. Cæsar was unwilling to give any further meeting; & the rather, for that the day before, the Germanes could not be restrained from violence, & force of Armes: Neither did hee think hee might safely expose the person of any of his followers, to the inhumanity of such barbarous people; and therefore thought it fittest, to send unto him M. Valerius Proculus, the sonne of C. Valerius Caburius, a vertuous young man, & well bred, whose father was made free of Rome by C. Valer. Flaccus: which he did, the rather in regard of his singular integrity, & his perfectnes in the French tongue, which Arionius through long continuance had learned; & that the Germans had no cause of offence against him. And with him he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Arionius; with instruction to heare what was said, and to make report thereof to Cæsar. Whom, as soone as Arionius saw come into his Campe, hee cried out in the presence of his Army; demanding wherfore they came thither? and whether they were not sent as Spies? And as they were about to make answer, hee cutte them off, and commaunded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he remooued his Campe, and lodged himselfe vnder a hill, sixe miles from Cæsar. The next day, he brought his forces along by Cæsars Campe, and incamped himselfe two miles beyond him; of purpose to cut off all such corne and convoies, as should be sent to the Romaines by the Heduans and Sequans. From that day forward, by the space of foure daies together, Cæsar imbattelled his men before his Campe; to the intent, that if Arionius had a mind to give battell, hee might doe it when he would. But Arionius all this while, kept his Armie without his Campe, and daillie sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romaines.

This was the maner of fighting which the Germans had practised: there were 6000 horsemen, & as many strong and nimble footmen, whom he horsemen had

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selected out of the whole host, euery man one for his safeguard: these they had alwaies at hand with them in battell, and vnto these they resorted for succour. If the horsemen were ouer-charged, these euer slept in to helpe them. If any one were wounded or vnhorfed, they came about him, & succoured him. If the matter required either to aduventure forward, or to retire speedily back againe, their swiftnesse was such (through continuall exercise) that hanging on the horse-mane by the one hand, they would runne as fast as the horses.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T may seeme strange vnto the souldiours of our time, that the foot-men should be mingled pell mell amongst the horsemen, without hurt and disaduantage to themselves; so vnlikely it is, that they should either succour the horsemen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some haue imagined, that these footmen in the encounter, cast themselves into one bodie, and so charging the enemy, assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I will alleage to this purpose, plainly euince that these footmen were mingled indifferently amongst the horsemen, to assist euery particular man, as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore, the choise of these footmen, was permitted to the horsemen, in whose seruice they were to be imployed; that euery man might take his friend, in whom he reposed greatest confidence. When they were ouercharged, these slept in to helpe them; if any man were wounded, or vnhorfed, he had his footman ready to assist him: and when they were to goe vpon any speedy seruice, or suddainly to retire vpon aduantage, they staied themselves vpon the mane of the horses, with one hand, & so ran as fast as the horsemen could go. Which seruices, they could not possibly haue performed, without confusion & disorder, if the footmen had not feuerally attended vpon them, according to the affection specified in their particular election.

The principall vse of these footmen of the Germanes, consisted in the aide of their owne horsemen vpon any necessitie, not so much regarding their seruice vpon the enemy, as the assistance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practiced the same Arte, to a more effectuell purpose; namely, as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troopes of horse, then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memorie which historie mentioneth, is recorded by Liuius, in the second Punick warre, at the siege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Consul: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better; so their caualrie was alwaies put to the worst: & therefore they inuented this meanes, to make that good by Arte, which was wanting in force.

Out of the whole army were taken the choicest young men, both for strength and agilitie, and to them were giuen little round bucklers, and 7 darts apeece in stead of their other weapons; these souldiers practiced to ride behind the horsemen,

men, and speedily to light from the horses at a watch-word giuen, and so to charge the Enemy on foote. And when by exercise they were made so expert, that the nouelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horsemen went forth to encounter with the enemy, euery man carrying his foot souldiour behind him; who at the encounter suddainly alighting, charged vpon the enemy with such a furie, that they followed them in slaughter to the gates of Capua. And hence, saith Liuius, grew the first institution of the Velites: which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this stratagem, is said to be one Q. Nauius, a Centurion, and was honourable rewarded by Fuluius the Consul, for the same.

Salust, in the historie of Iugurth, saith, that Marius mingled the Velites with the Cavalrie of the associates, *ut quacunq; inuaderent equitatus hostium propularent*. The like practice was vsed by Cæsar, as appeareth in the 3 book of the Ciuil war; sauing that in stead of the Velites, he mingled with his horsemen, 400 of the lustiest of his legionarie souldiers, to resist the caualrie of Pompey, while the rest of his Armie passed ouer the riuer Genulum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dyrrachium: *qui tantum proficere*, saith the text; *vt eques tri praelio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent*. Many other places might be recited: but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times, strengthened their caualrie with footmen dispersed amongst them. The Romaine horsemen, saith Polibius, at the first, caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, & a little round buckler; but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians: which Iosephus affirmeth to be a strong lance or staffe, and three or foure darts in a quiver, with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their lance was most effectuell when they charged in troope, pouldron to pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle foot-men: but when they vsed their dartes, euery man got what aduantage of ground hee could, as our Carabines for the most part do, & so the foot-men might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they would easily make place for the foot-men to serue among them. But, howsoeuer it was, it appeareth by this circumstance, how little the Romaines feared troopes of horse, considering that the best meanes to defeat their horse, was by their foote companies. But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two: the one out of Liuius, to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to foot-men: the other out of Hirtius, to shew the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen.

In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius, Valerius, hauing fortunately ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines; wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines refused two thousand of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the left Cornet of the Romaines, as they were in conflict; which tooke such effect, that the legionarie foote-men of that Cornet were forced to retreat. Which the Romaine horsemen (being in number six hundred) perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the

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enemy 5

Lib. 6.



Lib. 3. de excid.

Lib. 3.

De bello Africano.

enemy; they presently forooke their horses, and made hatt to make good the place on foote; wherein they caried themselves so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and then betooke themselves againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point; the Numidians, as Cæsar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that euer he met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Germans did, mingling among them light-armed footemen. An Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the historie saith, that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle.* And, as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rereward of the Armie, according to the maner of the Numidian fight; the historie saith, *Cæsariani interim, non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani se conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad vnum terga vertebant.* So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legianarium militem commodius sustinebat.* And euer as he marched, he caused 300 souldiers of euery legion to be free and without burthen, that they might bee ready vpon all occasions, *Quos in Equitatum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legionarij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire ceperunt.* I alleage the very words of the history, to take away all suspicion of falsifying, or wretling any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this disparitie, he shall find it to be chiefly the worke of the Romaine pile (an vnresistable weapon) and the terrour of horsemen; especially, when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, & fell so thick, that there was no meanes to auoide them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troope of horse, then the Causalrie of their owne partie, although they beare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with far greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For, as the force of all the engines of old time, as the *Balista*, *Catapultæ* and *Tolenones*, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth, as the onely strength and life of the engine: so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmnesse and stay, which Nature, by the earth, or some other vnmoueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth; as hee that lieth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heavier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heavier then his body. The footmen therefore, hauing a surer stay to counterpoise their forced motion, then the horsemen had, cast their darts with greater violence, and consequently with more certaintie.



march where in every Legion had his Cariadges in  
 ESARS march where the Enemy was neerer at hand

## CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar preuenteth Ariouistus of his purpose, by making two Campes.



Hen Cæsar perceined that Ariouistus meant nothing lesse then to fight, but kept himselfe within his Camp: least peraduenture he should intercept the Sequans, & others of his Associates, as they came with conuoes of Corne to the Romaines, beyond that place wherein the Germaines aboad; about six hundred pases from their Camp, he chose a ground meet to incamp in: and marching thither in three battells,

commanded two of them to stand ready in Armes, and the third to fortifie the Campe. Ariouistus sent sixteene thousand foote, and all his horse, to interrupt the souldiers, and hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding, Cæsar, as he had before determined, caused two battells to withstand the enemy, and the third to goe through with the worke: which beeing ended, he left there two legions, & part of the associate forces, and led the other foure legions backe againe into the greater Campe.

The next day, Cæsar, according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his Campes; and marching a little from the greater Campe, hee put his men in array, and profered battell to the enemy: but perceiuing that Ariouistus would not stirre out of his trenches; about noone, hee conuaid his Armie into their severall Campes. Then at length, Ariouistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser Campe. The encounter continued very sharp on both parts, untill the euening; and at sunne-setting, after many wounds giuen and taken, Ariouistus conuaid his Army againe into their Campe. And as Cæsar made inquirie of the Captiues, what the reason was that Ariouistus refused battell, hee found this to be the cause. The Germaines had a custome, that the women should by casting of Lots, and Southsaying, declare whether it were for their behoofe to fight or no: and that they found by their Arte, the Germaines could not get the victorie, if they fought before the new Moone.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Ifst, we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans obserued, and by which they conquered so many Nations: for, besides the safetie which it afforded their owne troops, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage: and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselves, or impeach the enemy, by cutting off his passages, hindring his attempts, blocking vp his Campe, besides many other aduantages, all auerring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: *dolabra vincendū esse hostē*:

Cæsar.

a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed, by the Commanders of such forces as serue the States, in the vnitied Prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practise of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vie of the spade, & to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatloeuer, which may bee thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Armes.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N the second place wee may obserue, that there was no Nation so barbarous (for, I vnderstand the Germanes to bee as barbarous, in regard of the motions of religion, as any knowne Nation of that time, beeing in a Climate so neere the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make vse in their greatest affaires, of that superstition to which their mind was naturally intralld; and forge prophesies and diuinations, as well to stir vp, as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæsar let slippe the occasion of making vse of this their religion: for, vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbade them to fight before the new Moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischicuing, might preiudice their resolution to returne Conquerers. Which may serue to prooue, that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueniences, which industry or Fortune may discouer to their ouerthrowe.

It is recorded, that Columbus, beeing General of some forces, which Ferdinand king of Castile sent to discouer the West Indies, and suffering great penurie for want of victuals in the Ile of Iamaica: after that hee had obserued how the Islanders worshipped the Moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen; hee told the inhabitants, that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the vvrath of their God should quickly appeare towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darknesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, strooken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might asist their enemies, to depopulate and ouer-runne their owne Country.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to giue them battell,  
and the Germans dispose themselves  
thereunto.



He next day, Cæsar left a sufficient Guarizon in each of his Campes; and, forasmuch as the number of his legionarie souldiers was small, in respect of the multitude of the Germanes, hee placed all the Auxiliarie troopes for a shew, before the lesser Camp: and putting his legions in a triple battell, he marched towards the Camp of Arionistus. And then at length, were the Germanes constrained to bring out their power, setting euerie Tribe and people by themselves, in like distance and order of battell (as, the Harudes, Marcomans, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians and Sueuians) and inuironing their vvhole Army with Cartes and cariage, that there might be no hope at all left to save any man by flight. And in these they placed their women, that they by their out-stretched hands and teares, mouing pittie, might implore the souldiers, as they descended by course to the battell, not to deliuer them into the bondage and thraldome of the Romanes.

Cæsar, assigned to euery legion a Legat and a Questor, that euery man might haue an eye-witnesse of his valour: and he himselfe, began the battell vwith the right Cornet, forasmuch as he perceiued that part of Arionistus Armie to be the vveakest.

Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He Romanes, euen from the infancie of their state, were euere zealous admirers of true honour, and alwaies desired to behold with the eye, to what measure of vertue euery man had attained; that the tongue with greater seruencie of spirit, might sound out the celebration of *Macte virtute*; which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom; considering that the most pretious things that are, lose much much of their worth, if they be not suted with other correspondend natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellencie then is discerned, when they appeare by themselves without such assistance. For, how small is the beautie which Nature hath giuen to the eye-pleasing Diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall forme? or what perfection can the forme giue, without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them, if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auails all these, where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an hart to imbrace it? Such a vision hath Nature imprinted in the diuersitie

fitic of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whose carriage there is a far greater exactnesse of correspondencie required to approue them honorable, then was requisite to make the jewel beautifull. And this did Cæsar in all his battels; amongst the rest, that at Alesia is particularely noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque recte aut turpiter factum celari poterat, virosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominia ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Liuie would expresse how valiantly an action was caried, hee saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*; which is as much to say, that forasmuch as the Romaines were diligent obseruers of euery mans worth, rewarding vertue with honour, and cowardice with reproch; euery man bent his whole indeauour to deserue the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that durie which he owed to the Commonwealth, with all loyaltie and faithfulness of spirit.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**he Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell: the first was called *Acies recta*, when neither the cornets nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most vsuall manner of im-

battailing. The second forme of the front was called *obliqua*, when as one of the cornets was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the rest, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right corner: for the right corner of an Army had great aduantage against the left of the enemies, in regard of their vveapons and furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceived that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemy, is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an Armie: for, so fauourable are mens iudgements to that which is already happened, that the sequell of euery action, dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning. *Dimidiū facti qui bene cœpit habet*, saith a Poet: and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequell by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qualitie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end without a good beginning: for, although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous & vnluckie, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end, there was a fortunate beginning: for, the bad beginning, was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore, that his men might foresee a happy end in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front, is called *Sinuata*, when both the cornets are aduanced forward, and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some

daies

daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best souldiers were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old souldiers in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuersie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called *gibbosa*, or *gibbera Acies*; when the battell is aduanced, and the two corners lag behind. This forme did Hannibal vse in the battell of Cannas; but with this Art, that hee strengthened his two corners with the best of his souldiers, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romaines following the retreat of the battell, which was easily repeld, might bee inclosed on each side with the two corners.

## CHAP. XX.

## The Battell betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.



**H**is signe of the battell being there vpon giuen, our men charged vpon the enemy very fiercely; and they on the other side, returned so speedily a counterbuss, that the legions had no time to cast their pikes, and in that regard, made haste to betake themselves to their swords: But the Germanes, according to their manner, putting themselves into a Phalanx, received the force of their swords. In the battell, there were many legionary souldiers scene to leape vpon the Phalanx, and to pull up with their hands, the targets that couered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: and so the left Corner of the enemy was ouerthrowne and put to flight.

Now, while the right Corner was thus busied, the left Corner was ouercharged with an vnequall multitude of the Germanes: which young Crassus the Generall of the horse no sooner perceived (hauing more scope and libertie then any of the Commanders that were in the battell) hee sent tertiam Aciem, the third battell, to reskew and aide their fellowes that were in danger; by meanes whereof, the fight was renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight, and neuer looked backe, untill they came to the Rhene, which was about five miles from the place where they fought. Where, some few of them saved themselves by swimming: others found some boate, and so escaped. Ariouistus, lighting vpon a little Barke tied to the shore, recouered the other side, & so saved himselfe: the rest, were all slaine by the horsemen. Ariouistus had two wiues: one a Swenian, whom he brought with him from home; and the other, of Noronberge, the sister of King Vocion, sent vnto him by her brother into Gallia, and married there: both these perished in that fight. His two daughters likewise being there, one was slaine, and the other taken.

As Cæsar pursued the Germane horsemen, it was his chaunce to light vpon Valerius Proculus, as he was drawne up and downe by his Keepers, bound in three chaines: which accident, was as gratefull to him as the victorie it selfe; beeing

Cæsar.

10



## OBSERVATIONS VPON CÆSARS

so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, and a man of sort in the Prouince, whom the barbarous enemy (contrary to the law of Nations) had cast in prison. Neither would Fortune by the losse of him, abate any thing of so great pleasure and contentment: for, he reported, that in his owne presence, they had three severall times cast lots, whether he should be burned alive; and still escaped by the fortune of the lots: And M. Titius was found in like manner, and brought unto him. The same of this battell being caried beyond the Rhene, the Suenians that were come to the banks of Rhene, returned home againe: whom the inhabitants neere upon that river pursued, finding them terrified and distracted, and slew a great number of them.

Cæsar, having thus ended two great vvarres in one Sommer, hee brought his Armie into their wintering Campes, some-what sooner then the time of the yeere required: and leauing Labienus to command them, himselfe returned into the hither Gallia, to keepe Courts and publique Diets.


## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**his Phalanx, here mentioned, can hardly be proued to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but wee are rather to vnderstand it to bee so tearmed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the Heluetian Phalanx. Secondly, I obserue, that Cæsar kept the old rule concerning their discipline in fight: for, although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his historie; yet he omitted not the substance: which was, to haue *primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should beginne the battell, and the second should come fresh and assilt them: or peraduenture if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were ioyned together, and so charged vpon the enemy with greater furie and violence; but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in *subsidio*, as they tearmed it, to succour any part that should be overcharged: which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For, if wee either respect the encouragement of the souldiours, or the casualtie of Fortune, what could bee more added to their discipline in this behalfe, then to haue a second and a third succour, to giue strength to the fainting weakenesse of their men, and to repare the disadvantage which any accident should cast vpon them? or if their valour were equally ballanced, and victorie stood doubtfull which of the two parties should honour, these alwaies slept in, being fresh, against wearie & overlaboured spirits, and so drew victorie in despite of casualtie, vnto themselves.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning vse of lottes, it shall not be amisse to looke into the nature of them; beeing in former times so generall, that there was no Nation, ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affaires, by the sentence of lots. As wee may not refuse for an vndoubted





doubted truth, that which Salomon saith in the 16 of Prouerbs; The lottes are cast into the lap, but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: through the knowledge whereof, Iosua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Ionas, & the Apostles to consecrate Matthias; So, whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth, could direct them no further then to senselesse superstition, & put them in mind of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these, I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destinie, & as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull.

Aristotle, the wisest of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that euent casual, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of man could assigne no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoeuer happened in any action, besides the intent of the agent and workman, was tearmed an effect of Fortune, or chance of hab-nab: For, all other effects, which depended vpon a certaintie and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casual, or subiect to the inconstancie of chance. And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like *terra filij* had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawfull children, either to nature, or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune; as the principall efficient and soueraigne Motor, of all such vnexpected euent: that is, they made nothing else the Gouvernesse, and director of many things. Which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was deified with celestial honour, as the Poet saith: *Nos te facimus Fortuna deam caeloque locamus*. By the prouidence of this blind Goddesse, which held her Deitie by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all casual actions directed, and especially lots; the euent whereof, depended onely vpon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for, then their nature had been altered from chance to certaintie, and the euent could not haue beene called *Sors*, but must haue been reputed in the order of necessarie effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cause. Whereby we see vpon how weake an axletree, the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, having irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the *intelligentia*, that governed their resolutions. All heerein all sorts of men (although in diuers respects) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken vnto them, and reuealed the mysteries of fatall destinie.

Rome directed the maine course of her gouernment, by the fortune of thisicke destinie: For, although their Consuls & Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their owne fancie with the free choice of their Commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authoritie: yet the publick aires, which each Consull was feuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. If an enemy were entered into their confines, to depopulate and waste their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the gouernment of the City; and another to command the legions, and to manage the war.

If forces were to be sent into diuers Prouinces, & against ſeueral enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Conſull his taſke: but their peculiar charges were authoriſed by lottes. If any extraordinary action were to be done in the Cittie, as the dedication of a Temple, the ſanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, *Sors omnia verſat*, did all in all. And yet (notwithſtanding the weak foundation of this praſtice in their Theologic and deepeſt diuinity) we may not thinke but theſe ſkilfull Architects of that abſolute gouernment, wherein vertue ioyned with true wiſedome, to make an vnexampled patterne: we may not thinke, I ſay, but they foreſaw the manifold danger, which in the courſe of common actions could no otherway be prevented, but by the uſe of lots. For, when things are equally leueled between diuers objects, and runne with indifferencie to equall ſtations, there muſt be ſome controlling power, to draw the current towards one Coaſt, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of Nature bee not inuerſed, nor a well eſtabliſhed gouernment diſturbed: So the ſtate of Rome, caſting many things with equall charge vpon her two ſoueraigne Magiſtrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented, to intereſſe the one in that office, and to diſcharge the other, then to appoint an Arbitr, whoſe decree exceeded humane reaſon? Of which, it could not bee ſaid why it was ſo, but that it was ſo: for, if the wiſedome of the Senate had been called to counſell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might eaſily haue burſt out into ciuill diſcord, conſidering the often contentions betweene the Senate and the people, the factions of Clients, and the conſtant mutabilitie of euerie mans private affections neceſſarily inclining vnto one, although their worth were equall, & by true reaſon indiſcernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peraduenture he had not, and caſt the other lower then would haue well beſeemed his vertues: and therefore to cut off theſe, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; vvhich without either reaſon or will, might decide ſuch controuerſies.

By this it appeareth, how little the ancient Law-makers reſpected the ground and reaſon of an ordinance, ſo the commoditie were great, and the uſe important to the good of the State: for, as they ſaw the thing it ſelfe to be caſuall, ſo they ſaw that caſuall things are ſometimes more neceſſarie, then demonſtrative conſclusions: neither ought the nature, and ſpeculative conſideration of Lawes and Statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof, maketh the Common-weale flouriſh. And thus endeth the firſt Commentarie of Cæſar his warre in Gallia.

THE

## THE SECOND COMMENTARIE OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.

### THE ARGVMENT.

**L**ike as when a heauy body lieth vpon the ſkirt of a larger continued quantitie, although it couer but a ſmal parcell of the whole ſurface; yet the other quarters are burthened & kept vnder with a proportionable meaſure of that waight; and through the vnion and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feele the ſame ſuppreſſion which hath really ſeiſed but vpon their fellow part: In like maner the Belgæ, inhabiting the furtheſt ſkirt of that triple Continent, ſeemed to repine at that heauy burthen, which the Romane Empire had laid vpon the Prouince, the Hedui, & other States of that kingdome. And leaſt it might in time be further remoued, and laide directly vpon their ſhoulders, they thought it expedient whilſt they felt it but by participation, to gather their ſeueral forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neighbour Nations from ſo greuous a yoaſe; or at the leaſt keep it from comming any neerer vnto themſelues. And this is the Argument of this ſecond booke; which diuideth it ſelfe into two parts: the firſt containing the warres betweene Cæſar and all the States of Belgia vnited together; the ſecond recording the battailes which he made with ſome of the States thereof in particular, as time and occaſion gaue him meanes to effect it.

### CHAP. I.

Cæſar haſteth to his Armie, marcheth towards the

*Conſines of the Belgæ, and taketh in the men of Rheimes.*



HE report of this confederacie beeing brought vnto Cæſar, who leſt he wintered beyond the Alpes, as well by Letters from Labienus, as by the common heareſay of the world: he leuied two new legions in Lumbardie, and ſent them by *Q. Pedius* into Gallia: and aſſoone as there was any forrage in the fieldes, he himſelfe came to the Army. At his arriual, vnderſtanding the Sebonas and the reſt of the

Cæſar.

the Galles that bordered vpon the Belgæ (to whome hee gaue in charge to learne what was done amongst them) that there was nothing in Belgæ but mustering of soldiers, and gathering their forces into one head: he thought it not safe to make any further delay: but hauing made prouision of corne, hee drew out his Armie from their wintering camps, and within fiftene daies he came to the borders of the Belgæ. As soone as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the vttermost of the Belgæ, next adioyning to the Cælia, thought it best to entertaine a peaceable resolution, and sent Ictius & Anebrogius, two of the chiefe mē of their State, vnto Cæsar, to submit themselves and all that they had, to the mercy of the Romane Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsell of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracie against the Romanes. For prooffe whereof they were ready to giue hostages, to receiue them into their townes, & to furnish them with corne or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgæ were all in Armes, and the Germans on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succor: yea their madnes was so great, that they themselves were not able to hold backe the Sueffones from that attempt, being their brethren & kinsmen in blood, and vsing the same lawes and customes as they did, hauing both one magistrate and one forme of government; but they would needs support the same quarrell which the rest of the Belgæ had undertaken.

## OBSERVATION.

**M**ight heere take occasion to speak somewhat of a particular reuolte in a generall cause; and howe a confederate State may in regard of their owne safetie forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer they inuierfall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale; but that I onely intend to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onely I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine government, that such cities as yielded to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasure (howsoeuer they were otherwise combined by confederacie) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that State, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

## CHAP. II.

## The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar.



Cæsar inquiring of the Embassadors which came from Rheimes what the States were that had taken Armes, and what they were able to doe in matter of Warre: found the Belgæ to be descended from the Germanes; who passing ouer the Rhene, time of out mind, droue away the Galles and seated themselves in their possessions: and that these only of all the Galles kept the Cimbri & Teutoni from entering into their

their Country: and in that regard they chalenged to themselves great authoritie, and vaunted much in their seats of Armes. Concerning their number, they had these aduertisements: the Bellouaci exceeded all the Belgæ in prowesse, authority, and number of men, and promised 60000. men: and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. The Sueffones inhabiting a large and fertile country, and hauing 12 walled townes, promised to set out 50000. The Nervii as many; the Atrebatii 15000. the Ambiani 10000. the Vellocassi, and Veromandui as many; the Morini 25000. the Menapij 7000. the Calletini 10000. the Catuaci 9000. the Eburones, Condrusjones, and others 40000. Cæsar encouraging the mē of Rheimes to persist in their faithfulness to the Romane Empire, propounded vnto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commaunded all their senate to come before him, and bring with them their Noble mens Sonnes to be giuen up for hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And hauing receiued two speciall aduertisements from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemy, and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he provided for the first by perswading Diuitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keepe asunder the powre of the enemy; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might auoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the Marches of the Bellouaci, and sacke their Territories with sword and confusion: which Diuitiacus promised to performe, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Vpon the second aduertisement, which presented vnto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, hee resolved not to bee too hasty in giuing them battell, but first to proue by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowesse could doe, and what his owne men durst doe.

## OBSERVATION.

**H**is rule of making trial of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obserued by prudent & graue commanders, as the surest principle wheron the true iudgement of the enemy may be grounded. For, if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the worde non putabz was neuer heard out of a wise mans mouth, haue any place in the course of humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing these maine points, whereon the State of Kingdomes and Empires dependeth. For, vnlesse we be perswaded that blind Chance directeth the course of this world with an vncertaine confusion, and that no foresight can sway the ballance of our hap in either part of our fortunes; see no reason why we should not by all means indeour to ground our knowledge vpon true causes, and leuel our proceedings to that certainty which riseth from the things themselves. And this is the rather to be viged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceived when they look no further then to match an enemy with equality of number, referring their valour to bee tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of it selfe cannot discern

discerne the difference betweene two champions of like presence and outward carriage, vnles it see their strength compared together and weighed as it were in the scale of triall: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to obserue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For, besides his owne satisfaction, on it gaue great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselves able to countermatch an enemy, & knew their task to be subiect to their strength. Neither did hee obstrue it only at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for, we finde that he neuer encountered any enemy, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour, to make head against them: which equalitie of strength, being first laid as a sure foundation, he vned his owne industrie and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as advantages to ouerthrow his aduersarie: and so drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himselfe, and feldome failed in any of his battels.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth his Armie ouer the riuer \* Axona,  
leauing Titurius Sabinus incamped on the  
other side with sixe cohorts.



SOOONE as Cæsar vnderstood, as well by his discoverers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of Belga was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Armie ouer the Riuer Axona, which diuided the men of Rheimes from the other Belga. Whereby he brought to passe, that no enemy could come on the backe of him to work any disadvantage: and that come might be brought vnto him from Rheimes, and other citties without danger. And further, that hee might command the passage backe againe, as occasion should serue to his best aduantage, hee fortified a bridge which he found on the riuer, with a strong garrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to incampe himselfe on the other side of the riuer with sixe cohorts, commanding him to fortifie his campe with a rampier of 12 foote in altitude, and a trench of 18 foote in breadth.

## OBSERVATION.

IF it be demanded, why Cæsar did passe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe, and did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and so take the aduantage of hindring him, if hee should attempt to passe over: I will set downe the reasons in the sequell of this warre, as the occurrences shal fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time, let vs enter into the particularitie of these sixe cohortes, that we may the better iudge of such troups which were employed in the seruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of souldiers the

there fixe cohortes did containe; it seemeth expedient, a little to discourtie of the companies and regiments, which the Romans vsed in their Armies.

And first we are to vnderstand, that the greatest and chiefeest regiment in a Roman Armie, was termed by the name of Legio: as Varro saith, *quod leguntur milites in delectu*: or as Plutarch speaketh, *quod lecti ex omnibus essent milites*: so that it taketh the name Legio, of the choise & selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making euery legion to containe 3000. soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth, vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hannibal came into Italy, and then it was augmented to 5000: but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, when Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonia to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300. horse. Out of Cæsar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men, but oftentimes it was short of that number. for he himselfe saith that in this warre in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the ciuill warre, where he saith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohortes, which amounted to the number of 55000 men: and being manifest as well by these number of cohortes, as by the testimony of diuers authors that Pompei his Armie consisted of 11 legions; if wee deuide 55000 into 11. parts, we shall find a legion to consist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vsual rate of a legion, the Romans alwaies expressed the strength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said, that Cæsar had eight legions: which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, & such as necessarily attended the Armie. Further, we are to vnderstand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and distinguished from the rest: & that it tooke either from their order of muster, or inrolement; as that legion, which was first inrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in the choise, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest, and so we read in this historie, the seventh, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleventh and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *legiones Germanica, Panonica, Britannica*, and such others: and some time of their Generall, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vitelliana legiones*, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident of qualitie, as *Rapax, Vitrux, Fulminifera* & such like. And thus much of the name and number of a legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into diuers kindes of soldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continuall obseruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of the smaller parts whereof a legion was compounded.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that after the Consuls had made a general choise and sworne the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place

A legion  
what it was.  
Lib. 4.  
De vita Ro-  
muli.

Liv. lib. 22.

Tacitus 3.  
hist.

Velites.

in regard of the other soldiers was both base & dishonorable: not only because they fought a far off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorne hopes are. Having chosen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choise of them which they called Hastati, a degree above the Velites, both in age and wealth, and teamed them by the name of Hastati; forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Iavelin, which the Romanes called Hasta: but before Polybius his time they vsed Pikes; notwithstanding their ancient name continued vnto the later time of the Empire. The third choise which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes: the rest that remain'd were named Triarii, as Varro saith; *Quod tertio ordine extremis subsidio deponuntur*: These were alwaies the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third diuision of the battell, as the last help and refuge in all extremitie. Polybius saith, that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes, did consist of 1200 men a peece; and the Triarii neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legio were augmented: wherof Lyppius alledgeth these reasons; First because these Triarii consisted of the best of the soldiers, and so might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it seldome came to buckle with the enemy, but when the controuersie grew very doubtfull. Lastly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers, ranged themselves amongst these Triaries, & so made the third battell equal to either of the former: but howsoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

In this diuision of their men, consisted the ground of that well ordered discipline; for, in that they distinguished them according to their yeeres and ability, they reduced their whole strength into severall classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall composition of their whole body, euery part might be fitted with place & office, according as his worth was answerable to the same: and so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties; that from euery accident which met with any part of the Army, the iudgment might determine how much or how little it imported the whole bodie: besides the great vse which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no small consequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The souldiers, at their inrolement beeing thus diuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they diuided the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of those three sorts of souldiers 30 small regiments, which they called Manipuli: And againe, they subdiuided euery manipule into two equal parts, and called them Ordo, which was the least company in a legion; and according to the rate set down by Polybius, contained 60 souldiers. In euery Ordo there was a Centurion, or Capitaine, and a Lieutenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The manipules of the Triarii were much lesser then the manipules of either the Hastati or the Prin-

cipes;

cipes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii were called *subsignari milites*, to make a difference betweene them & the Velites, which were not diuided into bands; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that euery Manipule had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort, which the history heere mentioneth.

The worde *Cohors* in latine doth signifie that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house; which from the same word wee call a court: and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioyned together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of severall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euery legion had ten cohorts, which must necessaillie comprehend those thirty maniples: but these three maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiers, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3 of the Principes, and 3 of the Triarii, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde manipule in euery kind, that could not haue beene brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a manipule of the Hastati, a manipule of the Principes, and a manipule of the Triarii; and so all the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; and euery cohort was as a little legion: forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of souldiers that were in a legion. So that making a legion to containe 5000. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titurius Sabinus, contained 3000 souldiers: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200 which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520 souldiers in these fixe cohorts.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of souldiers, which were reduced into ten cohorts, and euery cohort contained 3. maniples; and euery manipule 2 orders: and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutenant, that stood in the taile of the troupe.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemy, the least body or Squadron that it contained was a manipule; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making jointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and to euery five files had their Centurion in front, & Lieutenant in the reuerward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battalions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how greatsoeuer the Armie were.

Polybius distinguishing a manipule into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribune, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, knowne by the name of *Primus ordo*: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commanded the whole manipule. And so we finde that the Centurion of the first

*Cohors.*  
*Lib. 3. de re*  
*rust.*

*A legion ran-*  
*gain battell.*

*The first or-*  
*der.*



first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense Cæsar is to be vnderstood, where he saith that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, *Præter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities: first, the priority betwene the Centurions of the same Maniple: for, a cohorte consisting of 3. Maniples, whereof the first Maniple were Triarii, the second Principes, and the third Hastati; and every Maniple containing two orders; and every order a Centurion: he saith, that al the Centurions of this cohorte were slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing which I observe, is the title of the first cohorte: for these 10. cohortes, whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthines; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, tooke the priority both of place and name, and was called the first cohorte: the next, the second cohorte; and so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preheminance, both in imbatailing and in incamping, according either to the senioritie of their inolement, or the fauor of their Generall, or their owne vertue: And so we read that in these wars in Gallia, the tenth Legion had the first place in Cæsar's Armie. And thus much concerning the diuisions, and seuerall companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

Vpon this description it shal not be amisse, briefly to lay open the most apparent commodities depending vpon this discipline; the excellencie whereof more plainly appeareth, being compared to that order, which Nature hath obserued in the frame of her worthiest creatures: for it is euident, that such workes of Nature come neere to perfect excellency, whose materiall substance is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath every part indued with that propertie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For, being thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed with fitting abilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effectes, and discouer the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse fauour in Natures forge, being as abortiues, or barbarously composed, wanting the diuersitie both of parts and faculties; are no way capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the former that are directed with so many properties, & enabled with the power of so well distinguished faculties. Which better workes of Nature the Romans imitated in the Architecture of their Army, diuiding it into such necessary & seruiceable parts, as were best fitting al vses & imployments: as first Legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein every man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion: and thus the vniuersall multitude was by order disposed into parts, vntill it came vnto a vnitie. For it cannot be denied, but that these centuries were in themselves so sensiblie distinguished, that every souldiour carried in his minde the particular Mappe of his whole centurie: for in imbatailing, every centurie was disposed into 5. files, containing twelue in a file; whereof the leaders were alwaies certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other speciall occasion: and euery

leader

leader knew his follower, and euery second knew the third man, and so consequently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainly appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and disfrankt to rallie them into any forme, when every man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imployed vpon sudden seruice, the general Idea of the Armie being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such cōuenient troupes, both for number and qualitie, as might best agree with the safety of the Armie, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities, these principles of aduantage offered themselves, as ready means, to put in execution any designe, or stratagem whatsoever: the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euery man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of every such part, their sodalitie was sweetned, or rather strengthened with the mutual acquaintance, and friendship one of another; the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the middle, and the lieutenant in the rereward, and every man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend: which bred a true and vnfaigned courage, both in regard of themselves, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no smal means to cut off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissension: for, here every man knew his place in the File, and euery File knew his place in the Centurie, and every Centurie in the Maniple, and every Maniple in the Cohort, and every Cohort in the Legion, and every Legion in the Armie; and so every souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and every place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall gouernment of this age, with bloodshed and mutthers; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselves, as of our English forces that haue bene sent thither to appease their tumults: for, through defect of this order, which alloteth to every man his due place, the controuersie grew betwene Sir William Drurie & Sir Iohn Bowrowes; the issue whereof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue bene negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commendation to the care which is had of this point amongst the English troupes, in the seruice of the States in the vniited prouinces; where they are very curious in appointing euery man his place in the File, and euery File in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point, I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, & the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troupes stand best appointed for disposition & array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shooke, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for, the principal things

The benefite of small battailions: and the disaduantage of great squadrons.



the third and fourth ranks did more incline themselves, and so consequentlie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground: and so they made a boudie resembling halie the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this Squadron so strongly combined together, came two souldiers running some fittie foot off; and threatening each other with their weapons, ran nimble vpon the side of the roole; & sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemy, that would haue entred vpon it; sometimes againe encountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steadily as if they had been vpon firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wal, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other souldiers, that stood vpon the said wal to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the souldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; and couered their bodies with them: & so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, could any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vpon the Testudo, it quickly glyded downe by the decliuitie of the roole, without any hurt or annoyauce at all.

Thus far Liue goeth; neither doe I know what to say further of it: the chiefest vie thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were thoroughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention serued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that end they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the souldiers climed vpon the wall, *super iteratam testudinem*, by one Testudo made vpon another; and this was the ancient forme and vie of a Testudo in a suddaine assault or surprise.

Dio Cassius, in the actes of Antonie, saith, that being galled with the Parthian Archers, he commanded his whole Armie to put it selfe into a Testudo: which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearines and faintnes; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romaines, at a watch worde giuen, rose againe with such a furie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the saide Testudo after this manner: They placed, saith hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the midst; and those heauie armed footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles next vnto the Enemy: The rest (which bare large Oual Targettes) were thronged together throughout the whole troupe; and so couered with their Targets both themselves and their fellows, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a roole of Targets; which were so tiled together, that men might safely goe vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselves into a Testudo, to breake through an Enemy, or to route and disfranke a troupe. And this vie the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regard of the strength, for that it

couered

couered and sheltered, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**hirdly, we may obserue, how carefully Cæsar provided for the safetie of such succours as he sent vnto Bibrax: for, hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best & surest guides for that iourney; least peraduenture through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a war; but deserueth an extraordinary importunitie, to perswade the necessitie of this diligence: for, a Generall, that hath perfectlye discovered the nature of the country, through which he is to march, & knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousness of turnings, the nature of the hills, & the course of the riuers, hath all these particularities, as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy. And in this point, Haniball had a singular dexteritie, and excelled all the Commanders of his time, in making vie of the way, by which he was to passe. But, he that leadeth an Army, by an vnknowne and vndiscovered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disadvantages, as the other hath opportunitie of good fortune. Let euery man therefore perswade himselfe, that good Discoverers are as the eyes of an Armie, and serue for lights in the darknesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good providence, and make the path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble vpon casualties. Cæsar, in his iourney to Ariouistus, vied the help of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in who amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence, to discover the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would vndertake his voyage vnto \* Britanie, hee well enformed himselfe by Marchants and traualers, of the quantitie of the land, the qualitie of the people, their vie of war, and the opportunitie of their hauens. Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but he sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of war, to see what he could further discover, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that he neuer caried his Army, *per infidiosa itinera*, vnlesse he had first well discovered the places.

Concerning the order, which skillfull Leaders haue obserued in discoveries, we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one, in vnderstanding the perfect description of the country; and the second, in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, wee find as well by this as other histories, that the Romans vied the inhabitants of the country for Guides, as best acquainted with their native places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; provided alwaies, that their owne scouters were euer abroad to vnderstand what they could of themselves, that they might not altogether relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were obserued by the horsemen: and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter

H.

of

The necessity of good discovery.

\* Now England.

The order which is to be obserued in discovery.

hee fortified with bulwarkes, and placed therein store of engines: and leaving in his Campe the two legions which he had last inrolled in Lombardie, that they might be ready to be drawne forth when there should need any succour, he imbarcated his other sixe legions in the front of the hill, before his Campe. The Belge also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There lay betweene both the Armies a small Marish: ouer which the enemy expected that Cæsar should haue passed; and Cæsar on the other side, attended to see if the Belge would come ouer, that his men might haue charged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Cauldry on both sides incountered between the two battells, and after long expectation on either side, neither party aduenturing to passe ouer; Cæsar hauing got the better in the skirmish betweene the hostes, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his owne men, & the contesting of so great an Army; and therefore hee conuained all his men to gaine into their Campe. From that place the enemy immediatly tooke his way to the Riuer Axona, which lay behind the Romans Campe: and there finding foords, they attempted to passe ouer part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortresse which *Q. Titurius* kept, or to breake downe the bridge, or to spoile the territories of the State of Rheimes, & cut off the Romans from prouision of corne. Cæsar, hauing aduertisement thereof from *Titurius*, transported ouer the riuer by the bridge all his horsemen and light armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himselfe. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them: the rest like desperate persons, aduenturing to pass ouer upon the dead carcases of their fellowes, were beaten backe by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got ouer the water, and slew euery man of them.

When the Belge perceived themselves frustrated of their hopes, of winning *Bibrax*, of passing the Riuer, and of drawing the Romans into places of disadvantage, and that their owne prouisions began to faile them: they called a counsell of warre, where in they resolved, that it was best for the State in generall, and for euery man in particular, to breake vp their Camp, & to returne home vnto their own houses: and in whose confines or territories soeuer, the Romans should first enter, to depopulate & waste them in hostile maner, that thither they should haue from all parts, and there to giue them battell; to the end they might rather try the matter in their own country, then abroad in a strange & unknowne place, & haue their own household prouision alwaies at hand to maintaine them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that *Diuiticus* with a great power of the *Hedui*, approached neere to the borders of the *Belouacis*; who, in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their country.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**F**IRST we may obserue the Art, which he vsed to countermaine the strength of so great a multitude, by choosing out so conuenient a place, which was no broader in front then would suffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the sides of the hill so steepe, that the enemy

could not ascend nor clime vp, but to their owne overthrow; he made the back part of the hill strong by Art, & so placed his souldiers as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Wherby it appeareth, how much he preferred securitie and saletie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardy resolution; which fauoureth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisdom: for hee euer thought it great gaine, to loofe nothing and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that deliuered vp the Army safe vnto the evening: attending, vntill aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Cæsar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vlt hee made by passing his Armie ouer the riuer, and attending the enemy on the further side, rather then on the side of the State of Rheimes: for, by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemy should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were ready to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of *Bibrax*: and yet notwithstanding, hee lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of them, as they passed ouer the riuer. For, by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces hee would, to make head against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer could afford him.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



And heere the Reader may not maruel, if when the hills are in labor, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soon is the courage of this huge Army abated? for what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? but being hastily caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed vpon the sight of an enemy: which is no strange effect of a humane humour. For, as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, & the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the minde that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and fauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away euen with the smoake thereof, & bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance: and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering; that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraeth their indiscreet intemperance, in the hope pursuit of this enterprize, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemy, or hadde opportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for, their minds were so caried away with the conceit of warre, that they had no leisure to provide such necessities, as are the strength and sinewe of the warre. It was sufficient for euery particular man, to be knowne for a souldier in so honorable an action, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States

in like manner thought it enough to furnish out fortie or fiftie thousand men apeece, to discharge their oath, and to save their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, being directed by as vnskillfull gouernors, neuer looked further then the present multitude; which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man relied vpon an others care, and satisfied himselfe with the present garbe; So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state shoud seeme in greatest forwardnes; were motives sufficient to induce euery man to go, without further inquiry, how they shoud goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, considering the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogether vpon his prouidence, and engaged in the defence of their state & country: he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designs. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their error, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worthe by ill handling it, then it was before we first tooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other end, then to giue Cæsar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood, meete with the like strength againe, in the continuance of that warre. And this was not onely *grauius bellum successuri tradere*, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to draw a dangerous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

## CHAP. VI.

The Belgæ brake vp their Campe; and as they returne home, are chased and slaughtered by the Romaines.



**H**IS generall resolution being entertained by the consent of the whole Councell of warre; they departed out of their Campe with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or government, euery man pressing to bee foremost on his iourney, in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Cæsar hauing notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiving the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, vpon certaine intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen to stay the reuerward, commanding Labienus to follow after with three legions: these ouertaking the Belgæ, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the reuerward slaid, and valiantly receiued the charge of the Romaines, the vanguard being out of danger, and vnder no government,

affoone

affoone as they heard the alarm behind them, brake out of their ranks: & betook themselves to flight; & so the Romaines slew them as long as the sunne gaue them light to pursue them: and then sounding a retreat, they returned to their Campe.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T hath beene an old rule amongst souldiers, that A great and negligent error committed by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. Wee read of Fuluius a Legate in the Romaine Armie, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike dutie; the Tuscans tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could draw the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine souldiers, attired like shepheards, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine Army: who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe. Whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discovered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent. In like manner Cæsar not perswaded that men should bee so heedless, to carry a retreat in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not dis campe his men to take the opportunity of that aduantage, vntill hee had found that to be true, which in all reason was vnlikely. And thus 29000. Belgæ were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of government and order in their departure.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Sueffones; and there besiegeth \*Nouiudunum.



**H**E next day after their departure, before they could recouer themselves of their feare and slight; or had time to put themselves againe in breath: Cæsar, as it were continuing still the chase and victorie, ledde his Armie into the countrey of the \*Sueffones, the next borders vnto the men of Rheimes: and after a long iourney came vnto Nouiudunum a towne of good importance, which hee attempted to take by surpris, as hee passed along by it. For, hee vnderstoode, that it was altogether vnfurnished of defensiuie provision, hauing no forces within to defende it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, hee was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore hauing fortified his campe, hee began to make preparatiõ for a siege. The night following, the whole multitude of the Sueffones, that had escaped by flight, were receiued into the towne: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought vnto the wall, the mount raised, & the towers built; the Gallies being amazed at the hignes of the workes, such as they had neuer

\*Noyon.

Cæsar.

\*Soyffons.

neuer scene nor heard of before, and the speede which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Caesar, to treat of giuing up the towne, and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their suite.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N this relation, we may obserue the industrious art, which the Romans vsed in assaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, Vineæ, Agger, and Turrets.

Vineæ is thus described by Vegetius: a little strong-built house or houell, made of light wood, that it might be remoued with greatest ease; the rooffe was supported with diuers pillars of a foote square, whereof the formost were 8. foot high, and the hindmost 6. and betweene euerie one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was alwaies made with a double rooffe; the first or lower rooffe was of thick planks, and the vpper rooffe of hurdles; to breake the force of a waight without further shaking or disioyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the souldiers that were vnder it: the whole length was about 16 foote, and the breadth 7: the vpper rooffe was commonly couered with greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning. Many of these houels were ioyned together in ranke, when they went about to vndermine a wall: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which were thrown vpon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurto to the engine: the foure sides and groundis, had in euery corner a wheele, & by them they were driuen to any place as occasion serued: the chiefest vie of them was to couer and defend the souldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a wall. This engine was called Vineæ, which signifieth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were vnder the rooffe thereof, as a Vine couereth the place where it groweth.

Agger, which we call a mount, is described in diuers histories to be a hill or elevation made of earth & other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, vntil it approached neere vnto the place, against which it was built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an aduantage of height. The matter of this mount, was earth and stones, fagots, and timber. Iosephus saith, that at the siege of Ierusalem, the Romans cut downe all the trees within 11 mile compasse, for matter and stufte to make a mount. The sides of this Agger were of Timber, to keepe in the loose matter; the forepart which was towards the place of seruice, was open without any timber work: for on that part they stil raised it & brought it neerer the wals. That which was built at Massilia was 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80. foote high and 30. foot broad. Iosephus and Egesippus writ, that there was a fortress in Iudea, 300. cubites high: which Sulla purposing to win by assault, raised a mount 200. cubites high; and vpon it he built a castle of stone 50. cubites high, and 50. cubites broad; and vpon the said castell hee erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, & so took the fortress. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a haue, and commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that so they might fight, with much aduantage.

Amongst

Amongst other engines, in vie amongst the Romans, their moueable Turrets were verie famous: for, they were built in some safe place out of danger; & with wheels put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne. These turrets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described, by Vitruuius, to be sixtie cubits high, and the square side seauenteene cubites: the breadth at the top, was a fift part of the breadth at the base; and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner pillars, were at the base nine inches square, and 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, and windowes in euerie storie. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubits high, and the square side was 24 cubites: the breadth at the top was a fift part of the base; and in euery one of these, were commonly 200 stories. There was not one & the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonlie was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the highest storie 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of these stories, were souldiers and engines, ladders and casting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of these turrets were couered with yron, and wet coverings, to saue them from fire. The souldiers that remoued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-woke by Broken-wharfe in London, much resembleth one of these towers.

Towers or  
Turrets de-  
scribed.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**V**PON the building of these mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Sueffones submitted themselves to such powerfull industrie. For, whatsoever is strange and vnusuall, doth much affright the spirits of an enemy, and breed a motion of distrust and diffidence, when as they find themselves ignorant of such warlike practices: for, noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes beeing vnknowne, we apprehend it, as diuers from the vsuall course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangenesse thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the noueltie; so it inferreth diffidence, and so consequently feare, the viter enemy of martiall valour.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.



**C**ÆSAR, taking for pledges the chiefest of their Cittie, vpon the deliuerie of all their Armes, receiued the Sueffones to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellouaci; who, hauing commaied both themselves and their goods into the towne, called Bratipantium, and vnderstanding that Cæsar was come within five mile of the place, all the elder sort came forth to meete him, signifying their submission.

Cæsar.

The Bellouaci taken to  
mercy.

ion, by their lamentable demanour. For these, Diuitiacus became a mediator, who, after the Belgæ had broken up their campe, had dismissed his Heduanes and was returned to Cæsar. The Hedui, saith he, have alwaies found in the uocaci, a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not been betrayed by their nobilitie (who made them believe, that the Hedui were kept in bondage by the Romaines, & suffered all villanie & despite at their hands) they had neuer withdrawne themselves from the Hedui, nor consented to spire against the Romaines. The author of this counsell, perceining into what misery they had brought their country, were fled into Britanie: wherefore, only the Bellouaci, but the Hedui also in their behalfe, besought him to use his mercie towards them. Cæsar, in regard of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promised receiue them to mercy; but forasmuch as the State was very great and populous, he demanded six hundred hostages: which being deliuered, and their armour brought out of the towne, he marched from thence into the coast of the Amni: who, without further lingering, gaue both themselves & all that they had to his power. Vpon these bordered the Neruij; of whom Cæsar found this much inquirie, that there was no recourse of Marchants vnto them, neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to be brought into their country: for they were perswaded, that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned, that these Neruij were a valiant people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ, for yielding their necks to the Romaine yoke, openly affirming, that they would neither receive Ambassadors, nor take peace vpon any condition.

Cæsar, having marched, daies iourney in their country, hee understood that the river \* Sabis was not past ten miles from his campe; and that on the further side of this river, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the coming of the Romaine. With them were ioyned the Atrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aduatici: the women, and such as were unfit for the field, they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any Armie, by reason of fens and bogs, and marishes. Vpon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his discouersers and Centurions before, to chuse out a fit place to incampe in.

Now, whereas many of the surrendred Belgæ, and other Galles, were continually in the Romaine Army, certaine of these (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obseruing the order which the Romaines used in marching, came by night to the Neruij, and told them, that between euery legion went a great sort of cariages; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soone as the first legion was come into the camp, & the other legions yet a great way off, to set vpon them vpon a suddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages, and so to overthrow them: which legion being cut off, and their stuff taken, the rest would haue small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this aduice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the cavalry of their borderers, whensoever they made any rode into their marches: their maner was to cut young trees halfe asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and with thornes and briars planted between them, they made them so thick, that it was

impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them; so that, when by this occasion, the passage of the Romaine Army must needs be hindered, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romaines chose to incampe in, was a hill, of like lenell from the top to the bottome, at the foot whereof ran the river Sabis: & with the like lenell, on the other side, rose another hill directly against this, so the quantity of 200 paces; the bottome whereof was plaine and open, and the vpper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the Neruians kept themselves close: and in the open ground, by the river side, were onely scene a few troupes of horse, and the river in that place, was about three foute deepe.

Cæsar, sending his horsemen before, followed after with all his power; but the maner of his march differed from the report which was brought to the Neruij: for, inasmuch as the enemy was at hand, Cæsar (as his custome was) led six legions alwaies in a readines, without burthen or cariage of any thing, but their Armes: after them he placed the impediments of the whole Armie. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a rereward to the Army, & guarded the stuffe.

## OBSERVATION.



His trecherous practice of the surrendred Belgæ, hath fortunately discovered the maner of Cæsars march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconueniences, & capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Concerning the discreet carriage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered, that Cæsar principally respected safety: and secondly conueniencie. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, he was content in regard of conueniency, to suffer euery legion to haue the ouersight of their particular cariages, & to insert them among the troupes, that euery man might haue at hand such necessities as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publique discipline. But if he were in danger of any suddaine attempt, or if stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy, he then omitted conuenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disadvantageous to their safety; & carried his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be engaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their cariages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoued by their militarie rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitors.

The old Romans obserued likewise the same respects: for, in vnsafe & suspected places, they carried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, which as Liuius seemeth to note, was free from all cariage & impediments, which might hinder them in any suddaine alarm. Neither doth that of \* Hirtius any way contradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Cæsar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci, that 3 legions marched in front, and after them came all the cariages, to which the 10 legion serued as a rereward; & so they marched, *pene agmine quadrato*. \* Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of *agme quadratū*, where he saith, that where an enemy is expected, wee ought to march *agmine quadrato*, readie to fight.

The maner of the Romaine march.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a march.  
1 Safety.  
2 Conueniency

Agmen quadratum.

\* Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.

\* 60. Epistle.

pt. 1 he most materiall consequence of these places alleadged, is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their vsuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratū*, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, were obserued in *quadrata Acie*. For that triple forme of imbattailing which the Romans generally obserued in their fights, hauing respect to the distances between each battell, contained almost an equall dimension of front and file: & it made *Acie quadratā*; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*.

Polybius expresseth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumference; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the cariages: for, he saith, that in time of danger, especially where the country was plaine and champaigne, and due space and free scope to cleere themselves, vpon any accident, the Romans marched in a triple battell, of equall distance one behind another, euery battell hauing his seuerall cariages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselves according to the oportunitie of the place, either the right or left hand: and so placing their cariages on the one side of their Armie, they stood imbattailed, ready to receiue the charge.

The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more securitie, and gaue scope to conueniencie, they named *agmen longum*; when almost euery maniple or order, had their seuerall cariages attending vpon them, and stroue to keep that way which they found most easie, both for themselves, & their impediments. Which order of march, as it was more commodious then the former, in regard of particularity, so was it vnsafe and dangerous, where the Enemy was expected: and therefore Cæsar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, whē they were deluded by Ambiorix, *longissimo agmine*; as though they had receiued their aduertisements from a friend, & not from an enemy.

And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in qualitie, from them of ancient times; yet in this point of discipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obserued, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conueniencie: whereof the first dependeth chiefly vpon the prudent disposition of the Leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commoditie of euery particular shall giue occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that maner of imbattailing, which shall be thought most conuenient, if an enemy were present to confront them? for, a well ordered march, must either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the distinct principles and elements thereof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of strength, which the fittest disposition can afford it. First therefore, a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obserue the nature and vse of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest vse and aduantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequentlie inferre the best and exactest disposition of imbattailing, as the said forces are capable of; which, if it may be obserued in a march, is no way to be altered. But, if this exactnes of imbattailing will not admit

mit conuenient carriage of such necessarie adiuncts, as pertain to an Army; the inconuenience is to be releued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary iudgement shall be found expedient: that albeit the forme bee somewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their strength and safety consisteth, may still be retained.

Neither can anie man well descend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practices of manie great and experienced commanders; what sort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the rest of the carriage was bestowed, according as their seuerall iudgements thought most expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the issue of all will fall out thus; that he that obserued this rule before prescribed, did seldom miscarrie through an vn safe march. Let a good Martiallist well know their proper vse in that diuersity of weapons in his Army; how they are seruiceable or disadvantageous, in this or that place, against such or such an Enemy: and he will speedily order his battell, dispose of his march, and bestowe his cariages, as shall best fall out both for his safety, and conueniency.

Cæsar's custome was, to send his Cavalrie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to discover and impeach an Enemy; for these troupes were nimble in motion and fit for such seruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horsemen marched in the tayle of the Army, and gaue securitie where there was most cause of feare. But if it happened that they were found vnfit to make good the seruice in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and especially in Africa against the Numidians: hee then remoued them, as he best found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie soldiers, which were the sinewes and strength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horsemen could not perform. And thus he altered the antique prescription, and vniformitie of custome, according as he found himselfe best able to disadvantage an Enemy, or make waie to victorie.

## CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their campe: but are interrupted by the *Neruij*. Cæsar maketh haste to prepare his forces to battell.



He Roman horsemen, with the singers and archers, passed ouer the riuer, and incountred the Cavalry of the Enemy: who at first retired backe to their companies in the wood, & from thence sallied out againe vpon them: but the Romans durst not pursue them further then the plaine and open ground: in the meane time the sixe legions that were in front, hauing their

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATIONS VPON CÆSARS

ir work measured out onto them, began to fortifie their camp. But as soon as Neruy perceived their former cariages to be come in sight, which was the appointed amongst them to give the charge, as they stood imbattailed with the thickest, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman slemen; which being easily beaten backe, the Neruy ranne downe to the river, with such an incredible swiftness, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods at the river, & charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violence, having passed the river, they ran up the hill to the Roman Camp, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Caesar had all parts to be at one instant: the flagge to be hung out, by which they gaue the souldiers warning to take Arms, the battell to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the souldiers to be recalled from their worke, and such as were gone far off to get turf & matter for the rampier, to be sent for; the battell to be ordered, his men to be encouraged, and the signe of battell to be given: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sudden assault of the Enemye.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**A**S the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes; so especially in their camp-discipline, they strove to be singular: for, it seemed rather an Academie, or a Citie of ciuill gouernment, then a camp of souldiers; so careful were they both for the safety, & skilful experience of their men at Arms. For, touching the first, they neuer suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were inclosed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any new inuention or late found out custome in their State, but in vse amongst the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kings; their manner of incamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centurions, that went before to choose out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit situation for their camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperors pavilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily ouerueiw all the other parts, or any allarum or *signum pugnae*, might from thence bee discovered to all quarters. This pavilion was known by the name of *Pratorium*, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the Generall of their Army was called *Prætor*: in this place where the *Pratorium* was to be created, they stuck vp a white ensign, and from it they measured euery way 100. foot, & so they made a square containing 200. foot in euery side; the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the forme of the *Pratorium* was round & high, being as eminent among the other tents, as a Temple is amongst the priuate buildings of a Citie: and therefore Iosephus compareth it to a Church. In this *Pratorium* was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of diuination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of maiestie and authority.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the






# THE ROMAN CAMP.



*Principia*



*Principia*



*Quintana*

*Quintana*



*Porta Decumana*



# THE ROMAN CAMP



*Principia*



*Principia*



*Quintana*



*Quintana*

*Porta Decumana*

paullion laie most commodious for forrage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, every legion diuided one from another by a streete or lane of 50. foot in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that every legion had in the Atmie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honorable, or towards the sides, which was of meaner reputation. And againe, according to the place of every cohort in his legion, so was it lodged neerer the paullion of the Emperour, towards the heart of the camp; and so consequently every manipule tooke place in the cohort, distinguishing their preheminance, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions: there went a street of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the midst of all the legions, which was called *Quintana*; for that it diuided the fift cohort of every legion from the sixt.

*Quintana.*

Betweene the tents of the first maniples in euery legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a waie of 100. foote in breadth throughout the whole camp; which was called *Principia*; in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice; the souldiers exercised themselves at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publick place of meeting; and it was held for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperours paullion, in a direct line to make euen & straight the vpper side of the *Principia*, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, euery Tribune confronting the head of the legion wherof hee was Tribune: about them, towards the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie.

*Principia.**The tentes of the Tribunes.*

Polybius describing the manner of incamping, which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as manie associates, placeth the *Ablecti* and *extraordinarij*, which were select bandes & companies, in the vpper part of the camp; and the associates on the outside of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole camp about, was 200 foote distant from any tent: whereof Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the souldiers marching into the camp in battell array, might there dissolve themselves into maniples, centuries and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for, order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And again, if occasion were offered to fallie out vpon an Enemie, they might very conveniently in that spacious roome, put themselves into companies and troupes: and if they were assaulted in the night, the darts and fire workes, which the Enemie should cast into their campe, would little indamage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tents.

*The space betweene the tents and the rampier.*

Their tents were all of skins and hides, held vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11. souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euery tent, and that societie was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefeft was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contubernij*.

*Contubernium.*

The ditch and the rampire were made by the legions, every maniple having his part measured out, and every Centurion overseeing his Centurie; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the soldiers being girt with their swords & daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was alwaies 8. foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling soever was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch, was three foote in height, and sometimes foure, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfes cut all to one measure, halfe a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foote and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfes; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughes & fagots, that it might be strong and well fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung over the ditch, they vied to stick with thicke and sharp stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked stakes: which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith, that the front of the rampier thus stuck with stakes, was called *vallum*, a *varicando*, for that no man could stride or get over it.

The campe had foure gates: the first was called *prætoria porta*, which was alwaies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did usually looke either toward the east, or to the Enemy, or that waie that the Army was to march. The gate on the other side of the camp opposite to this, was called *Porta Decumana à decimis cohortibus*; for the tenth or last Cohort of every legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the soldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were carried to execution. The other two gates were called *Portæ principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place, which they called *principia*, only distinguished by these titles, *laeva, principalis*, and *dextra*: all these gates were shut with doores, & in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engines of defence, as Balistæ, Catapultæ, Tolenones and such like.

The Romans had their summer Camps, which they rearm'd *Aestiva*, and their winter Camps, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*: their summer camps were in like manner differenced, according to the time, which they continued in them. For, if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called them *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them *Aestiva* or *Sedes*: And these were more absolute, as well in regard of their tents, as of their fortification, then the former, wherein they staid but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna*, had great labor & cost bestowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them from the winter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hospital, & other publique houses.

These

These camps haue bin the beginning of many famous towns, especially when they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, vpon the banks of Euphrates, Danow, and the Rhene. The order which they alwaies obserued in laying out their Campe, was so vniforme, and well known to the Romanes, that when the Centurions had limited out euery part, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the Souldiers entered into it, as into a known and familiar Citie: wherein every societie or small contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euery particular man could assigne the proper station of euery company, throughout the whole Armie.

The vse and commoditie of this incamping, I briefly touched in my first booke: But if I were worthy any waie to commend the excellencie thereof to our moderne Souldier, or able by perswasion to reestablish the vse of incamping in our warres; I woulde spare no paines to archieue so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, than if my selfe had compassed a new found out meanes: and yet reason would deeme it a matter of small difficultie, to gaine a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especially when my discourse shall present securitie to our forces, and honour to our leaders, maiestie to our Armies, & terror to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victorie to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and fool-hardinesse, contempt of vertue, and derision of good discipline, to repugne the signes of honour, and so far to overmaister reason, that it suffereth not former harmes to beare witness against error, nor correct the ill archievements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to vrge this point any further, I will leaue it to the carefull respect of the wise.

The commodity of this incamping.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He fury of the Enemy, and their sodain assault, so disturbed the ceremonies which the Romans discipline obserued, to make the Soldiers truly apprehend the weight and importance of that action, which might cast vpon their state either loueraignty or bondage; that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here noted vnder these titles; the first was *vexillum proponendū, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurrere oporteret*: for when the General had determined to fight, he caused a skarlet coate or red flag to be hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the Soldiers might be warned, to prepare themselves for the battell; and this was the first warning they had: which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes, as the onely meanes to worke out their owne safety, and purchase eternal honour. The second was *Signum tubæ dandum*: this warning was a noile of manie trumpets, which they rearm'd by the name of *clasicum a calando*, which signifieth calling: for after the eye was filled with *species* surable to the matter intended; they then hastened to possesse the care, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, & fill them with resolute thoughts, that no dissident or base conceites might take hold of their mindes. The third

The ceremonies which they used in their preparation to battell.

*s. milites cohortandi*: for it was thought conuenient to confirme this valor, th motives of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motivations. The vse and benefit wherof I somwhat enlarged in the Heluetian wars and could afford much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or bee thought orthie regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was *gratum dandum*; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish & know themselves from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Cæsar gaue the word *Felicitie*; Brutus and Cassius gaue *libertie*; others haue giuen *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, & such like words, as might be ominous to a good successe: Besides these particularities, the manner of their delierie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: wherof Cæsar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may be much graced with ceremonies & complements, which like officers or attendants adde much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of lesse regarde.

## CHAP. X.

*The battell betweene Cæsar and the  
Neruij.*

**I**N these difficulties, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was the knowledge & experience of the soldiers: for by reason of their practice in former battells, they could as well prescribe vnto themselves, what was to be done, as any other commander could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Cæsar had giuen commandment to every Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, untill the fortifications were perfited: yet when they sawe extremitie of danger, they attended no countermand from Cæsar: but ordered all things as it seemed best to their owne discretion. Cæsar hauing commanded such things as he thought necessarie, ranne hastily to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion; where he vsed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemy was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to encounter them, he gaue them the signe of battell: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the encounter. For the time was so short & the enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head peeces, or to vnase their targets: & what part they lighted into from their work, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they slaid; least in seeking out their

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owne companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Army being imbatallied rather according to the nature of the place, the declivity of the hill, & the breuitie of time, then according to the rules of art; as the legions incourted the Enemy in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindered by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needfull to be done: & therefore in so great uncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the 9. & 10. legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles, with the aduantage of the hill, did drine the Attrebatij, breathless with running & wounded in the encounter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swords: Neither did they stick to follow after them ouer the riuer, & aduētūre into a place of disadvantage, where the battell being renewed againe by the Enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like manner two other legions, the 11. & the 8. hauing put the Veromāndui frō the upper ground, fought with them vpon the banks of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the camp was well neere left naked. For in the right corner were the 12. & the 7. legions, where as all the Neruij, vnder the conduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; & som of them began to assault the legions on the opē side, & other som to possess themselves of the highest part of the camp.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, & the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, & were at first al put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the camp, met with their enemies in the face, & so were driuen to sic out another waie. In like manner, the pages & souldiers boies, that frō the Decumane port & top of the hill, had seen the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their camp; betook them to their heels as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treniri (who for their prowess were reputed singular amongst the Galls, and were sent thither by their State, to aid the Romanes) first when they perceiued the Roman camp to be possessed, by a great multitude of the Enemy, the legions to be overcharged & almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they took their waie homeward, & reported to their State, that the Romans were utterly overthrowen.


Cæsar departing from the tenth legiō, to the right corner, found his men exceedingly overcharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, & the soldiers of the 12. legiō so thicke thronged on a heap, that they hindered one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensigne bearer kild and the ensigne taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whō Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grievously wounded, that he could scarce stand vpon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile & forsaking the field; the Enemy on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he sought against the hill, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any means or succor, to relieue thē: he took a target from one of the hindmost soldiers

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(for

(for he himself was come thither without one) & pressing to the front of the battell, called the Centurions by name, and encouraging the rest, commanded the ensignes to be aduanced toward the enemy, and the Maniples to bee enlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swords.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.


 His Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefeft Centurion of the 12. legion, being the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or simply *Primipilus*, and sometimes *Primopilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensigne of euery legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple: Neither was this dignitie, without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authours. We read further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunalicie was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a lawe made, I know not vp on what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

 And heere I may not omit to giue the Target anie honour I may: and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsar's hand, as in the place of greatest dignitie, and much honouring the excellency thereof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouerthwart the conuex surface thereof; and the length foure foot, of what form or fashion soeuer they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Targets amongst their legionarie; the first carried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Oval, a figure of an vnequal latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the ends like vnto an egge, described in *Plano*: the other sort was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter-tile; and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened vpon another, with lint and Bulls glewe; and covered with an Ox hide, or som other stiffe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middelt there was a boss of iron or brasse, which they called *Vmbro*. Romulus brought them in first among the Romanes, taking the vse of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either fallow, alder or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reason, for as much

as these trees are colde and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood, was presently contracted and shut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let vs enter a little into the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

## Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian WEAPONS.

 Promised in my first booke that I would make a comparifon, betweene the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I would likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies; how they do differ one from another: and in what regarde, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I will now with diligence endeavour to perform. And for as much as the Armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselves by their actions, by ouercomming the Armies as well of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa, as all the easterne countries of Europ: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the difference of either; especially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times scene triall, both of their battailes & forces; that knowing the reason why the Romans do ouercome, and in their battaile. cary away the better, wee doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue the due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgement. Concerning the battailes between Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losse, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to bee imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexter tie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entreated thereof when wee made mention of the battels themselves; and the end it selfe of that warre, doth especially confirme this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captaine equall with Hanniball, euen consequentie withall his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, he trayned his Armie to their weapons: and so taking them vp in the beginning, hee continued them on vnto the end.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding, it serued him not to get the victory; but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not vnfit

that I should say something, least in being altogether silent, it might seeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithstanding I wil hasten to my purposed comparison.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the disposition, and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppose it selfe against it, or to sustaine the violence thereof; as may easily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth stand firme in the space of three foote in so thicke an arraie of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the first basis, or scandling sixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniency of them, 14. cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the space betwene the left hand, which supporteth the same, and the butte end thereof, whiles hee stands in a readinesse to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I saie, it is manifest that the length of tenne cubites dooth extend it selfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his hands he doth aduance it ready to charge the Enemy. By which means it followeth, that some of the pikes doe not only extend themselues before the second, third, and fourth ranke, but some before the formost, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thicknesse, according to his naturall disposition, both on the sides and behinde: as Homer maketh mention when he saith, that one target doth enclose and fortifie another; one head-piece is ioined to another, that they may stand vnited and close together.

These circumstances being rightly and truely set downe, it must follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themselues two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betwene themselues: by which may evidently be seene the assault, and impression of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, consisting of 16. ranks in depth, or thicknesse; the excesse of which number of ranks aboue fise. For as much as they cannot commodiously couch their pikes, without the disturbance of the former, the points of them not being long enough to enlarge themselves beyond the formost ranks, they grow vterly vnprofitable, & cannot man by man, make any impression, or assault: but serue only, by laying their pikes vpon the shoulders of those which stand before them, to sustaine and hold vp the swaies and giuing backe of the former ranks, which stand before them to this end, that the front may stand firme and sure; and with the thicknesse of their pikes, they doe repell all those darts, which passing ouer the heads of those that stand before, would annoy those ranks which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe lo presse vpon the former, that they doe make a most violent impression. For it is impossible that the formost ranks should giue back.

This therefore being the generall and particular disposition of the phalanx: we must now speake on the contrarie part, touching the properties & differences, as well of the Arms, as of the whole disposition of the Roman battell. For euery Roman soldier for himselfe, and his weapon, is allowed three foot to stand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himselfe with his target; and mutually mouing whensoever there is occasion offered.

But

But those which vse their swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foot more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to belly, that they may vse their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it cometh to pass, that one Roman souldier taketh vp as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Roman is as it were to oppose himselfe against ten pikes, which pikes the saide one souldier can neyther by any agility come to offend, or elte at handy blowes otherwise annoy. And those which are behinde him, are not only vnable to repell their force, but also with conueniency to vse their owne weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battaile being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romans doe ouercome, and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victory? Euen from hence, that the Roman Armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, where-to it may profitably apply it selfe: so that if it were of necessitie, that their enemy should incounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only, not without danger, but in all probability likelie, that the phalanx should euer carry away the better. But if that may be auoided, which is easily done: shall not that disposition then, be vterly vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther eident, that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine and champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and tuers: for all these may hinder and disioine it. And it is almost impossible to haue a Plain of the capacity of 20. *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall bee found none of these impediments. But suppose there bee found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the Enemy refuse to come vnto them, and in the mean time, spoile, and sack the Citie, and country round about; what commodity, or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for, if it remaine in such places, as hath been before spoken of; it can neither relieue their friends, nor preserue themselves. For the conuoyes which they expect from their friends, are easily cut off by the Enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterprize, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose, that the Roman Army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not aduenture it self in gros at one instant; but would by litle and litle retire it selfe: as doth plainly appeare by their vuall practice. For there must not be a coniecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they doe not so equally frame their battell, that they doe assault the Enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Enemy, that if at any time the Phalanx doe presse them, that come to assault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is dissolued. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that doo assault them, these doe disioyne themselves.

## OBSERVATIONS VPON CÆSARS

hemselfes from part of their Army; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they neede not anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth; but to assault where the breach is made, both behinde, and vpon the sides. But if at any time the Romane Army may keepe his due propriety, and disposition, the phalanx by the disadvantage of the place, being not able to do the like: doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great betwene the goodnesse of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed vpon an Army: which is, to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselfes, to possesse places of advantage, to besiege, & to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemy. For, all these occasions necessarily accompany an Army; and oftentimes are the especiall causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: forasmuch, as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a conuenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Roman Army is apt for all these purposes. For, euery souldiour amongst them, being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time nor occasions; keeping alwaies the same order, whether he fight together with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himselfe, man, to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is advantageous: so the end doth answere the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because manie of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to be overcome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should be put to the worke by the Roman Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus farre goeth Polybius, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romans, with the vse of Arms amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue most advantage to the vse thereof: so that if our Squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee see they doe not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wiledome of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed vnto it. But suppose we could allowe it that disposition, in the course of our warres, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the sayd manner of imbattailing is tryed to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woddy countries, such as Ireland is: where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtles, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike and Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of them in euery companie, as there is; for, commonly half the companie are Pikes, which is as much to saie in the practice of our wars, that halfe the Army hath neither

offensive











Marcellus

offensive nor defensive weapons, but onely against a troupe of horse. For, they sildome or neuer come to the push of pike, with the foote companies, where they may charge and offend the enemy: and for defence, if the enemy thinke it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more aduantage, to play vpon them a farre off with shotte; it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand faire in the meane time, to entertaine a volley of shot, with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some seruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my self, there are weapons, if they were put to triall, that would counteruaile the pike, euen in those seruices, wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoever, as well in regard of the diuers and sundry sorts of imbatailing, as the qualitie of the place wherefoever: for, their vse was as effectuell in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troupes and great companies; in thicke and spacious imbatailing, as in thicke thronged Testudines.

Neither could the nature of the place make the vnseruiceable; for, whether it were plaine or couert, leuell or vnequall, narrow or large, if there were anie commodity to fight, the target was as necessarie to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conueniencie, which accompanieth the target in any necessitie imposed vpon an Armie, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retraite, to incamp themselves, to possess places of aduantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accompanie an Armie. The vse of this weapon hath been to much neglected in these later ages, but may be happily renewed againe in our Nation, if the industry of such as haue laboured to present it vnto these times, in the best fashion, shall find any fauour in the opinion of our Commanders. Concerning which Target, I must needs say this much, that the light target will prooue the target of seruice, whensoever they shall happen to be put in execution: for, those which are made prooue, are to heauie and vnielddie (although it be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the vse thereof) that they ouercharge a man, with an vnsupportable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight disproportionable to his strength. For, our offensive weapons, as namely, the Harquebusers, and Musketiers, are stronger in the offensive part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable & fit for seruice. Neither did the Romans regard the prooue of their target further, then was thought fit for the ready vse of them in time of battaille, as it appeareth in manie places, both in the Cuill vvars, and in these Commentaries: for, a Romaine Pile hath oftentimes dashed through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and fastened the both to the ground: which is more then a Musket can well do; for the bullet commonly resteth in the bodie. And although it may be said, that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it serueth to proue, that their targets were not prooue to their offensive weapons, when they were well deliuered, & with good direction. For, I make no doubt, but in their

battles there were oftentimes some hinderances, which would not suffer so violent an effect, as this which I speake off: for, in a volley of shotte, wee must not thinke, that all the bullets flie with the same force, & fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proofe, will hardly hold out some of them; so slender Armes, and of no proofe, will make good resistance against others. And, to conclude, in a battell or encounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions, futing the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then such as will aduantage the heauie Target of proofe, or countervail the surplus of waight, which it carrieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of proofe, in some places and in some seruices: which I deny not to those, that desire to be secured from the extremitie of peril. But this falleth out in some places, & in some particular seruices; and hindereith not, but that the vniuersall benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important accasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sword of the Targetiers, that according to the practice of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for, carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot bee that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance. And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must be very short; otherwise, it will neuer be readily drawne out: I say, that the sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to commaund the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, will easily discouer. But let this suffice, concerning the vse of the Pike and the Target.

## CHAP. XI.

The Battell continueth, and in the end  
Cæsar ouercommeth.

At the presence of their Generall, the souldiers conceived some better hopes; and gathering strength and courage againe, when as euery man bestirred himselfe in the sight of the Emperour, the brunt of the enemy was a little stayed. Cæsar, perceiuing likewise the seuenth legion, which stood next vnto him, to be sore overlaid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little, to ioine the two legions together, and so by ioyning back to back, to make two contrary fronts; & being thus secured one by another from feare of being circumvented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the mean time, the two legions that were in the reuerward to guard the cariages, hearing of the battell, doubled their pace, and were descried by the enemy vpon the toppe of the hill. And Titus Labienus, hauing won the Campe of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher ground

ground what was done on the other side of the riuer, sent the tenth legion to help their fellowes: who, vnderstanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fledde, in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Campe, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose comming, there happened such an alteration and change of things, that euery such as were sunke downe, through extreame griefe of their wounds, or leaned vpon their Targets, beganne againe to fight afresh; and the Pages and the boies, perceiuing the enemy amazed, ranne vpon them vnarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The horsemen also, strining with extraordinary valour, to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselves in all places before the legionary souldiers. Howbeit, the Enemy in the utmost perill of their lines, shewed such manhood, that as fast as the formost of thē were overthrowne, the next in place beset their carcases, and fought vpon their bodies: and these being likewise overthrowne, and their bodies heaped one vpon another, they that remained, posset themselves of that Mount of dead carcases, as a place of aduantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them againe to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deeme them men of haughtie courage, that durst passe ouer so broad a Riuer, climbe vp such high rocks, & adventure to fight in a place of such inequality. The battell being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Neruij being well nere swallowed vp with destruction, the elder sort, with the women and children, that before the battell, were conuaied into Ilands and Bogs; when they heard thereof, sent Embassadors to Cæsar, and yielded themselves to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State, affirmed, that of six hundred Senatours, they had now left but three; and of sixtie thousand fighting men, there was scarce five hundred that were able to beare Armes. Cæsar, that his clemencie might appeare to a distressed people, preserved them with great care, granting vnto them the free possession of their townes and country, & straightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or iniurie at all.

## OBSERVATION.



And thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battell, which Ramus complaineth of as a confused narration: much differing from the direct & methodicall file, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good, which learned Rhetoricians haue obserued in their Oratory; that An vnperfect thing, ought not to be told in a perfect manner: then by Ramus leaue, if any such confusion do appeare, it both fauoureth of eloquence, & well sueth the turbulent cartiage of the action, wherein order and skill gaue place to Fortune, & prouidence was swallowed vp with peradventure. For, that which Hirtius saith of the overthrow hee gaue to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this; that he got the victorie, plurimū adiuuante deorum benignitate, qui cū omnibus belli casibus interfuit, sum præcipuè ijs quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.

For, so it fell out in this battell, and the danger proceeded from the same cause, that brought him to that push in the battell with Pharnaces: for, he well understood that the Neruij attended his coming on the other side the river Sabis: Neither was hee ignorant how to fortifie his Campe in the face of an enemy, without feare or danger, as we haue seene in his warre with Ariouistus; when he marched to the place where hee purposed to incampe himselfe with three battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Armes to receiue any charge, which the Enemy should offer to giue, that the third battell in the meane time might fortifie the Campe. Which course would easily haue frustrated this stratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard lesse dangerous: but hee little expected any such resolution, so contrarie to the rules of Militarie discipline, that an enemy should not stick to passe ouer so broad a river, to clime vp such steep and high Rocks, to aduenture battell in a place so disadvantageous, and to hazard their fortune vpon such inequalities. And therefore, hee little mistrusted any such vnlike attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his own ouerthrow, if the legions had bene ready to receiue them.

Which may teach a Generall, that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too carefull in his best aduised directions; considering that the greatest means may easily be prevented, and the safest course weakened with an vnexpected circumstance: so powrefull are weake occurrences in the maine course of the waightiest actions; and so infinite are the waies, whereby either wisdom or fortune may work. Neither did this warne him, to prouide for that which an enemy might doe, how vnlike it soeuer it might seeme vnto him: as appeareth by that accident in the battell with Pharnaces. Which practice, of attempting a thing against reason and the arte of warre, hath found good successe in our moderne warres, as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding, it is to be handled sparingly, as no way fauouring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *temeritas non semper felix*, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefeest helps which the Romaines found, were first the aduantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Heluetian warre. Secondlie, the experience, which the souldiours had got in the former battailes, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherein they carried themselves, as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and vndanted iudgement of the Generall, which ouerwaied the perill of the battaile, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may obserue, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battaile rested vpon his directions, hee wholly intended warinesse and circumspection: so in the hazard and perill of good hap, hee confronted extremitie of danger with extremitie of valour, and ouer-toppe furie, with a higher resolution.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselves to a strong hold,  
and are taken by Cæsar.



HE\* Aduatici before mentioned, coming with all their power to aide the Neruij, and vnderstanding by the way, of their ouerthrowe, returned home againe; and forsaking all the rest of their Townes, and Castles, conuayed themselves and their wealth into one strong and well fortified towne, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steepe downefalls, sauing in one place of two hundred foote in breadth; where there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent: which passage they had fortified, with a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones & sharp beames vpon the walles, ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni; who, in their journey into Italie, had left such carriages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conuenientlie take along with them, in the custodie of these forces: who, after the death of their fellows, being many yeeres disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes inuading other States, and sometimes defending themselves, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselves in.

At the first coming of the Romaine Armie, they sallied out of the towne, & made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Cæsar had drawn a rampier about the towne, of twelue foote in height, fiftene miles in compasse, & had fortified it with Castles very thick about the towne, they kept themselves within the wall. And, as they beheld the Vines framed, the Mount raised, & a towre in building as farre off, at first they beganne to laugh at it; and with scoffing speeches from the wall, began to aske, with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romaines were but little men in respect of the Galles) a towre of that huge massie waight shold be brought vnto the walles? But, when they saw it remooued, and approaching neere vnto the towne (as men astonished at the strange and vnaccustomed sight therof) they sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to intreat a peace, with this message: They believed that the Romaines did not make war, without the speciall assistance of the Gods, that could with such facility transport engines of that height, and bring the to encounter at hand, against the strongest part of their towne: and therefore, they submitted both themselves, & all that they had, to Cæsars mercy; desiring one thing of his meeke clemencie, that hee would not take away their Armes; forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies vnto them, and eniued at their valour; neither were they able to defend themselves, if they should deliuer up their Armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconuenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murdered by them, whom in former time they had held subiect to their command.

Cæsar.  
Eiher Dä-  
way or Bosle-  
duke, in Bra-  
bant.

To this Cæsar answered; that he would saue the Cittie rather of his owne shame, then for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Ram touched the wall: but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present deliuerie of their Armes; for, he would doe by them as he had done by the Neruij, and giue commaundement to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answer being returned to the Cittie, they seemed contented to doe whatsoeuer he commaunded them: and thereupon, casting a great part of their Armour ouer the wall, into the ditch, inasmuch as they fild it almost to the toppe of the rampier; and yet (as afterward was knowne) concealing the third part; they set open the gates, & for that day caried themselves peaceably. Towards night, Cæsar commaunded the gates to be shut, and the souldiours to be drawne out of the towne. But the Aduatici, hauing consulted together before (forasmuch as they believed, that vpon their submission, the Romaines would either set no watch at all, or at the least, keepe it verie careleslie) partly with such Armour as they had retained, and partly with targets, made of barke, or wrought of wicker, which vpon the souldaine they had couered ouer with Leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our Fortifications was easiest, they issued suddainly out of the towne with all their power: but signification thereof being giuen by fires, as Cæsar had commaunded, the Romaines hastened speedily to that place. The Enemy fought verie desperately, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romaines in a place of disadvantage: at length, with the slaughter of foure thousand, the rest were driuen backe into the towne. The next day, when Cæsar came to breake open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the souldiers, and sold all the people and spoile of the towne: the number of persons in the towne, amounted to fiftie three thousand bondslaves.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N the surprise, attempted by the Belgæ vpon Bibract, I set down the manner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their souldaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any advantage in the course of war) they then prepared for the siege, in that manner, as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inuiroined the towne about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the said rampier, with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the towne from any forraine succour or reliefe: & with all, secured themselves from sallies, or other stratagems, which the townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumvallatio*; the particular description whereof, I referre vnto the historie of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set downe by Cæsar.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He Ram, which Cæsar here mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Romaine Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention thereof to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrowe a Castle, they tooke a long beame or rimmer tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof, they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees, they ouerthrew the whole towre. The Romaines had two sorts of Rams, the one was rude and plaine; the other, artificiall & compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtrayed in the column of Traian at Rome.

The compound Ramme is thus described by Iosephus; A Ramme, saith he, is a mightie great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end, with a head of iron, fashioned like vnto a Ramme, and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto another beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any towre so strong, or wall so broad, that is able to stand before it.

The length of this Ram was of a large scantling; for, Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian war, had a Ramme fourecore foote long. And Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsually one hundred and fixe, and sometimes one hundred and twentie; and this length gaue great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of souldiers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Centurie; and so the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermission. Iosephus saith, that Titus, at the siege of Ierusalem, had a ramme for euery legion: it was oftentimes couered with a Vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more safetie. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vntill the ramme had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptation of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacie, they had brought in perill the liues of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affordeth such mercie as the Victor pleaseth.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small securitie which one State can giue vnto another, that commendeth their safetie to be protected by it: for, as Architas the Pythagorian saith, A bodie, a familie, and an Armie, are then well gouerned, when they containe within themselves the causes of their safetie; So wee must not looke for anie securitie in a State, when their safetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection.

Aries, or the Ramme.

Cales.

Aries simplex.

Aries composita.

protection. For, the old saying is, that *Neque muras, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere*. Although in this case the matter was well qualified, by the maiestie of the Romaine Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia; whereof the Hedui with their associates, were very gaine-full witnesses: but amongst kingdoms, that are better suted with equalitie of strength and authoritie, there is small hope of safetie to be looked for, vnlesse the happy gouernment of both doe mutually depend vpon the safetie of either Nation. For, that which Polybius obserued in Antigonus, king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteeme no man, either as a friend or an enemy, but as the calculation of profit shall find them answerable to their proiects. And contrariwise, it cutteth off many occasions of practices and attempts, when it is knowne that a State is of it selfe able and ready to resist the designs of forraigne enemies, according to that of Manlius; *Offendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent*.

## THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.



He manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great vie in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for, fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeede it is; forasmuch as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance, cannot be discerned from the fire it selfe, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance. And contrariwise, in the day time it sheweth lesse then it is; for, the cleare brightnesse of the aire, doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall body: and therefore their custome was to vie fire in the night, and smoake in the day, futing the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie; that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

## THE FIFT OBSERVATION.



And albeit after the victorie, the Romans inflicted diuers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemy; yet as Flavius Lucanus saith in Liuius, there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romans were. The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towards a conquered Nation were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bond-slaves, *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub iugum*; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie States.

Of the first we find a manifest example, in the third of these Commentaries, where Cæsar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his Embassadours by force, contrarie to the law of Nations, hee put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona*.

Festus

Festus saith, that an enemy was said to be sold *sub corona*, inasmuch as the captiues stood crowned in the Market-place, where they were sette out to sale: as Cato saith, in his booke *Dere militari*, *et populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus, supplicatum eat; quam re malè gesta coronatus vaneat*. And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, forasmuch as the souldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keep them together; and this round-about-standing, was called *corona*. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: forasmuch as amongst the Greeks, by the speare or pike, was signified the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub iugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallows, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for, they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laid vpon their neck the yooke of thraldome.

Liuius saith, that Quintus the Dictator, dismissed the *Aquos sub iugum*; & this *iugum* was made of three speares, whereof two were stuck vpright in the ground, and the third was tied ouerthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub iugum*, were vngirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe, they tooke away their lands and territories, and either sold it for mony, & brought it into the Treasurie, or diuided the land amongst the Romaine people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which, Liuius hath many pregnant examples.

## CHAP. XIII.

Craffus taketh in all the maritime Citties that lie to the Ocean: the legions are caried into their wintering Campes.



THE same time Pub. Craffus, whom he had sent with one legion to the maritime Citties that lay to the Ocean, aduertised him, that all those States had yielded themselves to the people of Rome. The warres beeing thus ended, and all Gallia being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this vwarre among other barbarous people, that from Nations beyond the Rhene there came Embassadours to Cæsar, offering both hostages and obedience to whatsoeuer he commaunded them. But Cæsar willed them to repaire vnto him againe in the beginning of the next Sommer, forasmuch as he then hadst into Lumbardie, after hee had placed his legions in their wintering Campes. For these things, vpon the sight of Cæsars Letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for fifteene daies together: which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the second Commentarie.


Cæsar.

Of this supplication I will speake in the latter end of the 4. booke.

OBSER-

# OBSERVATIONS VPON THE THIRD BOOKE OF CÆSAR HIS COMMENTARIES.

## THE ARGUMENT.

 His Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter ende of the former Sommer; wherein the Belgæ had so leane a haruest: and then it proceedeth to the warre betwene Cæsar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitæ; and Titus Labienus, with the Treuiri.

## CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, beeing sent to cleere the passage of the Alpes, was besieged by the Seduni and Veragri.



**C**ÆSAR, taking his journey into Italie, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen unto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the river Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, unto the tops of the highest Alpes. The end of this voyage was chiefly to cleere the Alpes of thieues & robbers, that liued by the spoile of Passengers, that trauid betweene Italie and Gallia. Galba, having order if he found it expedient, to winter in those parts, after some fortunate encounters, and the taking of some Castles and holds, he concluded a peace, and resolved to place two cohorts of his legion amongst the Nantuates; and himselfe to winter with the other cohorts, in a towne of the Veragri, named Ocodurnus. This towne being sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mighty high hills, was divided by a river into two parts, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for his wintering Campe, and fortified it about with a ditch & a rampier. After he had spent many daies of wintering, and given order, that corne should be brought thither for provision; he had intelligence vpon a sudden, that the Galles in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was allotted vnto them; and that the hills which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne stood, were possesed with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this suddaine commotion, were chiefly the paucitie of the Romaine forces.

forces, not making a cōpleat legion; forasmuch as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wanting vpon necessary occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such aduantage, that they were perswaded by reason of the steepe declinitie of the hill, that the Romaines would not indure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hostages; and the Alpes, which Nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as bounds betwene two large kingdomes, to be seized vpon by the Romaine legions, and vnted to their Province.

Vpon these aduertisements, Galba, not hauing as yet finished the fortification of his Campe, nor made provision of Corne and forrage for the winter season, in that he little feared any motion of warre, being secured of their amitie and obedience, both by hostages and rendry: hee presently called a Councell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Councell, the mindes of many were so amazed, with the terrour of so vnexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed souldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, & no hope left of any succour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other way for their safetie, then leauing behind them their baggage & impediments, to sallie out of their Campe, and so to saue themselves by the same way they came thither: notwithstanding, the greater part concluded, to reserre that resolution to the last push; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the Campe.

## OBSERVATION.



**W**Hich aduise, although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suted the valour of the Romaines, and saoured more of tempered magnanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their minds, by their over-hastie and too forward resolution. For, as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troopes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselves by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terrour, and a stronger impression of feare, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for, desperate and inconsiderate rashness, riseth sooner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a lesse troubled eye, and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirit, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of aduantage might happen vnto them, vpon any enterprise the enemy should attempt; they lay, so gaue greater scope to Fortune, & enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.

## CHAP.



## CHAP. II.

The enemy setteth vpon the wintering Camp:  
Galba ouerthroweth them.

**T**HE Councell beeing dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enemy, at a watch-word giuen, assaulted the Campe on all sides, with stones and darts, & other casting weapons. The Romans, at first, when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast from the rampier; but what part soeuer of their Camp seemed to be in greatest danger, & want of help, thither they came with succour and reliefe; but heerein they were ouer-matched: for, the enemy being spent and wearied with fight, whensoeuer any of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwayes fresh combatants to supply it. But the Romans, by reason of their small number, had no such helpe: for, their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for weariness nor wounds, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And, hauing thus fought continually the space of six houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enemy persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch, and breake downe the rampire, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation, P. Sex. Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to bee so sore wounded in the Neruian battell, and Caius Volusenus, Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the onely way of safety was to breake out vpon the enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremitie. Whereupon, they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease awhile from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the Campe; and so to rest themselves a little & recover their strength: and then at a watch-word, to sallie out of their Campe, and lay their safetie vpon their vertue. Which the souldiers executed with such alacrity and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the gates of the Camp, they gaue no leisure to the enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a noueltie. And thus Fortune beeing suddenly changed, they slew more then the third part of thirtie thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay vpon the hills neere about them.

## OBSERVATION.

**W**Hich strange alteration, liuely describeth the force of noueltie, & the effectuall power of vnexpected aduentures: for, in the first course of their proceeding, wherein the Romaines defended the Campe, & the Gallies charged it by assault, the victory held constant with the Gallies, & threatened death & mortality to the Romans.

mans. Neither had they any meanes to recouer hope of better successe, but by trying another way, which so much the more amazed the Galls, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victory, by a set fight continuing the space of 6. houres, without any likelihood of contrariety, or alteration. Which practice, of frustrating a desigine intended, by an indirect and contrary answer, serued the Romans oftentimes to great aduantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentary we shall afterward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vnellos, with the same stratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption & falling out, when they expected nothing but a defensiu resistance from the rampier. From whence a Commander may learn, to auoid two contrarie inconueniencies, according as the qualitie of the war shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a iudicious eye wil easily discover) that a sally made out at diuers ports of a hold, wil much mitigate the heat of a charge, and controule the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place, what aduantage soeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himself of good fortune, if he appoint certain troups in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily employed in the assault may prouide to answere it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galls had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been decciued.

## CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelli  
giue occasion of a newe warre.

HE Enemy being thus defeated, Galba was unwilling to trie fortune any further: and the rather for that he wanted both corn & forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next day he returned towards the Prouince, and without let or resistance brought the legion safe into the Aquitanes; and from thence to the \*Allobroges, and there he wintered.

After these things were dispatched: Caesar supposing for many reasons, that al Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of any new war, the Belgæ being ouerthrowen, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alps subdued & vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great desire to see those nations: there grew a sudden tumult and dissension in Gallia vpon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the sixth legion in Aniou neare vnto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of corn in those parts; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes, into the next cities to demand corn, and other prouisions for his legion: of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent vnto the \*Veneti, Marcus Trebius to the \*Curiosilitæ, Q. Velanius & Titus Silius to the \*Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authoritie amongst all the maritime nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping.

Caesar.

\*Sauoians.

\*Le Perche  
Cornoaille.  
in Bretaine.  
\*Vannes.

ping, with which they did trafficke in Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skil and experience of sea-faring matters; hauing the most part of such, as vsed those seas, tributaries to their State: These Veneti first aduentured to taine Silius & Velanius, hoping thereby to recouer their hostages which they had giuen to Crassus. The finitimate Cities induced by their authority & exāple, for the same reason, laide hold vpon Trebius & Terasidius; and sending speedy ambassages one vnto another, coniured by their princes and chiefeſt magistrates, to approue their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same euent of fortune; soliciting also other cities and States, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Ancestors, then to indure the seruile bondage of a stranger.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He circumstance in this history, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of things made promise of peace: sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse in calculating the natiuitie of After-chances; which so seldom answer the iudgement we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speak of happiness, we find nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruell, if when almost all nations are at odds, and in our best conceits, threaten destruction one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace: or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillitie, & through the vncertaintie of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater wars in the end, then the former time can truly speak of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our haughty politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premises of their wake proicets, and predestinate succeeding ages, according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall break the maine streame of our iudgement, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnderstanding hath vttered. And it may learne them withall, how much it importeth a wise commander, to prevent an euill that may crosse his desigge, (how vnlikely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such maner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct means to resist the repugnancie of a contrary nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibility to continue the same.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



His practice of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull eye ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mighty amongst the rest, then

of any other interiour State of the same nature and condition: for, as example of it selfe is of great authoritie, making improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intention shall sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Act of superiour personages: it must needs be very effectual to stir vp mens minds, to approue that with a strong affection, which their own single iudgement did not way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which difference cannot afford, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar hauing aduertisement of these new troubles; hasteth into Gallia, and prepareth for the WARRE.



ALL the maritime States being by this meanes drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent a common ambassage vnto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deliuer vp the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, in as much as hee was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and ships of warre to be built vpon the river \* Ligeris. Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that Gallie-men, Mariners, and Ship-masters should be mustered in the Prouince: which being speedily dispatched, as soone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Cæsars arrivall, and considering how hainous a fact they had committed, in detaining the Ambassadors & casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred & inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, & especially such necessities, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.

## THE OBSERVATION.



From hence I may take occasion, briefly to touch the reuerent opinion, which all nations, how barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceiued of the qualitie & condition of Ambassadors: and what the grounds are of this vniuersall receiued custome, which in all ages, and times hath held Authentical. And first we are to vnderstand, that all mankind (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane societie, that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are vnatural, as proceeding from corruption

The Authority of exāple

Cæsar.

\* Ligeris.

The grounds of that reuerent opinion which is held of Ambassadors.

ruption and defect) driue them into extream discord, & disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuill conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect: yet without a necessary entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discorde it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerfull are the laws which she enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vles thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it frō falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a lawe, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne beliefe. Secondly, for as much as the end of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treatie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seem so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onely intendeth bloud, and propoeth as the chiefeſt object, the death and mortalitie of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill government: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgement of all nations, as vnworthy of humane societie. Last of all, it is an iniury of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extream infamy, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish Ambassadors for the faults of their State: considering that their chiefeſt duty consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued: which may as well tend to the aduancement and honour of that Citie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire war or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of Ambassadors, is reuerently to be respected and defended from brutish and vnnatural violence.

### CHAP. V.

#### *The proceedings of either partie, in the enterance of this Warre.*



*He Veneti conceiued great hope of their enterprise, by reason of the strength of their situation: for as much as all the passages by land were broken and cut off, with arms and creekes of the seas and on the other side navigation and entrance by sea was so troublesome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanelles and shelves of the coast. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to bee had in those quarters. And if*

*if it happened, that the course of things were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themselves were strong in shipping; whereas the Romans had none at all. Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and islands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were accustomed vnto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with prouision, & brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Cæsar (as it was reported) would begin to make war, taking the Osismi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambinarii, Morini, Menapij, Diablintes, as comforts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred vp Cæsar to undertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yielded themselves by vnder, and given hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so many Cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and States to the like insolvency. And therefore vnderstanding, that almost all the Gallies were inclining to nouelty & alteration, and of their own nature, were quick & ready to undertake a war; and further, considering that all men by nature desired liberty, and hated the seruile condition of bondage: hee preuented all further insurrections of the other States, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalrie, vnto the Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rhene: to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes & the rest of the Belge, to keep them in obedience, and to hinder such forces, as might peraduenture be transported ouer the riuer by the Germans, to further this rebellious humor of the Gallies. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12. legionarie cohorts, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitaine, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolite, Euelii, to disappoint any practice which rebellious minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towards Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himself marched thitherward with the rest of the foot forces.*

*Lendriguer.  
Lysieux.  
Vannes.  
Aurenche.  
Leondoul.  
Cities in Little Britaine.*

*\*Triers.*

### THE OBSERVATION.



*N the first booke, I obserued the authority which the Roman Leaders had to vndertake a war, without further acquainting the Senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generalls had, not to vndertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill & hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgements of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labor. And thus we find the reasons particularly deliuered, that moued Cæsar first to vndertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes, which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the*

*L 2*

*neces-*

necessity of that warre with the Belgæ; and now the motiues which induced him to this with the maritime Cities of Britaine: and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprise he attempted: which he laeth downe as the grounds and occasions of those wars, & could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Gallies, & to keep them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that Continent; & so settling the wavering disposition of the further skirts, with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary soldiers, which hee sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the advantage, which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy: whom he so little feared concerning the vpshot of that quarrel, that he had disperfed the greatest part of his Army vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

## CHAP. VI.

### The manner of their shipping, and their Sea-fight.



*He site of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twice in 12. houres, be approached by foot-forces, nor yet with shipping neither for, againe in an ebbe, the vessels were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the Enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equall to the walls of the towne, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey both themselves & their carriages, into the next towns, and there helpe themselves with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman fleet by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not adventure to put out of the riuer Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, & the tides great. The shipping of the Gallies was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Romans shipping, the better to beare the ebbs, and shallowes of that coast: the fore-deck was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the hugeness of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for, the ribbes and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastned with yron pinnes of an inch thicke: in steade of cables, they vsed chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant*

of

*of the vse therof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.*

*The meeting and conflict of the Roman navy, with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness with force of oars: but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the daungers of the foule weather, were far inferiour vnto them: for the strength of them was such that they could neither hurt them with their beak-heads, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if any gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safety shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chaunces the Roman navy stood continually in danger.*

## OBSERVATION.



*And here, let it not seem impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulars haue of navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularitie, and well approved rules in our Art of navigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heavens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteeme of them as they effect, and not as they are.*

*Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalists chiefly vnderstand celestiall influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is diuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betwene the east horizon and the noone meridian, which they call a flowing quarter: the second fro the noone meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and again, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrary effectes, are the sunne and the moone, as they are caried through these distinct parts of the heauen. And although experience hath noted the moon to be of greatest power in watric motions; yet wee may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.*

*First therefore we are to vnderstand, that when the moon or the sunne begin*

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*The causes of the ebbing & flowing of the Sea.*

to appeare about the right horizon, & enter into that part of the heauen which I termed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high flood. And again, as those lights passing the meridian, decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth & returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they set vnder the west horizon, & enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth again to flowe, and still increaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then again, it refloweth, according as the sun & moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the west horizon.

And hence it happeneth that in conjunction or new of the moon, when the sun & the moon are caried both together in the same flowing, & ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moon, when these lights are carried in opposite quarters, which we haue described to bee of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are caried, do ioyne their forces to make perfect this work of Nature in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moon is carried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of Nature dooth necessarily require: then are the tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, diuide euerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moon maketh in their revolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantity of 6. houres: and therefore that which Cæsar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12. houres, there are alwaies 2. high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland City, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him vnderstand, that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceived principally of the sea it self; and secondarily of such ports and hauens, as stand either neere or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding Meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought convenient to intert in these discourses touching the ebbing & flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, whereof posteritie hath only receiued the bare names, and some few circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critiques of these times haue laboured to set forth a fleet, answerable to that, which the teatims and title mentioned in history seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answer their charge. For, many men rest volatisfied, first touching the names themselves, whereof we find these kindes,

Names

Names

*Longas.*  
*Onerarias.*  
*Actuarias.*  
*Triremes.*  
*Quadrirèmes.*  
*Quinquerèmes.*

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second, ships of burthen: the third, ships that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for, I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a seuerall sort of shipping by themselves; or the general Names of the *Quadrirèmes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinquerèmes*, for as much as euerie kinde of these might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*, as it yet remaineth in controuersie: so it is not much materiall to that which wee seeke after. But that which most troubleth our sea-Criticks, is, in what sense they may vnderstand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadrirèmes*, & *Quinquerèmes*, whether they were so termed in regard of the number of rowers, or water-men that haied continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oares on either side, a *Quadrirème* foure, and a *Quinquerème* fise: whereof they tooke their distinction of Names.

Such as hold, that a *Trireme* had on each side three rankes of oares, and so consequently, of a *Quadrirème* and *Quinquerème*; alleage this place of Liuius, to make good their opinion. In the warres between Rome and Carthage, Lælius meeting with Aldrubal in the straights of Gibraltar, each of them had a *Quinquerème*, & seauen or eight *Triremes* a piece: the current in that place was so great that it gaue no place to Art, but carried the vessels according to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertainty, the *Triremes* of the Carthaginean closed with the *Quinquerème* of Lælius: which either because shee was *ponderetior*, as Liuius saith; or otherwise, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regetur*; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which resisted the billow and steamed the current, shee sunke two of the *Triremes*, and so got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a *Quinquerème* had *plures remorum ordines*, then a *Trireme* had; and therefore it took the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum*, to bee a couple of oares one answering another, on each side of the vessell, which wee call a paire of oares: So that a *Quinquerème* being far greater and longer then a *Trireme*, had more paires of oares then a *Trireme* had, & those oares were handled with five men at one oare, according to the vse of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this, and come to their manner of sea-fights, wee must vnderstand that the Romans, wanting the vse of Artillerie and managing their ships of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vse of their Art, in their conflicts and incounters by sea: for, all their shippes of seruice, which we terme

The manner  
of sea-fights.

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men of warre, carried a strong beake-head of yron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ranne one against another, with as great violence and turie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Art gaue great aduantage; for, he that couledest skill to turne his ship, with greatest celerity, and to frustrate an offer; or with speedy & strong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victory.

In the battell which D. Brutus had with the Massilians, we reade that two *Triremes* charging the Admirall wherein Brutus was, one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from betwene them, and the two *Triremes* met with such a carriere one against another, that one brake her beake-head, and the other split with the blowe.

For this skill & fortune withall, Euphranor the Rhodian was of great fame in Cæsars time; although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom Fortune honoureth with many good haps, the oftentimes releueth to a harder destiny; as other sea-men besides Euphranor, can truly witnesse.

This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, then the art & practices of their land seruices came in vse: for, they erected turrets vpon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting-weapons, as slings, arrowes, and pils; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionary fouldier find any difference when he came to the point, betwene their fight at sea and that at land: sauing that they could not be martialled in troupes and bands, in regard whereof the sea seruice was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuerfie, by slings and casting-weapons: which kinde of fight was of lesse honour, then buckling at handy-blows.

## CHAP. VII.

### *The Battell continueth: and Cæsar ouercommeth.*



**H**E manner of their fights being this, as I haue described, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his navy, knew what to do or what course of fight to take: for, the shipping of the Gallies was so strong, that the beake-head of their *Quinqueres* could performe no seruice vpon them: & although they shoulde raise turrets according to their vse, yet they would not equall in height the pouce of the Enemies shipping; so that therein al so the Gallies had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might soile so great a namie, which amounted to the number of 230. ships of war. One thing

thing there was amongst their prouisions which stood them in great stead: for, the Romans had provided great sharp hooks or sickles, which they put vpon great & long poles: these they fastned to the tackling which held the main yard to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oares, they cut the said tackling & the main yard fell downe. Whereby the Gallies, whose only hope consisted in sayling and yare turning of their ships, lost at one instant, both their sailes & the vse of their shipping: And then the controuerfie fel within the compass of valour, wherein the Romans exceeded the Gallies; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Cæsar and the whole Army, no valiant act could bee smothered in secret; for, all the hills and clifts, which afforded neere prospect into the sea, were covered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yares being cut downe, and the Romans endeavouring with great fury to boord them, failed not to take many of their ships: which the Gallies perceiving, & finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began al to fly, & turning their ships to a forewind, were vpon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a navy, very few through the helpe of the euening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8. houres: with which battell, ended the war with the Veneti, & the rest of the maritime nations. For, al sort of people both young & old, in whom there was either courage, counsell, or dignity, were present at this battell, and all their shipping was taken & lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer: and therefore yielded themselves to Cæsars, in whom he used the greater severity, that he might thereby teach al other barbarous people, not to violate the lawes of nations: for, he slew all the Senat with the sword, and solde the people for bondslaves.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune, which vually attendeth vpon industry: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made ready these hookes, not for this intent wherein they were imployed; but at all occasions and chances, that might happen, as seruiceable complements rather then principal instruments: & yet it so fel out, that they proued the only means, to ouerthrow the Gallies. Which proueth true the saying of Cæsar, that industry commandeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary labour: for industry in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the mooues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner, diligence and labour some indutrie, by circumspect and heedfull carriage, seldom faile either by hap or conning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For, euery action is intangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interrelled in the matter, that it succedeth according as it is carried

*The force of industry.*

carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherents, some of them are by wisdom foreseen; and directed to that course which may fortunate the action: the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, & are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyond the compass of our wisest reach, and in the waie either to assist or disadvantage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authority; in as much as she armeth her selfe for all chances, whereby she is sayd to command fortune.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Sabinus ouerthroweth the \* Vnelli, with the manner thereof.*



*Hile these things happened in the state of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entred with his forces into the confines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridoux was made chiefe Commander, hauing drawne the \* Aulerians and the \* Eburonics with a great number of vagabondes and theues into the same conspiracie: Sabinus in-*

*ping himselfe in a conuenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But, Viridoux, being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him opportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not onely to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardice, but to be taunted with the reprocheful speeches of his own souldiers; which opinion of feare being once settled in the minds of the Enemy, he vsed all meanes to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approche the very rampier of the camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but vpon some good opportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perswasion of feare, Sabinus chose out a subtiler witted Gall, whom he perswaded with great rewards, and further promises, to sue to the Enemy, and there to carrie himself, according to the instructions, which he should giue him. This Gall, comming as a reuolter to the Enemy, laid open vnto the feare of the Romans; the extremity that Cæsar was driue into by the Vnelli; & that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, & to make all the haste he could to relieue Cæsar. Vpon which aduertisement, they all cried out with one consent, that this opportunitie was not to be omitted; but setting apart all other deuises, to go & assault the Roman campe. Many circumstances perswaded the Galls to this resolution; as first the lingering & doubt which Sabinus had made, whē he was offered battell; secondly, the intelligence which this fugitiue had brought; thirdly, the want of victuals wherein they had bin negligent & vnadvisedly carelesse; fourthly, the hope they conceiued of the war of Vannes; and lastly for that men willingly belieue that which they would haue come to pass. The force of these motives was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridoux*

*donix, nor the rest of the Captaines, to dismisse the Councell, vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and goe to the Romaine Campe. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and sagots to fill vp the ditch; & with cheerful harts, as though the victorie were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a hill, rising gently from a leuell, the quantity of one thousand paces. Hither the Galls hastened with all expedition: & so the intent the Romaines might not haue so much time, as to put on their Armour, the Galls for haste ranne themselves out of breath.*

*Sabinus, incouraging his souldiers, gaue the signe of battell; and sallying out at two severall gates of his Campe, it fell out that through the oportunitie of the place, the wearinesse and vnxperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Romaine souldier, and their exercise in former battels, that the Galls could not indure the brunt of the first encounter, but presently took themselves to flight, of whom, very few escaped. And so it happened, that at one time; Sabinus had newes of the ouerthrow at Sea, and Cæsar of Sabinus victorie by Land. Vpon these victories, all the Citties and States yielded themselves to Titurius: for, as the Galls are prompt to vndertake a warre; so are they weak in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.*

## OBSERVATION.



*His practice of a counterfeit feare, was often put in vse by the Romaine Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemy, as to draw them into an inconuenience, and so to defeat them of their greatest helps in time of battell. Cæsar, comming to succour the Campe of Cicero, made such vse of this Art, that he put to rout a great Armie of the Galls, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly set downe by Cæsar.*

The chiefe thing in this place, which brought them to their ouerthrow, was disappointment: for, it is a thing hardly to be digested in busines of smal consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind shal dispose herselfe to one onely intent, and in the vp-shot meet with a counterbustle to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shal proceed in a course of victorie, and humour our conceits with that wee wish and would haue to happen; and in the end, meet either with bondage or death, must our best wits bee appalled? hauing neither repite nor meanes, to thinke how the cuill may be best prevented. Which the wise Romans well vnderstood, & counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shameful cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisdom; while they in the meane time foresawe their good fortunes, throwed vnder the cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a Leader, so to take the opportunitie of any such fortune, that in the execution, he omit not the chiefe points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the designe, as for his own safety and

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*The vse which the Romans made of a counterfeit feare.*  
Lib. 5.



the securitie of his Armie. For, order is as the sinewes and strength of martiall discipline, vniting the particular members into the firme composition of a well proportioned bodie: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soeuer.

I might heere alleadge infinite examples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux serue for all; wherein the Protestants, ouercharging the Catholick Armie, followed the retrait so hard, that they quickly became Maisters of the field: and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more glorious by slaughter and mortallitie. The Duke of Guise, all this while, bouged not a foot: but in vnexampled patience, kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their Generall that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise disperfed and broken: and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholick, hee dissolued that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence; and so changed the fortune of the day, that he tooke the chiefeft of their Princes prisoners, with liule or no losse of his owne men: so powerfull is order in the deeds of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victorie. And thus wee haue first seene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well dissembled, may cast vpon a credulous and vnaduised enemie, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their owne credulitie doth afterward auouch: and secondly, what strength and safetie consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to set vp.

## CHAP. IX.

## The proceedings of Crassus in Aquitaine.



*T*he same instant of time, it happened also, that Pub. Crassus comming into Aquitania (which both in regard of the large extenſion of the Country, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make war in those parts, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slaine, and the Army ouerthrowne: and where Lucius Manlius was faine to flie,

with the losse of his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therefore, hauing made prouision of Corne, & mustered many Auxiliarie forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouſe and Narbone, hee carried his Armie into the confines of the Sontiates; which was no sooner knowne, but they leuied great forces both of horse and foote, and with their horse, charged vpon the Romaines in their march: which being easilie repelled, as they folloved the retrait, the infanterie of the Gallies, shewued it selfe in a Valley as it lay in Ambush. These, setting vpon the Romaines, renewed the battaile, and there the fight continued hot a long time: the

Sontia-

*Sontiates* being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitaine relie vpon their vertue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to shew what they were able to doe of themselves, without their grand Captaine, and vnder the conduction of a young souldier. At length, the enemy, ouerwaged with prowesse, and wearied with wounds, betooke themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number: and then marched direſtly to the towne of the Sontiates, and laid siege vnto it: the siege grew hot on both sides, the Romans approached the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts. The towneſmen defended themselves, sometime by sallying out, sometimes by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the Aquitani are very skilfull. But, when they perceived the industrie of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated Crassus to accept their rendry: which being granted, and all the Army intending the deliuey of their Armes, Adcantuanus their chiefe Magistrate, fledde out in the meane time at another port of the Cittie, with sixe hundred denoted companions, whom they called Solduri; but as they attempted to escape, the souldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his enaſion by a clamour and shout, the rest betooke themselves to Armes, & so repelled him againe into the towne; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissiue multitude. Crassus, hauing taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the Vocontij.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



These skilfull and experienced men, which Crassus sent for out of all the Citties in Aquitaine, were those, whom the Romans called *Euocati*: such as were free from warfare, & exempted by their lawes from giuing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeeres, or the magistracie which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priuiledge: & in that regard, were sent for by Letters, increating their assistance in the cariage of that war, as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesſes. Their places were nothing inferioriour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction, although they had no part in command or authoritie.

Euocati.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



*I*n this fight, we may further obserue, their maner of defence against Mounts, and Cavalieros; which we find chiefly to be Mines. Iosephus, in the Iewish warre, saith, that The Romaines hauing raised an exceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art, that as they digged vnderneath, they supported the Mount with huge props & planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage, they set all the timber-work, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire,

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which

which taking fire, with the help of Brimstone and Pitch, the Mount fell vpon a suddaine, to the great terror and amazement of the Romans.

At the siege of *Anuricum*, we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take the earth from the Mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they fought then by all meanes to burne it; as it happened at the siege of *Masilia*: and oftentimes, when both burning & vndermining failed, they confronted it, with another Mount within the walles, to disappoint the disadvantage by equall contesting of it; and so made it vnprofitable.

Concerning Mines, this much may I say, without preiudice to that Art, that the chiefeest points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instrument, and helpe of Geometrie, where other marks of certaintie are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not erre in our course which the Compasse affordeth. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermine and crosse-meeting. All which parts haue very many circumstances, & require a larger discourse, then may be thought pertinent for this place.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**he strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their Chieftaine, may well deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especially, considering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for, the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happinels in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatsoeuer ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, took hold of their head, these deuoted, were tied voluntarily to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memorie was there euer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloody league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dangerous in a well ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or fought to practise any thing contrarie to good gouernment: for, he himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they, on the other side, must needs with well to his attempts, that were so interested in his life and death.

CHAP.

### CHAP. X.

#### The Galles raise new forces against *Crassus*.



He barbarous Galles were much troubled, that a towne of that strength should so soone be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadours into all quarters, coniuined one with another, confirmed their covenants with mutuall hostages, and leuied what power they were able to make: sending for aide out of *Spaine*, and from other States that bordered vpon *Aquitaine*. At the coming of these forces, they began to make warre, with a great power, and with many souldiers of great fame: for, they appointed such Leaders as had seene the experience of *Sertorius* his warres, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the *Arte Militarie*. These, according to the custome of the people of *Rome*, beganne to take places of aduantage, to fortifie their Campe, and to intercept the *Romaines* from free passage of conuoyes, and necessarie intercourses. Which when *Crassus* perceined, & considering withall, that his owne forces were so few, that he could not well dismember them vpon any seruice or aduantage, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding, a sufficient guarison in his Campe; by which meanes, their corne and provision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed every day stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to giue them battell.

The matter beeing referred to a Councell of warre, when he vnderstood that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to giue them battell; & in the dawning, putting his men in a double battaile, & placing the *Auxiliarie* forces in the midst, he attended to see what the enemy would doe. The Galles, although they were perswaded, that they might aduenture battell, both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowesse of warre, as also in respect of the paucitie of the *Romans*; yet they thought it better to block up the passages, and so cut off all cariages, and conuoyes of corne; and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the *Romans* for want of Corne, should offer to make a retreat, they would then set vpon them as they marched, wearied with travell, & heauily laden with their burthens. This resolution beeing approoued by the whole Councell of the Galles, when the *Romaines* imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their Campe.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His *Sertorius* had followed the faction of *Marius* and *Cinna*, and when *Sylla* had ouerthrowne both the elder & younger *Marius*, he fled into *Spaine*, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against *Pompey* and *Metellus*, and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in

Caesar.

Sertorius.

the end was treacherously slaine by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; & vnder him were these Captaines brought vp, which Cæsar commendeth for their skill in Armes.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N histories, propounding to our consideration the deedes and monuments of former ages, we may obserue two especial means, which the great Commanders of the world haue entertained to achieve victorie, and ouermaister their enemies: the first, by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second by forceable meanes and waging of battaile; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and abilitie of the bodie.

Concerning the first, it hath euer beene held more honourable, as better lasting the worth of the spirit, and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerser part may be weakened by wit, and prevented in the projects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, and so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, and conclude the matter by termes of Arte, taken from the directions of good providence. For, to speake a truth, the action of battell, as it is the last part in that facultie; so it is the worst in regard of Christian duties, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his second wife (which the Diuines doe note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind) then the children of grace; whose ioy consisteth in peace and loue.

Cæsar, in the first of the Ciuill warres, repeated the same thing, but from other grounds: for, hauing shurte vp Afranius and Petreius in a place of disadvantage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet, forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Captaines that were earnest vpon the enemy; *Cur etiam secundo pralio aliquis ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optimi deserti milites? cur denique fortuna periclitaretur?* And this course did these Gallies take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Art, and the Romaine industrie; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romaines at their owne weapon.

This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest way in these vncertaine and casuall euents: for, that which resteth vpon corporall strength, & maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is very terrible euen to the better partie, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For, it were a miracle of Fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoever, that the victor Armie should buy so great a fortune without bloodshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophée to Honour, at the sole cost of the Enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure.

And

And for the vncertaintie in a battaile, who knoweth not what infinite changes and changes may happen in euerie small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that partie, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and tear, ioy & sorrow; and therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the weywardnesse of Fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires.

This, I say, is chiefly to be imbraced, if our means will afford vs that happinesse: but howsoever, I hold it wisdom so to entertaine this course of victorie, that wee omitte not the chiefeest helps of furtherance, when it cometh to blowes, but to thinke of this conquest by Arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for, the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes, to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from providence and discreet cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarie to the later, and by the helpe of battell, fought to free himselfe from those disadvantages, into which the Gallies had brought him.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Obserue further, out of this place, that what course soeuer bee taken, a discreet Leader will not easilie forgoe an aduantage without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certaintie of a benefit, vpon probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For, so hee might forgoe his fortune, by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are often scene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

Not to forgoe  
an aduantage


## THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



Further, I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for, their viall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not afford that commoditie, they then made two battels that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their histories.

THE

## THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

 He last thing which I obserue, is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battaile; which is here said to bee, in *mediam Aciem*: for, as their Armies were diuided into three battells; so euery battell was diuided into three parts; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that Inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, hee commaunded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons; and to cary earth and turfe to the Mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather then in either of the cornets, is, for that the battaile hath not such scope to get out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischief, as the cornets haue: for, wherefoeuer there haue been set battells fought, the strength of their Armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell: and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certain on that part; for, the cornets kept the enemy, both from incompassing about the body of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie.

At the battell of Cannas, Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemy, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemy came to charge vpon the battell, they easily beate them backe, and as they followed, the reitrait fell in between the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted; & being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowne. And thus we see the aduantage which a Generall hath, when his two cornets stand firme, although the battell shrink in the incounter. Hanniball, in the battell hee had with Scipio in Africk, placed the Strangers in the front, and in the rereward; according peraduenture as hee found their number, and the vse of their Armes: which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgement of a Generall, then of any prescription that can be given in this matter.

## CHAP. XI.

Crassus taketh the Camp of the Galles: and  
with their ouerthrow endeth that

VVarre.



**C**RASSVS, vnderstanding their drift, and finding his men willing to set vpon their Campe, incouraged his souldiers; & to the contentment of all men, went directly to the place where they were lodged: & as some began to fill up the ditch, and others with casting weapons to beate the Galles from the rampier, he commaunded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom

hee had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the souldiers that fought, and to carie earth & turfe to the Mount; that so they might make a heap of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy beganne valiantly to make resistance, and to cast their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Romaine souldier; the horsemen in the meane time, riding about the Campe of the Galles, brought word to Crassus, that the rampier at the Decumane porte, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the Commanders of the horse, to incourage their men with great promises and rewards; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, took foure cohorts that were left in the Campe, and carying them a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the enemy, while all mens eyes and minds were intent vpon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsemen had found to be weake; which being easilie broken downe, they had entered the Campe before the Enemy could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour and shout beeing heard about that place, the Romaine legions renewing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, beeanne to charge them afresh with great furie. The Galles, beeing circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselves ouer the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But forasmuch as the Country was open & champaigne, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of fiftie thousand, there scarce remained the fourth part.

## OBSERVATION.



**F**rom this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, how an Enemy that is strongly incamped, & for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great consequence, in matter of warre; and therefore deserueth due consideration. Concerning which, he saith this downe for a maxime, that All forts and strong holds are taken by the foot; & that camps and lodgings are taken by the head. By which is meant, that hee who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and provided, must first get the foot, and take hold of the ditch, and then seise himselfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for, he saith, that mounts and eminent eleuations, are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vnlesse they ouer-top them: which may be easilie preuented, by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall cary his mounts aloft; and to they shall neuer come to ouer-toppe the holds. But all Camps and lodgings are taken by the head: that is, by mounts and eleuations; which by the aduantage of their height, commaund the champaigne: for, hee holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the Campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemy shall make without.

This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discouer a way, how to raise a mount, maugre the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or murder

Lib. 3.  
Auerimus  
to secundo.

urther them all within their trenches. And thus he tooketh from Cæsar, at the Siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geometricians call *Helicall*. By this double ditch, he maketh his approach to any place of most aduantage, where hee may, in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to play vpon any quarter of the Campe. The censure of this practice, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme, in the behalfe of these works, that they were of high esteeme amongst the Romans, who daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest meanes, both for securitie and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these works, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practices: but our men had rather flie vpon desperate aduentures, and seeke victorie in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar vndertaketh the warre with the  
*Menapij and Morini.*

*A*t the same time also, although the Sommer was almost at an end, yet forasmuch as all Gallia was in peace, and the *Morini* enely with the *Menapij* stood out in Armes, and had neuer either sent Embassadour, or otherwise treated of Peace: Cæsar, thinking that warre might quickly be ended, ledde his Armie into their Country. At his coming, hee found them to carrie the warres farre otherwise, then the rest of the Gallies had done: for, vnderstanding that the greatest Nations of Gallia, which had waged battell with the Romans, were beaten and overthrowne: and hauing vvhole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuained both themselves and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar, coming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his Campe, not discouering any enemy neere about him: but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods, and assaulted the Romans; but being speedily drinen in againe, with the losse of manie of them, as the Romans followed them farre into the woods, had some few of their men slaine.

The time that remained, Cæsar resolved to spend in cutting down the woods: and, least the souldiers might be taken vnawares, while they were busied in that worke, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either side of the Armie, that they might serue for a defence, against sudden assaults. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies, so that their goods & castell was taken by the Romans: but they themselves were fledde into thicker woods.

*woods. At which time there happened such a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue off the worke; and the souldiers could no longer indure to lie in Tents of skinned: and therefore Cæsar, after hee had wasted and spoiled their Country, burned their townes, and their houses; hee caried back his Armie, and placed them in such Citties to winter in, as were subdued by the late warres.*

## OBSERVATION.



*T*he Irish rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogges, do entertaine the like course of war, as the *Morini* did with Cæsar. The meanes which heved to disappoint them of that practice, was to cut downe the woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of war; let them consider that the Romaine discipline, wrought greater effects of valour, then can be made credible by the vse of these times. For, besides their exquisite discipline, which of it selfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampled magnanimitie, their industrie was admirable in the execution thereof, and caried it with such vncessant trauell, that the souldiers thought it great happinesse when they came to wage battell with the Enemy; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the hazard of their liues.

Neither let it seeme strange, that the Romaines vndertooke to cut down the woods: but rather let vs admire their facilitie in so difficult a taske; for, as the historie witnesseth; *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*: a great quantitie of ground, was rid in a few daies, with incredible speed. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder any luddaine assault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deserueth as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the sixth booke of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serue to acquaint vs with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The *Eburones*, or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods & bogges, and made vse of them in the warre they had with Cæsar. The matter faith hee, required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie (for there could no danger come from an enemy that was frightened and dispersed) as the safetie of euerie particular souldier, which in part did pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For, the desire of a bootie, caried many of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to goe either thicke together, or close imbattailed. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, & diuide his men into many bodies: but if he would haue the Maniples to keepe at their Ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Romaine Armie required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the Enemy. Neither did they want courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumuent such

such as they found alone, straggling from their companies. In the difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens mindes were set on fire with revenge) then to hurt the enemy with the losse of the Romaine souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the Eburones, & they should have all the prey for their labour: that the life of the Galles, rather then his legionarie souldiers, might be hazarded in those woods; as also, that with so great a multitude, both the race & name of that people might be quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true motion of the Irish warres, which may be better observed by such as knowe those warres by experience, then by my selfe, that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to prevent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallel in these two cases, I will leaue it to bee done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.



THE

## THE FOVRTH COMMENTARIE.

### THE ARGVMENT.

**T**He Visipetes, and Tenchtheri are driuen to seek new seates in Gallia; they driue the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are ouerthrowen by Cæsar. That warre being ended, he made a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carried his Army ouer into Germany. He taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri; and giueth libertie to the Vbij: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Britanie, with the occurrences of that warre.

### CHAP. I.

The\*Visipetes, and\*Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, ouer the Rhene into Gallia: the nature of the Sueui:

\* Those of  
Zurphen.  
\* Of Hassia.

**T**HE winter following, Pompeie and Crassus being Consuls, the Visipetes and Tenchtheri, two Germane nations, passed ouer the Rhene, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their sitting, was the ill intreatie, which for many yeares together they had receiued of the Sueni, the greatest and warlikest nation amongst the Germanes. For, these Sueni had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearely furnished their warres, with 1000. men apiece; and kept as manie at home to maintain both themselves, and their Armies abroad: and these the yeare following were in Armes; and the other staid at home, and performed the like dutie; and so by this means, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and master of war. They liued chiefly vpon cattel & milk, & vsed much hunting; which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continual exercise, and libertie of life, being neuer tyed to anie discipline, nor vrged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong & of a large stature, vsing skins and hides for their cloathing, which covered but part of their bodie, the rest being naked. Their horsemen oftentimes, in time of batell, forooke their horse, and fought on foot; being taught to stand

Cæsar.

N

still

in one place, that when they would they might returne vnto them. Neither is there any thing more base, or dishonest in the course of their life, then to vse furniture for horses: and would adventure to charge vpon great troupes of horse, at vsed Equipage, with a few of their owne quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in vnto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them vnapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion, was to haue their bordering Territories lie waste & desolate: for, so it would be thought, that any States together, would not rejoyce their conquering valour: and it was reversed, that the country lay waste from them one waie 600. miles together.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**B**Y this practice of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuill discretion, to make vse of that greatnesse which prowels hath obtained: for, notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other end, then to maintaine barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valor is alwaies subordinate to the preferuation of Common-weales, and is as the defensiu Armes of ciuill societie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it resemblen an humor that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular haniour of our young Gallians, whose naked valour revealing it selfe only in the lie and in the stabbe, for want of other assistant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a metall, lea- deth them into such inconueniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddie headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guardon, is repaid with irrisiion.

## CHAP. II.

The motiues, inducing the Vspetes to  
come ouer the Rhene into

GALLIA.

Cæsar.



Ext vnto these Sueui, inhabited the Vbij, a very ample and potent State: and through their entercourse & traffick with marchants, somewhat more ciuill then the rest of the Germans. With these, the Sueui had often waged battell: and albeit they could not expel them out of their country forasmuch as their State was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them vnder, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the Vspetes and Tenchtberi: for, hauing made head against the Sueui

Sueui for many yeares together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three yeares through the Continent of Germany, at last they arriued where the Menapij inhabited the banks, on both sides the riuer Rhene: but being terrified with the arriual of such a multitude, they forsooke all their dwellings beyond the riuer, and planted themselves on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.

The Vspetes with their associates, hauing tried all meanes, and not finding themselves able to passe ouer by force, for want of boats; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapij, gained a retreat to their old habitation: & after three daies iourney, their horsemen in one night speedily returned againe, and slew the Menapij, both vnguarded and vnprouided. For they vpon the departure of the Germans feared not to returne ouer the riuer into their towns & houses. These being slain, and their shipping taken, they got ouer the riuer, before the rest of the Menapij had any notice of their coming: by which meanes they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and lined that winter vpon the prouision they found there.

Cæsar vnderstanding of these things, and fearing the weaknesse of the Galles, in as much as they are sudden & quick in their resolutions, and withall desirous of noueltie: he durst no waie trust their vnconstancie; for, it was their practice and custome to slay trauellers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knewe, concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flocke about Merchants in faires and markets, and learne of them whence they came, and what newes they brought from thence: and by these rumors and hearesayes they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but repent themselves, being groundd vpon such weake intelligence, as was vsually coined to please the multitude. Which custom being known, Cæsar to preuent a greater war, hastened to his Army sooner then he was wont to doe.

## OBSERVATION.

**S**UCH as haue spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, & haue made diligent search of the temperature & quality of climates and nations, haue all with one consent made choler the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the laide humor vially breedeth. Neither haue these conditions, which Cæsar so long agoe obserued in the ancient Galles, any dissemblance from that which the learned of this age haue deliuered, concerning the nature of the said inhabitants; but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such nouelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same vnto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes, and people, or what else so long a time hath changed; which argueth the virefistable power of celestial influence, establishing an vniformity of nature, according as the sit of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The cause of the diuersitie in the temperature of nations, which are differen



ed by North and South, is not without apparant cause, attributed to their proximity, or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northern & Southerne climates of the earth; and separateth the inhabitants thereof, by the dominion of their actiue qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same climate, and vnder the same parallel, receiuing the vertue of the celestially bodies, by the same downfall and rebound of their beames, being differenced only by East and West; are so much disunited in nature, and so vnlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be as some haue imagined, forasmuch as the all-inclosing sphere; which remaineth quiet and immouable about the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diuersly distinguished with variety of properties; which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect, are imprinted in the correspondend quarters of the earth; and so keepe a perpetuall residency of one and the same qualitie, in one and the same place; and make also the variety of fashions in such partes, as otherwise are equall favorites of the heauens maiestie, by receiuing an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the saide quarters of the earth are in themselves diuersly noted, with seuerall qualities, which appropriate the selfe same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be some other vnkown cause: I wil leaue euery man to satisfie himself with that which seemeth most probable vnto him, and proceed to the discouerie of this cholerick passion. Wherein I will endeavour to shew, how impatiencie, sodaine resolution, and desire of noueltie, are naturall adiuncts of this humor. And if Cæsar made vse of this Philosophy in the managing of that warre; let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must laie for a maxime, that which long experience hath made authentically, that the motions of the minde are either quicke or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for, as the stegmaticall humor, is of a moist, colde and heauie nature, begetting weake and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a lueles disability; so is the motion of the internall faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments, wherby it moueth: and therefore men of this waterish constitution, are no way apt to receiue an impression, nor to entertaine any sensible apprehension, vnlesse it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions: and then also they proceede as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choise of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flamma bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the actiue vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the viuacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented vnto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily receiued, & possesseth the apprehending facultie, with such facility of entrance, that it moueth the other powers of the soule, with as great efficacy at the first conception, as if it had been brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of vndoubted truth: It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and fit

fit disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth fro heate the chiefeft qualitie in choler that the object is at the first moment, so strongly fetted, in the first receiuing facultie, that the other powers of the minde, with as great speed manifest their offices, concerning the apprehension; and deliuer a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so sodainly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discursive power to examine the substance thereof, by conference of circumstances; nor to giue iudgement according to the course of our intellectuall court. It behoueth therefore euery man, in that vnsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, & not to giue place to resolution, before his iudgement be informed, by discourse of the strength or weaknesse of the conceiued opinion.

But to leaue these speculative meditations, to Philosophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right vse of passions is either true wisdom, or cometh nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best becometh a soldier; or how it auaileth, or disaduantageh in matter of warre. And first it cannot be denied, that there is almost no passion, that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sinceritie of a good iudgement, then this of anger, which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseh it selfe in his owne actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it selfe, and conuince a false pretended cause, as the author of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage even against truth and innocency. Piso condemned a souldier for returning from foraging, without his companion, being perswaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution, the other that was missing, returned & with great ioy of the whole Army, they were carried to the Generall, thinking to haue much gratified him, with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despight, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withall, he made three culpable for that hee found one innocent; the first, because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to bee recalled without the breach of lawe: the second, for that he was the cause of the death of his companions; and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandement.

Concerning matter of warre, as it consisteth of differenced parts; so hath choler diuers effectes. In case of discourse and consultation, when as the powers of the minde ought to bee cleere of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the vnderstanding, and troubleth the sinceritie of a good iudgement, as Cæsar noted in his speech to the Senate concerning Catinell: and therefore a Commander, must by al means endeavour to auoid, even the least motions of so hurtfull a passion; and leaue his affections, with that grauity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may, either hinder his vnderstanding, or withhold his will from following that course, which reason appointeth, as the best means to a fortunate successe: alwaies remembering that all his actions are presented vpon a stage, and passe the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud graue & patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom;

Salust.

disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how iust soeuer otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and furie of battaile, I take anger to be a necessarie instrument to let valour on foot, and to ouerwage the difficulties of terror, with furious resolution: for, considering that the noblest actions of the mind, stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest meanes, to aduance the valiant carriage of a battaile: for, as feare is treacherous and vn- safe, to anger is confident and of an vnquencheable heart. And therefore a Com- mander ought by all meanes, to suggest matter of anger against an Enemy, that his men may beholde them with a wrathfull regarde, and thirst after the daie of battell, to satisfie their fury with the blood of their aduersaries. If any vrge, that it hath been heertofore obserued of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the later end they were lesse then women; and therefore a cholerick disposition is not so fit for seruice, as we seem to make it: I answer, that There is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was obserued in the Galles, and the passion of anger, wel kindled in the minde: for, the first is subiect to alteration and contrarietie of actions; but the other is furious, inuincible, neuer satisfied but with reuenge. And so that of A- ristotle is prooued true, that anger serueth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue; whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for, we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage vs; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth vs, and not we it, as it hap- pened in the raigne of Tyberius, amongst the nucinous legions at *Vetera*: & therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom hee maketh the ob- iect of that anger, which kindleth in his Army. For, as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regarde of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiers.

But to leaue this hasty matter, and fall neerer that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication, which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the euent whereof proued the truth of his predictions; which sheweth what aduantage a learned General that hath bin somewhat instructed in the school of Nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the actiue rudiments of the war, and thin- ket of no further lesion in that art, then that which the office of a Seriant, or Lanceprizado containeth.

CHAP.

## CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth to his Armie, marcheth towards the Germanes, and by the waie treateth of conditions of Peace.



Cæsar being come to his Army, found that to haue hap- pened which he before suspected: for, some of the States of Gal- lia had sent messengers vnto the Germanes, to leaue the banks of Rhene, and to Come further into the continent, where they should find ready, what soeuer they desired. Whereupon the Germanes began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as far as the confines of the \* Eburones. The Princes of the Galles being cal- led together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered, concern- ing their reuolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loia- lity, he commanded certaine troupes of horse to be lenied; and resolved to make warre vpon the Germanes; and hauing made prouision of torne, hee directed his march towards them. From who as he was on the way, within a few daies iourney of their Camp, he receiued this message: The Germanes as they were not willing to make warre vpon the Romans, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood, if they were iustly prouoked, for, their ancient custome was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet this much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driuen by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, & either giue them territories to inhabite, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the lawe of Armes, they might proue profitable friends vnto them. They onely yeelded to the Sueni, to whom the gods in feats of Arms were inferior; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

To this Cæsar answered what he thought fit, but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keepe their owne, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a mul- titude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the \* Vbi, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the iniurie of the Sueni, and desiring aide against them: this much he himself would intreat of the Vbi. The messengers went backe with these Mandates, promising within three daies to retorne againe to Cæsar: in the meane time, they desired him, not to bring his Army anie neerer their quarters, which request Cæsar denied. For, vnderstan- ding that a fewe dayes before, a great part of their Casualtie were passed ouer the Mosel, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the return of their horsemen.

When Cæsar was come within twelue miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned

Cæsar.

\* Liege.

\* Colonia A. rippina.

returned, and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them: but being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those troupes of horse, which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would give them leave to send messengers to the Vbij: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would sweare faith and safe continuance vnto their people: Neither would they require more then 3. daies, to negotiate this businesse. Cæsar conceived this intreaty to import nothing else, then the returne of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three dayes, notwithstanding he promised them to march but foure miles further that day, to a convenient waiting place: in the meane time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to prouoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustaine the charge, vntill he came neerer with the Armie.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**F**irst, wee may obserue his dissembling of the practice of the Galles with the Germans; and the incouragement which hee gaue them in a faithfull and loyall affection to the people of Rome, when hee himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for, he well understood, that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to haue obiected vnto them their errors, had not bin to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he took the waie to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the apparance of faithfull friends, that they might not be discouraged, by the detection of their reuolt.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**econdly, vpon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rheme; wee may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents & denials, as might manifest his readinesse to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as hee was content they should take a quiet farewel of Gallia, & plant themselves in the possessions of the Vbij, so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disadvantage his forcible constraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for, he well knew, that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parlee, then any other motiue, how reasonable soeuer.

Moreouer wee may obserue, how careful hee was not to impose vpon the Germanes a necessitie of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding vnto

to them the affociation of the Vbij) by which they might auoyd the hazard of battell. Which thing was alwayes obserued by Commanders of auncient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neyther of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hand and the tongue) had euer brought so many excellent workes to that type of perfection, vnles they had been forced thereunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too strict vpon a violent garde, we give occasion to the Enemy, by the waie of *Antiperistasis*, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Vetus Mæcius calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appeare by these examples.

Some fewe of the Samnites, contrarietie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incursions into the territories of the Roman confederats; the Senate of that State sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But beeing reiected, Claudius Pontius Generall of their forces, in an excellent Oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but chose rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Iustum est bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.*

Caius Manlius, conducting the Roman legions against the Veij, part of the Veian Army had entred the Roman Campe; which Manlius perceiuing, hee hasted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Veij: which they no sooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew Manlius; and had ouerthrowne the whole Campe, had not a Tribune opened them a passage, by which they fled away.

In like manner Canillus, the wisest of the Romaine Captaines, being entred into the Cittie of the Veij, that hee might take it with greater facilitie and disarm the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessitie, hee caused it to bee proclaimed, that no Veian should bee hurt, that was found vnarmed. Whereupon euery man cast away his weapon, and so the towne was taken without bloodshed.

Let a souldier therefore take such holde of occasions, and opportunities that are offered vnto him, that in time of battell hee may seem to cast necessitie vpon his own cause, and retain it in his paie: considering how the power thereof altereth the works of Nature, and changeth their effects into contrary operations: being neuer subiect to anie ordinance or lawe; and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

## CHAP. IIII.

The Germans, contrary to their owne request  
made to Cæsar, set upon the Romaine horse-  
men, and ouerthrewe them.

**N**otwithstanding the Germans request, concerning the truce,  
as soon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in num-  
ber 5000. (whereas the Germans had not about 800. horse)  
they charged upon the Romans, not expecting any hostile in-  
counter inasmuch as their ambassadours were newly depar-  
ted from Cæsar, and had obtained that daie of truce: but be-  
ing set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to  
their usuall custome, forsooke their horse, and fighting on foote, did easily put the  
Romans to flight; who neuer looked backe, vntill they came into the sight of the  
Romans: in that battell were slain 74. Roman horsemen. After this battell, Cæsar  
thought it not safe, either to hearken to any conditions, or to receive any message  
from them, that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, & meant nothing but  
war: And to attend any longer vntill their horsemen returned, was but to giue  
them that aduantage against him, especially considering the weakenesse of the  
Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battell had gayned great reputation;  
and therefore he durst not giue them space to thinke upon it.

## OBSERVATION.

**H**is cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speak somewhat,  
concerning that maine controuersie of policie, which is, whether  
the actions of Princes and great Commanders, are alwaies to be at-  
tended with integrity, & faithful accomplishment thereof. Wherein  
I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which vertue and  
morall honestie on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christi-  
an mind) & the daily practice of States men on the other side, alleage to make  
good their contrarie assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend vertue in a shew, and not  
in esse and being, & study to maintaine their states onely with humane reason,  
not regarding the authority of diuine ordinance, set this down as a *maxime* in  
their Art; That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an  
end, totting to his contentment, must in all respects bee like qualified, both in  
iudgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he  
cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himself strong in the matter, which he  
vndertaketh. For, a wrafter that commeth with mere strength to encounter  
an other that hath both strength and cunning, may bestrewe his strength  
that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laughd at, as an vnworthie

Cham-

Champion for serious sports: in like manner, in this vniuersall confusion of infi-  
delity, wherein subtilly flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity  
of spirit to wind through the labyrinths of falshood, and auoid the snares of de-  
ceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and bestrew his honesty, if  
he regard his commodity. For it is the course that euery man taketh, which must  
bring vs to the place, to which euery man goeth: and he that opposeth himself  
against the current of the world, may stand alone in his owne conceit, and ne-  
uer attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore, as craft &  
deceit are so generall, it behooueth a man of publicke negotiations, to carry a  
mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which ancient  
writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Cætaure, half a man  
and half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of Princely carriage; that of  
the brutish part, hee might learne to strengthen himselfe, with force and cou-  
rage; and of the humane shape, so to manage reason, that it might bee a fit in-  
strument to answer or preuent, whatsoever mans wit might forge to ouerthrow  
it. Neither ought a priuate man to wonder at the strangenes of these positions;  
considering that the gouernment of kingdoms, & Empires is caried with ano-  
ther bias, then that which concerneth particular affaires in a wel ordered State:  
wherein truth-breakers and faithles dissemblers are worthily condemned, inas-  
much as they necessarily enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helm  
of gouernment, and are to shape the course of a State, according to the variati-  
on of times and fortunes, deriue their conclusions from other principles, where-  
of inferior subiects are no more capable, then men are able to vnderstand the  
works of the Gods: and therefore they are called *arcana imperij*, to be reueren-  
ced rather, then lookt into.

To conclude, the affaires of particular persons are of so short extension, and  
incircled in so small a compasse, that a meane capacity may easily apprehend  
the aduantages or inconueniences, which may ensue vpon the contract: and  
therefore it is requisite they should stand to the aduenture, and their iudgement  
is worthily taxed with the losse: but the businesses of the Common-weale are,  
both subiect to so many casualties of fortune, and rely vpon such vnexpected  
accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how prouident foueer, to foresee  
the issue in that variety of chances. Besides that, euery particular subiect is much  
interested in the fortune of the euent, and may iustly challenge an alteration of  
the intended course, rather then suffer shipwrack through the error of their Pi-  
lot: And so the safetie of the State doth balance out the losse of credit in the Go-  
uernour.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirme vertue to bee  
the same both in Prince & people; neither doth condition of state, or calling,  
or the qualitie of publicke or priuate business, alter the nature and essence of  
goodnes: for, to deprive the tongue of truth and fidelity were to break the bond  
of ciuill society, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Common-  
weales. They doe not denie but that a wise Prince may so carrie a treatie, that  
he may seeme to affect that most which he least intendeth: or answer doubt-  
fully concerning the propositions; and that hee may vse with great honour the

prac-

practices and stratagems of warre, when the fortune of both parties consisteth vpon their owne industrie: but to breake any covenants agreed vpon, may wel get a kingdome, but neuer honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means, wherby a State is continued in happy gouernment: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this History, that he who falsifieth his word vpon aduantage, howlocuer he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his owne safetie: for, if they once recover the loss, and get any aduantage against those truth-breakers, they will finde as little fauour, as the Germans did with Cæsar.

## CHAP. V.

*Cæsar marched directly to the Campe of the Germans, and cut them all in peeces, and so ended that warre.*



Vpon these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Quæstor, there happened a very fortunate accident. For, the next daie, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefeest of the Germans came vnto Cæsar into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent practices, and with all to continue their petition of truce. Whereof Cæsar was exceedingly gladd, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had bin daunted with so late an ouerthrow: And making a triple battel, marched speedily eight miles, and so came vpon the Germans, before they had notice what had hapned; & being terrified with our suddain arriuall, & the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course, to bring forth their forces, or defend their Căp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult & feare was no sooner perceiued by the Roman soldier, but calling to mind their perfidious treacherie, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little resisted; in the meane time, the women and children fled euery one away: which Cæsar perceiuing, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans, hearing the clamour and schrichings behind their backs, & seeing their friends pursued and slaine, did cast away their weapons, and fledde out of the Campe: and comming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped, cast themselves into the riuer, where, what through feare & weariness, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict, the Romans lost not a man. The number of the enemy was 430000, with women and children. To them who he had retained in his Campe, he gaue leaue to depart; but they, fearing the cruelty of the Gallies, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Cæsar agreed vnto.

ORSEP.

## OBSERVATION.



His relation affordeth little matter of warre, but onely a seuerer reuenge of hatefull trecherie: notwithstanding, I will hence take occasion, to discouer the offices of the Quæstor and the Legates; and shew what place they had in the Armie. And first, concerning the Quæstor, we are to vnderstand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same Court, which was called to create the Generall. His office was, to take charge of the publique treasure, whether it came out of their Aerarium, for the pay of the Armie; or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the souldiers received their stipend, both in corne and money: and what other bootie was taken from the enemy, he either kept them, or sold them, for the vic of the Common-weale.

The Legates were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assitants and Coadiutors to the Emperour, for the publique seruice, & were altogether directed by the Generall, in whose absence they had the absolute command: and their number was for the most part vncertaine; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Armie.

## CHAP. VI.

*Cæsar maketh a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carieth his Armie ouer into Germanie.*



THE Germane warre beeing thus ended: Cæsar thought it necessarie, to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene into the Continent of Germanie, for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded, to bring their Colonies, & their vagrant multitudes into Gallia, he thought it good to make known vnto them, that the Romaine people could at their pleasure, carie their forces ouer the Rhene into Germanie. Moreover, those troupes of horse, which were absent at the late ouerthrow of the Germanes, were fledde into the confines of the Sicambri; to whom, when Cæsar sent Messengers to demaund them to be sent vnto him, they answered, that the Romaine Empire was limited by the Rhene: & if the Germanes were interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge anie authoritie in their quarters? Laßlie, the Vbi, who amongst all the rest of the Germanes, had onelie accepted of Cæsars friendship, and giuen pledges of their fidelitie, had made earnest sute vnto him, to send them aide against the Sueni; or at the least, to transport his Army ouer the Rhene: for, the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, & of such fame, what with Ariouistus ouerthrow, & this

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this last service, that it sounded honorable amongst the furthest Nations of Germany. For these reasons, Cæsar resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carie his Armie over by boate, was neither safe, nor for the maiestie of the people of Rome. And, albeit it seemed a matter of great difficultie, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse, and depth of the river, to make a bridge: yet hee resolved to try what he could doe; otherwise, hee determined not to passe over at all: and so hee built a bridge after this manner.

At two foote distance, he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the river: these hee let downe into the water with engines, and droue them in with commanders, not perpendicularly, after the fashion of a pile, but gable-wise, and bending with the course of the water: opposite unto these, he placed two other trees, ioyned together after the same fashion, being fortie foote distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the river. These two paire of couples thus placed, hee ioyned together with a beame of two foote square, equal to the distance betweene the said couples, and fastened them at each end, on either side of the couples, with braces and pinnes: whereby the strength of the worke, and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the streame was, and the faster it fell upon the timber work, the stronger the bridge was united in the couplings and ioyns. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beames, untill the work was brought unto the other side of the river: and then hee laid straight planks from beame to beame, and covered them with hurdles; and so hee made a floore to the bridge. Moreover, on the lower side of the bridge, he droue down supporters, which being fastened to the timber worke, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the upper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boates, or what else the enemy might cast downe to trouble the worke: within tenne daies, that the timber beganne to be cut downe and caried, the worke was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar, leaving a strong guard on at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Siambrs.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**T shall not be amisse, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge: as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar: whom wee may observe to insist with as great plenty of wit and eloquence, in presenting unto vs the subtiltie of his invention, in such manner of handy works, as upon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiently witness: besides, the fortifications at Aleſia, & the intrenchments in Britany, for the safety of his shipping, with many other works, which he might well record, as the greatest designes of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effects of magnanimous industrie, that succeeding ages might not boast either of Arte or prowess, which his vertue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder

wonder at that worth, which they themselves could not attaine unto. And to that purpose, he entertained Virruuius, the Father of Architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that facultie, as his Maister Cæsar is in feates of Armes. By whose example, a great Commander may learne, how much it importeth the eternitie of his fame, to beautifie his greatest designes with Arte, and to esteeme of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall Muses, to shew themselves vnder the shape of a sensible forme; which albeit, through the rudeness of the matter, fall farre short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beautie expresseth such a maiestie of Arte, that no time will suffer the memorie thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double postes, whereof the first order bending with the streame, and the lower ranke against the streame, when they came to be coupled together with ouerthwart beames, which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the streame fell upon the work, the faster the ioyns of the building were vnited, as may better appeare by a modell of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speake of the diuersitie of bridges, and of the practices which antiquitie hath deuised, to transport Armies ouer Rivers: but inasmuch as it is a common subiect for all that vnder take this Militarie task, & hath been handled by Lipsius, upon the occasion of this bridge; I will referre the Reader to that place; and onely note the singular disposition of this action, inasmuch as Cæsar made the meanes correspondent to that end which hee intended. For, considering that the chiefeſt end of his passage was, to let the Germans vnderstand, that the power of the Romaine Empire, was not bounded with the Rhene; and that a river could not so separate their territories, but that they were able to ioyne both the Continents together, and make a common roade way, where it seemed most vnpassable: hee thought it best to passe ouer his Armie by a bridge, that so the Germanes might knowe the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories, as vnited unto Gallia; or to be vnited at the pleasure of the Romans, with a firme Isthmus and plaine passage by foote, which in times past had alwaies been separated by a mighty river. Neither would a transportation by boat haue wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily vse thereof was so familiar to the Germanes, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an vnaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, & so suddainely performed, they would easily vnderstand, that they were not so farre off, but that they might bee ouertaken: and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to proue, that a passage ouer a river by a bridge, is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be deuised; especially, if the river carrie any depth, such as the Rhene is: otherwise, if it haue either shallowes or fordes, whereby men may wade, ouer, without any great incombance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge; but rather to thinke of it, as of a place incombred with such hindrances, as men often meet with a march.

## CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri: giueth libertie to the Vbij; and returneth againe into Gallia.

**T**HE Sicambri, vnderstanding that Cæsar was making a bridge over the Rhene, prepared themselves to flie; and at the perswasion of the Vsiptes, forsooke their country, and conuained themselves into their possessions into woods and solitarie Deserts. Cæsar, continuing a few daies in their quarters, hauing set on fire their villages and houses, and burned vp their Corne and prouision; he came to the Vbij, promising them aide against the Sueui: by whom, he vnderstood, that as soone as the Sueui had intelligence, that hee went about to make a bridge, calling a Councell, according to their manner, they sent vnto all quarters of their State, that they should forsake their townes, and carie their wiues and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to beare Armes, should make head in one place which they appointed to be the midst of their Country: & there they attended the coming of the Romans, & were resolu'd in that place to giue the battell. Which when Cæsar vnderstood, hauing ended all those things, in regard vvhich he came into Germanie, vvhich was chiefly to terrifie the Germans, to be reuenged vpon the Sicambri, to set the Vbij at libertie; hauing spent in all eightene daies beyond the Rhene, as well in regard of his own honor, as the good of the Common-wealth: hee returned into Gallia, and brake up the bridge.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voiage into Britanie: hee enquireth of Merchants, concerning the nature of that people.

**A**Lthough the Sommer was almost spent, & that in those parts the winter hastened on apace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding, hee resolu'd to goe over into Britanie: forasmuch as hee vnderstood, that in all the former warres of Gallia, the Enemy had receiued most of their supplie from thence. And, although the time of the yeere would not suffer him to finish that warre; yet hee thought it would bee to good purpose, if he went onely to view the land, to vnderstand the qualitie of the inhabitants,

inhabitants, and to know their Coast, their Ports, & their landing places; where of the Galles were altogether ignorant: for, sildome any man but Marchants did trauell vnto them. Neither was there any thing discovered but the Sea-coast, & those Regions vvhich were opposite vnto Gallia. And therefore, calling Marchants together from all quarters, he neither could vnderstand of what quantity the land was, what Nations, or of what power they were that inhabited it; what use or experience of warre they had; what lawes or customes they used; nor what Hauens they had to receiue a Nanie of great shipping.

## OBSERVATION.



As the Germans had oftentimes stirred vp motions of rebellion amongst the Galles, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britaines had vpheld most of their warres, by furnishing them with such supplies, as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Cæsar, or the Romane people, would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, as they had chastised the insolence of the Germans, and sent them backe againe, with greater losse then gaine; so was it necessary to make the Britaines knowe, that their assistance in the warre of Gallia, would draw more businesse vpon them, then they were well able to manage. For, as I haue noted in my former discourses, the causes of an vnpeaceable government, are as well externall and forraigne, as internall, and bred in the bodie; which neede the helpe of a Physician, to continue the body in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualifie their malicious operations, as any internall sicknesse whatsoeuer.

In the second Commentarie, I briefly touched the commoditie of good discouerie: but because it is a matter of great consequence, in the fortunate carriage of a warre, I will once againe by this example of Cæsar, remember a Generall not to be negligent in this dutie. Suetonius, in the life of our Cæsar reporteth, that he neuer vndertooke any expedition, but he first receiued true intelligence of the particular site and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and qualitie of the people: and that he would not vndertake the voiage into Britanie, vntill hee had made perfect discouerie by himselfe, of the magnitude and situation of the land. Which Suetonius might vnderstand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needs vndertake in the later end of a Sommer, although it were as he himselfe saith, but to discouer.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that gouerned the world in their time, gaue great honour to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of warre in the resemblance of all parts; and namely, in the discouerie and knowledge of a Country: without which, all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in warres, were friuolous and of no effect. And therefore Xenophon in the life of Cyrus, sheweth, that his expedition against the King of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sports, as hee had vied in hunting. Howsoeuer, if the infinite examples registred in historie, how by the

O 3 dexteritie



dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great victories, and through the negligence of others, irrecoverable overthrowes, are not sufficient motives to perswade them to this duty: let their owne experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weakness of their proceedings, whē they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they haue in hand. But let this suffice in the second place, to proue the necessity of good discouerie; and let vs learn of Cæsar, what is principally to bee inquired after in the discouery of an vnknown country; as first, the quantity of the land: secondly, what Nations inhabite it: thirdly, their vse of warre: fourthly, their ciuill gouernment: and lastly, what Hauens they had to receiue a Naue of great shipping. All which circumstances, are such principall Arteries in the bodie of a State, that the discouery of any one of these demands, would haue giuen great light, concerning the motion of the whole body.

## CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volusenus, to discouer the coast  
of Britanie; and prepareth himselfe for  
that voiage.



**C**ÆSAR sent out Caius Volusenus, with a Galley, to discouer what he could concerning these things; and to returne againe vnto him very speedily: hee himselfe marched in the meane time, with all his forces, vnto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence, lay the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither hee commaunded that shippes should be brought from all the maritime Citties of that quarter, and namely that fleet, which hee had built the yere before for the warre at Vannes. In the meane time, his resolution being knowne, and caried into Britanie by Merchants and others, many private States of that Iland sent Embassadors vnto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readinesse to submit themselues to the Romaine Empire. To these he made liberal promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them backe againe. And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made King of Arras, whose wisdom & vertue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authoritie in those Regions. To him hee gaue in charge to goe to as many of the States as hee could, and perswade them to accept of the friendship of the Romaine Empire, and that Cæsar himselfe would presentlie follow after.

Volusenus, hauing taken what view of the Country he could (for he durst not goe on shore to commit himselfe to the barbarisme of the enemy) after five daies returned to Cæsar: and while hee staid in those places, for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent Messengers vnto him, excusing their former faulces, and manifesting their readinesse to obey his mandates.

Cæsar,

Cæsar, not willing to leaue any enemy behind him, or to neglect his voyage into Britanie, for such small matters; hee willingly accepted of their submission, hauing first receiued many hostages of them, and hauing made readie eighty ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he diuided the Gallies to the Questor, the Legates, and the Commanders of the horse. There were also eigheteene ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen. The rest of the Army, he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commanding them to goe to the confines of Menapij: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus, a Legate, to keep the Port, with a sufficient guarizon.

## CHAP. X.

Cæsar saileth into Britanie, and landeth  
his men.



**T**Hese things beeing thus dispatched; hauing a good wind, in the third watch, he put out to Sea, commanding his horsemen to imbarke themselues at the further Port; which was but slowly performed: He himselfe arriued vpon the coast about the fourth houre of the day, where hee found all the Clifts possessed with the forces of the enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep ouer the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher ground vpon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place, notwithstanding, hee cast anchor vntill the rest of the Naue were come vp vnto him.

Cæsar.

In the meane time, calling a Councell of the Legates and Tribunes, hee declared vnto them what aduertisements he had receiued by Volusenus, and told them what he would haue done; and withall, admonished them, that the course of Militarie affaires, and especially Sea matters, that had so suddaine & vnconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Councell being dismissed, hauing both wind and tide with him, hee waighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, vnto a plaine and open shore.

The Britaines, perceiuing the Romans determination, sent their horse & chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romaines intended to land. Cæsar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respects: the shippes were so great, that they could not be brought neere vnto the shore; the souldiers in strange & vknowne places, hauing their hands laden with great and heauie weapons, were at one instant to goe out of the ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemy; where-as the Britaines either standing vpon the shore, or making short sallies into the water, did bolaly cast their weapons in knowne and frequented places, and managed their horses, as accustomed to such seruices.

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## OBSERVATIONS VPON CÆSARS

*The Romans being terrified with these things, and also together unskillfull of this kind of fight, did use the same courage as they were wont to doe in land-services. Which whē Cæsar perceived, he caused the Gallies, that were both strange to the Brittaines, and readier for use, to be removed from the shippes of burthen, and to be rowed up and downe, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence, with slings, engines and arrowes, the Enemy might bee beaten up from the water side; which stood the Romans in good stead: for, the Britains, being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oares, and the unusuall kind of engines; were somewhat dismayed, and beganne to retire backe, and giue way to the Romans. But the souldiers still lingering, and especially for feare of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion, desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happily to the legion: If you will, saith hee, forsake your Eagle, O yee souldiers, and betray it to the enemy: for mine owne part, I will doe my dutie, both to the Common-weale, and to my Imperator. And hauing spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himselfe into the Sea, and caried the Eagle toward the Enemy. The Romaines, exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the shippe: which when others that were neere at hand perceiued, they followed them with as great alacrity, and pressed towards the enemy to encounter with them.*

*The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keepe any order of battell, nor to get any firme footing, nor to follow their Ensignes, forasmuch as euery man kept with those Ensignes which he first met withall) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy, acquainted with the flats and shallowes, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their shippes, putting spurres to their horse, would set vpon them incombred and vnprepared, & many of them would ouer-lay a few: others, would get the aduantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troupes of them. Which when Cæsar perceiued, he caused the shiphoates and smaller vessels to be manned with souldiers: and where he saw need of help, hee sent them to rescue such as were overcharged.*

*As soone as the Romaines got footing on the firme land, they made head together, and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight; but they were not able to follow them, nor take the land at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was onely wanting to Cæsars fortune.*

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**U**PON this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuersie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, & in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our Coast; or quietly to suffer him to sette his men on shore, and retire our forces into some in-land place, & there attend to giue him battell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opinion,

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on, that we ought not by any means to encounter an enemy at his landing; for, so we might much endanger our selues and our Country; did ground themselves vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference between an Iland and a Continent. For, where he setteth downe that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon another in the same Continent; but where their territories are disioyned by so great a bar as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to surpris one another, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vnuseful to oppose an enemy at his landing, not as being vrged by that party (for, I neuer heard any probable motiue from them, which might induce any such opinion) but set downe by such as haue looked into the controuersies, both with experience, and good iudgement.

And first, it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertainie of place, as of time: for, being ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will proue meere fruitiuous; & to performe that, it is requisite that our defensiu forces be sufficient, according to the particular qualitie of euery place subiect to danger: which, considering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the many landing places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men, then this Iland can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number, as might seeme in some sort sufficient; yet the vncertainie of the time of the enemies arriual, would require that they should be lodged, either vpon, or neere the places of danger, many daies at least, if not many weekes, before the instant of their attempt, which would exhaust a greater masse of Treasure, then could bee well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may bee objected, that all our landing places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that it were no safetie at all to make head against him at the landing: for, inasmuch as such places are open & plaine, they yield no commoditie to shelter the defendants from the furie of the artillerie, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boates and landing vessailes; which beating vpon the beach (for, most of our landing places are of that qualitie) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The third obiection, may arise from the disparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the first, it must needs bee granted, that the defendants, being to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to euery particular place for defence, as the assailants may, for offence.

Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without question, that a great & potent Prince (for, such a one it must be, that undertaketh to inuade the territories of so absolute and well obeyed a Princesse as her Maiestie is) would draw out the floure of his soulderie wheresoeuer; besides, the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which doe commonlie attend such seruices. Now, these being thus qualified,

qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one bodie: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants should equall them with forces of like vertue and experience?

These are the reasons, which may be drawne from the disadvantage, which they haue that goe about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that haue beene vrged, by such as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the aunswere of these reasons, I will lay this downe for a principle: That it is impossible for any forraigne Prince, how puissant soeuer, to make such a preparation as shal be fitting, to invade a State so populous, and respectiue of their Soueraigne (notwithstanding the pretences deuised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessitie be discovered, before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my selfe in the example of the yeere 88, which proueth the discovery of the pretended inuasion, before it could come to execution.

Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed be denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of access: but that our defensue forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To proue that our forces are sufficient: we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritime parts, as any other within this kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vttermoſt skirte vpon the coast of Suffex, vnto Margate, vpon the coast of Essex; is by computation about twentie foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not, that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy as wee speake of: partly, in regard of the hugeness of the cliffes, which doe inclose a great part of that skirte; & partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an Armie that should put it selfe there on shore, should find it selfe, being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a Nauie of great shippes can haue no commoditie to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part, the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it will appeare that this large skirte of Kent, will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publike a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make

it so euident, by the particular description, both of the number, quantitie, and qualitie of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent iudgement, would imagine our forces to be insufficient, to afford euery of them such a safe & sure guard, as shal be thought requisite for the same. But so far as it is vnsuſiting to giue such particular satisfaction in this publike discourse, giue mee leave, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall raste of that meanes as would secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Hauiug shewed you before, the circuit of the maritime parts of Kent, I would obſerue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shal be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I will suppose the number to bee twelue thousand, of which I would lodge three thousand about the point of Nesse, and three thousand about Margate, and sixe thousand about Foulkeston, which I take to be as it were the center: for, my greatest care should bee so to dispose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same shire: but as euery shire bordereth one vpon another; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the sixe thousand lodged as before, should march to their succours, but such also of the Suffex forces as were neer vnto that part; & so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a force would in few houres be assembled, for the reinforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, so far as the one halfe of the whole forces, are thus lodged in the center of the Shire, which is neerer to all parts then any other place whatsoever. There would also in the quartering of them, an especiall care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importunee thereof: for, my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast, by regiments and companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertaine them.

Now, concerning the later part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncertainie of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I hold it most requisite, that our defensue forces should be drawne into a head, before the enemy should be discovered neer our coast, ready to put himselfe on shore: for, it were a grosse absurditie to imagine, that companies could vpon such a suddaine bee assembled, without confusion; and make to long a march, with such expedition, as the necessitie of the occasion would require. Now, for that husbanding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremitie, as it would be vnſupportable for this State to beare: as I doubt not but good intelligence would much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much our of season to dispute about vnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

*Vt ingulēt homines surgunt de noſſe latrones:  
Non expēgiſceris, vt te ipſum ſerues?*

The enemy (peraduenture) hath kept 30000 men in pay 2 months before, to make hauocke of our Countie, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome; shall

shall we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vpon our Coast, to assure our selues that no such enemy shall enter into our Country? The extremitie of this charge, would be qualified by our good espial, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessitie which is imposed vpon vs, to be carefull in busineses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are sufficient to keepe the Sea-coast; and that the vncertaintie of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and Country, imposeth vpon euery good subiect; which is the substance of the first reason, which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

Now, concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disadvantage of the place, in regard of the furie of the Enemies artillery. True it is, that such places as yeeld the Enemy commoditie of landing, are for the most part plaine and open, and afford naturally no couert at all. What then? Shall a souldier take euery place as he findeth it, and vse no Arte to qualifie the disadvantages thereof? Or shall a man forgoe the benefit of a place of aduantage, rather then hee will relieue with industry, the discommoditie of some particular circumstance? I make no question, but an ingenious Commander, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea, vpon the beach it selfe, which is vnapt to make defensible, as any place whatsoever, would vse such industrie, as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, & ouer-weigh the Enemy with aduantage of place; especially, considering that this age hath attorded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that behalfe. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies attempt, that our Commanders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, hand-baskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble any man: for, I dare auouch it, that if our forces are not drawne into a head before the Enemy bee discovered vpon the Coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attend them in some inland place, to giue them battraile; our Commanders will be farr to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore, let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessities, and wee will easilie overcome all these difficulties, and vse the benefite of the firme land to repell an Enemy, weakened with the Sea, tolled with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented vnto him both from the Land and the Sea. Hee that saw the landing of our forces in the Iland of Fiall, in the yeere 97, can some-what iudge of the difficultie of that matter: for, what with the working of the Sea, the steepnesse of the Cliffes, the troublefomnesse of their Armes, the souldiers were so incombred, that had not the Enemy beene more then a coward, he might well with two hundred men, haue kept vs from entering any part of that Iland.

Concerning the third Obiection, this briefly shall bee sufficient, that wee are not so much to regard, that our forces doe equall them in number,

as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for, wee know that in places of aduantage and difficult accessse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not, but all circumstances duely considered, wee shall proportionably equall the Enemy, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our State shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trayned, and exercised in a competent manner, to defende their Contrey from forraigne Enemies. For, the neglect thereof were to drawe on such as of themselves are but too forward to a prey of vs; and to make vs vnapt, not onelie to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defende our selues from beeing over-runne; as other Nations liuing in securitie, without due regarde thereof, haue beene.

And this much concerning the answere to those three reasons, which seeme to proue that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if wee doe but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discover the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leave to liue vpon the spoile of our Country; which cannot bee prevented by any wasting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentifull a Country as this is, especially considering that we haue no strong townes at all to repose our selues vpon. Whereof we need no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seventh booke of these Commentaries, in that warre, which Cæsar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly, weakened at such times; whereby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn frō the subiect. Thirdly, opportunity is giuen to malecontents & ill disposed persons, either to make head themselves, or to flie to the Enemy. Fourthly, the madnesse to aduenture a kingdome vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disadvantages, which the opportunity of any such occasion would discover.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He word Imperator, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romane Leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploit, and after a iust victory obtained; and then in the place where the battraile was fought, and the Enemy ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of Imperator, with the triumphant shout of the whole Armie; by which acclamation, the souldiers gaue testimonie of his worth; and made it equialent with the most fortunate Commanders.

This Ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by manie Histories, and namely by Tacitus, where hee saith, that Tiberius gaue that honour to Blesus, that hee should bee saluted Imperator by

Of the name  
Imperator.

Annal.

the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Capitaines, after they had foiled the Enemy, with an eminent overthrow. For, euery victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might challenge for great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the Enemies to be slaine. Appian in his second book sayth, that in olde time the name of Imperator was neuer taken, but vpon great and admirable exploits: but in his time 10000. of the Enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero sayth, that 2000. slaine in the place, especially of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles, did worthily merit the name of Imperator. Howsoever it seemeth by the same Author, that there was a certaine number of the Enemy required to be slaine, where he sayth, *Se iusta victoria Imperatorem appellatum.*

## CHAP. XI.

*The Britaines make peace with Cæsar, but breake it againe vpon the losse of the Roman shipping.*



*He Britaines being overthrowne in this battaile, as soone as they had recovered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreat for peace, promising hostages & obedience, in whatsoeuer he commanded. And with these Ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britany. Cæsar complained, that whereas they sent unto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his coming they made war against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, hee commanded hostages to be deliuered vnto him: which they presently performed in part; and the rest being to be set further off, should likewise be rendered within a short time; in the meane while, they commanded their people to returne to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselves and their States to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded; foure daies after that Cæsar came into Britanie, the 18. ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind: and approaching so neere the coast of Britanie, that they were within viewe of the Roman Camp; there arose such a sodaine tempest, that none of them were able to holde their course, but some of them returned to the port from whence they came; other some were cast vpon the lower part of the Island, which lieth to the West-wards; and there casting anchor tooke in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselves againe to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moone being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the Romans being altogether ignorant, both the Gallies which were drawne up vpon the shoare were fild with the tide, and the shippes of burthen that lay at anchour, were shaken with the*

tem-

*tempest; neither was there any help to be given vnto them: so that many of them were rent, and split in peeces; and the rest lost both their anchors, gables and other tackling, and by that meanes became altogether vseruicicable. Whereat the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them backe againe: Neither had they any necessaries to new furnish the olde: and euery man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia; forasmuch as there was no prouision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britanie, that were assembled to conferre of such things as Cæsar had commanded them to performe when they understood that the Romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping and prouision of corn, and coniecturing of the paucity of their forces, by the small circuit of their Campe; and that which was more important then all the rest, that Cæsar had transported his souldiers without such necessary cariages, as they used to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keepe the Romans from corne and conueyes of prouision, and so prolong the matter, untill winter came on. For, they thought that if these were once overthrowne and cut off from turning into Gallia, neuer any man would afterward adventure to bring an Army into Britanie: therefore they conspired againe the second time, and conuined themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their men priuily out of the fields, to make head in some conuenient place against the Romans.*

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



*Concerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already been handled in the second book: to which I will adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romans became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and newe of the Moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogether directed by the course of the moons wherein she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And forasmuch as al mediterranean seas, & such gulfs as are inclosed in sinues and bolomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the small reles of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power, as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuscan seas, wherein the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plentiful abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestiall bodies, taking hir course of flowing fro the North, falleth with such a current between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channell between England and France, with great swelling tides; & maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it cometh, and hauing withall a plaine*

cuelled belly, and a very smal fresh current, raketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known ruer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the full of the moon.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**Vch as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the gouernment of Common weales, are not ignorant with what difficultie a nation, that either hath long liued in libertie, or bin gouerned by Cōmanders of their owne choosing, is made subiect to the yoke of bondage, or reduced vnder the obedience of a stranger. For, as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill society; to by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our felues and possessions, as the chiefeft end of the saide societie: and therefore in the gouernment of a subdued State, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the Victor, or how indirectly, soeuer it concerneth the bond of their thraldome, the captiue people behold it as a part of their aduersaries overthrow; and conceiue thereupon such spirits as answere the greatnes of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwaies maketh that seem easie to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason that the Britains altered their resolution of peace, vpon the losse which the Romans had receiued in their shipping.

## CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken nauie: the Britains set vpon the Romans as they haruested; but were put off by CÆSAR.

Cæsar.



Cæsar although hee had not discovered their determination, yet conceiuing of the euent by the losse of his shipping, and by their dea'v of giuing vp hostages, hee provided against all chaunces: for, hee brought corne daily out of the fieldes into his Campe; and tooke the hulls of such shippes as were most dismembred, and with the timber and brasse therof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessities to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great industry and trauell of the souldiers, he lost only twelue ships, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seventh legion being sent out by course, to fetch in corne, and little suspecting any motion of warre, as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came between them & the Campe, the

the station that watched before the gate of the Camp, gaue aduertisement to Cæsar; that the same way which the legion went, there appeared a greater dust then was vsually seen. Cæsar suspecting that which indeed was true, that the Britains were entred into some new resolution, he tooke those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselves, and presently to follow him, and went that way, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his men overcharged with the Enemy, & scarce able to sustaine the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, & weapons cast from all parts amongst them. For, when they had haruested all other quarters, they remained one piece of corn, whither the Enemy suspected the Romans would at last come; and in the night time conuaied themselves secretly into the woods, where they continued untill the Romans were come into the field: and as they saw them disarmed, dispersed and occupied in reaping; they suddenly set upon them, and slaying some fewe of them, rowled the rest and incompassed them about with their horsemen, and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots, was first to ride up and down & cast their weapons, as they sawe aduantage; and with the terror of their horses and rattling of their wheelles, to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselves between any troups of horse, they forsook their Chariots and fought on foot: in the mean time, the guides of their chariots would drine a little aside, & so place themselves, that if their masters needed any helpe, they might haue an easie passage vnto them. And thus they performed, in all their fights, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firme stability of footmen; and were so ready with daily practice, that they could staie in the declivity of a steep hill, and turne short or moderate their going, as it seemed best vnto them; and run along the beam of the coach and rest vpon the yoke, or harness of their horses, and return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Cæsar came to rescue them in very good time: for, at his comming, the Enemy stood still; and the souldiers gathered their spirits vnto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Cæsar taking it an unfit time, either to prouoke the Enemy, or to giue him battel, he continued a while in the same place: and then returned with the legions into the Camp. While these things were a-doing, and the Romans thus busied, the Britains that were in the field, conuaied themselves alway.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**B**Y this we plainly find, that there were vsually two cohorts (which according to the rate of 120. in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720. men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the Camp, & were alwaies in readines vpon any seruice. The commoditie whereof appeareth by this accident: for, considering that the aduertisement required haste and speedy recourse; it greatly furthered their rescue, to haue so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, untill the rest of their fellows came in.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**H**is manner of fight with Chariots, is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to be stood vpon any longer: only I obserue that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europ, the vse of Chariots is euer mentioned: but they haue euer beene attributed, as a peculiar fight, vnto the Easterne Countries, as futable to the plain and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scripture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such Chariots.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**H**irdly, wee may obserue the discrete and moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes hee vsed to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for, notwithstanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a present reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inasmuch as his men had beene somewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britains) he thought it best to expect some other opportunitie. And againe, to auoid the inconueniences of a fearefull retreat, hee continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his soldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a carefull respect of their safetie: which gaue his men resolution when they were carried vpon seruice; being assured that what seruice soeuer they were imploied vpon, was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that warre: whereas if they had perceiued, that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason haue drawn back from such imployments, and valued their safety about the issue of such an enterprize. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the soldiers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of warre.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.

The Britaines make head, with their forces; and  
are beaten by Cæsar: his returne into  
GALLIA.



After this; for manie dayes together, there followed such tempests and foule weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keepe their Campe, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing against them: But in the meane time, they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the smal number of the Roman forces, & amplifying the greatnesse of the bootie, & the easie means offered vnto them of perpetuall liberty, if they could take the Roman Campe. Shortly, vpon this, hauing gathered a great companie, both of horse and foot; they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæsar (although he foresawe the event by that which before had hapned, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would auoid the danger by flight) yet hauing som 30. horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his coming into Britany; he imbarailed his legions before his Camps; & so gaue them battel. The Enemy not being able to beare the assault of the Roman soldiers, turned their backs & fled: the Romans followed them, as far as they could by running on foote; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their towns farre and neere, they returned to their Camp. The same day the Britains sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace; whom he commanded to double their number of hostages, which he commanded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himselfe to the winter sea, with such weake shipping: and therefore hauing got a conuenient time, he hoised saile a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe vnto the Continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not being able to reach the same haven, put in somewhat lower into the land: the souldiers that were in them being about 300. being set on shore, and marching towards their Camp; the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a bootie, first with a fewe of their men stood about them, commanding them vpon paine of death to laie downe their weapons: & as the Romans by casting themselves into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000. of the Enemy. Which thing being knownen, Cæsar sent out all the horsemen to relieue them: in the meane time the Romans sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly the space of foure houres; and receiuing themselves some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast awaie their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

Cæsar.



## OBSERVATION.

**Q**Ual the figures which the *Tactici* haue chosen to make vse of in military affairs; the circle hath euer been taken for the fittest, to be applied in the defensiu part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all parts whatsoeuer is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometrie teacheth a circumference a simple line, forasmuch as if you alter the size of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another; the figure notwithstanding will remaine the same, because of the equal bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which property, as it proueth an vniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flank: So doth that, which Euclide doth demonstrate in the 3. of his Elements, concerning the simal affinity between a right line, and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatness of this strength in regarde of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which, howsoeuer they seem, as speculative qualities, conceiued rather by intellectuall discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proued the strength of this figure, in a defensiu part, about any other manner of imbattailing; let vs not neglect the knowledge of these naturall properties, which discouer the causes of this effect: neither let vs neglect this part of militarie knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, & the sinew of al our abilitie: for, order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or voide of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eat nor sleep, without the direction of the Consull, or chief Commander; otherwise their valour might rather haue been tearmed fury then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it neuer failed as long as the laide order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore, how important it is for a Commander to look into the diuersity of orders for imbattailing, and to waigh the nature thereof; that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans tearmed this figure, *Orbis*; which signifieth a round body both with a concaue, and a conuex surface: in resemblance whereof, I vnderstand this Orbe of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peraduenture consist of fiftie, or more, or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many circles, described about one Center: so that either the midst thereof remained voide, or otherwise contained such cariages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbattailing was neuer vied, but in great extremitie: for, as it was the safest of all others; so it gaue suspition to the soldiers of exceeding danger: which abated much of their heat in battel, as will hereafter appeare by the testimony of Cæsar himself, in the fift Commentarie, vpon the occasion which happened vnto Sabinus and Cotta.

CHAP.

## CHAP. XIII.



He next daie, Cæsar sent Titus Labienus a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of Britany, against the reuolted Morini; who hauing no place of refuge because their bogs & fennes were dried vp, where they had sheltered themselves the yeare before; they al fel vnder the power of his mercy. Q. Titurius, & A. Cotta the Legats, who had led the legions against the Menapij, after they had wasted their fields, cut vp their corn, burned their houses (for, the Menapij were all hid in thicke woods) they returned to Cæsar: these things being thus ended, Cæsar placed the wintering Camps of al his legions amongst the Belgæ, to which place two only of all the Cities in Britany, sent hostages vnto him. the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: vpon the relation of Cæsars letters, the senat decreed a supplicatio for the space of 20. daies.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

**I**N the end of the second Commentarie, we read of a supplication granted by the Senat, for 15. daies; which was neuer granted to anie man before that time, since the first building of the Citie: but forasmuch as in this fourth yeare of the wars in Gallia, it was augmented from 15. vnto 20. daies, I thought it fit: to refer the handling thereof, vnto this place. We are therefore to vnderstand, that whensoever a Roman Generall had carried him self well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the boundes of their Empire: that then the Senate did decree a supplication to the gods, in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought after: not onely because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourse & gratulation of the Roman people; but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honor in the Roman government: And therefore Caro nameth it the prerogative of a triumph. And Lilius in his 26. book saith, that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was there present to triumph, whole absence they had honoured, with supplication, & thanksgiving to the gods, for things happily effected. The manner of the Ceremonie was; that after the Magistrate had publicly proclaimed it with this form or stile, *quæd bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*; the Roman people clothed in white garments & crowned with garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses, but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplicatio, was at first included within one or 2. daies at the most, as appeareth by Lilius in his third book, where he saith, that the victorie gained by two feuerall battells, was spitefully shut vp by the Senat in one daie: supplication; the people of their own accord keeping the next day holy, & celebrating it with greater deuotion then the former.


Lilius. fam. Lucero.


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## OBSERVATIONS VPON CÆSARS

Vpon the victory which Camillus had against the Veij, there were granted foure daies of supplication; to which there was afterward a daie added, which was the vsuall time of supplication vnto the time that Pompei ended the warre, which they called Mithridaticum; when the vsuall time of fiue daies was doubled, and made 10. and in the second of these Commentaries, made 15. and now brought to 20. daies. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of well doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as in- deuoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their Common-wealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentarie.

THE





THE FIFT COMMEN TARY OF  
THE WARRE, WHICH CÆSAR  
MADE IN GALLIA.

THE ARGUMENT.

**C**æsar caused a great nauy to be built in Gallia: he caried 5. legions into Britany, where he made war with the Britains, on both sides the riuer Thames: at his returne into Gallia, most of the Galles reuolted; and first the Eburones, vnder the conduction of Ambiorix, set vpon the Camp of Q. Titurius the Legate, whom they circumuented by subtilty; and then besieged the Camp of Cicero: but were put by, and their Army ouerthrowen by Cæsar.

CHAP. I.

Cæsar returneth into Gallia: findeth there great  
store of shipping made by the souldiers, and commaundeth  
them to be brought to the haueu Iccius.



**I**teius Domitius, and Appius Claudius, being Consuls; Cæsar at his going into Italy, gaue order to the Legats to builde as many ships that winter, as possibly they could; commanding them to be built of a lower pitch then those which are used in the mediterranean sea, for the speedier lading & unlading of them, and because the tides in these seas were very great: and forasmuch as he was to transport great store of horse, he commanded them to be made flatter in the bottome then such as were vsuall in other places, and all of them to be made for the vse of Oares, to which purpose their lowe building serued very conueniently. Other necessaries and furniture for rigging, he gaue order to be brought out of Spain. Cæsar after the assembly of the States in Lombardy, and that he set free Illiricum from the incursions of the Pirusta, he returned into Gallia: where he found 600. ships built, by the extraordinary industry of the souldiers, notwithstanding the penurie and want of all necessary matter, with 28 Gallies ready furnished, which in a few daies might be lanchèd: hauing commended the souldiers and ouerseers of the work, he commanded them to be brought to the port called Iccius, from whence he knew the passage into Britany, was not above thirty mile ouer.

Cæsar.

THE

## THE OBSERVATION.

**T**His Iccius Portus, Floide thinketh to bee Caleis; others take it to bee Saint Omer: partly in regarde of the situation of the place, which being in it selfe very lowe, hath notwithstanding very high banks, which incompasse the towne about; and in times past was a very large haven. To this may be added the distance from this towne, to the next Continent of the land of Britany; which Strabo maketh to containe 320. stadia, which agreeth to the French computation of 13. leagues. Cæsar maketh it thirty mile: this is the haven, which Pliny calleth *Britannicum portum Morinorum*.

## CHAP. II.

*Cæsar saileth into Britanie: landeth his forces, and seeketh the Enemy.*



*Cæsar having prepared all things in readinesse, he left Labienus in the Continent with three legions, & 2000. horse, both to keep the haven & make provision of corne; and also to observe the motion of the Gallies: and with 5. legions & the like number of horse, as he left in the Continent, about sun-setting he put out to sea, with a soft south wind, which continued untill midnight; and then ceasing he was carried with the tide untill the morning, when he perceived that the land laie on his left hand: and again, as the tide changed, he laboured by rowing to reach that part of the land, where hee had found good landing the yeare before: wherein the soldiers deserved great commendation; for, by strength & force of Oares, they made their great ships of burthen to keepe waie with the Galleies. About high noon, they arrived in Britany, with all their ships: neither was there any Enemy seene in that place: but as afterward Cæsar understood by the Captives, the Britains were there with a great power; but being terrified with the infinit number of shipping, which they discovered from the shore (for there were in al about 800) they forsook the shore, & hid themselves in the upland country. Cæsar having landed his men, and chosen a convenient place to incamp, as soon as he understood by the captives where the enemy laie, in the 3. watch of the night, he marched towards them; leaving ten cohorts & 300. horse for a guarison to his shipping: which he the lesse feared, because it lay at anchor in a soft & open shore: he marched that night about 12. mile before he found the Enemy. The Britains sending out their horse, and chariots to a river that ran between them & the Romans, and having the advantage of the upper grounds began to hinder the Romans and to give them battell: but being beaten backe with our horsemen, they conained themselves into a wood. The place was strongly fortified both by Art and Nature, and made for a defence (as it seemeth) in their civill warres:*

*wars: for, all the entrances were shut up with great trees, laid overthwart the passages. And the Britaines shewed themselves out of the wood but heere and there, not suffering the Romans to enter the fortification: but the souldiers of the 7. legion, with a Testudo which they made, and a mount which they raised, tooke the place, and drave them all out of the woods, without any losse at all; saving some few wounds which they received. But Cæsar forbade his men to follow after them, with any long pursute, because he was both ignorant of the place, and a great part of that day being spent, he would imploy the rest thereof in the fortification of his Campe.*

## OBSERVATION.



*Cæsar, having taken what assurance of peace hee could with the Gallies, both by carrying the chiefe of their Princes with him, and by leaving three legions in the Continent, to keep the vulgar people in obedience; he embarked all his men at one place, that they might be all partakers of the same casualties, and take the benefit of the same adventures: which being neglected the yeere before, drew him into many inconveniences for want of horse, which being embarked at another Haven, met with other chances, & saw other fortunes; & neuer came to him into Britanie. The place of landing in this second voyage, was the same where he landed the yeer before: & by the circumstances of this history, may agree with that which tradition hath delivered of Deale in Kent, where it is said that Cæsar landed. In the first yeere we find, that he neuer remooued his Campe from the sea shore, where he first seated himselfe; although his men went out to bring in Corne, as far as they might wel returne again at night: but now he entered further into the land, and within twelue miles march came vnto a river, which must needs be that of Canterbury, which falleth into the Sea at Sandwich.*

*In that he saith that the guarizon of his shipping consisted of tenne cohorts, which I have said to be a legion; we must vnderstand, that Cæsar left not an entire legion in that guarizon; but he tooke tenne cohorts out of his whole forces, peradventure two out of euery legion, and appointed them to take the charge of his shipping.*

## CHAP. III.

*Cæsar returneth to his Nauies, to take order for such losses as had happened by tempest the night before.*



*HE next day, earlie in the morning, hee deuided his forces into three companies, and sent them out to pursue the enemy: but before they had marched any farre distance, and came to haue the reuerward of the Enemy in viewe; there came newes from L. Atrius, vnto whom*

*Cæsar.*

whom he left the ten cohorts, & the charge of the shipping, that the night before, there was such a tempest at sea, that the whole Nauie was either sore beaten, or cast on shore; and that neither anchor nor gable could hold them, nor yet the Sailers indure the force of the weather: and that there was great losse in the shipping, by running against one another, in the violence of the tempest.

Vpon these newes; Cæsar caused the legions to be called backe againe, and to cease for that time, from following the enemye any further. Hee himselfe returned to the Nauy, where he found forty ships lost, and the rest, not to be repaired, but with great industry and paines: first, therefore, he chose Ship-wrightes and Carpenters out of the legions, and caused others to be sent for out of Gallia, and wrote to Labienus to make ready what shipping he could. And although it seemed a matter of great difficulty & much labour, yet hee thought it best, to hale up all the ships on shore, and to inclose them within the fortification of his Campe. In this businesse he spent ten daies, without intermission either of night or day, untill he had drawne up the shippes, and strongly fortified the Campe; leaving the same garrison which was there before, to defend it.

#### THE OBSERVATION.

**W**Herein we may behold the true image of vndanted valour, and the horrible industry (as Tully tearmeth it) which hee vsed to prevent Fortune of her stroke in his business, and comprehend casualties and future cōtingents, within the compasse of order, & the bounds of his owne power, beeing able in tenne daies space, to set almost eight hundred shippes from the hazard of wind and weather; & to make his Campe the Roade for his Nauie, that so hee might rest secure of a meanes to returne at his pleasure.

#### CHAP. III.

The Britaines make Cæsiuellaunus Generall in this warre: the Iland, and the manners of the people described.



**C**ÆSAR, returning to the place from whence he came, found far greater forces of the Britaines there assembled, then he left when he went to the Nauie: and that by publique consent of the Britaines, the whole government of that warre was given to Cæsiuellaunus, whose kingdome lay diuided from the maritime States, with the riuer Thames, beginning at the sea, & extending it selfe foure-score mile into the Iland. This Cæsiuellaunus, made continuall warre with his neighbour States: but upon the coming of the Romaines, they all forgot their home-bred quarrels, and cast the whole government upon his shoulders, as the fittest to direct that warre.

The

The inner part of Britanie is inhabited, by such as memorie recordeth to bee borne in the Iland, and the maritime coast by such as came out of Belgia, either to make incursions or inuasions; and after the war was ended, they continued in the possessions they had gained, and were called by the name of the Citties from whence they came. The Country is very populous, and well inhabited with houses, much like unto them in Gallia. They haue great store of castell, & vse brasse for money, or iron rings, weighed at a certaine rate. In the mediterranean parts, there is found great quantity of Tyn, and in the maritime parts, iron: their brasse was brought in by other Nations. They haue all sorts of trees that they haue in Gallia, excepting the Fig and the Beech. Their religion will not suffer them to eate either Hare, Hen, or Goose; notwithstanding, they haue of all sorts, as well for noueltie as varietie. The Country is more temperate, and not so cold as Gallia: the Iland lieth triangle-wise, where of one side confronteth Gallia, of which side that angle, wherein Kent is, pointeth to the East, and the other angle to the South: this side containeth about 500 mile. Another side lieth toward Spaine, and the West, that way where Ireland lieth, being an Iland halfe a big as England, and as farre distant from it as Gallia. In the midway betweene England and Ireland, lieth an Iland called Mona, besides many other smaller Ilands; of which some write, that in Winter-time, for thirtie daies together, they haue continuall night: whereof we learned nothing by inquirie; onely we found by certain measures of water, that the nights in England were shorter then in the Continent: the length of this side, according to the opinion of the inhabitants, containeth seauen hundred mile. The third side lieth to the North & the open sea, sauing that this angle doth somewhat point towards Germanie: this side is thought to containe eight hundred miles; and so the whole Iland containeth in circuit 2000 miles. Of all the inhabitants, they of Kent are most courteous and ciuill; all their Countrey bordering upon the sea, & little differing from the fashion of Gallia. Most of the in-land people sowe no Corne, but live with milke and flesh, clothed with skinner, & hauing their faces painted with a blew colour, to the end they may seeme more terrible in fight: they haue the haire of their head long, hauing all other parts of their body shauen, sauing their upper lip. Their wives are common to tenne or twelue, especially, brethren with brethren, and parents with children; but the children that are borne, are put unto them, unto whom the mother was first giuen in marriage.

#### OBSERVATION.

**I**N the descriptions of the ancient Britains, we may first obserue their pedigree, according to the Haraldry of that time: wherein we must vnderstand, that in those ages, the Nations of the world thought it no small honour, to deriue their descent from a certaine beginning, and to make either some of their Gods, or some man of famous memorie, the Father of that progenie, and founder of their State; that so they might promise a fortunate continuance to their government, beeing first laid and established by so powerfull a meanes. But if this failed, they then bragged of antiquitie, and cast all their glory vpon the fertility of their soile, being so strong and fruit-

Q. 2.

full

full, that it yeilded of it selfe such a people, as they were: and so wee read how the Athenians, forasmuch as they were ignorant frō whence they came, were an Oaken leafe, in token that they were bred of the earth where they dwelled. And heereupon also grew the controuersie betweene the Egyptians and the Scythians, concerning antiquitie: wherein the Egyptians seemed to haue great aduantage, because of the fertilitie and heat of their country; whereas the Scythians inhabited a cold climate, vnfruitfull, and an enemy to generation. Of this sort were the Britaines, that inhabited the mediterranean part of the Iland: who, not knowing from whence they came, nor who first brought them thither, satisfied themselves with that common receiued opinion, that they were borne and bred of the earth. The sea-coast was posselt by such as came out of the Continent, and retained the names of the Citties from whence they came, as a memoriall of their progenitors.

The forme of the Iland is very well described, and measured out, according to the scale of our moderne Geographers. For, concerning the difference of longitude between the Easterne angle of Kent, & the furthest point of Cornwall, they make it eight degrees; which in a manner jumpeth with Cæsars dimensionation: the other sides are somewhat longer: and therefore Tacitus, in the life of Aricola, compareth it to a Carpenters Axe, making that side which bordereth vpon France to resemble the edge, and the other two sides to incline by little and little, one towards another; and so make the Iland narrower at the top, according to the forme of that instrument. Hee setteth downe the whole compasse of the Iland, according to the manner of the ancient Geographers, who by the quantitie of the circuit, did vsually iudge of the content: not considering that the *Area* of euery figure dependeth as well of the quantitie of the angle, as the length of the side.

Concerning the temperature of Britanie, in regard of the cold Winters in France, we must vnderstand that Britanie hath euer been found of a more temperate constitution, in regard of sharp and cold winters, then any other countrie lying vnder the same parallell: whether the cause thereof may be imputed to the continuall motion of the sea about the Iland, which begetteth heate, as some haue imagined; or to the site therof, in regard of other Continents from whence the wind alwaies riseth, and carieth with it the nature of the Country by which it passeth: and so the Iland hauing no other Continent lying North to it, from whence the wind may rise, but all for the most part vpon the South, hath no such cold windes to distemper it, as other parts of Germanie, which are vnder the same parallell: but the Southerne wind, which is so frequent in Britanie, tempereth the ayre with a mild disposition, and so keepeth it warme, or whether it be some other vnknowne cause, our Philosophers rest vn-satisfied. But as touching Gallia, it may be said, that forasmuch as it beareth more to the South then this Iland doth, the aire thereof (by reason of the continuall heat) is of a farre purer disposition; and so pierceth more then this grosser aire of Britanie, and carieth the cold further into the pores; and so seemeth sharper, and of a farre colder disposition.

This Iland, which Cæsar nameth *Mona*, is known at this time by the name of

*Man,*

*Man*, and lieth between Cumberland and Ireland. Ptolemy calleth it *Moneda*, Tacitus calleth Anglesey by the name of *Mona*, peraduenture from the nomination of the Britaines, who called it *Tyr mon*, the land of Mon.

Concerning those places, where the night continueth in the midst of winter for 30 daies together, they must be sited 6. degrees beyond the circle Articke, and haue a day in summer of like continuance, according to the rules of Astronomy. In that he found the nights in Britanie shorter then in the Continent, we must vnderstand it to be onely in summer: for, the more oblique the horizon is, the more vneuen are the portions of the diurnall circles which it cutteth; and the neerer it cometh to a right horizon, the neerer it cometh to an equality of day and night: and hence it happeneth, that in summer time, the nights in France, are longer then heere in England; and in winter, shorter. The like we must vnderstand of all Southerne and Northerne Countries.

To conclude, I may not omit the ciuilitie of the Kentish men, and their curious disposition, aboue the rest of the Britains, which must be imputed to that ordinary course which brought ciuility vnto all other Nations: of whom such as were first seated in their possessions, and entertained societie, were the first that brought in ciuill conuersation, and by little and little were purified, and so attained to the perfection of ciuill government. So we find, that first Assyrians and Babilonians (as neereſt to the Mountaines of Armenia where the Ark rested, and people first inhabited) reduced their States into Common-weales of Monarchies of exquisite government, flourishing with all manner of learning and knowledge; when as yet other Countries lay either waste, or overwhelmed with Barbarisme. From thence it flowed into Egypt; out of Egypt into Greece; out of Greece into Italie; out of Italie into Gallia; and from thence into England: where our Kentishmen first entertained it, as bordering vpon Fraunce; and frequented with Marchants of those Countries.

## CHAP. V.

### Diuers skirmishes between the Romans and the Britaines.



THE Cavalrie of the enemy and their chariots, gaue a sharpe conflict to the Romaine horsemen, in their march: but so, that the Romaines got the better euery way, driving them with great slaughter to the woods and hills, and loosing also some of their owne men, being too venturous in the pursuit. The Britaines, after some intermission of time, when the Romaines little thought of them, and were busied in fortifying their Campe, came suddainly out of the woods, and charged vpon those that kept station before the Campe. Cæsar sent out two the chiefest cohorts of two legions, to second their fellows. These two cohorts, standing vwith a small alley betwene them, the other that were first charged, being terrified

Cæsar.



with that strange kind of fight, boldly brake through the thickest of the enemy, and so retired in safetie to their fellows. That day, *Quintus Laberius Dursus*, a Tribune of the souldiers, was slaine. The Brittaines were repelled with more cohorts, which *Cæsar* sent to second the former. And, so far as much as the fight happened in the view of all the Campe, it was plainly perceiued, that the legionarie souldiers, being neither able for the weight of their Armour, to follow the enemy as he retired, nor yet daring to goe farre from his Ensigne; was not a fitt aduersarie to contest this kind of enemy: and that the horsemen likewise fought with no lesse danger, inasmuch as the enemy would retire backe of purpose, and when they had drawne them a little from the legions, they would then light from their Chariots, and encounter them, with that advantage which is betwene a footman and a horseman. Furthermore, they neuer fought thicke and close together, but thin, and in great distances, hauing stations of men to succour one another, to receiue the wearie, and to send out fresh supplies.

## OBSERVATION.

**V**Pon this occasion of their heauie Armour, I will describe a legionarie souldiour in his compleat furniture, that we may better iudge of their manner of warfare, and vnderstand wherein their greatest strength consisted. And first we are to learne, that their legionarie souldiers were called *Milites grauis armatura*, souldiers wearing heauy Armour, to distinguish them from the Velites, the Archers, Slingers, and other light armed men. Their offensive Armes were a couple of Piles, or as some will, but one Pile, and a Spanish sword, short and strong, to strike rather with the point then with the edge. Their defensiu Armes were, a helmet, a cotlet, and boots of brasle, with a large Target; which in some sort was offensive, in regard of that *umbonem* which stuck out in the midst thereof. The Pile is described at large in the first booke, and the Target in the second. The sword, as *Polybius* witnesseth, was short, two edged, very sharpe, and of a strong point: and therefore *Liuius*, in his 22 booke, saith, that The Gallies vsed very long swords without points: but the Romaines had short swords, readier for vse: these they called Spanish swords, because they borrowed that fashion from the Spaniards. The old Romaines were to girt with their swords, as appeareth by *Polybius*, & their monuments in Marble, that from their left shoulder it hung vpon their right thigh, contrary to the vse of these times; which, as I haue noted before, was in regard of their target, which they caried on their left arme: this sword was hung with a belt of leather, belet with studs, as *Varro* noteth, and these were their offensive weapons.

Their Helmet was of brasle, adorned with three Ostrich feathers, of a cubite in length: by which, the souldiour appeared of a larger stature, and more terrible to the Enemy, as *Polybius* saith in his sixth booke. Their breast plate was either of Brasle or Iron, ioynted together after the manner of scales, or plated with little rings of Iron: their bootes were made of baires of brasle, from the

foote

foote vp to the knee. And thus were the legionary souldiers armed, to stand firme, rather then to vse any nimble motion, and to combine themselves into a body of that strength, which might not easily recoile, at the opposition of any confrontment: for, agilitie standeth indifferent to helpe either a retreat or a pursuit: and nimble-footed souldiers, are as ready to flie back, as to march forward; but a waightie bodie, keepeth a more regular motion, and is not hindered with a common counterbuffe: so that whensoever they came to firme buckeling, and felt the enemy stand stiffe before them, such was their practice, and exercise in continuall works, that they neuer fainted vnder any such taske, but the victorie went alwaies cleere on their side. But, if the enemy gaue way to their violence, and came not in but for advantage, and then as speedily retired, before the counterbuffe were well discharged, then did their nimblenesse much help their weaknesse, and frustrate the greatest part of the Romaine discipline. This is also proved, in the ouerthrowe of *Sabinus* and *Cotta*, where *Ambiorix* finding the inconuenience of bucking at handy blowes, commanded his men to fight afar off; and if they were assaulted, to giue backe, and to come on againe as they saw occasion: which so wearied out the Romaines that they all fell vnder the execution of the Gallies. Let this suffice therfore to shew, how vnapt the Romaines were to flie vpon any occasion, when their Armour was such, that it kept them from all starting motions, and made them fusable to the staied and well assured rules of their discipline, which were as certaine principles in the execution of a standing battaile; and therefore, not so fitt either for a pursuit, or a flight.

Concerning the vnequall combat betwene a horseman and a footeman, it may be thought strange, that a footman should haue such an advantage against a horseman, being ouermarched, at least with a Sextuple proportion both of strength and agilitie: but we must vnderstand, that as the horse is much swifter in a long carriere, so in speedie and nimble turning at hand, wherein the substance of the combat consisteth, the footman farre exceedeth the horseman in advantage; hauing a larger marke to hit by the Horse, then the other hath. Besides, the horseman ingageth both his valour, & his fortune in the good speed of his horse, his wounds and his death, do consequently pull the rider after, his feare or turie maketh his maister either desperate or slowe of performance, and what defect soeuer ariseth from the horse, must be answered out of the honour of the rider. And surely, it seemeth reasonable, that what thing soeuer draweth vs into the societie of so great a hazard, should as much as is possible, be contained in the compasse of our owne power.

The sword which we manage with our owne hand, affoordeth greater assurance then the Harquebuse, wherein there are many parts belonging to the action, as the powder, the stone, the spring, and such like; whereof, if the least faile of his part, we likewise faile of our fortune: but, how probable soeuer this seemeth, this is certaine, that in the course of the Romaine warres, the horse were euer defeated by the foote, as is manifestly proued in the first of these bookes.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.  
Cæsar giueth the Britaines two  
seuerall ouerthrowes.

**T**HE next day, the Enemy made a stand vpon the hills afar off from the Campe, and shewed themselves not so often; neither were they so busie with our horsemen, as they were the day before: but about noone, when Cæsar sent out three legions, and all his Cavalrie to get forrage, vnder the conductiō of Caius Trebonius a Legate, they made a suddaine assault vpon the forragers, and fell in close vwith the Ensignes and the legions. The Romaines charged very fiercely vpon them, & beate them backe: neither did they make an end of following them, untill the horsemen trusting to the succour of the legions which were behind them, put them all to flight, with the slaughter of a great number of them; neither did they giue them respite either to make head, to make a stand, or to forsake their chariots.

After this ouerthrow, all their Auxiliarie forces departed from them; neither did they afterward contend with the Romaines with any great power. Cæsar, vnderstanding their determination, caried his Armie to the riuer Thames, and so to the confines of Cassiuellannus, which riuer was passable by foote but in one place onely, and that very hardly. At his comming, he found a great power of the Enemy to be imbatailed on the other side, and the banke fortified vwith many sharpe stakes, and many other also were planted covertly vnder the water. These things being discovered to the Romaines by the Captiues and fugitiues, Cæsar, putting his horse before, caused the legions to follow suddainlie after: who notwithstanding they had but their heads cleere aboue the water, went with that violence, that the enemy was not able to endure the charge, but left the banke, and betooke themselves to flight.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**His attempt of Cæsar, seemeth so strange to Brancatio, that he runneth into strange conclusions, concerning this matter: as first, that he that imitath Cæsar, may doubt of his good fortunes: for, his proceeding in this point, was not directed by any order of war; and that a great Commander, hath nothing common with other Leaders: but especially, he crieth out at the baseness of the Britains, that would suffer themselves so cowardly to be beaten. But if we looke into the circumstances of the action, we shall find both Art and good direction therein: for, being assisted by the fugitiues, that the riuer was passable in that place, and in that place onely; he knew that he must either aduenture ouer there, or leaue Cassiuellannus for another Summer, which was a very strong inducement to vrge him to that

that enterprise. The difficultie whereof, was much relieved by good direction, which consisted of two points: First, by sending ouer the horsemen in the front of the legions, who might better indure the charge of the enemy, then the footmen could, that were vp to the neck in water; and withall, to shelter the footmen from the furie of the Enemy.

Secondly, he sent them ouer with such speed, that they were on the other side of the water before the enemy could tell what they attempted: for, if hee had lingered in the seruice, and giuen the enemy leaue to find the advantage which he had by experience, his men had neuer beene able to haue indured the hazard of so dangerous a seruice. It is hard to coniecture at the place where this seruice was performed; for, since the building of London bridge, manie foordes haue beene scoured with the current, and fall of the water, which before that time, caried not such a depth as now they doe.

## CHAP. VII.

The conclusion of the Britissh warre: Cæsar  
returneth into Gallia.



Cassiuellannus, hauing no courage to contend any longer, dismissed his greatest forces; and retaining onely foure thousand and chariots, obserued their iourneies, keeping the wood Countries, and driuing men and cattell out of the fields into the woods, for feare of the Romans: & as their horse straied out either for forrage or bootie, he sent his chariots out of the woods by unknowne waies, and put their horsemen to great perill: in regard whereof, the horsemen durst neuer aduenture further then the legions, neither was there any more spoile done in the Country, then that which the legionarie souldiers did of themselves.

In the meane time, the Trinobants, being almost the greatest State of all those Countries (from whom Mandubratius had fledde to Cæsar into Gallia, for that his father Imanuentius holding the kingdome, was slaine by Cassiuellannus) sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to offer their submission, and to intreat that Mandubratius might be defended from the oppression of Cassiuellannus, and sent vnto them to take the kingdome. Cæsar, hauing receiued from them fortie pledges, & Corne for his Armie, sent Mandubratius vnto them. The Trinobantes, being thus kept from the violence of the souldiers, the Cenimagni, Seguntiaci, Anacalites, Bibrocasi, yielded themselves to Cæsar. By these he vnderstood, that Cassiuellannus his towne was not farre off, fortified with woods and bogs, and well stored with men and cattell. The Britaines call a towne, a thicke wood, inclosed about with a ditch and a rampier, made for a place of retrait, when they stood in feare of incursions from the borderers. Thither marched Cæsar with his Army, and found it well fortified, both by Arte and Nature: and as hee assaulted it in

Cæsar.

two

two severall places, the enemy unable to keepe it, cast himselfe out of the towne by a backe way: and so he tooke it. Where he found great store of cattell, and slew many of the Brittaines.

While these things were a-doing, Cassiuellaunus sent messengers into Kent, wherein there were foure severall Kings, Cingetorix, Carnilins, Taximagulus, & Segonax: them he commanded with all the power they could make, to sette upon the Campe where the Nannie was kept. The Kings comming to the place, were overthrowne by a sally which the Romaines made out upon them, many of them being slaine, and Cingetorix taken prisoner. This battell concurring with the former losses, and especially moued thereunto with the reuolt of the forenamed Citties, Cassiuellaunus intreated peace of Cæsar, by Comius of Arras. Cæsar, being determined to winter in the Continent, for feare of suddaine commotions in Gallia, and that the Summer was now farre spent, and might easilie bee lingered out, he commaunded pledges to be brought vnto him, and set down what yeerely tribute the Brittaines should pay to the Romans. The hostages beeing taken, hee carried backe his Armie to the sea, imbarked his men, and arrived safe with all his shippes vpon the coast of Gallia.


## OBSERVATION.



And thus ended the warre in Britanie, which affordeth little matter of discourse, being indeed but a scrambling warre, as well in regard of the Brittaines themselves; who after they had felt the strength of the Romaine legions, would neuer adventure to buckle with them in any standing battell, as also in regard that there were no such townes in Britanie, as are recorded to haue beene in Gallia, which might haue giuen great honour to the war, if there had been any such to haue been besieged, and taken in by Cæsar.

And although Tacitus saith, that Britanie was rather viewed then subdued by Cæsar, being desirous to draw that honour to his father in law Agricola; yet we find heere, that the Trinobantes, which were more then either the skirre, or the hart of Britanie (for, our Historians doe vnderstand them to haue inhabited that part, which lieth as farre as Yorkshire & Lancashire) were brought vnder the Romaine Empire by Cæsar: who was the first that euer laid tribute vpon Britanie, in the behalfe of the people of Rome; or cast vpon them the heauie name of a subdued people.

TO



TO THE WORTHY KNIGHT,  
SIR ROBERT DRVRIE.  
(\* \*)



IR, my purpose was to haue concluded these discourses, with the end of the Brittainish warre; reseruing the later part of this first booke, for an entrance vnto such obseruations, as may be gathered from the sixth & seauenth Commentaries, which I intend to make a second part of this worke: but your desire to see the errorrs of Sabinus and Cotta discouered, and the famous fight of Q. Cicero in his wintering Campe, hath brought them forth somewhat before their time, annexing that to the first part, which was meant for the later. If my labour shall be found too weake to deserue well of Militarie designs; yet I thinke it very well imploy'd, in that it pleaseth you to giue it the reading, and so rest

Readie to doe you seruice,

C. EDMUNDS.

CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their  
wintering Campes.

After he had put his ships in harbour, & held a Councell of the Galles at \* Samarobrina; forasmuch as that yeere, by reason of the drought, there was some scarcitie of Corne in Gallia; he was constrained to guarizon his Armie, and to disperse them into more Citties then hee had done the yeeres before. And first, he gave one legion to Caius Fabius, to be led among the Morini; another to Q. Cicero, to be caried to the Nervij; another to L. Roscius, to be conducted to the Eslui; a fourth he commaunded to winter amongst the men of Rheimes, in the marches of the Treuiri under T. Labienus; three he placed in Belgia, with whom he sent Marcus Crassus, his Questor, L. Munatius Planus, and C. Trebonius, Legates; he sent one legion, that which hee had last inrolled, beyond the river Po in Italie, with five cohorts, unto the Eburones: the greatest part of whose Country, lieth between the Maze & the Rhene; with them he sent Q. Titurius Sabinus, and Lucius Arunculeius Cotta. By distributing his legions in this maner, he thought to remedie the scarcitie of corne, and yet the guarizons of all these legions, excepting that which Roscius caried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred mile: and untill his legions were settled, and their wintering Campes fortified, he determined to abide in Gallia.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Have heard it oftentimes contradicted by some, that vnderstand not the weight of a multitude, when it was said, that an Armie keeping head continually in one part of a kingdom, was more burthen some to the common-wealth, in regard of the expence of victuals, then when it was dispersed into particular cities and families, before the time of the muster and inrolment: for (say they) in the generall account of the publike weale, it differeth nothing, whether a multitude of 30000 men be maintained with necessarie provisions in one intire body together, or dispersed particularly throughout euery part of the Country: forasmuch as euery man hath but a competent quantitie allotted vnto him, which he cannot want in what sort or condition of life hee will be ranged; neither doth the charge of a multitude grow in regard they are vnited together, but in regard they amount to such a multitude wherefoeuer. But such as looke into the difference with iudgement, shall finde a marvellous inequality, both in regard of the portion of victuals which is spent, and the means whereby it is provided: for, first, we must vnderstand,

stand, that an Army lying continually in one place, falleth so heauie vpon that part, that it quickly consumeth both the fatte and the flesh (as they say) & leaueth nothing vnspent, which that part can afford them; and without further supply of provisions, woulde in a small time come to vtter destruction. This want then must be relieved by taking from the plenie of other bordering quarters, to furnish the wants of so great a multitude: wherein there cannot be observed that proportion of moderate taking, to vitraile the Armie with a sufficient competencie, but the partiall respect which the pursuiers, and vitrailleurs will haue to their priuat commodity, will quickly make an inconuenience either in the country, from whence it is taken; or in the Armie, for which it is provided; according as the error may best aduantage their particular, what discipline soeuer be established in that behalfe: Whereas on the contrary part, when euery particular man of that multitude shall be billeted in a seuerall family, throughout all parts of the kingdom, the charge will be so insensible, in regard of the expence of the laid families, that the countrie wil neuer feelee any inconuenience. And if euery houlholder that had receiued into his house one of the said Army, should giue a true account of that which riseth about his ordinary expence; by the addition of one man, it would fall far short of that treasure, which is necessarily required, to maintaine the saide number of men vnited together into one bodie.

Neither doth the difference consist in the quantity of vittailles, which euery man hath for his portion, whether they be dispersed or vnited; but in the manner of prouision, and the means which is vled to maintaine them: wherein euery maister or steward of a family, endeouoreth to make his prouision at the best hand, & so to husband it, that it may serue for competencie, and not for superfluitie; and by that means, the generall plenty of the country is maintained, & the common-wealth flourisheth by well directed moderation. But in the victualling of an Army, there is no such respect had, which may any way aduantage the publike good; for, there the gaine of the puruier riseth by expence and superfluous wasting, rather then by thrift and sauing frugality: and so the common-wealth is weakened by the ill husbanding of that great portion of vittraille, which is allowed for so great a multitude. And if they should haue such varietie of viands in an Armie, as they haue when they are in seuerall families, it were vnpossible it should continue any tyme together. And therefore the Romanes, notwithstanding the exactness of their discipline, could afford their Armies no other prouision but corne, and larde, as well in regard of the commodity which that kinde of diet afforded them in the course of their warres, as also for the good of that country, wherein they were resident: And if it so fel out, that the extremity of the season, or any other cause, had brought a dearth into the land, there was no readier way to help that inconuenience, then by dispersing their Armies into diuers quarters; which Cæsar disposed with that care, that they might be as neere together as they could.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar disposeth his legions into their  
wintering Campes.

After he had put his ships in harbour, & held a Countell of the Galles at *Samarobrina*; forasmuch as that yeere, by reason of the drought, there was some scarcitie of Corne in Gallia; he was constrained to guarizon his Armie, and to disperse them into more Citties then hee had done the yeeres before. And first, he gave one legion to *Caius Fabius*, to be ledde among the *Morini*; another to *Q. Cicero*, to be caried to the *Deruij*: another to *L. Roscius*, to be conducted to the *Essui*; a fourth he commaunded to winter amongst the men of *Rheimes*, in the marches of the *Treuri* under *T. Labienus*; three he placed in *Belgia*, with whom he sent *Marcus Crassus*, his *Questor*, *L. Munatius Plannus*, and *C. Trebonius*, Legates; he sent one legion, that which hee had last inrolled, beyond the river *Po* in *Italie*, with five cohorts, unto the *Eburo*nes: the greatest part of whose Country, lieth between the *Maze* & the *Rhene*; with them he sent *Q. Titurius Sabinus*, and *Lucius Arunculeius Cotta*. By distributing his legions in this manner, he thought to remedie the scarcitie of corne, and yet the guarizons of all these legions, excepting that which *Roscius* carried into a quiet and peaceable part, were contained within the space of one hundred mile: and untill his legions were settled, and their wintering Campes fortified, he determined to abide in *Gallia*.

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THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**C** Concerning the choice of their souldiers and their maner of inrolment, I had rather referre the Reader to Polybius, then enter into the particular discourse of that action; which was carried with such grauitie and religious ceremonies, as might best serue to possesse their minds of the waight and consequence of that businesse: but forasmuch as the largenesse of their Empire, and the necessitie of their occasions would not admit, that the enrolement should still be made at Rome amongst the citizens, as it appeareth by this legion which was inrolled beyond the riuer Po; it consequently followeth, that such Ceremonies, which were annexed to the place, were altogether omitted: and therefore I cannot speake of that which the old Romanes did in that part of their discipline, as a thing continued vnto Cæsars time. But he that desireth to see the maner of their choise, with such complements as might adde both a reuerent respect, and a Maiestie to the work; let him read Polybius of that argument.

## CHAP. IX.

Ambiorix attempteth to surprisè the Campe of Sabinus and Cotta; and failing, practiseth to take them by guile.

**I**f seuerall daies after the legions were settled in their wintering Camps, there began a sudden tumult and rebellion by the meanes of Ambiorix, and Catuunculus, who hauing received Sabinus and Cotta into their confines, & brought them in corne to the place, where they lay, at the inducement of Inducimarus of Triers, they stirr'd up their people to rebellion: & suddenly surprising those that were gon abroad to get wood, came with a great power to assault the Camp. But when our men had tooke Arms, and were got up upon the rampier, and had overmatch'd them in a skirmish of horse, which made a sally out of the Camp upon the Gallies; Ambiorix despairing of good success, withdrew his men from the assault; & then after their maner, they cried vnto vs, that some of our company should come & speak with them; for, they had somwhat to discouer touching the publike state, whereby they hoped all controuersies might be ended. Whereupon Caius Carpineius a Roman horseman, and one of Titurius his familiar friends, and one Iunius a Spaniard, who

diuers times before had bene sent by Cæsar to Ambiorix; were sent out to treat with them. Ambiorix first acknowledged himselfe much indebted to Cæsar; for, manie curtesies, in that by his meanes he was freed from a pension which he paid to the Aduatici; and for that both his own son, and his brothers sonne, whom the Aduatici had helde in prison vnder the name of hostages, were by Cæsar released and sent home againe. And touching the assault of the Camp, he had done nothing of himselfe, but by the impulsions of the States; among whom such was his condition, that the people had as great authority ouer him, as he himselfe had in regard of the people: who were likewise forced to this warre, because they could not withstand the sudden insurrection of the Gallies, whereof his small meanes might bee a sufficient argument. For, his experience was not so little, to thinke himselfe able with so small a power to ouerthrow the people of Rome; but it was a general appointment throughout all Gallia, vpon this day to assault all Cæsars garrisons, to the end that one legion might not giue reliefe vnto another: Gallies could not easilie denie the request of Gallies, especially when it concerned their publike libertie. Now hauing satisfied that duetie which he owed to his countrey, hee had respect to Cæsar and his benefites; in regard whereof, he admonished them, and praised Titurius for the hospitality that had been between them, that hee would looke to the safetie of himselfe, and his soldiers. There were a great number of Germanes that had alreadye passed the Rhene, and would be heere within 2. dayes: and therefore let them aduise themselves, whether they thought it good before the next borderers perceiued it, to depart with their souldiers out of their wintering places, either to Cicero or Labienus, of whom the one was not past fifty mile off; and the other, a little further: for his owne part, he promised them this much, and confirmed it by oath, that they should haue safe passage through his territories; for, so hee should both doe a pleasure to his countrey, in disburdening it of garrisons, and shew himselfe thankfull to Cæsar for his benefits. This speech being ended, Ambiorix departed, and Carpineius and Iunius made report thereof to the Legates.

## OBSERVATION.

**E**nder his counsell, to vse the foxes skinne where the Lions faileth, doth shewe, that the discourse of our reason is sooner corrupted with error, then the powers of our bodie are overcome with force. For, oftentimes the mind is so diquieted, with the extremitie of perturbation, that neither the apprehension can take found instructions, nor the iudgement determine of that which is most for our good: but according as any passion shall happen to raigine in our disposition; so are wee carried headlong to the ruine of our fortune, without sense of error, or mistrust of well-succeeding; where as the body continueth firme in his owne strength, and is subiect onely to a greater waight of power, by which it may be subdued and overthrowen. It becometh vs therefore to take good heede, that our surest holde bee not vnfastned by the subtiltie of the Foxe, when it

hath continued firme against the force of the lion: and that the treacherie of the spirit doe not disadvantage those meanes, which either our owne power or opportunitie, hath gained in our actions. Wherin a Commander cannot haue a better rule for his direction, then to beware, that violence of passion do not hinder the course of sound deliberation: and withall, to bee iecalous of whatsoeuer an Enemie shall, eyther by speech or action, seeme to thrust vpon him, how colourable soeuer the reasons may be, which are alleadged to induce him thereunto. For first, if the minde be not confirmed by the vertue of her better faculties, to resist the motion of fruitlesse apprehensions, it may easily be seduced (eyther by feare or vaine imagination, diffident conceptions or ouer-easie credulitie, with manie other such disturbing powers) from that waie, which a good discretion, and an vnderstanding free from passion, would haue taken.

First therefore I holde it necessarie, to haue the consistorie of our iudgement well settled, with a firme resolution, and with the presence of the mind, before we enter into deliberation of such things, as are made happy vnto vs by good direction. And then this, amongst other circumstances, will giue some help to a good conclusion; when we consider how improbable it is, that an Enemie, whose chiefeest care is to weaken his aduersarie, and bring him to ruine, should aduise him of anie thing that may concern his good; vnlesse the profit, which he himselfe shall thereby gather, do farre exceed that which the contrarie part may expect.

I grant that in Ciuill wars, where there are many friends on either partie, & haue the aduantage as deare vnto them as their owne; there are oftentimes manie aduertisements giuen, which proceed from a true and sincere affection, & may aduantage the partie whom it concerneth, as wel in preventing any danger, as in the furtherance of their cause; and therefore are not altogether to be neglected, but to be waighed by circumstances, & accordingly to be respected; whereof we haue manie pregnant examples in the ciuill warres of France, and particularly in *Monsieur La Nou* his discourses: but where there are two Armies, different in nation, language and humour, contending for that which peculiarly belongeth vnto one of them; where care to keep that which is dearest vnto them, possesseth the one, and hope of gaine stirreth vp the other; there is commonly such an vniuersall hatred between them, that they are to looke for small aduantage by aduertisements from the Enemie: which if the Romans had well considered, this subtle Gall had not disposed them of their strength, nor brought them to ruine.

CHAP.

## CHAP. X.

The Romans call a counsell vpon this aduertisement, and resolute to depart, and ioine themselves to some other of the Legions.



He Romans being troubled at the sodainnesse of the matter, albeit those things were spokē by an Enemy, yet they thought there no way to be neglected; but especially it moued them, for that it was incredible that the Eburones; being base and of so reputation, durst of themselves make war against the people of Rome: and therefore they propounded the matter in a counsell, wherein there grew a great controuersie among them: L. Arunculeius & most of the Tribunes, and Centurions of the first orders, thought it not good to conclude of any thing rashly, nor to depart out of their wintering Camps, without expresse commandment from Cæsar; forasmuch as they were able to resist neuer so great a power yea euen of the Germans, hauing their garizons well fortified: an argument wherof was, that they had valiantly withstood the first assault of the Enemy, & giuen them many wounds. Neither wanted they any victuals; & before that provision which they had was spent, there would come succor from other garizons & from Cæsar. And to conclude, what was more dishonorable or fauoured of greater inconstancie, then to consult of their waightiest affairs, by the aduertisement of an Enemy? Titurius urged vehemently to the contrarie, that it then would be too late for them to seeke a remedie, when a greater power of the Enemy, accompanied with the Germans, were assembled against them; or when anie blowe were giuen to any of the next wintering Campes: he tooke Cæsar to be gone into Italy; for, otherwise the Eburones, would not haue come so proudly to the Campe. Let them not respect the an hour, but the thing it selfe; the Rhene was not farre off, and hee knewe well that the ouerthrowe of Ariouistus, and their former victories, were greuous to the Germans. The Gallies were vexed with the contumelies they had receiued, being brought in subiection to the Roman Empire, and hauing lost their former reputation in deeds of Arms. And to conclude, who would imagine that Ambiorix should enterprise such a matter, without any ground, or certainty thereof? but howsoeuer things stood, his counsel was sure, and could bring no harm: for, if there were no worse thing intended, they should but goe safelie to the next garizons; or otherwise, if the Gallies conspired with the Germans, their onely safetie consisted in celeritie. As for the counsell of Cotta, and such as were of the contrary opinion, what expectation could be had thereof? wherein if there were not present danger; yet assuredly famine was to be feared by long siege. The disputation being thus continued on either part, and Cotta with the Centurions of the first orders, earnestly repugning it; Doe as please you, since you will needes haue it so, sayth Sabinus; and that he spake with a loud voice, that a great part of the souldiers might well heare him: for, I am not hee that most feareth death among you;

Cæsar.



let these be wise: and if any mischance happen unto them, they shall aske account thereof at thy hands, inasmuch as if thou wouldst let them, they might ioinethemselves within 2. dayes to the next guarizons, & with them sustain what chance soever their common destinie should allot them; and not perishe with famine and sword, like a people cast off and abandoned from their fellows. After these words, they began to rise out of the Councel; but holde was laide upon them both; entreaty was made that they would not obstinately bring all unto a desperate hazard; the matter was all one whether they went or staid, so that they all agreed upon one thing; whereas in disagreeing, there was no likelihood of well doing: the disputation was prolonged untill midnight; at length Cotta yeelded, and the sentence of Sabinus tooke place. And thereupon it was proclaimed, that they should set forth by the break of day: the rest of the night was spent in watching: every souldier sought out what he had to carry with him, and what hee should be constrained to leaue behind him of such necessities, as he had prepared for winter: all things were disposed in such sort, to make the souldiers belieue, that they could not stay without danger.

## OBSERVATION.

**B**Y the resolution in this disputation, it appeareth how little a graue and wise deliberation auaieth, when it is impugned with the violence of passion, according to the truth of my former obseruation; for, the matter was well reasoned by Cotta, and his positions were grounded vpon things certaine, and wel known to the whole Councel: and yet the feare of Sabinus was such, that it carried the conclusion by such supposed assertions as the qualitie of his passion had ratified for true principles; being grounded altogether vpon that which the Enemie had suggested, and not vpon any certaine knowledge of the truth: neither is it often seene, when a Councell disputeth vpon matters of such consequence, that their deliberations are altogether cleere from such troublesome motions, but that it will somewhat incline to the partialitie of a strong affection; so powerfull is passion in the government of the soule, and so interested in the other faculties. And this is one cause of the vncertainty of mans iudgement, from whence all contrarie and different opinions do arise. Neither is this so strange a matter, that a councell of warre should so much varie in case of deliberation, when-as manie especiall points of militarie discipline remaine yet vndecided; hauing the authoritie of the great Commanders of all ages, to ratifie the truth on either part; whereof I could alleage many examples. But concerning the issue and euent of our deliberations, what can be more truly said then that of the Poet?

*Et male consultis pretium est prudentia fallax,  
Nec fortuna probat causas, sequiturque merentes;  
Sed vaga per cunctos nullo discrimine fertur:  
Scilicet est aliud quod nos cogatque regatque  
Maius, & in propriis ducat mortalia leges.*

Not-

Notwithstanding, forasmuch as our wisdom is not so subiect to fortune, but that it may comprehend within it self, the good direction of most of the occurrences, which fall within the course of our businesse; or if we must needs miscarry, yet it somewhat helpeth our ill fortune to thinke, that we went vpon best probabilities; it shall not be amisse to set downe some rules for the better directing of a mature consultation. Wherein we are to vnderstand, that as all our knowledge ariseth from some of our senses, and our senses comprehend only particularities, which being caried vnto the apprehension, are disposed into formes and degrees, according as they either concur or disagree in their seuerall properties: from whence there arise intellectuall notions, and rules of Art; wherein the science of the said particulars consisteth: so he that intendeth to debate a matter, with sound deliberation, must descend from confused conceptions & a knowledge in general, to the exact distinction of particular parts, which are the occurrences to be directed, and the materiall substance of euery action: he therefore that can giue best direction, either by experience, or iudicious discourse, concerning such particularities as are incident to the matter propounded, can best aduise which is the safest way to auoid the opposition of contradicting natures. But to make this somewhat plainer, I wil alleage 2. exampls: the one moderne in case of consultation; the other ancient, and may seeme not so pertinent to this matter, in regard it is a meere Apologie: yet forasmuch as it freely censureth the quality of particular circumstances, it may giue great light to that which we seek after.

The moderne example is taken out of Guicherdin, from the warres which Lewis the French King had with the Pope and the Venetians, concerning the State of Ferrara & the Duchie of Millan: wherein there arose a controuersie among the French Captaines, whether it were better to go directly to seeke the Enemy, who albeit were lodged in a strong & secure place, yet there was hope, that with the vertue of Aimes and importunity of artillerie, they might be lodged, and driuen to a retreat: or otherwise, to take the waie either of Modena or Bolognia, that so the Enemy for feare of losing either of those townes, might quit their holde, and by that meanes Ferrara should be freed from the warre, Monsieur Chaumont the Generall of the French, inclined to the former aduise: But Trumlee, a man of great authoritie and experience, hauing bene an executioner in 18. batailles, reasoned thus in particulars to the contrary. We debate (saith he) to go seek the Enemy to fight with him; and I haue alwaies heard great Captaines holde this as a firme principle; Not to attempt the fortune of a battell, vnlesse there be either an offer of an especiall aduantage, or otherwise, compulsion by necessity. The rules of warre giue it to the Enemy that is the inuader, and hath vndertaken the conquest of Ferrara, To seeke to assaile and charge vs; but to vs, to whom it is sufficient to defende our selues, it cannot bee but impertinent to vndertake an action, contrary to all direction and discipline of war. I am of opinion, which is confirmed by euident reason, that there is no possibilitie to execute that deuise, but to our harmes & disaduantage: for, we cannot go to their Camp but by the side of a hill, a streight and narrow way, where all our forces cannot bee employed; and yet they with

Lib. 9.

small numbers will make resistance, having the opportunity of the place favourable to their virtues: we must march by the rising of a hill, one horse after another; neither have we any other way to draw our Artillery, our baggage, our carts and bridges, but by the streight of the hill: and who doubteth not but in a way so narrow and combrous, every artillery, every cart, or every wheel that shall breake, will not stay the Army a whole houre at the least? By which impediments every contrary accident may put vs to disorder. The Enemy is lodged in couert, provided of victuals and forrage; and we must incampe all bare and naked, not carrying with vs that which should serve for our necessaie nouriture; but expect the things to come after, which in reason ought to goe with vs. To attempt new enterprises, whereof the victory is lesse certaine then the perill, is contrary to the gravity and reputation of a Leader; and in actions of the war, those enterprises are put to adventure, that are done by will & not by reason. Many difficulties may compell vs to make our abode there, two or three dayes; yea, the snowes & rains ioined with the extreamity of the season, may suffice to detain vs: how shall we then do for victuals & forrages? What shal we be able to do in the wars, wanting the things that should give vs strength & sustenance? what is he that considereth not, how dangerous it is to goe seek the Enemy in a strong Camp, & to be driven at one time to fight against them & against the discommodity of the place? If we compell them not to abandon their Campe, wee cannot but be enforced to retire; a matter of great difficultie in a country so wholly against vs, and where every little disavow will turn to our great disadvantage, &c.

And thus proceeded that graue discourse, in the discoverie of the particular occurrences, incident to that enterprise; which being laied open to their confuted iudgements, did manifestly point at the great disadvantages, which were to be vndergone, by that attempt.

The other example is of more antiquitie, taken out of Tacitus, and concerneth the arraignment of certaine Senatours, for the friendship that had past between Seianus and them. Amongst whom M. Terentius thus answered for himselfe; according as it hath of late been published by translation:

It would bee peradventure lesse behoouefull for my estate to acknowledge, then to denie the crime I am charged with: but hap what happe may, I will confesse that I haue been Seianus friend, and that I desired so to be, and that after I had obtained his friendship I was glad of it. I had seen him ioint officer with my father, in the government of the pretorian cohort; and not long after, in managing the Citie affaires, and matters of warre: his kinsmen and allies were aduanced to honour: as euery man was inward with Seianus, so he was graced by Cæsar: and contrariwise, such as were not in his fauour, lined in feare, and distressed with pueritie. Neither doe I alleadge any man for an example of this; all of vs who were not priuie to his last attempts, with the danger of my only estate I will defend: not Seianus the Vulsinensis, but a part of the Claudian and Iulian family, which by alliance he had entred into; thy sonne in law Cæsar, thy companion in the Consulship, and him who took vpon him thy charge of administering the Common-wealth, wee did reuerence  
and

## SABINVS AND COTTA



and honour. It is not our part to iudge of him, whom thou doest exalt above the rest, nor for what considerations: to thee the highest iudgement of things the gods haue giuen; and to vs the glory of obedience is left. Wee looke into those things which wee see before our eyes, whom thou doest enrich, whome thou doest aduance to honours, who haue greatest power of hurting or helping: which Seianus to haue had, no man will denie. The Princes hidden thoughts, or if he go about anie secret drift it is not lawfull to found, and dangerous: neither shalt thou in the ende reach vnto them. Thiinke not onely, Lords of the Senate, of Seianus last daie; but of sixteene yeares, in which we did likewise fawne vpon and court Satrius, and Pomponius; and to be known vnto his freed men and partners, was reckned for a high fauour. What then? shall this defence be generall, and not distinguished, but a confusion made of times past, and his later actions? No: but let it by iust boundes and tearms be diuided: let the treasons against the Common-wealth, the intentions of murdering the Emperour bee punished; but as for the friendships, dueties, pleasures and good turnes, the same end shall discharge and quit thee, O Caesar, and vs.

The constancie of this Oration preuailed so much, that his Accusers were punished with exile. And thus wee see how particularities decide the controuerfie, and make the waie plaine to good direction.

CHAP. XI.

The Romaines take their iourney towardes  
the next legion; and are set vpon by  
the GALLES.



As soone as the day light appeared, they set forth of their Camp (like men perswaded that the counsell had been giuen them not by an Enemy, but by Ambiorix an especiall friend) with a long tailed march, and as much baggage as they were able to carrie. The Gales vnderstanding of their iourney, by their noise and watching in the night; secretly in the woodes some two miles off layed an Ambuscado, in two seuerall places of aduantage, and there attended the comming of the Romans; and when the greatest part of the troupes were entred into a valley, sodainely they shewed themselves on both sides the vale, pressing hard vpon the reuerward. and hindering the foremost from going vp the hill, and so began to charge vpon the Romans in a place of as great disadvantage for them as could bee. Then at length Titurius, as one that had provided for nothing before hand, began to tremble, ranne vp and downe, and disioined his cohorts, but so feareful.

Caesar.



fearefully and after such a fashion, as if all things had gone against him, as it happeneth for the most part to such, as are forced to consult in the instant of execution.

## OBSERVATION.

**N**ow plainly appeareth, by this negligent and ill ordered march, and the vnlooked for encounter which the Galles gaue them, that feare had ratified in the iudgement of Sabinus the smooth suggestio of Ambiorix, with an approbation of a certaine truth, and layed that for a principle, which a discourie free from passion would haue discerned to be but weake, and of no probabilitie: which so much the more amazed Titurius, by how much his apprehension had erred from the truth, and betrayed good counsell to a courle full of danger; which as Cæsar noteth, must needes fall vpon such, as are then to seeke for direction when the businesse requireth execution. I haue handled already the inconueniences of disappointment; and therefore at this time will but bring it only into remembrance, that wee may take the greater care to preuent an accident of that nature: wherein, as the best remedie for an euill is to foresee it, according to the saying, *Præuisa percutunt mala*; so the greatest mischiefe in an euill, is when it commeth vnthought of, and besides our expectation; for, then it falleth vpon vs with a supernaturall waight, and affrighteth the mind with a superstitious astonishment, as though the diuine powers had preuenied our desigmentments, withan irre-mediabie calamitie, and cut off our appointment with a contrarie decree: although peraduenture the thing it selfe carrie no such importance, but might be remedied, if we were but prepared with an opinion, that such a thing might happen.

It were no ill counsell therefore, what resolution soeuer bee taken, to make as full account of that which may fall out to crosse our intentions, as that which is likely to happen from the direction of our chiefest projects; and so we shall be sure to haue a present minde in the midst of our occasions, and feele no further danger, then that which the nature of the thing inforceth.

CHAP.

## CAP. XII.

*The Romans cast themselves into an Orbe; and are much discouraged.*



**B**ut Costa, who had before thought that these things might happen by the waie, and for that cause would not bee the author of the iourney, was not wanting in anything that concerned their common safetie: for, both in calling vpon the souldiers and encouraging them, hee executed the place of a Commaunder; and in fighting, the dutie of a souldier. And when they found, that by reason of the length of their troupe, they were not able in their owne persons to see all things done, and to giue direction in euery place, they caused it to be proclaimed, that they should all forsake their baggage, and cast themselves into an Orbe: which direction, although in such a case be not to be reproved; yet it fell out ill fauouredly: for, it both abated the courage of the Romans, and gaue the Enemy greater incouragement, inasmuch as it seemed that that course was not taken, but vpon a great feare and in extremitie of perill. Moreover, it hapned, as it could not otherwise choofe, that the souldiers went from their Ensignes, to take from the cariages such things as were most deare vnto them: and there was nothing heard amongst them, but clamours and weepings. But the Barbarous Galles were not to learne how to carrie themselves: for, their Commanders caused it to be proclaimed, that no man should stir out of his place, for the preiewas theirs, and all that the Romans had laide aparte, was reserved for them: and therefore let them suppose that all things consisted in the victory. The Romans were equall to the Galles, both in number of men and valour; and albeit they were destitute of good Captaines, and of good fortune, yet they reposed in their manhood all the hope of their safety: and as often as any cohort issued out, they failed not to make a great slaughter of the Enemy on that part.

Cæsar.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



**H**auē already handled the nature of an Orbe, with such properties as are incident to a circle; wherein I shewed the conueniencie of this figure, in regarde of safe and strong imbattailing: I will now adde thus much concerning the vie thereof, that as it is the best manner of imbattailing for a defensive strength, and therefore neuer vied but in extremitie; so we must be very carefull, that the sodaine betaking of our selues to such a refuge, do not more dismaie the souldiers, then the aduantage of that imbattailing canne benefit them.

them. For, vnlesse a Leader be carefull to keepe his men in courage, that their hearts may bee free from despaire and amazement, what profit can there arise from any disposition or body foueer, when the particular members shall bee senselesse of that duty, which belongeth vnto them? For, order is nothing but an assistance to courage, giuing means to manage our valour with aduantage. In the warre of Affricke wee reade, that Cæsars legions being incircled about with great multitudes of enemies, were forced to make an Orb; but he quickly turned it to a better vse, by aduancing the two Cornets two contrary waies; and so diuided the Enemy into two parts; and then beate them backe, to their great disaduantage.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**N**eede not stand vpon this order which the Galles heere took, concerning pillage, that no souldier should forsake his station, or distank himself in hope of spoile; which is a thing that from the very infancy of warres hath often changed the fortune of the day, and solde the honour of a publike victory, for priuate lucre and petty pilfering. Amongst other examples, let that which Guichardine reporteth of the battell of Taro, suffice to warne a well directed Armie, as well by the good which Charles the eighth of that name, King of France, receiued at that time, as by the losse which the Italians felt by that disorder, not to seek after pillage vntill the victory be obtained.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**he insufficiency of these Commanders, whereof Cæsar now complaineth as the onely want, which these Romans had to cleere themselves of this daunger; bringeth to our consideration that which former times haue made a questiō: which is, whether it were the vertue of the Roman Leaders, or the valour of their souldiers, that enlarged their Empire to that greatnesse, and made their people and Senate, Lords of the world? Polybius waighing the causes of a victory, which the Carthagineans gained of the Romans, by the counsell and good direction of one Zantippus a Grecian, hauing before that time receiued diuers ouerthrowes, during the time of those warres in Affricke; concluded, that it was more in the worthinesse of the Commanders, then in any extraordinary vertue of the souldiers, that the Romans archieued so many conquests. And besides the present example of Zantippus, he confirmed his opinion with the proceedings of Hannibal; who from the beginning of the second Punicke warre, still gained of the Roman Empire, enlarging the territories of Carthage, and streightening the iurisdiction of mightie Rome, vntill it had got a Leader matchable to that subtle Carthaginian, and found a Scipio to confront their Hannibal. To this may be added that famous

famous battell betwene the olde Romans, and the last Latines; wherein both parties were equally ballanced, both in number and qualitie of their souldiers, hauing both the same Armes, the same vse of their weapons, and the same discipline, as if it had been in a Ciuill warre. Neither could Fortune tell by the presence of their Armies, where to bestow her fauour, or where to shew her disdaine; but that the worthinesse of the Roman Leaders, brought the oddes in the triall, and made Rome great with the ruine of the Latines. Vwhereby it appeareth, how much it importeth the whole fortune of the Armie, to haue a Leader worthy of the place which he holdeth: forasmuch as nothing doth make a greater difference of inequality betwene two equall Armies, then the wisdom and experience of a graue Commander, or the disability of an vnskillfull Leader; which are so powerfull in their seuerall effects, that there is greater hope of a heard of Harts ledde by a Lion, then of so many Lions conducted by a Hare.

## CHAP. XIII.

*Ambiorix directeth the Galles how they might  
best fight with aduantage, and frustrate  
the weapons of the Romaine  
souldiers.*

**H**E which thing when Ambiorix perceiued; he commanded his men to throwe their casting weapons as far off, and keepe themselves from comming neere at hand, and where the Romans charged them, to giue way: & againe, as they saw them retire to their Ensignes, then to pursue them. Which commandement was so diligently obserued by the Galles, that as oft as any cohort sallied out of the Orbe to giue an assault, the Enemy gaue backe as fast as they could; and in the meane time there was no helpe, but that part must be left naked and open to the inconuenience of casting weapons: and againe, as they retired to their place, they were circumuented, as well by them that had giuen place vnto them, as by such as stood next about them. And if they went about to keep their ground, they could neither helpe themselves by their manhood; nor standing thicke together, auoide the darts that such a multitude cast vpon them: and yet notwithstanding these inconueniences, besides the wounds which they had receiued, they stood still at their defence; & hauing so spent the greatest part of the day (for they had fought eight houres together) they committed nothing dishonourable, or vnworthie of themselves.

Cæsar.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**H**ave spoken alreadye of the manner of the Roman fight, consisting altogether in good disposition of imbattailing, and in firme standing, and buckling at handy-blows: as may appeare by this circumstance, where Ambiorix forbiddeth his men to buckle with them, but to giue backe & follow on againe, as the lightnesse of their Armes gaue them opportunitie. In like manner, in the first booke of the Ciuill wars, in the battell betwene Cæsar and Afranius, it appeareth, that Cæsar his souldiers were bound to keepe their array, nor to leaue their Ensignes, nor without a waig, tie occasion to forsake their stations appointed them: whereas the Afranius fought thin, and scattered heere and there; and if they were hard laid vnto, they thought it no dishonour to retire and giue backe, as they had learned of the Portugals, and other Barbarous Nations.

## CHAP. XIII.

## The Romans are ouerthrowne.

**H**en T. Baluentius, who the yeere before had bene Primpile of that region, a valiant man, and of great authoritie, had both his thighes darterd through with a Iavelin; and Q. Lucanius, of the same order, valiantly fighting to succour his sonne, was slaine: and L. Cotta the Legate, as hee busily encouraged all the Cohorts & Centuries, was wounded in the mouth with a sling. Titurius moued with these things, as he beheld Ambiorix as farre off encouraging his men, sent C. Pompeius vnto him, to intreat him that he would spare him and his souldiers. Ambiorix answered, that if he were desirous to treat, hee might: for, hee hoped to obtaine so much of the people, to saue the souldiers; but for himselfe, he should haue no harme at all: for the assurance whereof, he gaue him his faith. Titurius imparted the matter to Cotta, who absolutely denied to goe to an armed enemy, and continued resolute in that opinion. Titurius commanded such Tribunes & Centurions that were present, to follow him; and when hee came heere to Ambiorix, being commanded to cast away his Armes, he obeyed, and willed those that were with him, to doe the same. In the meane time, while they treated of the conditions, and Ambiorix began a solemne protestation of purpose, Titurius was by little & little compassed about and slaine. Then, according to their custome, they cried victory; and taking vp a howling, charged the Romaines with a fresh assault, and routed their troupes. There L. Cotta fighting valiantly, was slaine, with the most part of the souldiers with him. The remnant retired into their Campe, amongst whom L. Petrosidius the Eagle-bearer, when hee sawe himselfe ouercharged with enemies, threw the Eagle within the Rampier, and fighting with

with a great courage, before the Campe, was slaine. The rest, with much ado endured the assault vntill night, and in the night, being in despaire of all succour, slew themselves euery man: a few, that escaped from the battell, came by vnkowne waies through the woods, to Labienus, and certified him how all things had fallen out.

## OBSERVATION.



And thus haue we heard of the greatest losse, that euer fell at any one time vpon Cæsar his Armie, from the time that he was first Proconsull in Gallia, vnto the end of his Dictatorship. For in the two ouerthrowes at Dirrachium, he lost not about 1000 men, and in that at Gergouia, not so many: but heere, fiftene cohorts were cut in peeces, which amounted to the number of 7000 men, or thereabout. Which maketh cowardice, and ill direction the more haefull, in regard that the great victorie, which his valour obtained in Pharsalia, cost him but the liues of two hundred men.

The resolution of such as returned to the Campe, witnesseth the exceeding valour of the Roman souldier, if a valiant Leader had had the managing thereof; or if Cotta alone had been absolute Commander, there had bene great hope of better fortune in the successe. But heere it happened as it commonlie doth, that where there are many that are equall sharers in the chiefe authority; the direction, for the most part followeth him that is more violent in opinion then the rest: which being a propertie rather of passion then of iudicious discourse, forceth a cōsent against the temperat opposition of a true discerning vnderstanding; and so consequently it falleth out, that one coward, hauing place and authoritie in the Councell, doth either infect or annihilate the sound deliberations of the rest of the Leaders: for, his timorousnesse sleeth alwaies to extremities, making him rash in consultation, peremptorie in opinion, & base in case of perill; all which are enemies to good direction, and the onely instruments of mischieuing fortune.

## CHAP. XV.

*Ambiorix hasteth to besiege Cicero, and stirreth vp the Aduatici, the Neruij, and so raiseth a great power.*



Ambiorix tooke such spirits vnto him vpon this victory, that with his horsemen he went immediatly vnto the Aduatici, being the next borderers vpon his kingdome, without intermission of night, commanding his footmen to follow him. The Aduatici being stirred vp to commotion, the next day after hee came to the

the Neruij, exhorting them not to let slippe this occasion of taking to themselves perpetuall libertie, and reuenging them of the Romaines for the wrong they had receiued. He told them that two Legates were already slaine, and a great part of the Armie overthrowne: it was now no great matter, suddenly to surprise the legion that wintered with Cicero; to the performance whereof, hee offered himselfe to be their assistant. These remonstrances easily perswaded the Neruij, and therefore they dispatched speedy messengers to the Centrones, Grudij, & other people under their dominion, and raised very great forces; and with them they hastied to the Campe where Cicero wintered, before any inkling of the death of Titurins was brought unto him.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**He ambitious and working spirit of Ambiorix, that could attempt to raise the baseness of a small and ignoble State, to so high a point of resolution, that they durst adventure vpon the Romaine legions, being seated in the strength of their Empire, by the memorie of so many victories in Gallia; wanted now no means to make an ouerture to a vniuersall commotion, propounding libertie & reuenge to the Galls (two the sweetest conditions that can happen to a subdued people) if they would but stretch out their hands to take it; and follow that course which his example had proued sure and easie. Which may serue to shew, that hee that will attempt vpon doubtfull and vn safe Principles, will take great aduantage from a probable entrance, and make a small beginning a sufficient means for his greatest designs.


## CHAP. XVI.

Cicero defendeth his Campe from the surprise  
of the Neruij, and preparath himselfe  
against a Siege.



**L**T happened to Cicero also (as it could not otherwise chuse) that many of the souldiers, that were gone into the woods for timber and munition, were cut off by the sudden approach of the Enemies horsemen. These being circumvented, the Eburones, Neruij, and Aduatci, with all their confederates and clients, began to assault the Campe. The Romans betooke them speedily to their weapons, and got vpon the rampier, with much ado they held out that day: for the Galls trusted much vpon celeritie, hoping if they sped well in that action, to be victors euer after.

Cicero





Cicero dispatched Letters with all speed to Cesar, promising great rewards to him that should carie them: but all the waies were so fore-laid, that the Messengers were taken. In one night there was built in the Campe one hundred and twenty towers, of such timber as was brought in for fortification; and whatsoeuer wanted of the rest of the worke, was perfected.

The enemy the next day, with a farre greater power assaulted the Campe, and filled up the ditch: the Romans made the like defence, as they had done the day before; the like was continued diuers daies after. The Romaines made no intermission of their work at any part of the night, nor gaue any rest either to the sick or the wounded. Whatsoeuer was needfull for the next daies assault, was provided in a readinesse the night before; a great number of stakes hardened in the fire were prepared, and many murall piles were made; the towers were floored in their stories; Pinacles and Parapets were set up of hurdles: and Cicero himselfe beeing sickly, and of a weake constitution, tooke not so much leasure as to rest himselfe in the night time: so that the souldiers of their owne accord, compelled him by intreatie, to spare himselfe.

## OBSERVATION.



His Q. Cicero, is said to be the brother of Marcus Cicero, the famous Oratour, & to him were the Letters sent which are found in his Epistles, directed *Quinto fratri*. In this action, his cariage deserved as great reputation, in the true censure of honour, as euer his brother did for his eloquence, *pro Rosstris*. And if it had beene the others fortune to haue performed the like seruice, he would haue made it the greatest exploit that euer Roman had atchieued by Armes. Wherein particularlie may be commended, the diligence and indutry which was vfed, in raising so many towers in so small a time; for providing the night before, such things as were necessarie for the next daies defence; for making so many stakes hardened in the end with fire, for the defence of the rampier; and for the store of these murall piles, which resembled the forme of the ordinarie pile, but were farre greater and waightier, in regard they were to be cast from the rampier, which gaue them such aduantage, by reason of the height, that being cast by a strong and well practiced arme, they were very effectuall and of great terrour.

## CHAP. XVII.

The Neruij propound the same things to Cicero  
which Ambiorix had done to Sabinus;  
but are reiected.

**T**hen the Princes and chiefe Commanders of the Neruij, which had any entrance of speech, and cause of acquaintance with Cicero, signified their desire to speak with him: which beeing granted, they propounded the same things they had used to deceine Sabinus; all Gallia were in Arms; the Germans were come ouer the Rhene; Cæsar and the rest were besieged in their wintering Campes; Sabinus & his men were cut in peeces: notwithstanding, they carried this mind to Cicero, that they refused nothing but their wintering among them; they might depart in safetie whither they would, without disturbance or feare of danger. Cicero onely made this answer: that It was not the custome of the people of Rome, to take any article or condition from an armed Enemy; but, if they would lay their Armes aside, let them vse his furtherance in the matter, and send some to negotiate it with Cæsar; there was great hope, in regard of his iustice and equitie, that they should not returne unsatisfied.

## THE OBSERVATION.

**T**He first attempt, which Ambiorix made vpon the Camp of Sabinus and Cotta, was but short; but heere, what with the pride of the former victorie, and the great multitude of the assailants, they continued it longer, in hope to carrie it by assault: for, the first assault of a place, especially, when it cometh by way of surpris, is of greater hope to the assailant, and of greater danger to the defendant, then such as afterward are made in the sequell of the warre: for, after the first brunt, the heat of the enemy is much abated, as wel through the nature of a hot desire, which is most violent in the beginning, & afterward groweth cold & remisse, as also with the harmes and perill which they meet with in the incounter; and on the contrarie side, the defendants hauing withstood the first furie, wherein there is most terour and distrust, grow more confident and better assured of their manhood, and in experience of their strength, stand firme against any charge whatsoeuer.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. XVIII.

The Neruij besiege Cicero, with a ditch and  
a rampier, and worke meanes to set fire on  
their Tents.



He Neruij disappointed of this hope, caried a ditch & a rampier round about the Camp; the rampier was 11 foot high, and the ditch 15 foot deepe; which they had learned of the Romaines, partly by beeing conuersant among them certaine yeeres before, and partly by the prisoners and captiues which they had taken; but they had no iron tooles fit for that purpose, but were driuen to cut up turfe with their swords, and gather earth with their hands, and carie it away with their Mantles and Gaberdines. Whereby may be gathered, what a multitude of men there were at the siege: for, in lesse then three houres, they finished the fortification of fifteene miles in circuit. The daies following, the enemy built towers to the height of the rampier, prepared great bookes and strong penthouses, or safeguads of boords and timber, according as the captiues had given them instruction. The seauenth day of the siege, beeing a verie windie day, they cast hot bullets of clay out of slings, and burning darts vpon the cabines of the Romans, which after the manner of the Gallies, were thatched with strawe: these cabines were quickly sette on fire, which by the violence of the wind was caried ouer all the Campe. The enemy pressing forward with a great clamour, as though the victorie were already gotten, began to bring their Turrets and Testudines to the rampier, and to scale it with ladders. But such was the valour of the Roman souldiers, that albeit they were scorched on all sides with fire, and ouer-charged with multitude of weapons, and saw all their wealth burned before their face; yet no man forsooke the rampier, or scarce looked backe at that which had happened, but they all fought valiantly, and with an exceeding courage.

Cæsar.

## OBSERVATION.

**T**His one example may serue, to shew the excellencie of the Roman discipline, and the wisdom of the first founders of that Art: for, they perceiuing that the fortune of warres consisted chieslie in the mastering of particular occurrences, trained their souldiers in that forme of discipline, as might struggle with inconveniences, and strong oppositions of contradicting accidents; and so ouerwage all difficulties and hinderances, with a constant perseueration & a courage inuincible. For, the great attempting spirit of an ambitious Commander, that seeketh to ouertoppe the trophies of honor, with the memory of his exploits, will quickly perish by his own direction, if the instruments of execution be weaker, then the means which lead

leade him to his designments. For, where the waight is greater then the strength, the engine will sooner breake, then lift it vp. Let a discret Leader therefore so leuell his thoughts, that his resolution may not exceed the abilitie of his particular meanes: but first let him be well assured what his souldiers can doe, before he resolue what he will doe: or otherwise, let him so inable them by discipline and instructions, according to the example of the old Romans, that their worth may answere the height of his desires, and follow his aspiring mind, with a resolution grounded vpon knowledge and valour; and so making their abilitie the ground of his designes, he shall neuer faile of meanes to performe what he intendeth. The want of this consideration, hath within these late yeeres, repaid our Commanders in many parts of Christendome, with losse and dishonour, when as they measure the humour of their poore needie and vndisciplined souldier, by the garbe of their ambitious thoughts, & so laid such proiects of difficultie, as were verie vsurable in the particularitie of occurrences, to that which their souldiers were fit to execute.

## CHAP. XIX.

The æmulation betweene two Centurions, *Pulso*  
and *Varenus*, with their fortunes in  
the incounter.



HERE were in that legion two valiant men, *Titus Pulso*, & *L. Varenus*, Centurions, coming on apace to the dignity of the first orders: these two were at continuall debate which of them should be preferred one before another, and euerie yeere contended for place of preferment, with much strife & emulation. *Pulso*, at a time that the fortification was very sharply assaulted, called to *Varenus*, and asked him why he now stood doubtfull? or what other place hee did looke for to make triall of his manhood? This is the day, saith he, that shall decide our controversies. And when hee had spoken these words, he went out of the fortification; and where he saw the Enemy thickest, he fiercely set vpon them: then could not *Varenus* hold himselfe within the rampier, but followed after in a reasonable distance. *Pulso* cast his pile at the enemy, and strooke one of the multitude through, that came running out against him. He being slaine, all cast their weapons at him, giuing no respite or time of retreat. *Pulso* had his target strooke through, and the dart stuck fast in his girdle. This chance turned aside his scabberd, and hindered his right hand from pulling out his sword; in which disadvantage the enemy pressed hard vpon him. *Varenus* came and rescued him: immediately the whole multitude, thinking *Pulso* to be slaine with the dart, turned to *Varenus*, who speedily betooke him to his sword, and came to handy-strookes: and hauing slaine one, he put the rest somewhat back. But as he followed overhastily vpon them, hee fell downe: him did *Pulso* rescue, being

being circumvented and in danger; and so both of them hauing slaine manie of the enemy, retired to their Campe in safetie, to their great honour. Thus Fortune caried as well the contention, as the incounter of them both, that being Enemies, they neuertheless gaue helpe to saue each others life, in such sort, as it was not to be iudged which of them deserved greatest honour.

## OBSERVATION.



Aesar inserteth this accident of the two Centurions, as worthie to be related amongst the deeds of Armes contained in these Commentaries: wherein we are first to obserue the grounds of this quarrell, which was their cōtinuall strife for place of preferment, which they fought alter, by shewing their valour in time of danger, and approouing their worth by the greatnesse of their desert; a contention worthy the Roman discipline, and may serue for a patterne of true honour full of courage, accomplished with vertue. For these *Simulates*, which desire of honour had cast between them, brought forth emulation, which is the spur of vertue, far from enmitie or hatefull contention: for, the difference between these two qualities, is, that enmitie hunteth after destruction, and onely reioiceth in that which bringeth to our aduersary viter ruine, dishonor, or ill archievement: but emulation contendeth only by well deserting, to gaine the aduantage of another mans fame, that vseth the same meanes to attaine to the like end; and is alwaies mixed with loue, in regard of the affinitie of their affectiōs, and the sympathy of their desires, not seeking the ouerthrow of their Competitor, but succouring him in time of danger, and defending him from foule and vnfürunate calamitie, that he may still continue to shew the greatnesse of his worth, by the opposition of inferiour actions, which are as a lesser scantling of desert, to measure the estimation of the others honour.

A vertue rare and vknowne in these daies, and would hardly find subiects to be resident in, if she should offer her help in the course of our affaires, or sue to be entertained by the crooked dispositions of our times: for, we can no sooner conceiue the thoughts that breed emulation, but it turneth presently to hatred, which is followed to the vttermost of our malice, & resteth better satisfied with the miserable end of our opposed partner, then with thousand of Trophes deleriously erected to our honor. Which maketh me wonder, when I looke into the difference of these and those ages, whether it were the discipline of that time, which brought forth such honest effects of vertue, to their glory and our ignominie, hauing learned better rules then were known vnto them; or whether the world weakened with age, want strength in these times to bring-foorth her creatures in that perfection, as it did in those daies; or what other cause hath made our worst affectiōs so violent, and our better faculties so remisse & negligent, that vertue hath no part in vs but words of praise, our whole practise beeing consecrated to actions of reproach. The iniuries, murders, scandalous cariages of one towards another, which in these daies are so readilie offered and


and to impatiently digested, will admit no satisfaction but priuate combate; which in the first Monarchies, was granted onely against strangers and forraigne enemies, as the onely obiects of Armes and wrath, and capable of that iustice, which the priuate sword should execute: for, they well perceived, that these single bartels, were as sparkles of ciuill discord, and intestine warres; although not so apparant in the generall view of their State, yet as odious in particular, and as dishonourable to good gouernment. And if there were a true record of such, as haue been either slaine or wounded within these fortie yeres, either in this kingdome, or in France, or in Germanie, by this licentious and brutish custome; I make no question, but they would amount to a number capable of that fearefull stile, which is attributed to Ciuill warres.

Neither is there any law, how rigorous or hard soeuer, that can giue reliefe to this disorder, but the restraint will draw on as great enormities, and as vntolerable in a good gouernment. Rotaris, King of the Lumbards, forbade his subiects this manner of combate: but shortly after, he was constrained to recall the Edict, for the auoiding of greater euils; although he protested the thing to be both inhumane and barbarous. The like Edict was published in France, by Philip the Faire; but was within two yeeres reuoked againe, at the instant request of his subiects, in regard of the murders and assassinations committed in that kingdome.

The onely remedie that I find to take effect in this case, was that of late time, which the Prince of Melphe in Piemont, inuented to preuent this euill: for, perceiuing how ordinarie quarrels and bloodshed were in his Campe, he assigned a place betweene two bridges, for the performance of the *Duellum*, vwith this charge; that hee that had the worst, should alwaies be slaine, and cast from the bridge into the water: the danger ioyned with dishonour (which by this Decree attended such as vndertooke priuate combate) made the souldiers wiser in their carriage, and put an end to their sedition and ciuill discords. But that which is yet worst of all, is, that custome hath now made it so familiar, that euery trifle seemeth sufficient to call the matter to a priuate combate: a crosse looke calleth another mans honor in question; but the word Lye, is of as great consequence, as any stabbe or villanie whatsoeuer. Wherat we may wel wonder how it happeneth, that wee feele our selues so much exasperated at the reproach of that vice, which wee so ordinarilie commit: for, in the custome of these times, to cast vpon vs the lye, is the greatest iniurie that wordes can doe vnto vs; and yet there is nothing more frequent in our mouth. It may be a propertie in our nature, to stand chiefeleie in the defence of that corruption vnto which we are most subiect.

I speake not this to qualifie the foulness of this vice: for, I hold a Lye to be a monster in nature; one that contemneeth GOD, and feareth man, as an ancient Father saith; but to shew the crookednesse of our disposition, in disdaining to acknowledge that fault, which we so commonly commit. But I would faine learne, when honour first came to be measured with vwords: for, from the beginning it was not so. Cæsar was often called to his face theefe, and drunkard, without any further matter; and the libertie of inuectiues, which  
great





great personages vied one against another, as it beganne, so it ended with words. And so I think our lie might too; for, I take him that returneth the lie, and so letteth it rest, vntill further prooffe, to haue as great aduantage in the reputation of honour, as the former, that first gaue the disgrace.

## CHAP. XX.

Cicero findeth meanes to aduertise Cæsar of this  
*Accident; who hastning, raiseth the siege, and*  
putteth the Enemie to a great  
slaughter.



As the siege grew daily hotter & sharper, and specially, for that the greatest part of the souldiours were laid vp with wounds, and the matter brought into a few mens hands that were able to make any defence; so they sent out Letters and Messengers the more often to Cæsar: of whom, some were taken, and in the sight of our souldiours, tortured to death. There was one within the place besieged, of the Nation of the Nernij, called Vertico, of honest parentage; who in the beginning of the siege had fledde to Cicero, and caried himselfe faithfully in that seruice: this man did Cicero chuse, perswading him with hope of libertie, and other great rewards, to carie Letters to Cæsar; which he tooke, & hauing tied them vp in his Dart, travelled as a Gall amongst the Gallies, without any suspicion, & so came to Cæsar: Of whom he vnderstood, how dangerously Cicero and the legion was beset.

Cæsar, hauing receiued those Letters about the eleuenth houre of the day, dispatched presently a Messenger to M. Crassus, the Treasurer in the country of the Bellonaci, twentie five miles off; commaunding the legion to set out at midnight, and speedily to come vnto him. Crassus set out and came along with the Messenger. He sent another Post to C. Fabius, the Legat, to bring that legion to the confines of the Atrebatij, through which he was to passe: And writ in like manner to Labienus; that if it stood with the conueniencie of the State, hee should bring the legion to the territories of the Nernij: for, the rest of the Armie that were further off, he thought good not to expect. He drew foure hundred horse or thereabouts, from the neereſt wintering Campes. And beeing aduertised about the third houre (by the fore-runners) of Crassus comming, hee marched that day twentie miles.

Hee made Crassus Gouvernour of Samarobrine, & gaue him one legion for the defence thereof; in regard that the baggage of the whole Armie, the hostages of the Prouinces, the publique transactions and Letters, together with all the Corne which hee had got for the provision of the Winter, was left in that place. Fabius, according to his directions, without any delay, met him with the legion.

C c.

Labie-

Cambray.



*Labienus, understanding of the death of Fabrius, and the slaughter of the Cohorts: and knowing also that the whole forces of the Treveri were marching towards him; he doubted, that if his setting forward out of his winter station, should seeme as a stealing away, he should not be able to undergoe the charge of the enemy, who a late victory had made insolent: and therefore informed Cæsar by his Letters, what danger it would be to draw the legion from their wintering Camp; relating what had happened amongst the Eburones, and how that all the forces of the Treveri, both horse and foote, lay but three miles distant from his Campe.*

*Cæsar, allowing of these reasons, howsoever his hope of three legions was fallen vnto two; yet his whole trust was in celeritie, as the onely meanes of all their safeties: and so by great iourneys, came into the confines of the Nervij; where he understood by the Captives, how matters passed with Cicero, and what danger he was in. At what time he perswaded a certaine horseman of the Galles, by great rewards offered vnto him, to carrie a Letter to Cicero; which hee sent writ in Greeke Characters, lest his purposes should be discovered, if the Letter had been intercepted: advising, that if he could not come to his presence, hee should tie it to the string of a Dart, and so cast it into the fortifications. Hee advertised them by his Letter, that he was on the way with the legions, and would be there instantly to raise the siege. The Gall, fearing some danger, followed the directions, and cast it into the works by a Dart; which fell by chance upon a turret, and there stuck two daies before it was perceiued: the third day, a souldiour finding it, took it downe, & brought it to Cicero; who read it publicly in the assembly of the souldiours, and put them all into exceeding great ioy. And at the same time, the smoake of their fires began a farre off to be discovered: which put them out of all doubt of the approach of the legions.*

*The Galles, being advertised thereof by their Discoverers, left the siege and made towards Cæsar with all their power; which consisted of threescore thousand men or thereabouts. Cicero, finding himselfe at libertie, sought out the same Pertico before mentioned, to carry Letters to Cæsar: advising him to be warie and diligent in his passage; signifying by those Letters, that the Enemy had left the siege, and turned all his forces towards him. Which Letters, being brought vnto Cæsar about midnight, he certified his Partie of the contents thereof, and prepared them by encouragement to fight. The next day, as soone as it began to be light, he remoued his Campe; and hauing marched about foure miles, he discovered the multitude of the enemy, beyond a great Valley and a River. It was a matter of exceeding danger to giue battell to so great a number, in a place of disadvantage: yet forasmuch as he knew that Cicero was freed of the siege, he thought he might the better forbear to make such haste: and thereupon sat downe, and in as indifferent a place as he could chuse, fortified his Campe. Which being of it selfe very little, as not hauing scarce seauen thousand men, & those without any carriages: yet he lessened it as much as hee could, by narrowing the small streetes thereof; to the end he might the better defend it, if happily the enemy might be drawne to ingage himselfe seriously in any attempt upon the same. In the meane time, hauing sent out Discoverers into all parts, he informed him-*

*selfe*

*selfe which way he might most conueniently passe ouer the valley.*

*The same day, after small encounters of the Cavalrie at the water, either partie contained themselves within their fortifications: the Galles, as expecting greater forces, which were not yet come; and Cæsar, that by a counterfet feare, he might draw the Enemy to the place where he was lodged on this side the valley, and so strike the battell before his Campe; and if he could not bring it so about, then upon discovery of the waies, to passe the Valley and the River with lesse danger. As it began to be day light, the Cavalrie of the enemy came neere vnto the Campe, and began to skirmish with our horsemen. Cæsar, of set purpose, commaunded the horsemen to fall back, and to betake themselves into the Camp: and withall, to fortifie their Camp on all sides with a higher rampier, to stoppe up the Gates; and in doing of these things, to cary themselves tumultuously, and with a fained show of great feare. With which inducemēt, the enemy was so drawn on, that he brought ouer all his forces, and imbatailed them in an vnequall and disadvantageous place. Our men being drawne from the rampier (to make the matter more apparent) they were emboldened to come neerer, and to cast vpon weapons from all parts into our works: sending Herralds round about with Proclamations, That if any Gall or Roman would come ouer vnto the before the third houre, he should be taken into their safe protection; but, after that time, there was no hope of any such reception. And they did so contemne our party, that when as the Ports were shut up for a shewe, with a single rowe of turfes, to the end they might appeare to be made up in such manner that they could not be broken open; some of them began to breake downe the rampier with their handes, and others to fill up the ditches.*

*Which Cæsar perceiuing, salied out at all the Ports at once; & sending out the Cavalrie, put the enemy so suddainly to flight, that not one of them resisted by way of fighting: insomuch as he slew a great number of them, & put them all besides their Armes. But because he feared to follow them farre, in regard of the woods and bogs, that lay in their passage (being unwilling to hazard himselfe vpon the least occasion of danger) he returned with all his forces in safety; and the selfe-same day came to Cicero. Where he admired the towers, the mantelets and works, which were begun and prepared by the enemy: and drawing out the legions, hee found that the tenth man had not escaped without wounds. By all which circumstances he understood, with what danger & valour the busines had been caried. Hee commended Cicero & the legion, according to their merit; calling out by name such Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiours, as by testimonie of Cicero, were found to haue deserved extraordinarily in that service; informed himselfe by the Captives, of the certainty of Sabinus and Cottas misfortune. The next day, hee spake publicly to the souldiours, opened the particulars of that matter, and then seasoned them with comfort and encouragement; shewing that the losse which happened through the fault and temerity of a Legate, was to bee borne with better patience: and the rather, forasmuch as by the assistance of the immortal Gods, and by their owne vertue, the losse was redeemed, in such a fashion, as neither the enemy did long ioy it, nor themselves were long afflicted with griefe for the same.*



## OBSERVATION.

**T**He passages in this Chapter, are of great varietie, and do giue occasion of much discourse: but that which is most remarkable, is, that to exceed in forces and troopes of men, may be a meanes to bring a partie to an ouerthrow: for, an extraordinarie power doth alwaies beget an opinion sorting to their owne desires, and can hardly thinke of anie other end, then that which suiteth with securitie and victorious successe; vvhich beeing crossed in any materiall circumstance, & put besides the course of their intendments, whereby they faile of what they expected, doth consequentlie draw all, the other way; and changeth hope into mishap: as it fared here with the Galles, vpon Cæsars suddaine salying out of his Campe.

## CHAP. XXI.

The commotions of the States of Gallia. Induciomarus, attempting great matters, was slaine, and the Countrey quieted:

**I**N the meane time, the report of Cæsars victorie was caried to Labienus, with incredible speed, through the Countrey of those of Rheimes: inasmuch, as being fifty miles distant from that place where Cicero wintered, and that the ouerthrowe was giuen about three of the clock in the afternoone, there was a shout at the Campe gate before midnight; whereby the men of Rheimes congratulated Labienus for that victorie. The same vvhereof beeing caried to the Treuiri, Induciomarus, that purposed the next day to besiege Labienus, fled in the night time, and caried all his forces backe to the Treuiri. Cæsar remaunded Fabius, with the legion, into their vvinter stations: He himselfe, with three legions, determined to winter about Samarobrine. And so much as there were such commotions throughout all Gallia, himselfe resolved to abide with the Armie all the vvinter: for, vpon the newes of the ouerthrowe of Sabinus, almost all the States of Gallia, did enter into a consultation of war; sent Messengers and Embassadours into all parts, to make ouertures for future resolutions, and to vnderstand in what place the war might best be set on foote; holding their Conuenticles by night, in secret and desert places: in such manner, as there passed not a day, during all that winter, vvhich brought not some newe care or doubt concerning Cæsar, least he should be aduertised of these meetings and conspiracies, amongst these occurrences.

He had intelligence fro L. Roscius the Legat, that great forces of those States and Citties of the Galles, that are called Armorica, were assembled together, to fight against him; and were come within eight miles of his Campe: but vnderstanding of Cæsars victorie, they fell backe, in such a fashion, as though they meant

means to iue away. But Cæsar, hauing called vnto him the Princes and chiefe men of euery State; terrifying some, as seeming to vnderstand their complotments, and perswading others, kept a great part of Gallia in obedience. Howbeit, the Senones (a strong people, and of great authority amongst the Galles) went about by a publique Decree to kill Canarinus, vvho Cæsar had set to be king ouer them (vvhose brother Moritagus, at Cæsars comming into Gallia, and vvhole ancestors formerly, were possessed of that kingdom): which he perceiuing, fledde away, and was persecuted to the very borders, and so driuen as vvell out of his priuate house, as of his kingdome. And hauing sent Embassadours to Cæsar, to satisfie him herein; whereas hee commaunded the whole Senate to come vnto him, they refused to obey his warrant: so much it preuailed amongst barbarous people, that there vvore some found that durst auousch the vndertaking of a vvwarre. Which made such an alteration in the minds of all men, that besides the Etedui, and the state of Rheimes, vvhom Cæsar had in great fauour and respect (the one for their ancient and perpetuall fidelitie to the people of Rome, and the other, for their late seruices in the war of Gallia) there was almost no State free from suspicion. Inasmuch, as I knowe not vvell, whether it may not be wondered at or no; as vvell for many other reasons, as specially for that they greatly grieved, that they, vvho excelled all other Nations in deeds of Armes, had now lost their reputation so farre, as they were forced to beare the yoke of the people of Rome.

The Treuiri and Induciomarus, lost no time of all that Winter, but sent Commissioners beyond the Rheine, soliciting the Citties, and promising monies with confident assurance, that the greatest part of our Armie was already cut off; and that which was left, was but a small remainder of the same: and yet for all that, no people of the Germanes could be perswaded to passe the Rheine. For, hauing twice made triall to their cost, in the vvare of Ariouistus, & in the passage of the \* Teuctheri, they vvould tempt Fortune no further.

Francfort.

Induciomarus, cast downe from his hope, did not vvithstanding traine and gather forces, got horses from the bordering States, and vvith great rewards, drew vnto him banisht and condemned men, from all parts of Gallia; and did thereby get such an opinion throughout all that Continent, that Embassadours came flocking vnto him from all quarters, and sought his fauour both in publique and priuate. When he vnderstood that men made to him of their owne accord, and that on the other side, the Senones and Carnutes were instigated with a remembrance of their offences; and on the other side, the Nerviij and Aduataci, made prouision of war against the Romaines, and that hee should not want voluntarie forces, if he did but once goe out of his confines; hee gaue order to call a Conncell of Armes: which, according to the manner of the Galles, was alwaies the beginning of a war: beeing such, as constrained all the men that vvore of yeeres, by the common law of the Land, to assemble together in Armes: and hee that came last, was in the sight of all the rest, put to death vvith exquisite torture. In that Conncell, he tooke order to proclaime Cingetorix the chiefe of the other faction, and his sonne in law (vvho, as we haue before declared, had followed Cæsar, and not left him in any of those seruices) a Traytor to the State, and that his goods should be confiscated.

Cc 3.

That

That beeing done, he published in the Councell, that he was sent for by the Senones and the Carnutes, and many other States of Gallia: whether he meant to go, through the territories of the inhabitants of Rhemes; & that he would harry and waste their country. But first, his purpose was to take the Camp of Labienus, and accordingly gaue order what he would haue done. Labienus, being in a Camp exceedingly fortified, as well by Nature as by Art, did not feare any danger that might happen to himselfe, or the legion; but rather studied not to let passe any occasion, to carry the matter handsomly, and to purpose. And therefore, being aduertised by Cingetorix and his allies, what speech Induciomarus had deliuered in the Councell, he sent Messengers to call the confining citties, and commanded horsemen to be sent vnto him by a certaine day.

In the meane time, Induciomarus rid vp and downe almost euery day, with all his caualrie vnder his campe; sometimes to view the site thereof, otherwhile to parlee, or else to terrifie the souldier: & his horsemen, for the most part, would cast their weapons within the rampier. Labienus kept all his men within the fortifications, and did what he could to make the enemy belieue that hee was sore afraid. And, as Induciomarus came daily with greater contempt to the camp, one night, hauing taken in the caualry of the bordering citties, which he had formerly sent for, he kept all his party (by good guarding) within his campe, with such diligence, that their reception could not possibly be bruted abroad, or caried to the Treuiri. In the meane time, Induciomarus, according to his wonted custome, approached neere the campe, and there spent a great part of the day: the horsemen cast their weapons, and with words of high reproach, called out our men to fight; without any word giuen in answer by them. And a little before the euening, as they dispersed themselues and departed; vpon a suddaine, Labienus let out all the caualry at two Ports, commanding them, that after the Enemy was put to flight (which he saw would necessarily happen) that euery one should make after Induciomarus: and that no man should so much as wound any other Enemy, before they saw him slaine; Being very unwilling, to giue him time to escape, while the souldiours were ingaged with the rest: and propounding great rewards to thō that slew him. Fortune made good that direction: for, as all made after one, Induciomarus was surpris'd in the foord of a Riuer, & slaine; & his head was brought backe into the campe: the horsemen returning, slew as many of therest as they could take. This thing beeing knowne, all the forces of the Eburones and Neruij, which were met together, departed home: and after that time, Cæsar had Gallia better settled in quietnesse.

## OBSERVATION.



the misfortune which befell Sabinus and Corta, put all Gallia into troubles and commotions; so the head of Induciomarus, reduced all into peace: According as it is said of the Spaniard; that in some cases, one man is worth a thousand.

And thus endeth the fift Commentarie.

FINIS.  
L DE 65



THE FIRST BOOKE OF  
Cæſars Commentaries of the  
*Ciwill Warres.*

THE ARGVMENT.

**T**His Commentarie containeth the Motions and Contentions at Rome, concerning Cæſars giuing vp his gouernment: The rent in the State, vpon the disagreement of the Senate: How either ſide beſtirred themſelues, to ſeize vpon the Provinces. Pompey got the Eaſt, and Cæſar the Weſt part of the Empire; and defeated Afranius and Petreius in Spaine.

CHAP. I.

The Senates affection on Cæſars behalfe.

**L**ETTERS beeing deliuered by Fabius, to the Conſuls from C. Cæſar, it was hardly obtained by the extreame importunitie of the Tribunes, to get them read in the Senate: but to conſult thereof, or to bring the Contents in queſtion, would not be graunted. The Conſuls propounded buſineſſes concerning the ſtate of the Cittie. L. Lentulus, Conſull, proteſted his aſſiſtance ſhould not be wanting, neither to the Senate nor to the Common-weale, if they would ſpeake their mindes freely and boldly: but if they reſpected Cæſar, and had an eye to his fauour (as in former times they uſually had) he would then take a courſe for him ſelfe, and not regard the authoritie of the Senate; neither wanted hee meanes of entrance into Cæſars friendſhip and good acceptance. To the ſame effect ſpake Scipio, that Pompey was reſolued to be ayding to the Common-weale, if the Senate would ſtand to him: but if they temporized, and dealt coldly, in vaine hereafter ſhould they ſeake ayde from him, albeit they inſtantly deſired it. This ſpeech of Scipios, ſeemed to come from

B. Pompeis

# Observations vpon the first

Pompeys owne mouth, he himselfe being absent, and the Senate at that time kept within the Cittie. Some others spake more temperately; as first, M. Marcellus, who thought it not convenient, that the Senate should bring these things in question, vntill they had made a leuie of souldiers throughout all Italie, and inrolled an Army; by whose protection, they might safely & freely determine what they thought fit: As also M. Calpidius, who thought it requisite, that Pompey should goe to his Provinces and Governments, to remove all occasions of taking Armes: For, Caesar hauing two legions newly taken from him, feared that Pompey kept them neere about the cittie to his preiudice. And likewise M. Rufus, varying some few words, declared himselfe of Calidius opinion. All these were bitterly reprooued by L. Lentulus the Consull; who utterly denied to publish what Calidius had sentenced. Marcellus feared with these menaces, retracted his opinion. And so, what with the clamor of the Consull, the terrour of the present Armie, and the threatning vsed by Pompeys faction, most of the Senators were compelled against their will, to allow that which Scipio thought fit: which was, that by acertain day, Caesar should dissolue and dismisse his Armie; which if he did refuse to doe, that then he openly shewed himselfe an Enemy to the Common-weale. M. Antonius, and L. Cassius, Tribunes of the people, did oppose this decree. Their opposition was instantly spoken vnto; and many sharpe & hard censures were giuen vpon the same: for, according as any one spake most bitterlie, and cruelly, so they were most highly commended by Caesars Enemies.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**A**S the former Commentaries doe carie in their front the ensignes of honour, displaying the militarie valour of the Romaine people, in the Continent of Gallia, and other Kingdomes of warlike Nations: so are these Relations branded in the forehead with a note of Infamie, and titled with the direfull name of Ciuill warre; An odious and decried cause, ill besitting the integritie of that State, or the excellencie of the Actors, which are chiefe in this Tragedy; who neglecting all that might either enlarge the Empire, or repaire Romes honour for the losse of Crassus, chose rather to imbrow their ambitious swords in the blood of their owne Country: Eagle against Eagle, and Pile against Pile, in a warre which could challenge no Triumph. Is it be now demanded as formerlie it was,

*Quis furor ô Cines? quæ tanta licentia ferri?*

Was it Pompeis Ambition, or Caesars high Thoughts, that bereft the State of libertie, with the losse of so many Romaines? It were besides the scope of these discourses, to lay an imputation vpon either of those Worthies; the one beeing chiefe Assistant to the Empire, when she put off her Consularie Government, and the other sitting sole at the helme, directing a course to wars in many Caesars. Only this I may truly say with Tacitus; That Ciuill wars were neuer set on foote by iustifiable courses. Yet for the Readers better direction, and for opening the truth of this storie (which is more to be regarded

then

# Commentary of the Ciuill Warres.

then either Socrates or Platos friendship) it shall not be impertinent to fetch the causes of this warre a little higher in a word then these Commentaries doe afford them.

The histories of that age do all intimate, that whē Rome had ennobled Pompey with her seruice, & titled him by employments with the title of Greatnesse, as a satisfaction for the iniuries done vnto his father; he (forgetting the rights of a State, which chalenge the renouue of other mens labours, and suffereth no subiect to be Copartner therein, further then by approbation of seruice & obedience) assumed to himselfe the honour due to the Common-weale, and became proude of that which was none of his; in which conceit, the ambition of his spirit kept no measure, but over-valued his merits so far, that he thought himselfe rather a Soueraigne then a seruant; so easily are men bewitched when the fauour of a State hath once made them absolute, and put it selfe vnder the awe of priuate command. In this height of greatnesse & authoritie, he made way for Caesar, his father in law; hauing a spirit as subiect to ambition, and as capable of publique dignities, as any one amongst all the Patrician Families: And vpon the ending of his first Consulship, in the yeere of Rome 695, obtained the gouernment of Gallia Transalpina, and likewise of that other Gallia which they called Cisalpina, containing the Countries that lie betwene the Alpes and the little Riuer Rubico, together with Slaunia, and foure legions of souldiers for the tearme of five yeares. At the expiration wherof, his charge was continued, by the like fauour and mediation of Pompey, and the assistance of Crassus, for five yeares longer, with a redoubling of his forces. But after that Crassus was slaine in the Parthian warre, and that Iulia, Caesars daughter, who Pompey had married, was deceased (wherby Caesar stood single, without any tie of alliance, or other counterpoise of a third partie, to hold them balanced at the same weight as they stood while Crassus liued) Pompey, ialous of those victories and passages of Armes which Caesar had atchieued by his valour, and impatient of any partner in point of Lordship; found meanes first to draw two legions from him, vnder colour of the Parthian warre; and afterwards, got a Decree of Senate, to send him a succesor before his time was expired: and withall, to returne as a priuate person to Rome, to render an account of his Actions during his imployment. Which Caesar taking as an assurance of his downefall, gaue huge summes of money to gaine Paulus Aemilius, one of the Consuls, and C. Curio, a Tribune of the people, to resist this Decree. Howbeit, the succeeding Consuls beeing both his enemies, and hauing no hope of repealing the same, hee intreated in the end, that hee might hold onely Gallia Cisalpina, and Iliricum with two legions, vntill hee should obtaine the Consulship; which was the effect of these Letters deliuered by Fabius. And beeing denied by Pompeys faction, in these partiall and tumultuous assemblies of the Senate, caused him to forfeit his loyaltie to the State, verifying the olde laying; That oftentimes an iniurie maketh way to a greater fortune.

*Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato: Magis amicus veritati. Aristot. 1. Ethic. Pomp. Mag.*

Constantine was so ialous thereof, that he published an Edict, that the honour of all victories should be attributed to him, although they were atchieued too leagues off.

*Fonte cedit madico, paruisque impellitur vndis. Iuniceus Rabinus, et Gallica cœtus limes, ab Ausonii diffeminat arua colonis. Lucan. li. 1. Fallat tribum dominis communis Roma.*

*Pompeius, Caesar, et Crassus. Nisi sola futuris Crassus erat belli Medius mora.*

*Nulla sancta societas, nec fines Regni. Ennius.*


*Nec quemquam, iam ferre potest. Cæsarne priore, Pompeiusque patrem. Lucan. li. 1. Arduas hac est, opibus non tradere mores. Martialis.*

*Sæpe maior fortuna locum fecit iniuria. Seneca Epist. 91.*

*Pars Agrippæ in pile montibus. Bella geri placuit, non habere triumphos. Luc. lib. 1.*

*Amicitia parata, non per se. Aristot. 1. Ethic.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

 Concerning the opposition of the Tribunes, it is to bee vnderstood, that the people eaten vp with vsurie, and other grieuous exactions, forsooke both the Cittie and the Campe, when the State had war with the Dolsi and the Equi; and taking themselves to a Mountaine neere vnto Rome, would not returne from thence, vntill the Senate had giuen order for their grieuances. In which transaction it was agreed, that there should be Magistrates chosen out of the body of the people, to counterpoise the power of the Senate, and to restraine the boundlesse authoritie of the Consuls: which office, was reckoned in the number of their holiest things; neuer to be violated either in word or deed, but the offender should redeeme it with the losse of his life. Their whole power consisted in letting & hindering. As, when either the Senate, or any one Senatour, went about a matter, which might be preiudiciall to the people in generall, or to any one of the communaltie in particular; Then did the Tribunes interpose their authority, to frustrate and avert the same: which was auailable, albeit the matter was gainesaid but by one Tribune onely. By which intervention, they kept the Senate in awfull moderation, and were alwaies profitable to the State, but when they happened vpon factious and turbulent persons; howbeit, their power was bounded with the walls of Rome, and extended no further then the gates of the Cittie. Their doores were neuer shut, but stood open night and day, for a refuge to such as should flie to them for succour: neither was it lawfull for them to bee absent from Rome a whole day together. The robes of their Magistracie were of Purple; as Cicero intimateth in his oration *Pro Cluentia*. This Tribunitian power, began about the yeere of Rome 260; was suppressed by Sylla; restored by Pompey; and utterly taken away by the Emperour Constantine.


If it be demanded what kind of Common-wealth this Romaine government was; it is to be vnderstood, that vpon the expulsion of their Kings, the soueraintie rested in their Consuls. For, as Liuius saith, there was nothing diminished of kingly government, saue onely for the better establishing of libertie, that the Consular dignitie was made Annuall. But that held not long, for Publicola impaired this soueraintie to the Communaltie; making it lawfull to appeale from the Consuls to the people. Whereby the Consular soueraintie was dissolued, and the people tooke occasion to oppose themselves against the Fathers. Hence grew the reciprocal inuestiues between the Senate and the Tribunes; and when the Consul sent a Seriant to the Tribune, the Tribune would send a Purseuant to the Consul. And so the Common-wealth halted betweene an Aristocratie and a Democratic, vntill at length the voage of the Communaltie, drew it to a perfit Democratic, and made their Acts of Senate of no value, vnlesse they were ratified by the people: Howbeit, the Senate, affording alwaies many famous and eminent Men, such as hauing enlarged the boundes of their Empire, and kept on foote their auncient valour, and

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and were the flower of that people, which Cynas called a towne of kings, were consequentlie so engaged in the businesse of the State, that matters were for the most part, carried as they stood affected; as appeareth by this passage of Caesar.

Cynas interrogatus à Pyrrho qualis Roma esset? Respondit, Regia vrbem sub videri Iussit. l. 8.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

 Hardly, we may obserue, that violence and partialitie, are the bane of all consultations: espéciallie, when the common good is shadowed with priuate respects. And albeit, the grauitie of the Romaine Senate, farre exceeded all that can be spoken of other Councils of State, rectifying the inordinate affections of any Catiline that would lift vp his head higher then his fellowes: yet heere it suffered equitie and indifferencie to bee suppressed with faction, giuing way to violence, which gouerneth all things vntowardlie; and with cordes of priuate hate, oftentimes draweth the Common-wealth into vtter desolation. For preuention whereof, the Athenians swore their Senatours, to make the common good the chiefe scope of all their counsels: Implying thereby that priuate respects are alwaies offensive to publike ends; and the State euer suffereth, when fauour preuaileth against the common profit.

Tully, going about to direct a Councillor in this behalfe, onely witheth a man to deliuer sincerely what hee thinketh of any matter, although hee happen to stand alone in his owne conceit: for, the illue of a businesse, dooth not so much concerne a Councillor, as to speake truly his opinion thereof. And to that end, the custome of the Romaine Senate was, that the youngest & such as came last in place, should declare themselves first; that they might not bee forestalled in their opinions, nor put besides that they would haue spoken; together with the equalitie which it made of their voyces: for, thinges first spoken, doe alwaies sticke fastest in our apprehensions. And for that cause, Theophrastus (a Greeke Tragedian) would neuer shew himselfe on the stage after any other Actor; as holding the first passages to affect most the Spectators. Notwithstanding which custome, it is reported, that Caesar, in fauour of Pompey, after their new made alliance, would take his voice first, thereby to anticipate the opinion of others that should follow.

The Emperours (as it seemeth) tooke what place they pleased; for, Tiberius in Marcellus cause said, that he would sentence openly, and vpon oath, that other men might doe the like. Wherevnto Cn: Piso replied; What place wilt thou take to declare thy selfe, Caesar: for, if thou speake first, I knowe how to follow; if last, I am assured I shall dissent from thy opinion. But that which is most blameable in matter of counsell, is, when they come to the Senate house as to a prize of flatterie. Wherein L: Piso is deservedly commended, for that hee neuer willinglie shewed himselfe of a seruile opinion; but when necessity forced him, hee tempered it with wisdom. Neither is it

Faction in a Council, is an enemy to the publike good.

Quam male ciuitas ministrat impetui, et stimulat non raro priuati adly pestinationem in publicum exitium. Tac. a. hist.

Atheniensis Senator iurabat se prae seipsum populum consulturum. Demost. cōt. N. ear. i. Philippic.

Arist. 7. polit. 27.

Sueton. in vita Iulij Caesaris.

Tacit. 1. Annal.

Tacit. 6. Annal.

the least milchiet, that the condition of Ioueraintie is such as will hardly indure reproofe: but must be disguised, as Appolonius corrected Lyons, by beating dogges before them.

CHAP. II.

The Senate proceede against Cæsar, with all eagerneße.



HE Senate, rising a little before night, were all sent for to Pompey. He commended them for what they had done, and confirmed them for after resolutions, reprehended such as shewed themselves indifferent, and stirred them up to more forwardnesse. Many which were of Pompeis former Armies were sent for, vpon hope of reward & aduancement. Many of the two legions which lately came from Cæsar, were commaunded to attend; insomuch, as the Cittie swarmed with souldiers. Against the election of new Magistrates: C. Curio called on the Tribunes of the people. All the Consuls friends, the kinsfolks & allies of Pompey, and such others as had any former enmity with Cæsar, were cōpelled into the Senate. By the presence & opiniū of these Men, the weakest were terrified, the doubtfull confirmed, & the most part were cut off from giuing absolute and free voyces. L. Piso the Censor, and L. Roscius the Prator, offered themselves to goe to Cæsar, to aduise him of these things; requiring but sixe daies space to returne an answer. Others thought it fit, that Embassadors should be sent to Cæsar, to giue him notice of the pleasure of the Senate. To all these was opposed what the Consul, Scipio, and Cato thought fit. Cato was incited through former enmitie, and specially, by the repulse of the Pratorship. Lentulus, out of a consideration of his great debts, hoping to commaund an Armie, to gouerne Prouinces, and to receiue the liberall acknowledgements of Kings, whom he should thereby procure, to be stiled with the Title of friends to the people of Rome; insomuch, as he would not stick to boast in private, that hee was like to proue a second Sylla, on whom, the soueraine commaund of the Empire would be conferred. Scipio was drawn on by the same hope, of hauing the gouernment of a Prouince, or the commaund of an Armie; which by reason of his alliance he thought to share with Pompey (beeing otherwise asseard to be called into iustice) as also through flattery and ostentation, both of himselfe, and other great friends, which were able to sway much, as well in the course of iustice, as in the Common-wealth.

Pompey, in his particular, was much prouoked by Cæsars enemies, and specially, for that hee could indure no man to be his equall. Hee was alienated altogether from Cæsars friendshipp, and had reconciled himselfe to their common Enemies; the greatest part of whom, were by his meanes gained to Cæsar,

in the time of their alliance: as also by the dishonour which he had gotten by taking those two legions from their iourney towards Asia and Syria, and vsing the for the aduancement of his owne particular: which things mōed him to draw the matter to Armes. For these respects, all things were caried impetuoullie and confusedly; neither was there leasure giuen to Cæsars friends to aduertise him thereof; nor yet to the Tribunes, to auoide the danger which was falling vpon them, or to vse their right of opposition which L. Sylla left vnto them: but within seauen daies after they were entred into their office, they were forced to shift for their safetie; notwithstanding that the most turbulent and seditious Tribunes of former times, were neuer put to looke into their affaires, or to giue account of their actions before the eight Month. In the end, they tooke themselves to that extreame and last Act of Senate, which was neuer thought vpon, but whē the cittie was vpon the point of burning, or in the most desperate estate of the Common-weale. That the Consuls, Prators, Tribunes of the people, and such as had bene Consuls, and were resiant neere about the cittie, should endeavour that the Common-weale might not be endangered. This Act was made the seauenth of the Ides of Ianuary: so that the fine first daies, in which the Senate might sit, after that Lentulus was entred into the Consulship (excepting onelie two daies for the generall assembly of the people) most heauie & cruell Decrees were made, against the authority of Cæsar, and against the Tribunes of the people, famous and worthy men; who there-vpon sledged presently out of the cittie. Cæsar being then at Rauenna, attended an answer to his easie and modest demands, if by any reasonable course matters might be drawne to a peaceable end.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



It is the condition of humane nature, to make good that which once it hath auouched, although the matter be of small consequence in particular, & tendeth rather to infamie then to profit; neither will it easilie be reclaimed by motives of reason, but is rather incited thereby (per Antiperistasin) to persist in willfulness, then to harken to that which is more conuenient; especially, when either ieaiousie or reuenge doe impie an advantage: for, then partialitie keepeth no measure; but to iustifie an error, runnes headlong into all extremities, and flieth to the last refuge of desperate and deplored cases, to make disordered passions seeme good discretion. Which euidently appeareth by Pompeis faction, in resolving of that desperate Act of Senate, which was neuer thought of but in most eminent danger. For, as in foule weather at sea, when a shippe rideth in a dangerous road, and through the violence of the tempest, is vpon the point of shipwrack, the Mariners are wont to cast out a sheete Anker as their last refuge: so had Rome anciently recourse to this Decree, at such times as the Common-wealth was in eminent and extreame calamitic; whether it were by enemies abroad, or by serpents in their bosome at home. Liuiē speaking of the warre

De quid respub. detrimenti capiat. Consentes sunt dies Communitates, per quos senatus haberi non poterat. Cic. L. i. iustit.

Per gratia oneri, sic vltio in qua-ssu habetur. Tac.

Suprema lex Salus respub.

of the Equi, saith; I the Senators were to affrighted, that following the forme of the Decree which was alwaies referued for cases of extremitie, they ordained, that *Posthumius* (one of the Consuls) should take care that the Common-wealth might not be endangered. The likewise vied in ciuill and intestine seditions; as, when *Manlius Capitolinus* aspired to a Tyranny; and as likewise in the tumults of the *Gracchij*, the conspiracie of *Catiline*, & other times of like danger. For, albeit the Consuls had all foueraigne authoritie, as well in warre as in peace; yet neuertheless, there were certaine referued cases wherein they had no power, without expresse order from the Senate, and assent from the people: as, to leuie an Armie to make war, to take money out of the Treasury; whereas vpon such a Decree, they were inabled to dispose of all busineses of State, without further mouing of the Senate or people: which *Tully* noeth in his Orations against *Anthonic*. I thinke it fit (saith hee) that the whole state of the Common-weale be left vnto the Consuls, and that they be suffered to defend the same; and to take care that the Common-weale be not endangered.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**M**ay not omit (for the better vnderstanding of this noble Historie) to say somewhat of the Persons here mentioned: and first of *Fabius*, as descended of the noblest and most auncient Family of the *Patrician* Order; being able of themselves to maintaine warre a long time against the *Veij*, a strong & warlike towne, vntil at length they were all vnfortunately slaine by an ambushment: which *Ouid* mentioneth, where he saith;

*Hac fuit illa dies, in qua Veientibus arvis,  
Tercium Fabij ter cecidere duo.*

Onely there remained of that house, a child then kept at Rome: which in tract of time, multiplied into fixe great Families, all which had their turne in the highest charges and dignities of the Common-weale; amongst whom, hee that supplanted *Hanniball* by temporizing, & therby got the surname of *Maximus*, was most famous, as *Ennius* witnesseth;

*Vnus homo nobis cunctando restituit rem:  
Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem.  
Ergo postque magisque viri nunc gloria claret.*

But *C. Fabius*, here mentioned, neuer attained to any place of Magistracie, other then such commaunds as he held in the warres vnder *Cæsar*.

*Lentulus* the Consul was of the house of the *Cornelians*, from whom are said to come xvi. Consuls. He was from the beginning a mortall enemy to *Cæsar*, and so continued to his death, which fell vnto him in Egypt, by commaundement of King *Ptolomey*, after *Pompey* was slaine.

*Scipio* was father in law to *Pompey*, after the death of *Julia*, *Cæsars* daughter; and by that meanes, obtained the government of Asia. In the beginning of

of the Ciuill war, he brought good succors to assist his son in law, as it follows in the third Cometary: & vpon the ouerthrowe at *Pharsalia* he fled into *Affrick*, where he renewed the war, & became chief Commander of the remaining party against *Cæsar*; but being in the end defeated, he made towards Spaine: and leaving by the way lest he should fall into his enemies hands, he slew himselfe.

*Marcellus* was of the ancient Family of the *Claudians*, which came originally of the *Sabines*; on his behalfe there is an Oration extant of *Tullies*, intitled, *Pro Marcello*. He was afterwards slaine by one *Chilo*.

*M. Antonius* is famous in all the Romaine histories, for attaining in a small time to so great a height in that government; for, in all the warres of Gallia, he was but a Treasurer vnder *Cæsar*, which was the least of all publique places of charge: In the beginning of the ciuill wars, hee was made Tribune of the people; and within lesse then eight yeeres after, came to bee fellow partner with *Octavius Cæsar* in the government of the Empire. And if *Cleopatras* beautie had not blinded him, he might haue easily through the fauour of the souldiers supplanted his Competitor, and seized vpon the Monarchie.

The name of *Cæsius* was ominous for trouble to the state of Rome, & their ends were as vnfortunate. This *L. Cæsius*, for his part, after the great troubles he had stirred vp in Spaine, was drowned in the mouth of the River *Eber*.

*Piso* was made Censor in the Consulship of *L. Paulus* and *Claudius Marcellus*, hauing himselfe been Consul eight yeeres before, in the yere of Rome 695, succeeding *Cæsar*, and *Bibulus*; and was the man against whom *Tullie* penned that Oration which is extant in *Pisonem*. Touching the office of Censor, it is to be vnderstood, that about the yere of Rome 310, the Consuls being distracted with multiplicitie of forraigne businesse, omitted the Censure or alsment of the Citie for some yeeres together: wherevpon it was afterwards thought fit, that there should be a peculiar officer appointed for that seruice, and to be called Censor; forasmuch as euery man was to be taxed, rankt and valued, according to his opinion & censure. The first part of their office consisted in an account or valuation of the number, age, order, dignity, & possession of the Romaine citizens: for it was very material for the State to know the number of their people, to the end they might be informed of their owne strength, and to shape their course accordingly, either in vndertaking warres, transplanting Colonies, or in making prouision of victuals in time of peace. It was also as requisite to know euery mans age, whereby they grew capable of honour & offices, according to that of *Ouid*;

*finitque certis*

*Legibus et ætas, vnde petatur honos.*

*M. Antonius* commaunded, that the names of the Romaine children should be brought into the Treasury within 30 daies after they were borne; according to which custome, Francis the French king published an Edict, Anno 1539, that euery parish should keepe a Register of burials and christenings: which since that time is vied in England.

The distinction of conditions and states, ranging euery man in his proper order, is as necessary in the Common-weale, and as woorthy of the Censors notice,

*Marcellus.*

*M. Anto.*

*Cæsius.*

*Piso.*

To know the number of Citizens.

Their age.

*De Fæst.*

*Halicarnassensis. lib. 4.*

*Gotofred ad L. atatem 3.*

*De Cons.*

Their calling.

*Materni primus*

*quisque suis illis*

*honorum, aut Pa-*

*stor fuit, aut il-*

*lud quod dicere*

*noli.*



notice as any thing besides. Neither may the allotment of mens abilities bee omitted: which was ordained that euery man might beare a part in the seruice of the State. In which respect, Seruius Tullius is commended, for rating men according to their wealth; whereas before that time euery man paid alike: for, men are taken to bee interested in the Common-weale according to their means. The last and basest sort of Cittizens, were named *Capite censi*, and were set in the Subsidie at 375 peeces of money. Such as were not assessed, had no voice in the Common-weale.

The second and chiefe part of this office, was in reforming maners, as the ground-plot and foundation of euery Common-wealth; to which end they had power to inquire into euery mans life. If any one had plaid the ill husband, and neglected his Farme, or left his Vine vntrimmed, the Censors tooke notice of it. If a Romaine knight kept his horse leane, it was a matter for them to looke into. They deposted, or brought in, new Senators. They reviewed all degrees and conditions of men: advanced this man from a meane Tribe to a more honourable, and pulled another downe. They had the care of buildings, repairing of high waies, with other publique works; and were reputed of the best rank of Magistrates in Rome. L. Roscius had formerly bin one of Cæsars Legates in Gallia: as appeareth in the first Commentary, *Tertiam in Essnos. L. Roscio*. The Prætor was ludge in causes of controuersie, & differences between partie and party; and was as the Caddy amongst the Turkes.

## CHAP. III.

## The Senate prepareth for warre.



HE next day after, the Senate assembled out of the Cittie: where Pompey (according to such instructions as he had formerly giuen to Scipio) extolled their constancy & magnanimity; acquainted them with his forces, consisting of ten legions in Armes; and further assured them, he knew of a certaine, that Cæsars souldiers were alienated from him, and would not be drawne either to defend or follow him. And vpon the assurance of these remonstrances, other motions were entertained: As first, that a leuie should be made throughout all Italy. That Faustus Sulla should forth-with be sent as Proprator into Mauritania. That mony should be deliuered out of the Treasurie to Pompey. That king Iuba might haue the title of friend & confederate to the people of Rome; which Marcellus contradicting, stopt the passage thereof for that time. Philippus, Tribune of the people, countermanded Faustus commission: other matters were passed by A.C. The two Consular, and the other Prætorian Provinces, were given to priuate men that had no office of Magistracie. Syria fell to Scipio, and Gallia to L. Domitius. Philippus and Marcellus, were purposely omitted, and no lottes cast for their employment. Into the other Provinces were sent Prætors, without any consent or approbation of the

the people, as formerly had beene accustomed: and hauing performed their ordinary vowes, they put on their Military garments, and so tooke their iourney. The Consuls (which before that time was neuer scene) went out of the Cittie, & had their Seruants priuately within the Cittie, and in the Capitoll, against all order and ancient custome. A leuie was made ouer all Italie: Armes and furniture was commaunded: Money was required from Municipall townes, and taken out of Temples and religious places. All diuine and humane Rights were confounded.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



HE neglect of Ceremonies and formes in matter of State, is the ruine and abolishment of a Common-weale. For, if it hold generallie true which Philosophers say; That the forme giueth being to whatsoever sublieth, and that euery thing hath his name from his fashion and making: then it must necessarily follow, that the life and perfection of a State, dependeth wholly of the forme; which cannot be neglected but with hazard of confusion. For, complements and solemnities, are neither *Nimia* nor *Minima* (as some haue imagined) either superfluities, which may be spared, or trifles of small consequence. But, as the flesh couereth the hollow deformitie of the bones, and beautifieth the body with naturall graces: so are ceremonies, which ancient custome hath made reuerent, the perfection and life of any Common-weale; and doe couer the nakednesse of publique actions, which otherwise would not be distinguished from priuate businesse. And therefore the neglect of such ceremonies, as were vsually obserued to ennoble their actions, was as iniurious to the safety of the Empire, and as euident a demonstration of faction and disloyaltie; as the allotment of Provinces to priuate persons, or whatsoever else they broached, contrarie to the fundamentall rights of the publique Weale.

Concerning which, it is to be vnderstood, that no man was capable of those governments, but such as had borne the chiefe offices and places of charge. For, their manner was, that commonly vpon the expiration of their offices, the Consuls and Prætors did either cast lots for the Provinces, which they called *Sortiri provincias*, or did otherwise agree amongst themselves how they should be disposed: and that they teamed, *Comparare Provincias*. Liue toucheth both the one & the other; *Principio insequentis anni cum Consulibus noui de Provincijs retulissent, primoquoque tempore, aut coparare inter eos Italiam et Macedoniam, aut sortiri placuit*. Howbeit, sometimes the people (whose assent was alwaies necessary) interpolated their authoritie, & disposed the same as they thought expedient. But such as had neuer borne office of charge in the State, were no way capable of those dignities, nor thought fit to command abroad, hauing neuer shewed their sufficiency at home.

For the manner of their setting forward out of Rome, after they were assigned to employments, it appeareth by infinite examples of histories, that they first went into the Capitoll, & there made publick sacrifices & solemn vowes, either

Paludati exiit.

The use of Ceremonies. Forma dat nomini officio. Arist.

Nimia nec Minima.

Cinitatis legibus, creatis, salutis quoque populi dominatio. Aekin, in Ctesiphont.

The manner of disposing of the Provinces and governments.

Sortiri Provincias, comparare Provincias. Liue. 43.

The manner of their setting forward to their governments.

to build a Temple, or to doe some other worke woorthy good fortune, if their designes were happily atchiued; which they called *Vota nuncupari*. And hee that had made such a vow, stood *voti reus* vntill his busines sorted to an issue: and after he had attained his desire, he was *voti damnatus*, vntill he had acquitted himselte of his promise.

Touching their habite expressed in this phrase, *Paludati exeunt*, it appeareth, as well by auncient Sculptures, as Medallies, that *Paludamentum*, was a cloake vled and worn by men of warre, whether they commaunded in chiefe, or as Lieutenants and Centurions; and was tied with a knot vpon their left shoulder. Festus calleth all militarie garments, *Paludamenta*. And Vatro giuing a reason of that name, saith; *Paluda à Paludamentis, sunt hac insignia et ornamenta Militaria: Ideo ad bellum, cum exit Imperator, ac Liçtores mutant vestem, et signa incinuerunt, Paludatus dicitur proficisci: quæ, propterea quod conspiciuntur, qui ea habent, et Palam fiunt, Paludamenta dicta*. The colour of this cloake, was either purple or white. And therefore it was held a preface of ill fortune, when at Carres, a Cittie in Mesopotamia, one gaue Crassus a black cloake in steed of a white, as hee went to lose the battaile to the Partians.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He Romaines, not contented with the spacious circuit of the sunne, bounding their Empire with the East and the West, but for want of Regions and Countreys, searching the vastnes and depth of the sea; did sildome acknowledge any other soueraintie, or leaue a partie worthy their amitie, in any remote angle of the then knowne world. But if any Prince had been so fortunate, as to gaine the fauour and estimation of a friend or confederate to the State, it was vpon speciall and deserued respects, or at the instance of their Generalls: broad, enforcing the woorthines of such Potentates, and the aduantage they might bring to the seruice of the Empire. Which appeareth by that of Liuius, concerning Vermina, king Syphax sonne; tht no man was at any time acknowledged either a king or a friend by the Senate and people of Rome, vnlesse first he had right well deserued of the Common-weale.

The manner of this acknowledgement, is likewise particularly expressed by Liuius, in another place speaking of Scipio. The day following (saith hee) to put king Mafsinissa out of his griefe and melancholie, hee ascended vp to his Tribune, and hauing called an assembly of the souldiers, presented him before them; where he first honoured him with the appellation of king, accompanied with many faire praises: and then gaue him a crowne of gold, a cuppe of gold, a chaire of State, a scepter of Iuorie, and a long robe of Purple. To which agreeth that of Caesar: That Ariouistus was by the Senate stiled by the name of King and Friend, and presented with great and rich gifts; which happened but to few, and was onely giuen by the Romaines to men of great desert. Howbeit.

beit, such as had governments and imployments abroad, did oftentimes make profit of giuing this honour: whereof Caesar taxeth Lentulus in the former chapter. And in this sence was king Iuba brought in question, to bee called by the Senate, a Friend and Associate to the State of Rome.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Touching the franchises and liberties of the townes of Italy, and others in the dominions of the Romaine Empire, called *Municipia*; it is to be noted, that according to Gellius, those were called *Municipes*, that beeing gouerned by their owne lawes, and their owne Magistrates, were neuertheless indowed with the freedom of Rome. And therefore Adrianus maruailed, that the Italicenses and Vitenses, did rather desire to bee Coloni, and so tied to the obedience of forraigne & strange lawes, then to liue in a Municipall state, vnder their owne Rights and Customes; and as Festus addeeth, with the vse of their peculiar rites for matter of religion, such as they aunciently vled, before they were priuiledged with the immunities of Rome.

For the better vnderstanding whereof, we are to obserue, that there were degrees and differences of Municipall townes; for some had voices with the Romaine people, in all their elections and suffragies: and some others had none at all. For, Gellius in the same place, saith, that the *Cerites* obtained the freedom of the Cittie, for preferring the holy things of Rome, in the time of the warre with the Galles, but without voice in elections. And thence grew the name of *Cerites Tabula*, wherein the Censors inroled such, as were by them for some iust cause deprined of their voices. And the Tusculani, beeing at first receiued into the liberties of the Cittie, according to the admission of the Cories, were afterward, by the free grace of the people, made capable of giuing voyces.

The meanes of obtaining this freedom, was first and specially by Birth: wherein it was required (as may be gathered by Appius Oration) that both the Parents, as well the mother as the father, should be free themselves. Howbeit, Vipian writeth, that the sonne may challenge the freedom of the State, wherein his father liued and was free. So that the father being of Campania, & the mother of Puteolis, he iudgeth the sonne to belong to Campania: According to that of Canuleius; That the children inherite the condition of the father, as the head of the Family, and the better rule to direct in this behalfe. Neuertheless, Adrianus made an Act of Senare in fauour of Issue; That if the wife were a citizen of Rome, and the husband a Latine, the children should be Romaine Cittizens. And the Emperour Iustinian, caused it likewise to be decreed, that the mother being a free woman, and the father a bond-man, the son should be free. Such as were thus borne free, were called *Cines originarij*.

The second meanes of obtaining this freedom, was by Manumission, or letting bond-men at libertie: for in Rome, all men freed from bondage were taken for Cittizens; and yet rankt in the last and meanest order of the people.

Er Spe Apellan-  
dorum Regum.

Municipes.

Lib. 6. cap. 13.

Lib. 11.

Cum suffragio

Municipum  
Sine suffragio.

Cerites Tabula  
Liuielb. 6.

Liuielb. 3.

Liuielb. 3.

Cines originarij.

The third meanes, was by gift, or coaptation; and to Romulus at first enlarged and augmented Rome; Theseus, Athens; Alexander Magnus, Alexandria, sited at the out-lets of Nilus; and Richard the first, London; by taking all such strangers into the freedome of the Cittie, as had inhabited there for tenne yeeres together. The Emperours were profuse in giuing this honour. Cicero floutes Cæsar, for taking whole nations into the freedome of the City; and Anthony gaue it to all that liued in the Romaine Empire. Wherevpon, as Vlpian witnesseth, Rome was called *Communis Patria*. Popular states were more sparing in this kind; as may be deemed by the answer of one of the Corinthian Embassadors, to Alexander. Wee neuer gaue the freedome of our Cittie (saith he) to any man but to thy selfe and Hercules. And vntill Herodotus time, the Lacedemonians had neuer admitted any, but onely Tifamemus and his brother.

The priuiledges of this freedome were great; for, the Cittizens of Rome were held to be *maiestate plenos*. Is the best man of Gallia (saith Tully) to be compared with the meanest Citizen of Rome? And hence came that law, requiring, that the life of a Cittizen should not bee brought in question, but by the generall assembly of the people. Verres hauing condemned one Cossanus, a Romaine Cittizen in Sicilia, Tully vrgeth it as a matter vsufferable: *Facinus est (inquit) vinciri Cinem Romanum, scelus verberari, prope parricidium necari, quid dicam in crucem agi?* with many the like examples: besides the possibility they were in, if their sufficiency were answerable accordinglie, to become great in the State; and consequently, Commanders of the Empire.

## CHAP. IIII.

## Cæsar tasteth the affection of the Souldiers.



*Cæsar vnderstanding of these things, called the souldiers together, and acquainted them with all the injuries which his Enemies from time to time had done vnto him; complaining that Pompey was by their practice and meanes alienated from him, and drawne through enuy of his good fortune, to partialize against him; notwithstanding that he had alwaies affected his honour, and endeuoured the aduancement of his renowne and dignitie: Lamenting likewise the president which this time had brought into the State; that the Tribunes authoritie should be opposed and suppressed by Armes, which former ages had by force of Armes reestablished. For, Sylla hauing stript the Tribuneship, naked of all rights and prerogatives, yet left it the freedome of opposition: But Pompey, who would seeme to restore it to the dignity from which it was fallen, did take away that power which was onely left vnto it. The Senate neuer resolved of that Act, That the Magistrates should take a course for the satisfaction of the Common-weale, whereby the people were necessarily summoned to*

Armes;

*Armes; but in times of pernicious lawes, vpon the violence of the Tribunes, or the mutinie and secession of the people, when the Temples & high places of the Cittie were taken and held against the State: which disloyalties of former ages, were expiated and purged by the fortune and disaster of the Saturnines and the Gracchi. But at this present, there was no such matter attempted, so much as in thought: no law published; no practice with the people; no tumult; no departure out of the Cittie. And therefore adhorted them; that forasmuch as vnder his leading and command, for nine yeeres together they had most happily caried the government, sought many prosperous and victorious battels, settled all Gallia and Germanie in peace; they would now in the end, take his honor into their protection, and defend it against the malice of his aduersaries. The souldiers of the xij. legion which were present (for them onely had hee called out in the beginning of the troubles, and the other legions were not as yet come) cried out instantly, That they were readie to undertake his defence against such wrongs, and to keepe the Tribunes of the people from iniurie.*

Whercof *Lex Agraria* was the chiefest.

Plutarch saith, he had the but 500. foote, and 500. horse on that side the Alpes: which amounted to the iust number of a legion.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**A**S Publique-weales and Societies are chiefly supported and maintained by iustice: so likewise, such as liue in the ciuill communitie of the same, and inioy the benefit of a well qualified government, doe take themselves interested in the maintenance of iustice, and cannot endure the tyrannic of wrongs: vnlesse happily (as every man is partiall in his owne cause) they be the authors thereof themselves. The first dutie of iustice, which is, *Ne cui quis noceat*, did Cæsar make the theame of his Oration to the souldiers; aggravating his particular injuries, by opening and enforcing the malice of his Aduersaries: and making the State a partie in his sufferings, through the oppresion and defacing of the Tribuneship; which in times of libertie, and iust proceeding, was sacred and inuolable.

These remonstrances were apprehended by the souldiers, as matters specially concerning their dutie; holding themselves, either bound to redresse them, or otherwise to be guiltie of betraying their parents, coutry, companions & friends. Some report, that one Lælius, a Primpile of Cæsars Armie, making answer to this speech, gaue assurance of the souldiers good affection; which the rest approved with a generall acclamation. Howbeit, the argument lay couched in a Sophisme, pretending Cæsars right, but concluding the ruine of the State.

Cic. 1. officio.

*Nihil iustius quâ propulsare iniurias. Xenophon Cyrop. lib. 1.*

*Iustitia primum munus est ne cui quis noceat. Cic. lib. 1. de officiis.*

*Qui non defendit nec obsequit si potest iniurias, tam est in uitio, quâ se parentes, aut amicos, aut patriam, aut bonos deservat. Cic. lib. 1. off.*

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



**S**Econdly, we may obserue, that as discord and dissension, renting asunder the bonds of ciuill communie, are the bane of flourishing and opulent Citties, and make the greatest Empires examples of Mortalitie: so by the same rule of discourse, it is also true, that the mutual

*Opulentis ciuitatibus venenâ sedtio, magna imperia mortalia reddit. Liv. lib. 2.*

seruati  
Theſauri  
regni  
verum a-  
ditiu  
guth.  
amictia.

q. max-  
bus prin-  
et pote-  
relli, ita  
maxime  
Arſi.  
8.

mutuall respects or well qualified friendship, are as expedient, both for the strengthening of the ioynts of a publique State, & for keeping the particular parts in due temper and proportion, as either treasure, or Armies, or any other thing required therevnto. Hence it is that Cicero saith, that wee haue as much use of friendship, as of fire and water: and that he that should goe about to take it from among men, did indeavour (as it were) to take the funne out of the heauen; which by heate, light, and influence, giueth life vnto the world. And as men are eminent in place and authoritie, and haue use of many wheelles for the motion of their feuerall occasions; so haue they the more neede of amitie and correspondencie, to second the multiplicitie of their desires, and to put on their businesse to their wished ends.

## CHAP. V.

## Cæsar taketh Arminium, receiueh and aunswereh messages from Pompey.



*Cæsar* hauing sounded the minds of the souldiers, went directly with that legion to *Arminium*: and there met with the Tribunes of the people that were fled vnto him, sent for the rest of their legions from their wintering Campe, and gaue order they should follow him. Thither came young *L. Cæsar*, whose father was a Legate in *Cæsars* Campe. And after some speech of the occasion of his comming, acquainted *Cæsar*, that *Pompey* had given him a message in charge to be deliuered vnto him: which was, that he desired to cleare himself to *Cæsar*, least he might peradventure take those things to be done in scorn of him, which were commaunded onely for the seruice of the State; the good whereof he alwaies preferred before any priuate respect: and that *Cæsar* likewise was tied in honour to lay aside his indignation and affection for the Common-wealths sake: and not to be so transported with anger and disdain of his Adversaries, as he seemed to be; least in hoping to be auenged of them, he should hurt the publique weale of his Country. Hee added somewhat more of the same subiect, together with excuses on *Pompeys* behalfe. Almost the selfe same discourse, and of the selfe same things, *Roscius* the Prætor deals with *Cæsar*, and said that hee had received them in charge from *Pompey*: which although they seemed no way to satisfie or remooue the iniuries and wrongs complained of; yet hauing got fit men, by whom that which he wished might be imparted to *Pompey*, he praied the both, for that they had brought vnto him what *Pompey* required, they would not thinke it much to returne his desires to *Pompey*; if happily with so little labour they might accord so great differences, and free all Italy from feare and danger. That he had euer held the dignitie of the Common-weale in high regard, and dearer then his owne life. He greeued much, that

that a benefit given him by the people of Rome, should be spitefully wrested from him by his aduersaries; that six months of his gouernment were to be cut off, & so he to be called home to the Cittie: notwithstanding the people had commaunded at the last creation of Magistrates, that there should regard be had of him, although absent. Neuer thelesse, for the Common-wealths sake hee could be content to vndergoe the losse of that honour. And hauing writ to the Senate that all men might quit their Armies, he was so far from gaining the same, that contrariwise a leuie was therevpon made throughout all Italy; and the two legions which were drawne from him, vnder a pretence of the Parthian warre, were still retained about the Cittie, which was likewise in Armes. And to what tended all this, but his destruction? And yet notwithstanding, hee was content to condescend to all things, and to indure all inconveniences, for the cause of the Publique weale. Let *Pompey* goe to his gouernment and Prouinces; let both the Armies be discharged; let all men in Italy lay downe their Armes; let the Cittie be freed of feare, the assemblies of the people left to their ancient libertie; and the whole gouernment of the State remitted to the Senate and people of Rome. For the better accomplishment whereof, vnder well advised and secure conditions, let an oath be taken for due keeping of the same: or otherwise, let *Pompey* approche neerer vnto him; or suffer *Cæsar* to come neerer to him, that these controuersies might happily receive an end by conference.

*Roscius*, hauing this message, went to *Capua*, accompanied with *L. Cæsar*; where finding the Consuls and *Pompey*, he deliuered vnto them *Cæsars* propositions. They hauing consulted of the matter, made an aunswere in writing, and returned it by them to *Cæsar*, where of this was the effect; That he should returne into Gallia, quit *Arminium*, & dismishe his Army: which if he did, *Pompey* would then goe into Spaine; In the meane time, untill assurance were given that *Cæsar* would perform as much as he promised, the Consuls & *Pompey* would not forbear to leuie souldiers. The condition was too vnequal, to require *Cæsar* to leaue *Arminium*, and to returne into his Prouince; and *Pompey* to hold Prouinces & legions belonging to other men: to haue *Cæsar* dismishe his Armie, and he to raise new troopes; to promise simply to goe to his gouernment, but to assigne no day for his departure: insomuch, that if hee had not gone vntill *Cæsars* time of gouernment had expired, he could not haue been blamed for falsifying his promise. But forasmuch as they appointed no time for a conference, nor made any shew of comming neerer, there could no hope be conceived of peace.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



*Cæsar*, lying at *Ravenna*, within his gouernment of Gallia, and vnderstanding how matters past at Rome, according as *Plutarch* reporteth, commaunded diuers of his Centurions to goe before to *Arminium*, without any other armour then their swords; and to possesse themselues thereof with as little tumult as they could. And then leauing the troopes about him to be commaunded by *Hortensius*, he continued a whole day together in publique sight of all men, to behold the fencing of the

D.

Sword-

*Capua*.  
*Cicero*, lib. 7. ad  
*Atticum*, epist.  
13, saith, that  
this aunswere  
was made at  
Thiand, in the  
territories of  
*Lauour*, the 25  
of Ianuary.

*Plutarch*: in *vi-  
ta Cæsaris*.

Sword-players. At night hee bathed his body, and then kept companie with such as he had bidden to supper; and after a while rose from the table, wishing euery man to keepe his place, for he would instantly come againe. Howbeit, hauing secretly commaunded some of his followers to attend him, in such manner as might giue least suspicion, hee himselfe tooke a Coach which he had hired; and making shew of going a contrary way, turned suddenly towards Arminium. When hee came to the little river Rubicon, which diuided his government from the rest of Italie, he stood confounded through remorse of his desperate designe, and wist not whither it were better to returne or goe on; but in the end, laying aside all doubtfull cogitations, he resolved vpon a desperate Adage, importing as much as *Fall back, fall edge*. And passing ouer the Riuer, neuer staid running with his Coach, vntill he came within the Cittie of Arminium: Where he met Curio & Antonius, Tribunes of the people; and shewed them to the souldiers, as they were driuen to flie out of Rome, disguised like slaves in a Carriers cart.

It is said, that the night before he passed ouer this Riuer, hee dreamed that he lay with his mother in an vnnatural sense; but of that, hee himselfe maketh no mention. This Cittie of Arminium, is now called Rimini, and standeth in Romania, vpon the Adriatick sea, in the Popes dominion. The Riuer Rubicon, was anciently the bounds of Gallia; ouer which, Augustus caused a faire bridge to be built, with this inscription;

IVSSV. MANDATV-VE. P.R. COS. IMP. MILI. TIRO. COMMILITO. MANIPVLARIS-VE. CENT. TVRMÆ-VE. LEGIONARI-VE. ARMAT. QVISQVIS. ES. HIC. SISTITO. VEXILLVM. SINITO. NEC CITRA. HVNC. AMNEM. RVBICONEM. DVCTVM. COMMEATVM. EXERCITVM-VE. TRADVCITO. SI. QVIS. HVIVSCE. IVS- SIONIS. ERGO. ADVRSVS. FECIT. FECERIT-VE. ADIVDICATVS. ESTO. HOSTIS. P.R. AC. SI. CONTRA. PATRIAM. ARMA. TVLERIT. SACROSQVE. PENATES. E. PENETRALIBVS. AS- PORTAVERIT. SANCIO. PLEBISCI. SENATVS-VE. CONSVLT. VLTURA. HOS. FINES. ARMA. PROFERRE. LICEAT. NEMINI. S. P. Q. R.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**F this manner of proceeding be brought into dispute, and therefor required why Caesar kept not himselfe in the prouince of Gallia, where he might haue held his government according to his owne desire, or otherwise haue drawne his aduersaries to buckle with the strength of those conquering Legions; and so brought the businesse to a short end, with as great probability of good successe, as by any hazard of vndertaking: It is to bee vnderstoode, that in causes of this nature, which fil- dome admitte anie treatie of accorde, hee that striketh first, and hath the advantage

advantage of the forehand, is well entered into the way of victorie: for, the rule is of old, that if an enemy hath a designe in hand, it is faire more safe to begin first, and by way of preuention, to giue the onset on him, rather then to shew a readinesse of resisting his assaults. For, if blowes (of necessitie) must be way- makers to peace, it were a mistaking to be either wanting or behind hand therein; besides the gaine which attendeth this advantage. For, hee that stands affected to deny what is iust, and of right due, doth neuertheless grant all things which the sword requireth; and will not stick to supply all vnwill refusals, with as great an ouer-plus of what may be demanded. For which cause, Caesar staid not the comming of his whole Army; but began with those forces which were ready at hand: and so preventing all intendements, hee put his aduersaries to such a straight, that they quitted Italie for feare, and left Rome (with whatsoeuer was sacred or precious therein) to the mercy of them whom they had adiudged enemies to their Countrey.

### CHAP. VI.

### Caesar taketh diuers Municipall Townes.

**F**OR which regard, he sent M. Antonius with fine cohorts to Arctium: but he himselfe staid at Arminium with two legions, and there intended to inroll new troopes; and with seuerall cohorts, to kee Pisaurum, Fanum, and Ancona. In the meane while, being advertised that Thermus, the Pretor, did hold Tignium, with fine cohorts, and fortified the place, and that all the inhabitants were well inclined towards him; hee sent Curio thither with three cohorts, which he had at Pisaurum and Arminium. Vpon notice of whose comming, Thermus (doubting of the affection of the towne) drew his cohorts forth of the Cittie, and fled. The souldiers by the way went from him, and repaired home-ward. Curio was there receiued with the great contentment and satisfaction of all men. Vpon notice whereof, Caesar conceiuing hope of the fauourable affections of the Municipall townes, brought the cohorts of the 13 legion out of their guarizons, and marched towards Auximum; a towne held by Atius, with certaine cohorts: which hee had brought thither with him: and hauing sent out diuers Senatours, made a leuie of men thoroughout all the Countrey of Picenum.

Caesars comming being knowne, the Decuriones of Auximum repaired to Atius Varius, accompanied with great troopes of people; told him that the matter concerne not him at all: for, neither themselves, nor the rest of the Municipall townes, would shut their gates against such a Commander as Caesar was, that by great and worthy seruice had so well deserved of the Common-wealth:

D 2.

and

Magis scire  
nuntii, ut in  
lore valenti  
pror curras, qu  
ut te equina  
rum semines.  
Thucyd. lib. 6.  
Arma tenenti  
omnia dat, qui  
negat.  
Lucan. lib. 1.

Caesar.  
Iulius a legion  
being about  
5500 men.  
Pisaurum.  
Pefaro. Ital.  
Fanum.  
Ancona.  
Tignium.

Auximum.  
Atius Varius  
Picenum.

and therefore aduised him to consider what might ensue thereof, and the danger which might befall him in particular. Varus, beeing thoroughly wakened at this warning, drew out the Guarison which he had brought in, and so fled away: and being overtaken by a few of Casars first troopes, was compelled to make a stand, and there giuing battell, was forsaken of his men. Some of the souldiers went home, and the rest came to Caesar. Amongst them was taken L. Puppilus, Centurion of a Primpile order, which place he had formerly held in Pompeys Army. Caesar commended Atius souldiers; sent Puppilus away; gave thanks to them of Animum; and assured them of a mindfull acknowledgement on his behalfe for this seruice.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Mongst other things which serue to inable our iudgements, and do make men wise to good fortune: that which is gathered from similitude or likeness of qualitie, is not the vnforeest ground of our discourse; but oftentimes giueth more light to guide our passage, thorough the doubtfulness of great enterprises, then any other help of reason: for, he that will attend an overture from euery particular, and tarry for circumstances to accomplish all his purposes, & make no vse of instances to better his advantage, shall neuer wade farre in businesses of moment, nor achieve that which he desireth. Which Caesar well obserued. for, vpon the accidentall discourteie of the disposition of one towne, hee thereby tooke occasion to make triall how the rest stood affected: and either found them or made them answerable to his hopes.

Concerning these places taken by Caesar, it is to be vnderstood, that *Pisaurum* is sited on the Adriatick sea, and belongeth to the Dutchie of Vrbine; a towne famous of old, by reason of the prodigious opening of the earth, and swallowing vp the inhabitants before the battell of Actium, some few yeeres after it was thus taken by Caesar.

*Fanum* was so called of a faire Temple which was there built to Fortune. Tacit. Annal. 10. *Exercitus Vespasiani ad Fanum Fortuna iter sumpsit*. It is a small towne on the same sea, and belongeth to the Pope.

*Ancona* is a famous towne vpon the Adriaticke sea, sited vpon a boaw-like promontorie, which taketh in the sea betwene two forlands; and so maketh one of the fairest Hauens of all Italie, as well for largenes as for safetie. From whence riseth that common saying, expreising the rarenesse and singularity of three things; *Vnus Petrus in Roma*, noting the beauty of Saint Peters Church: *Vna Turris in Cremona*, the excellent workmanship of a steeple there: And *vnus Portus in Ancona*, which is this Hauen. The Emperour Traian, to giue it more shelter, and keepe it from the furie of the wind, raised the top of the Promontorie in fashion of a halfe moone, with a mount made of great Marble stones: and made it Theater wise, with descents and degrees to goe to the sea; together with an Arke triumphall in memorie thereof. The towne is now vnder the Pope.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



His word *Decurio* hath a double vnderstanding: for, Romulus hauing 3000 foote, and 300 horse, diuided them into three Tribes, & euery Tribe into ten Curies, containing 100 foote men and tenne horsemen. Whereby Marcellinus concludeth, that *Decuriones*, et *Centuriones* a numero cui in Militia preerant dicebantur. But Vegetius is more particular in this point. A Companie of footmen (saith he) was called a *Centurie* or *Maniple*: and a troope of horse was called *Turma*, of *Ter-denos*, containing 30 men, whereof the Captaine was named *Decurio*. In which sense Caesar speaketh; *Ea res per fugitivos L. Aemilij Decurionis equitum Gallorum hostibus nunciatur*. But in this place it hath another signification: for, the Romans, when they sent any Cittizens to people and inhabite a place, they chose out euery tenth man; such as were found most able, and of best sufficiency, to make and establish a publique Councell: whom they called *Decuriones*; according as Pomponius and other Ciuilians vnderstand it. So that these *Decuriones* were the Senate of that place.

Decuriones.

Lib. 2. cap. 14.

Lib. 1. de bell. Gallico.

## CHAP. VII.

Lentulus flieth in great feare out of Rome.

Caesar commeth to Corfinium.



These things beeing reported at Rome, the Cittie was suddenly strooke into such a terrour, that when Lentulus the Consull came to open the Treasurie, and to deliuer out money to Pompey according to the Act of Senate, he fled out of the Cittie, & left the inner chamber of the Treasurie open. For, it was reported (although vntruly) that Caesar was neere approaching, & that his Canallie was hard at hand. Marcellus, the other Consull, together with most of the other Magistrates, followed after. Pompey, departing the day before, was gone to those legions which he had taken from Caesar, & had left in Apulia to winter. In the meane while, the inuolment of souldiers ceased within the Cittie. No place seemed secure betwene that and Capua. There they began first to assemble and assure themselves; impresting for souldiers, such as by Iulius law were sent thither to inhabite. And the Fencers which were there trained and exercised by Caesar, for the entertainment of the people of Rome, were by Lentulus brought out, set at libertie, mounted vpon horses, & commaunded to follow him. But afterwards, vpon aduise of his friends (euery mans iudgement disallowing thereof) he dispersed them heere and there throughout Campania, for their better safetie and keeping.

Caesar.

Sanctiore Atratio.

Capua.

Lex Iulia.

Caesar,

D 3.

Picenum.

Cingulum.

Asculum.

L. Hir.

Camerinum.

Domitius.

Corfinium.

Alban.

Mar.

Peleg.

8500 men.

Cæsar, dislodging from Auximum, marched throughout all the Countrey of Picenum, and was most willingly received by all the Praefectures of those Regions, and relieved with all necessaries which his souldiers stood in need of; insomuch as Commissioners were sent vnto him from Cingulum, a towne which Labienus had founded, and built from the ground at his owne charges, promising to obey whatsoever he commanded: whereupon he required souldiers, & they sent them accordingly. In the meane time, the twelfth legion overtook Cæsar, and with these two hee marched directly to Asculum, a towne which Lentulus Spinther held with ten Cohorts: who, understanding of Cæsars approche, left the place; and labouring to carry the troopes with him, was forsaken by the greatest part of the souldiers: and so marching with a few, happened by chaunce vpon Vibullius Rufus, sent of purpose by Pompey into the Countrey of Picenum to confirme and settle the people. Vibullius, being aduertised how matters went there, took the souldiers, and so dismissed him of his charge: gathering likewise from the confining Regions, what cohorts hee could get from former inuolvements; and amongst others, entertained L. Hir: us, flying with sixe cohorts out of Camerinum, whereof he had the keeping. These being all put together, made 13 cohorts; and by long marches, he made towards Domitius Aeneobarbus, who was at Corfinium, telling him that Cæsar was at hand with two legions. Domitius had raised twenty cohorts, out of Albania, Marsia, and Pelignia, adjacent Countreys. Asculum being taken in, and Lentulus driuen out, Cæsar made inquirie after the souldiers that had left Lentulus, and commanded them to be inrolled for him. And after one daies aboad for the prouision of Corne, he marched towards Corfinium. Vpon his approche thither, Domitius sent 5 cohorts out of the towne, to breake downe the bridge of the Riuer, which was about three mile off. The vauntgard of Cæsars Armie, incountering with Domitius souldiers, draue them from the bridge, & forced them to retrait into the towne; whereby Cæsar past ouer his legions, made a stand before the towne, & incamped himselfe under the walles.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**T is well obserued by Guichardine, that Intolencie & Timiditie are neuer found asunder, but doe alwaies accompany one another in the same subiect; for, the minde being the center of all such motions, doth according to euery mans nature, giue the like scope to passions of contrariety, and extend them both to an equidistant circumference: as, if courage shall happen to dilate it selfe to Intolencie, then is doubtlesse in like manner enlarged to Cowardice; & will imbale mens thoughts as lowe, as they did rise in height by insulting. For which cause it is aduised by such as treat of Morality, that men be well warie in admitting dilatation of passions, or in suffering them to flie out beyond the compasse of reason, which containeth the measure of Equabilitie, commended by Cicero, to be obserued throughout the whole course of mans life. Lentulus the Consul may be an instance of

this weakenes, and learne others moderation by shunning his intemperancie. For, in question of qualifying the rage of these broiles, & sorting of things to a peaceable end, his arrogancie was incompatible with tearmes of agreement, and overwaide the Senate with heedlesse impetuositie. And againe, when his authoritie, and Consular grauitie should haue settled the distracted Comons, and made good his first resolution, his over-hastie flying out of the Cittie, did rather induce the people to belieue, that there was no safetie within those wals, nor for so small a time, as might serue to haue shut the Treasurie at his heeles; and so became as abiect, as before hee shewed himselfe insolent.

Concerning these words (*Aperto sanctiore Aerario*) it is to be noted, that *Aerarium* was their publique Treasurie; and by the appointment of Valerius Publicola, was made within the Temple of Saturne: whereof diuers men make diuers coniectures. Macrobius saith, that as long as Saturne continued in Italie, there was no theft committed in all the countrey: and therefore his Temple was thought the safest place to keepe money in. Plutarch thinketh rather, that the making of the Treasurie in that place, did allude to the integrity of the time wherein Saturne reigned; for, avarice and deceit was not then known amongst them. S. Cyprian is of an opinion, that Saturne first taught Italie the vse and coynage of money; and therefore they gaue the keeping thereof to his Dietie. Howsoever, it is manifest, that not onely the publique Treasure was there kept, but also their Records, Chartes, Ordinances and Edicts: together with such bookes as were for their immeasurable greames, called *Libri Elephantini*; containing all their Acts of Senate and deedes of Armes, archived by the Commanders abroad, as also their militarie Ensignes which they fetched alwaies from thence when they went into the field: and there likewise did such Embassadours as came to Rome, enterregister their names, as Plutarch affirmeth.

It was called *Aerarium* of *Aes*, signifying Brasse; for that the first money vsed by the Romaines was of that metall, vntill the yeere of Rome 485, as Pliny witnesseth; when they began first to coyne peeces of siluer marked with the letter X. whereof they took the appellation of *Denarium*, as valuing ten asses of brasse, which before they vsed for their coyne; and euery of the saide asses waied 12 ounces. Touching their order obserued in their Treasurie, for their disposing and laying vp of their moneys, we must vnderstand, that as bodies politique require necessarie and ordinarie treasure to be employed in such manner, as may best concurre with the publique honour and weale of the same: so there must be speciall care to provide against vnusuall and extraordinarie casualties, which are not remoued but by speedy and effectuall remedies. According to which prouidence the Romaines disposed of their treasure, and took the twentieth part of their reeue, which they called *Aurum vicefimarium*, and reserved it apart in an inner chamber; where it lay so priuiledged, that it was a capitall crime to touch it, but in extreame and desperate necessity: as in time of warre with the Galles, or in a sedition and tumult of the people. Liuius affirmeth as much, where he saith, *Cætera expedientibus quæ ad bellum opus erant consuli-bus, aurum vicefimarium, quod in sanctiore Aerario ad ultimos casus seruaretur, promi placuit, prompta ad quatuor Millia pondo Auri.*

*Aerarium.*  
Plutar. in vita  
Publicola.  
*Aerarium po-*  
pulus Romanus  
in æde Saturni  
habuit. Festus.

*Libri Elephantini.*

*Signa ex Aerario prompta seruantur ad Dictatorem. Liv. lib. 4.*

*Lib. 3. cap. 33.*

*Aurum vicefimarium.*

*Lib. 24.*

THE



THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**uch as affect offices and dignities in a State, must euer have meanes to court *Souerainty*, according as may best sute with her *Politia*, either as she is espoused to a Monarch, or left in trust to a Multitude. Hence it was, that the Romaines to gaine the fauour of the people, & to make way for their owne ends, were very sumptuous in setting forth shewes and spectacles, of diuers sorts and fashions; and specially of Gladiators or Fencers, as best fitting a Romaine disposition, & more pleasing then others of any kind. *Equidem* (saith Tully) *exissimo, nullum tempus esse frequentioris populi, quam illud Gladiatorum, neque concionis vilius, neque verò vllorum Committiorum.* And in another place; *Id autē spectaculi genus erat, quod omni frequentia, atque omni hominum genere celebratur.* *quod multatō maximè delectatur.*

Their manner was to keepe great numbers of these Fencers, in some conuenient and healthfull townes of Italie, as at Rauenna, & Capua (which were as Seminaries of these people) and there to traine them vp in the feate of fencing, vntill they had occasion to vſe them in their ſhewes, either at their triumphall entries into the Cittie vpon their victories, or at the funeral ſolemnitie of ſome perſonage of memorie; or otherwiſe at their feasts and iollities.

*Quin etiam exhilarare viris convivia cade  
Mos olim, et miscere epulis spectacula dira.*

They fought commonly man to man, at all aduanrage, and were sildome excused, vntill one of the two lay dead vpon the place. Neither was hee then quitted that had slaine his companion, but stood liable to undertake another, and so a third, vntill he had foiled fixe or teauen Combatrants. And if his hap were to preuaile so often, he was then honoured with a Garland wound about with ribands of wooll, which they called *Lemisci*, and receiued of the Prætor a great knotted staffe, called *Rudis*: which he afterward carried about with him as an ensigne of libertie. These bloody spectacles continued vnto the time of Constantine the great; and were by him prohibited, as likewise also by Arcadius and Honorius; and vtterly abolished after the raigne of Theoderick, king of the Gothes. Let him that would looke further into the fashon of these shewes, read what Lipsius hath written cōcerning the same. That which I obserue heerein, is, the vſe which the State made heereof: for, howsoeuer these fights and solemnities were sette forth for the compasing of priuate ends; yet neuertheless, the Common-weale drew benefit from the same. For, a multitude beeing of a fickle and mutable nature, are no way so well settled with contentment of the time, or kept from nouelties and innovations, as with publick shewes and entertainments: which are as saies to their affections, that they swatue not from the government by which they liue in ciuill conſociation. So we read how the Grecians instituted, as popular entertainments, their Olympian, Nemean, Istmean, and Pythian Games; The Romaines, their Apollinary, Secular, Gladiatory, and Hunting shewes, with Tragedies and Comedies: and

a)

all for the satisfaction of the people. Wherein, howsoever the Grecians seem more judicious, for inventing such Games as might both exercise and entertaine the people, yet the Romaines failed not of the end aymed at in these spectacles; which was, to inure them to blood and slaughter, and to make the dreadlesse in cases of horror.

But, to leaue all shewes of this nature, as either too little for earnest, or too much for pastime; it shall suffice to note, that these publike entertainments are so farre expedient as they consist of pleasure and comlineesse: for, as their chiefeſt end is to please and content the people; ſo their manner muſt be directed by lawfullneſſe and honeſtie. In which reſpect, a Tragedy is more commendable then a Comedy; foraſmuch as few comick arguments doe ſympa-  
 ſiſe with honeſtie.

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**O be great, and of a large proportion, doth not take away casualties of inconuenience; nor can it giue a priuiledge, to free thinges from distemperature: tall men are as subject to Feauers, as others of lesser stature; and great Empires as easily disturbed, as the states of petty Princes.

*O faciles dare summa Deos, eademque tueri  
difficiles !*

It is easier to attaine the end of high desires, then to keepe it being got: and better is the affurance of feeling then of posseſſing. The Romaine people that had over-awed the world with Armes, & left no kingdom vnſubioled with the fear of their legions, were as much diſmaied at a ſubiects diſſolualtic, as was poſſible for a meane State to be amazed vpon an alarm of any danger. And that City which ſuffered no enemy to approch neer her confines, but in the condition of a Captiue, was not truſted as able to giue her owne people ſafety.

*sic turba per Urbem*  
*Præcipiti lymphata gradu, velut unica rebus*  
*Spes foret afflictis patrios excedere muros,*  
*Inconsulta ruit.*

The aduantage is, that kingdomes of great commaund, haue great helps in cases of disturbance; but are other wise as subiect to apprehensions of distrust, as those of lesser power to resist.

## CHAP.

## CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar goeth on with the siege of Corfinium,  
and taketh it.

**D**OMITIVS, being thus engaged, sent out skilfull men of the Countrey, with promise of great reward to carrie Letters to Pompey, intreating and praying, that he would come and relieue him; for, Cæsar, by reason of the straightnesse of the passages, might with two Armies bee easily shut up: which opportunitie if he neglected, himselfe, with aboue 30 cohorts of souldiers, besides a great number of Senators and Romaine Knights, were in danger of running a hard fortune. In the meane time, he exhorted his men to courage and resolution; placed his Artillery on the walles; assigned euery man his quarter to bee made good; promised in publike assembly of the souldiers, foure akers a peece to each man out of his owne lands and possessions: and the like rateable parts to the Centurions and Enocates. Meane-while, it was told Cæsar, that the inhabitants of Sulmo, a towne distant seauen miles from Corfinium, were desirous to receiue his commaunds, but that they were restrained by L. Lucretius, a Senator, & Atius Pelignus, that kept the towne with a garrison of seauen cohorts. Whereupon, he sent thither M. Antonius with five cohorts of the seauenth legion: whose Ensignes were no sooner discovered by those of the towne, but the inhabitants and souldiers came all out, to gratulate and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Atius conuained themselves ouer the wall. Atius being taken and brought to Antony, desired to be sent to Cæsar. Antonie returning the same day, brought Atius & the souldiers that were found in Sulmo, to Cæsar; whom he tooke to his Army, and sent Atius away in safetie.

Cæsar, the three first daies, made great workes to fortifie his Campe; caused store of corne to be brought from the townes next about him; and there determined to stay the coming of the rest of his forces. Within the space of those three daies, the eight legion came vnto him, with 22 cohorts newly inrolled in Gallia, together with CCC. horse, which the King of Noricum had sent vnto him. Vpon the arriuall of which forces, he made second Camp on the other side of the towne, and appointed Curio to commaund it. The rest of the time was spent in compassing the towne with a Ramper and with Castells: the greatest part of which worke being finished, it chaunced at the same time, that such as were sent to Pompey, returned. The Letters being read, Domitius dissembling the truth, gaue out in the conspell of warre, that Pompey would come speedily to succour them: and therefore wished that no man should be dismayed, but to prepare such things as were of vse for the defence of the towne; and hee himselfe conferring secretly with some of his familiar friends, consulted how he might escape away. But forasmuch as his looks agreed not with his words, and that his carriage seemed more troubled and timorous then vsuall, & likewise his secret conferences,

as also his avoiding of publike counsellis and assemblies, as much as hee could, the matter coulde bee no longer dissembled. For, Pompey had writt backe, that hee would not hazard the cause, by drawing it into such tearmes of extremitie: neither was Lomitus engaged in the keeping of Corfinium by his aduice or consent; & therefore, if by any meanes he could, he should quit the place, and bring the forces vnto him: But the siege was so straight, and the workes did so begrid the towne, that there was no hope of effecting it. Domitius purpose being knowne abroad, the souldiers within the towne, about the beginning of the evening forsooke their stations, and drew themselves apart, and thereupon had conference with the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions to this effect: That they were besieged by Cæsar, and the fortifications almost finished; their Generall Domitian (in hope and confidence of whom they were engaged in that place) setting aside all matters what soeuer, was betinking himselfe how hee might escape and flie away: and in regard thereof, they were not to neglect their owne safetie. The Mursi at first began to differ from the rest, vpon that point; possessed themselves of that part of the towne which seemed to be strongest: and such a dissension thereby grew amongst them, that they had almost gone to blowes. Howbeit, vnderstanding a while after (by messengers which past to and fro betweene them) of Domitius purpose to flie away, whereof formerly they were ignorant, they agreed together, and with one consent brought Domitius out into open publike; and sent some to Cæsar, to let him know, they were ready to open the gates to receiue his commaundements, and to deliuer Domitius aline into his hands. Vpon advertisement whereof (albeit Cæsar found it a matter of great consequence, to gaine the towne with as much speed as he could, and to take the souldiers into his Campe, least cyther by large promises and gifts, or by entertaining other purposes, or otherwise through false bruits or deuised messages, their mindes might happily be altered, as oftentimes in the course of war, great and eminent chances & alterations do happen in a smal moment of time; yet for that he feared least the night time might giue occasion to the souldiers vpon their entrance to sack & pilfer the towne) hee commending those that came vnto him, sent them back againe, & willed that the gates & the walles should be kept with a good guard. He himselfe disposed the souldiers vpon the worke, which hee had begun; not by certaine spaces and distances, as hee had accustomed the daies before, but by continuall watches and stations, one touching another round about all the fortifications. Moreover, he sent the Tribunes & Captaines of the horse about, and willed them to haue a care that there might be no eruptions or sallies, and that they should looke to the private slippings out of particular men. Neither was there any man so heauie or dull, that suffered his eyes to be shut that night; for, so great was the expectation of what would ensue, that no man thought of any other thing, then of what would happen to the Corfinians, to Domitian, to Lentulus and the rest. About the fourth watch of the night, Lentulus Spinther spake from the wall to our souldiers that had the watch, and signified that hee would willingly haue leaue to come to Cæsar: which being graunted, he was sent out of the towne, attended with some of Domitians souldiers, who left him not vntill he came in sight of Cæsar. With him he dealt concerning his life, & praised him

Lentulus  
Spinther.

him to pardon him; put him in mind of their former familiarity; acknowledged the fauours received from Caesar, which were very great; namely, that by his meanes, he was chosen into the Colledge of Priests; that vpon the going out of his Pratorship, he obtained the prouince of Spaine; and in his suit to be Consul, hee was much assisted by him.

Caesar, interrupting his speech, told him, that hee came not from his government to hurt any man; but to defend himselfe from the iniuries of his aduersaries; to restore the Tribunes of the people to their dignitie, that were thrust out and expelled the Cittie; and to put himselfe and the people of Rome into liberty, which were opprest with the partialities of a few factions persons. Lentulus, being reassured vpon this answer, prayed leaue to returne into the towne; and the rather, that this which he had obtained touching his owne safety, might giue hope to the rest: amongst whom, some were so affrighted, that hee doubted they would fall into some desperate course; and hauing obtained leaue, hee departed. Caesar, as soone as it was day, commaunded all the Senators and Senators children, together with the Tribunes of the souldiers, and the Romaine Knights, to be brought out vnto him. Of Senatours, there were L. Domitius, P. Lentulus Spinther, Vibulius Rufus, Sex: Quintilius Varus, the Treasurer, L. Rubius, besides Domitians sonne, and many other young men: with a great number of Romaine Knights and Decurions, whom Domitian had called out of the Municipall Townes. These being all brought forth vnto him, were protected from the insolencies and iniuries of the souldiers. Moreover, he spake a few words vnto the, concerning the ill requitall on their behalfe, for the great benefites hee had done vnto them: and so sent them all away in peace.

The gold which Domitian had laid up in the publike Treasury, being brought vnto him by the two chiefe Magistrates or Bailies of Corfinium, he redeliuered to Domitian; least hee should seeme more continent in taking away mens liues, then their moneys: although he knew, that this money was part of the publike treasure, and deliuered out by Pompey to pay souldiers. He commaunded Domitians partie to be sworn his souldiers. And that day remouing his Camp, went a full daies march through the confines of the Marmurci, Erentani, & Larinati, and came into Apulia.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**t is true, that a friend is not solie tied to the respects of right; but doth giue more advantage by offices of good indeuour, then by that which dutie requireth: so is it dangerous for a man to put his sickle further into a haruest, then happily may deserue thanks of the owner. Neither can it be cleared from imputation of follie, to care an other mans business, with hazard and perill of our own fortune. Howbeit, the Current & drift of things, doth oftentimes so ingage both our persons and affections, either in the maine action it selfe, or in some circumstances of the same, that we cannot avoid the hazard of rebuke, if our indeuours doe not (soe with

with his liking that is to approue them. VWhereof Domitius may be an instance; who, taking Corfinium on the behalfe of the State, was neuertheless disauowed in his merit, and consequentially brought into extremitie of danger, for his over-forwardnes in the seruice of his Country. Such libertie hath soueraintie, either to take or leaue, when the euent shal not rise answerable to a good meaning.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**W**hen a partie is fallen into an exigent, it hath no better remedie for reliefe then that of the Comick, *Redimas te captum quam queas minimo*; which is not vnderstood, that we should cleere the head, and leaue the rest of the members to misfortune: for, that were to draw a double mischief on the whole bodie. But the head is to escape with as little preiudice to the other parts, as by wisdom and vertue may be gained; and so much the rather, least in seeking to purchase safetie with hazard of the other members, it draw the whole destruction vpon it selfe; as it fell out with Domitius: VWho, going about to flie out of the towne, and to leaue such forces as by his meanes were imbarcked in that cause, was iustly made the sacrifice of their peace. Sulla deserued better to be followed by men of adventure: for, being moued to escape himselfe away by night, and to leaue his troops to such fortune as Iugurth vpon advantage should put vpon them; answered, *Etiamsi certa pestis adesset, mansurum potius, quam proditis quos ducebat, turpi fuga, incerta ac forsitan paulo post morbo interitura vita parceret*. And therefore, if a Commaunder shall at any time goe about to betray his forces, with hope of his owne safetie, the issue will bring out either his dishonour, or his confusion.

*Salust. de bello Iugurth.*

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**I**f as vndertake great designs, doe likewise proiect the meanes of archieuing the same, & doe propound vnto themselves such principles to be obserued, as they take to be speciall way-makers to the fortune they reach at; from which grounds they sildome or neuer swarue. As appeareth by this of Caesar; who ayming at the soueraintie of that Empire, and knowing no way so direct to leade him therevnto, as to cline vp by the steps of Mildnes, and to make his Aduersaries debtors to his clemency, he left aside his Maximes of war, to hold firme that principle; and did forbear to gaine a towne of great importance, with that speed which occasio & opportunitie did afford him, and to take the troops into his Campe, for the preuention of such chaunces and changes, as doe happen in a small moment of time; least his souldiers entering into the towne, after the shutting of the euening, might take leaue of the night time to make forfeiture of his mercie.

E.

Ic

It shall therefore be well-beseeming the wisdom of a Leader, to haue alwaies respect to the principles of his Meanes, and to distinguish between that which is fit and that which is more fit, in the native carriage of his busines.

### THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

**O**ncerning this *Colligium Pontificum*, the Colledge of Priestes; we are to note, that Numa, the founder of the Romaine Commonweale, for the preventing of partialities and factions in that State, which at that time consisted of two Nations or Tribes, did breake the whole bodie into manie small parts and fractions, making his diuision by Artes and Occupations; whereby he ordained, that all Minstrels or Trumpeters should bee incorporated into one Brotherhood: and that in like manner, Goldsmithes, Carpenters, Diers, Shoemakers, Coriers, Tawyers, Belfounders, Potters, & all other trades & Sciences, should haue their peculiar body or Fraternitie; appointing them feasts, assemblies, and seruices, according to the worthiness of each myserie, as Plutarch hath obserued in the life of Numa.

Valerius Maximus maketh mention of the Colledge of Pipers or Minstrels. And Plinie, in like manner, mentioneth the Colledge of Coppersmithes. Cicero taketh notice of the colledge or companie of Marchants, which hee calleth *Collegium Mercurialium*; for that of old time, the nimble tongued Mercurie was believed in, as the Guider and Protector of Marchants. The priuileges & customes where-with these Fraternities were endowd, are set downe by Caius, the Ciuilian. There are certaine Colledges at Rome, saith hee, incorporated by Act of Senate, and established with good ordinances and constitutions, hauing certaine things in common, in imitation of the publike weale: And as Scenola further noteth, with power to make lawes, for the better gouernment of such Colledges and Societies; so the same be not contrary to the fundamentall lawes of the State. After the same manner, the Priestes had their peculiar Colledge or corporation; & at the first institution were but foure in number, and all of Patrician families, vnto the yeere of Rome 454: at what time there were foure of the Commons chosen, and added to the former number; whom Sulla increased to 15, as Dio: witnesseth. And these were called *Collegiū Pontificū*, wherof this *Pontifex Maximus* was president: one of the absolutest dignities of Rome; as being for teame of life, and of greatest and diuine authority. Vvhich generall distribution of the Romaines into trades and mysteries, doth not vnwisely bring into remembrance, that which is vsuall amongst the Turks, who by their law, are al bound to be of an occupation; not excepting the Grand Signior himselfe. For, hee that now vpholdes the Ottoman familie, by the name of *Sultan Acmel*, is a professed maker of rings, which the Turkes doe weare on their thumbe when they shoote, to let the string go easily without hurting them: and his father Mahomet was a Fletcher, and made arrowes. In like manner, all his Courtiers are of trades and occupations; and euery man is called by the title of his Art; as, he that was lately Visier Bassa to the present Sultan, was called by the name of *Natcasb Bassa*; the Visier Painter, beeing indeed the

the Sultans Painter; neither are they ashamed to acknowledge as much: for, opening Letters which were sent into Turkie out of Christendome, that were limned about the Margin, said, he could paint as well as that himselfe.

### THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

**T**HE fift thing which I obserue out of these passages at Corfinium, is the restoring back of such moneys to Domitian, as were brought vnto Caesar by the Officers of the towne, and which he knew to be of the publike treasure of the State. Vvhich howsoeuer may seeme admirable to the hearers of these times, wherein there is but this one rule for matter of mony, *Vnde habes as querit nemo, sed oportet habere*: Yet such as will lay a sure foundation of honour, and thrive in the courtes which they follow, must not be ignorant, that there is nothing more requisite to gaine opinion & reputation in the carriage of any publike busines, then to bee cleare of the least suspicion of couetousness. Neither is there any meanes that will sooner win a multitude, to believe in those things which are set abroad by publike Authoritie, then those two virgin vertues, Abstinence & Continencie: especially when they are found in Princes and chiefe Comaunders, that can other wise iustifie their actions with soueraintie & vnconuolment. Nor on the other side, did euer Apollo giue out truer Oracle then that, which saide; that there was no meanes to ruine Sparta but by Auarice.

In which sense, C. Pontius, the Samnite, wished, that the Gods had reserved him to times wherein the Romaines would haue beene corrupted with gifts: for, then he would soone haue seene an end of their Common-weale. And certainly, that Empire could neuer haue towred so high, nor continued firme to many ages, had not her foundation been laid by men of admirable temper in this kind: Such as was Paulus Aemilius; who hauing sacked Macedon, and brought as much wealth into the publike Treasurie, as gaue an end to Tributes and Subsidies, was no way the richer (but in honour) for all that hee had taken. And such also was Scipio Africanus; that of all the wealth of Carthage, brought nothing into his priuate house, but a high and triumphant Name, as a merit of his vertues and deedes of Armes: Leaving behind him this Oracle, as a document to following times; That couetous Captaines are good to none but to the Enemie. And to conclude, such was M. Curius, who hauing triumphed of the Samnites, the Sabines, and Pyrrhus, refused a great mass of Gold, which was offered him by the Samnites: esteeming it more honourable, to commaund them that had Gold, then to haue Gold of his owne. Howbeit, such is the frailtie of humane nature, that for the most part, men haue alwaies suffered their desire of money, to increa'se with their wealth, although it were to their ruine and destruction. Vvhich Caesar well discerned, as appeareth by that which he writ to Oppius, touching this accident: *Hac noua sit vincendi ratio, ut misericordia et liberalitate nos muniamus.*

## THE SIXT OBSERVATION.



Pon occasion of Cæsars calling vnto him, out of the towne, *Senatores*, (*senatorumque filios*, *Equitesque Romanos*, it shal not seeme impertinent, to note the degrees and conditions of state whereof the Romaine people consisted. For the better clearing wherof, it is to be vnderstood, that by that notable transaction at Comitium, between Romulus and Tatius, it was agreed; that both those Nations should dwell together at Romulus towne, which after his name, should bee called Rome: and that the inhabitants thereof, should be named *Quirites*, after the name of Tatius Citrie. Howbeit, speciallie they were diuided into three Tribes, whereof they which were of Romulus partie, were called after his name, *Rammenfes*; those that came with Tatius, *Tatienfes*; and the third Tribe *Luterenfes*, of *Lucus*, a Groue: so farasmuch as they beeing neither of Romulus retinew, nor yet of the Sabines, were neuertheless met together at that place, from diuers parts, as at a Groue where commonly assemblies were made to offer sacrifice, and to performe their heathenish solemnities.

Each of these Tribes were diuided by Romulus into ten *Curia*; and so made the number of 30 *Curia*. And out of each of these *Curia*, he chose 3 persons, such as by their presence and sufficiency, seemed fittest; and most worthy; which amounted to ninetie. To whom, out of euery Tribe hee further added three, and one more of his owne choosing, to make the number vp a hundred; whom he established as his Council or Senate: by whose aduise he resolved of all matters of consequence, either concerning peace or warre, as Dionisius Halicarnassensis noteth. Howbeit, Plutarch saith, they were sildome assembled but to vnderstand the Kings pleasure: and had no other preheminance in the Common-weale, sauing they were the first that did knowe what was purposed. Howfoeuer; they were stiled by the name of *Senatores*, *quasi seniores*, as they thereby qualified to be admitted to Counsell: and in the same sense they were called *Patres*.

The Senate beeing thus established, Romulus selected out of euery of those *Curia* ten young men, and so made vp the number of three hundred for a guard to his person: who for their readinesse and nimblenesse were called *Celeres*, all mounted on horsebacke: whence grew their *Ordo Equestris*, or band of Romaine knights, which were the meane betweene the Senate and the people; and as a Seminarie to supply the Senate; for, out of them were the *Senatores* taken. The rest, that were not of these two Orders, were comprehended vnder the name of the Commons, or Populacy. Whereby it appeareth, that Rome consisted of three estates; Senators, Knights, and the Commons, according to that of Ausonius;

*Martia Roma triplex; Equitatu, Plebe, Senatu.*

Touching the number of Senators, it is further to be noted, that Tarquinius Priscus, to gaine the fauor of the people, tooke 100 of the Commons, & added them to the Senate, who were called *Senatores minorum Gentiu*. And Brutus hauing

hauing reduced it to a Common-weale, made the vp three hundred out of the band of Knights; and from that time they were called *Patres conscripti*. Neither were they at all times limited in that number: for, the seditious *Gracchi* added 300 more vnto them: and Iulius Cæsar admitted vnto the Senate all manner of persons. In which regard, Augustus (as Suetonius saith) *Senatorum affluentem numerum, deformi, et incondita turba (erant enim super mille, et quidam indignissimi) ad modum pristinum et splendorem redegit.*

Concerning a competencie of wealth, to make a man capable of the place of a Senator; we may obserue, that in the raigne of Seruius, the King, hee that was worth a thousand asses (which are about 300 pound sterling) was eligible. But the riches of the Empire increasing, a Senators wealth was rated at nine thousand pound, according to Suetonius; *Senatorum sensum ampliavit, ac pro octingentorum milliū summa duodecies H-S taxauit, suppleuitque non habentibus.* The wealth of a Romaine Knight, was rated at three hundred three score, or there abouts.

This Corfinium, was the chiefe towne of the Pelignians, and stood in the center of Italie, where all the confederate people assembled when they consulted of warre against the Romaines, for their right of Burgeshippe, or freedom of the Citrie, which was then denied them: which war was called *Bellū sociale, Marsicum*, and *Italicum*. There is now nothing remaining of that towne but the ruines, as a marke of the place where it anciently stood vpon a Plaine, commonly called Pentina, or Sant Peligno.

## CHAP. IX.

Pompey goeth to Brundisium: Cæsar maketh  
meanes to treat with him.

Pompey, vnderstanding of these things which had past at Corfinium, departed from Luceria, and went to Canusium, and from thence to Brundisium; causing all the power hee could to be raised by new multitudes and inrolements, arming shepherds and slaues, and mounting them on horsebacke; of whom he made some 300 horse. In the meane time, L. Manlius, the Prator, fled from Alba with sixe cohorts; and Rutilius Rupus, Prator, fled from Taracina with three cohorts: who deserying a farre off the Cavalrie of Cæsar, commaunded by Binus Curius, forsaking the Prator, turned their Ensignes towards Curius, and ioyned with him. In like manner, the daies following, diuers other cohorts came in as they marched, some to the foote troopes, and some to the horse. Cn. Magius of Cremona, maister of the workes, and of the munition in Pompeys Army, was taken on the way, and brought backe to Cæsar: whom he sent backe againe to Pompey, with commission to treat with him to this effect; For

Patres conscripti.

Suetonius, 35.

Suetonius, 41.

Corfinium.  
Strabo, lib. 6.

Cæsar.

Rocernum.

Castle besieged  
 at  
 in, the  
 of the  
 in cod.

**Pompey** says fen  
**married** Labo  
**his da**ughter.

*Libo, having heard Caninius, went straight to Pompey; and within awhile returning,*

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**he first of these is the fact that the

Præfatus Fa-  
brum.

Lib. 2. cap. 11.

- Plutarch in the  
t life of Cicero.

Of which Mamurra, Plinie thus writeth; Cornelius Nepos, saith hee, writeth, that Mamurra, a Romaine knight, borne at Formia, and Maister of the workes vnder Caesar, in Gallia, was the first that couered all the wallies of his house, which he built in Mount Cælius, with leaues of Marble. Neither let any man disdaine the Author as a meane person; for, this is that Mamurra, whom Catullus dooth note in his verses; whose house was faire more stately then Catullus did expresse, by saying hee had gotten all the wealth of Gallia Comata. For, the saide Cornelius affirmeth, that hee was the first in Rome

*Lib. 36. cap. 6.*

as much as there had yet happened no opportunity of meeting or conference, hee was now determined to seek him at Brundisium; for, it much imported the common-weale, and euery mans safety in particular, that they two might confer together. Neither could things bee so well handled, vpon so great a distance of way, where the articles of treatie must be caried to and fro by a third partie, as when they met face to face to conclude of the conditions.

This message being first giuen, he came to Brundisium with sixe legions, foure legions of old souldiers, and the other raised by new inrollements, or made up as he came along the Countrey: for, he had presently dispatched Domitians cohorts from Corfinium into Sicily. At his comming, he found the Consuls gone ouer to Dyrrachium, with the greatest part of the Armie, and Pompey remaining at Brundisium with twentie cohorts. Neither could hee certainly bee informed, whither he remained at Brundisium to make good the towne, whereby he might the easier be maister of the Adriatick sea, and commaund both the vtter parts of Italy, and the Regions of Greece, and so to keepe the warre on foote on the one side and on the other; or whether he staied there for want of shipping. Howsoeuer, he would not endure, that Pompey should thinke hee could not be forced to quit Italie; and therefore resolved to stop up the mouth of the Hauens, & to take away the vse thereof, which he went about in this manner: Where the mouth of the Hauens was narrowest, hee raised great mounts of earth on either side neere vnto the shore; for, there the Sea was shallow: but going further into the deepe, where no such mounts could be raised, hee placed double flottes of wood, right against the same mounts, of thirtie foote square; and at the corners cast out foure Ankers to fasten them. These flottes beeing thus placed, hee then added other flottes of the same scantling, and couered them with bavin and earth, to the end men might come readily vpon them to defend them. Hee armed them in front and on each side, with hurdles and gabions; and on euery fourth flotte, made a towre of two stories high, the better to defend them from violence of shipping, and from burning.

Against this worke, Pompey sent out great ships of burthen, which he found in the Hauens, armed with towers of three stories high, full of munition, & all sort of weapons, to hinder and disturbe the same. So that euery day they fought a sarre off each with other, with slings, arrowes, and other casting weapons. Which busines Caesar so carried, as being willing not to let fall the conditions of peace, if happily it might be effected. And albeit hee greatly wondered that Magius, whom hee had sent to Pompey, did not returne againe; and that this Treatie so often attempted, did hinder much his designs: yet hee thought it fitt by all meanes to perseuer therein: and therefore sent Caminius Renilus, one of his Legates, and an inward friend, and neere allied to Scribonius Libo, to speake with him, commaunded him to perswade Libo to mediate a reconciliation, and that Caesar himselfe might speake with Pompey. It might be, that therevpon, both of them would yeelde to lay downe their Armes vpon equall conditions: the greatest part of which honour would redound to Libo, if by his intercession the war might take an end.

Libo, hauing heard Caninius, went straight to Pompey; and within awhile

returning,

returning, told him: That so farasmuch as the Consuls were absent, there could be nothing done touching an agreement. Where-vpon, Caesar resolved to let fall the matter of Treatie, which hee had so often attempted, and to prepare for warre.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His accident of taking Cn. Magius, hath made knowne an officer of great place and vse in the Romaine Armie, of whom otherwise their Histories make little mention. For, howloeuere there is found in these Commentaries, many particular descriptions of admirable and incredible workes; such as may seem to be made rather by Giants & Cyclops, then any labour of man; yet there is no mention of any *Præfectus Fabrum*, or Maister of the workes in any of Caesars Armies. Howbeit, Vegetius, expressing their singular care to haue in abundance all manner of prouisions requisite for an Armie, saith; That to euery legion did belong Carpenters, Bricklayers, Smithes, Painters, & other Artizans, skillfull and fit to build lodgings for their wintering Campes; to make Engines and deuises for warre; such as were their portatiue, or ambulatorie towres, targets, morions, corlets, bowes, arrowes, darts, and piles: or whatsoever else might serue, either for offence or defence. Which Artificers were all knowne by the name of *Fabri*; and he that was Chiefe, and had the commaund of them, was called *Præfectus Fabrum*. And in like manner, Plutarch sheweth, that there was such an officer; as also, that the place was giuen by the General; where hee saith, that Vibius a Sicilian, refused to lodge Cicero, as hee passed to exile, thorough Lucania; although that in his Consulship hee had bestowed vpon him the place of *Præfectus Fabrum*. And albeit Caesar maketh no mention of any such officer; yet Catullus dooth it for him, in such biting Trimetres as will not be forgotten:

*Quis hoc potest videre, quis potest pati  
Nisi impudicus, et vorax et Hellus,  
Mamurram habere, quod comata Gallia  
Habeat et ultima Britannia?*

Of which Mamurra, Plinie thus writeth; Cornelius Nepos, saith hee, writeth, that Mamurra, a Romaine knight, borne at Formia, and Maister of the workes vnder Caesar, in Gallia, was the first that couered all the walles of his house, which he built in Mount Cælius, with leaues of Marble. Neither let any man disdaine the Author as a meane person; for, this is that Mamurra, whom Catullus dooth note in his verses; whose house vvas faire more stately then Catullus did expresse, by saying hee had gotten all the wealth of Gallia Comata. For, the saide Cornelius affirmeth, that hee was the first in Rome

*Præfectus Fabrum.*

*Lib. 2. cap. 11.*

*Plutarch in the life of Cicero.*

*Lib. 36. cap. 6.*

Pompey sent  
marice Libo  
his daughter.



that made the pillars of his house of solide Marble, euen hewen out of the quarries of Caristus, or Luna: Thus farre goeth Pliny. Out of which may be noted, that exorbitancie in gaining, doth produce the like course in spending; and howsoever such commings in may be close and secret, yet the issuings out will proclaime it in profuse and laushing manner: and therefore, such as command in these places, and haue such meanes to enrich themselves, had neede to be cleane fingered. Cæsar writing to Oppius, mentioneth the taking of this man, as a thing of some note. *Cn: Magium, Pompei Præfectum deprehendit scilicet, meo instituto vsus sum, et eum statim missum feci: iam duo Præfecti fabrum, in meam potestatem venerunt, et à me missi sunt.* Concerning the vie of these manuell Artes, and the prerogatiue they haue in well ordered States; it is to be noted, that without these, no Citie can conveniently be built, fortified, or furnished with Armes. And therevpon such Artizans, haue alwaies challenged a place of chiefe regard in the Common-weale. Whence it was, that Virgiles scorned not *se fabrum proferri*.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



HE *Maxime proprium* of warre, is opposition; and that vniuersall, rather then any other kind of repugnancie: for, there is no sympathizing condition betweene two enemy Armies, otherwise then by mutuall exchange of *velle et nolle*, throughout the whole course of their intendements; as may be here obserued vpon Cæsars arriuall at Brundisium. For, finding Pompey to remaine there after the departure of the Consuls, and not certainly informed of the reason of his stay; least he should think he could not be forced to quit Italy, Cæsar went about to thrust him out headlong: or otherwise, if his purpose were to follow after the Consuls to Dyrrachium, Cæsars designe then was to shut him in, and so to haue followed the rule of contradiction, by which souldiers are directed in their atchieuements.

Concerning the site of Brundisium, which hath euer been famous for the commodiousnesse of the Hauen, and the vsuall port where the Romaines tooke shipping for Greece; being but a hundred Italian miles distant from Apollonia in Epirus: We are to note, that the towne standeth vpon a Langet of earth, extended into the Hauen Peninsule-like from the maine land, resembling the neck and head of a Stagge, and in that regard is called Brundisium, of *Brundis*, which signifieth a Stagge: which Langet hath many crooked guts, or inlets of of the Sea, capable of great shipping; besides the two maine Ports on either side of the towne, which with the rest of the Hauen, make the safest and fairest roade of that part of the world. The mouth of the Hauen where Cæsar made his flottes, is very straight; and opposite therevnto, some three miles distant into the Sea, standeth a small Island, to abate the violence and rage of the waues. Now, to besiege Brundisium, it was requisite to take away the vie and benefit of the Hauen: which Cæsar attempted with such rare and artificall works (of mounts where the Sea was shallowe, and of flottes where the

water





water was deepe; and those made firme with earth, and fenced with hurdles & turrets) that the Reader may discern it, by the description, to bee a Maister-piece of excellent invention.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**T**is truly said of old; That peace is not deare at any rate. Which Antiochus well vnderstood, when he bought it of the Romaines for twelue thousand Attick talents, and 540000 bushels of wheate: Esteeming it as the foueraigne happinesse of mans fortune; and an extraordinary effect of those intelligent spirits, which guide the motions of the celestiall spheres, to keepe the elements in a disagreeing concord, and the secte of men in the pathes of tranquillitie. Hence it is, that such as are instruments of so great a good, and shall thereby happen to redeeme a Nation from horror and confusion, haue in all ages been crowned with honor & renowne, as the due rewarde of a Mediatour of Peace. And therefore Cæsar, perswading Libo to negotiate a celsation of Armes, and to worke in Pompey a disposition to an agreement, propounded the honour which attended this seruice, and the merit of that endeavour which brought backe peace into the Empire.

Liui. lib. 8.  
Dec. 4.

CHAP. X.

Pompey leaueth Brundisium, and shippeth  
himselfe for Greece.



**T**HE worke beeing halfe perfected, and nine daies labour bestowed vpon it; the shippes that had transported the Consuls and the other part of the Armie, returned from Dyrrachium to Brundisium: and thereupon, Pompey beganne to fitt himselfe for a departure; Beeing induced therevnto, either by the workes which Cæsar had begunne, or by a resolution formerly taken to quit Italie. And the better to retard Cæsars prosecution (least vpon his issuing out, the souldiers should enter the towne) he mured vp the gates, and stopt the enterances of the streets and passages; sunke ditches and trenches crosse the waies, & therein stuck sharp piles & stakes; and covering the same with slight hurdles, leuelled it with thin & light earth: leaving onely two waies free, which went vnto the Etanen, which he hedged in with a strong Palisado of huge sharpe Piles.

Cæsar.

These things beeing thus prepared, he commaunded the souldiers to get a ship-board, without noyse or tumult; and left vpon the walles, and in the towers here and there, some of the readiest Slingers and Archers, to bee called away vpon a warning



warning signes, when the rest of the souldiers were all shipped; appointing Gallies to take them in, at an easie and safe place. The inhabitants of Brundisium, oppressed with the iniuries and contumelies of Pompeys souldiers, did fauor Caesars partie; and vnderstanding of this departure, whilst they were running up and downe, and busied about getting aboard, gaue notice thereof from the top of their houses. Which beeing perceived, Caesar (not to omit any opportunitie of atchieuing his purpose) commaunded ladders to bee prepared, and the souldiers to take Armes. Pompey a little before night weied Anker: and the souldiers keeping guard on the wall, vpon the watch-word giuen, were all called fro their stations, and by knowne passages repaired to the shippes. Caesars souldiers with ladders got vpon the wall: but beeing admonished by them of Brundisium, to take heed of the blind ditch, they stood still. At last, they were brought a great compasse about, and so came to the Hauens; and with skiffes and boates, seized two shippes with souldiers, which stuck by chaunce vpon the Mounts which Caesar had made.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**R**as much as this manner of Pompeys departure from Brundisium, and the slight he vsed to imbarke himselfe and his Armie without danger of Caesars entering the towne, is commended for one of the best stratagems of warre that euer he vsed; Let vs a little consider the parts thereof, which present themselves of two sorts: the one consisting of the workes he made, to hinder and retard Caesars entrance, if happelic he should haue knowledge of his departure: and the other, in the cleanlie conuenance of his men aboard, without noise or tumult; & the semblance hee made of keeping the towne, by continuing watch vpon the walles, to the end there might be no knowledge taken thereof. The workes were of three sorts. For, first hee mured and stopped vp the ends and enterances of streets and lanes, which might giue access to a pursuing enemy. And to that end also, hee sunk ditches, or trenches, crosse the waies and passages: which he stuck full of sharp stakes and Galthrops, and couered them with light and thin hurdles, that the Enemy might not espy them; And thirdly, hedged in the waies leading to the Port, with a strong Palizado of huge sharp piles: And so vsed both the Lions and the Foxes skin, to auoid the danger which might haue fallen vpon him; Caesar happely had found meanes to attache them, as they were incombred in getting to their shippes, and disposing themselves to flee away. Which beeing an occasion that might haue giuen him great aduantage, was in this manner carefullie preuented by Pompey. Howbeit, this his quitting Brundisium, is censured but for a faultie resolution handsomely caried: for, Cicero dooth much blame him for abandoning Italie; calling it a Themistoclean policie, to perswade his partie to forsake their Countrey, and to leaue the best of their pleasures, and the weakest of each sexe, to such miserie and desolation, as misued pittie in those that considered but the condition of the dogges, and brute

beastes; as it fell out at Athens, when Themistocles perswaded the Athenians to leaue their towne and Countrey, and betake themselves wholly to sea, to fight against Xerxes.

## CHAP. XI.

Caesar dispatcheth forces into Sardinia and Sicilie.

Catos endeuour to keepe Sicily for Pompey.



**A**beit Caesar well knew, that it much imported a speedy end of the business, to get shippes and passe the Seas after Pompey, before hee could ioine himselfe with the forces of the transmarine parts; yet doubting the lets, and the long time before it could be effected, for that Pompey had taken with him all the shipping he could get, and thereby left him for the present no meanes to follow after: it remained that hee attended shipping to be brought from remote parts; as, out of Gallia, from Ancona and the Streights: which at that time of the yeere, would require a long and troublesome passage. In the meane time, he thought it no way fit, that Pompeys old Army, & the two Prouinces of Spaine, should be settled and assured; (one of them being deepe lie ingaged to Pompey for many great and ample benefits) or that they should haue time to raise new troopes, especially of horse; or that Gallia or Italie should be solicited or wrought from him in his absence: And therefore for the present, resolved to desist from making any further pursute after Pompey, and to goe into Spaine; giuing order to the Duumviri of all the Municipall townes, to provide shipping, and send it to Brundisium. He sent Valerius, a Legate, into Sardinia, with one legion; and Curio, the Proprator, into Sicily with three legions; commaunding him, after he had possessed Sicily, to transport his Armie into Affrica. Marcus Cotta gouerned Sardinia, and M. Cato Sicily. Tubero should by lotte haue held Affrica.

The Caralitanians, vnderstanding that Valerius was to be sent vnto them, before he had left Italy, of their own accord thrust Cotta out of the towne. Cotta amused thereat, and perceiuing withall, that the whole Prouince gaue consent vnto it, fled presently out of Sardinia into Affrica. Cato prepared and new trimmed the Gallies in Sicily, giuing order to the townes to build new, and prosecuting his direction with great diligence: Moreover, by his Legats, mustered and enrolled Cittizens of Rome, in Lucania and Brutia, requiring rateable numbers of horse and foote from the townes in Sicilie. Which thinges beeing almost accomplished, vnderstanding of Curio his coming, he complained in publique how he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey; who, without any prouidence or preparation, had ingaged himselfe in an vnecessary warre: and yet beeing deman-

Caesum vallum.

Plutarch in the life of Pompey

Caesar.

Bailliffes.

Cec. Prist. ad Atticum.

ded by himselfe, and the rest in the Senate, answered confidently, that hee was provided of all necessities fit for warre: And after he had thus publicly complained, fled out of the Prouince. By which meanes, Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio Sicily, void of government, and there brought their Armies.

Tubero, arriving in Affrica, found Atius Varus commanding the Prouince, who (as wee haue formerly shewed) hauing lost his cohorts at Auximum, fled forth with into Affrica; and of his owne authorite, possessed himselfe of the Prouince, which he found without a Gouvernour. He got together by new inuolments, two compleat legions, which hee raised by his knowledge and experience of the people of that Country, by reason hee had gouerned that Prouince as Praetor some few yeeres before. Tubero, arriving with his fleet at Vrica, was by Varus kept out of the towne and the Hauens; neither would he suffer him to set his sonne ashore, which was sicke, but compelled him to wey Anker and depart.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Chapter maketh the first period of this warre, as it is taken from the beginning of these Ciuill broiles, vnto Pompeys forsaking Italie, which was begun and ended in the space of 60 daies: and also openeth the gate to second resolutions, which are prosecuted, as the sequel of the Historie will manifest: Containing likewise the reasons, why Caesar made not present pursuit after Pompey, as the hinges of the succeeding war, and the true causes of the consequents of the same. In the consideration whereof, albeit Caesar vnderstood the advantage of him that prosecuteth a receding enemy, and the hopes which might be thereby conceiued of a speedie end of that warre; yet hauing no ready meanes to accomplish his desire, thought it better to prevent such inconveniences as might happely haue fallen out vpon the same: and so to keepe his partie in a progresse of their actiue thoughts, by clearing and assuring that Westerne part of the Empire, which Pompey had left vnto him by his departure; rather then to leaue an enemy on his back, or to admit a cooling and languishment of their resolutions, through expectation of shipping, to follow that course which otherwise had bene without exception.

In the carriage whereof, we may obserue, that as vpon the first breaking out of these troubles, they scambled for the townes of Italie, & sought to strengthen their parties, by such as had no voice in the grand Chapter of the Senate; but onely inioyed the benefit of Municipall rights; so now being parted asunder, and the contagion of this intestine euill spread abroad, and grown to more ripeness, they made like haste to fasten vpon the remoter Prouinces, wherein Caesar had the better portion. For, in his share, were contained Italia, Gallia, Britannia, Hispania, Sicilia; which being the prime Countreys of Europe, were consequently the flowre of that Empire, for that Europe hath euer been taken for the principall and chiefe part of the world.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Secondly, wee may obserue, in Cato, the effects of a Stoicall or formal spirit, which are more valuable in the ensignes of peace, then in the difficulties of warre. For, howsoeuer hee made shew of bestirring himselfe, in rigging and trimming vp the Gallies of his Prouince, commanding more to be built, raising new troopes of horse & foote, and prosecuting his commaunds with purpose of an exact account: yet in the end, vnderstanding of Curio his comming, spent his furie in complaining of his friends, and laying the cause of those garboiles vpon him, whom by election and consent he had formerly set vp, to make head against such, as otherwise may be supposed would haue contained themselves in a better measure of moderation.

## CHAP. XII.

Caesar goeth to Rome; and, calling a Senate, complaineth of the iniuries done vnto him.



These things beeing ended, that the souldiers might for the residue of the time bee a little eased and refreshed, Caesar brought them backe into the next Municipall townes; hee himselfe went directlie to the Cittie: and hauing called a Senate, he laieth open the iniuries and wrongs offered vnto him by his Adversaries; sheweth them, that he neuer sought honour in the State by extraordinary meanes, onely hee looked to haue enioyed the full time of his Consulship, and there-with to haue been contented: which was no more then any Cittizen might stand for. The Tribunes of the people had required, that consideration might be had of him in his absence, notwithstanding the opposition of his enemies, and Cato his bitter resistance: spending the time after his old manner, with long and tedious speeches: which if Pompey (being Consul) had disliked, why did he suffer that to passe which was enacted? But if then he did allow and like of it, what reason had he to hinder him from inioying a benefit which the people of Rome had bestowed vpon him? From that, hee fell to speake of his patience: which appeared, in that of his owne accord, hee moued that either party might quit their forces, which might haue bin very preiudiciall to his honour and dignitie: Declared what had bene the malice and bitterness of his Adversaries; who refused to doe that themselves, which they required of another man: choosung rather to imbroile and confound the whole State, then to forgoe the command of an Armie: Spake at large as well of the wrong done vnto him, by taking the two legions from him, as also for their hard and insolent dealing, in putting the Tribunes of the people by their place and authoritie.

F.

He

March in the  
of Pompey

Tucri quæstia  
difficilis est,  
quam acquirere;  
quoniam in ac-  
quiritur, igna-  
tia et fido, non  
sæpe plus confer-  
t, quæstia vici-  
tior: tucri autem  
quæstia, sine pro-  
pria virtute, ne-  
mo potest. D.  
Tolius. Zenonas.

Europa prima  
et præstissima  
mundi pars.  
Appian.  
Europa atrox  
victor: omnium  
gentium populi  
consequitur terræ  
in pulcherrima.  
Plin. lib. 3. c. 1.

He forgot not likewise to relate the conditions which he propounded; the conference which he desired, and would not be granted. In regard whereof, hee praied and required, that they would take the charge of the Common-weale, and giue a helping hand to him for the government thereof. But, if they should vpon any doubt or mistrust, refuse to ioyne with him, hee would not much importune them, but would take it into his owne handes; and in the meane time, let Commissioners be sent to Pompey to treat of peace. Neither did hee respect what Pompey a little before had saide in the Senate (That to whom soeuer Embassadors were sent, to such seemed to be ascribed Authoritie and Preheminence; as, on the contrary part, such as sent thē, manifested an apprehension of feare); for, these were arguments of pusillanimitie. For his part, as he had gone beyond him in deedes of Armes and noble acts; so would hee in like manner, endeavour to excell him in iustice and equitie.

The Senators were well pleased that Embassadors should be sent: but there was no man found that would go; euery man refusing in particular, for feare of Pompey: who, vpon his departure from Rome, had saide in the Senate, That hee would hold him that staid at Rome, in the same condition with them that were in Cæsars Campe. So that three daies were spent in debate and excuses; L. Metellus, Tribune of the people, being drawne by Cæsars aduersaries, to protraile the time, and to hinder any matter which Cæsar should propound vnto them.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**rst, wee may obserue, how irksome it is to humane nature, for him that hath tasted the sweetnesse of authoritie, to forgoe the raines of commaund, and againe to inrolle his name in the list of common dutie; descending from the throne of soueraintie, to the condition of obedience, & to lose his eminencie in respectles equalitie: especially, if the honour be Militarie, and of Martiall nature. For, that fasteneth on vs with a stronger hold, then any other power; being lesse capable of moderation, and waited on with the eyes and expectation of present and future ages. Whereby, men growe desperately iealous of the opinion of the world, and cannot indure to quit themselves of that care, although they haue attained to the full time of their deliuerance: but to be supplanted in the midst of so glorious a race, or to be pulled out of the seate of Magistracie, by an abortiue miscarriage, is able to intrage an ambitious spirit, so farre beyond the bounds of modestie, that it will not spare any endeour, to confound the greatest Empire, with irrecoverable calamities.

THE

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**Econdly, wee may obserue the disposition of those Senators, that by their staying at Rome, became neutrall in that Faction; and there-vpon, refused either to take Cæsars commaundes, or to present themselves to Pompey, as Mediators of peace. Plutarch hath two reasons why the Senators would vndertake no such matter of Commission as was required by Cæsar. The first is this which is heere expressed; euery man fearing the displeasure of Pompey, who at his departure from Rome, had protested to hold them for enemies that went not along with him: where-as Cæsar censured their forbearance with better advantage to himselfe; and tooke their neutralitie as an argument of becoming his followers. The other reason which Plutarch auoucheth, is the opinion which the Senators had of Cæsars double dealing; as not carying his hart in his mouth, but pretending that which he neuer meant. For, they could not be perswaded that his end was a cessation of Armes, or such a peace with Pompey as should haue kept on foot their auncient libertie; but sought rather pretexts of good meaning, to colour his designe of making Rome his seruant. How-soeuer; wee may not omit what is reported to haue happened betweene him and Metellus, more then hee himselfe speaketh of. For, going about to take Money out of the Treasurie, hee was there stoutly resisted by this Metellus, of whom hee complaineth; alleading the Lawes and Acts of the State, forbidding any man to touch that Money, but in such times of extremitie as were therein expressed.

To which, Cæsar answered; That those Lawes were onely made for time of peace: but now, Armes and warre required an other course of proceeding. Neuerthelesse, Metellus would not suffer him to breake open the doores, vntill Cæsar aduised him to be gone if he loued his life; for, it was easier for him to dispatch him then to speake it: and so entered and carried away the Treasurie. VWhere-vpon, groweth that of Florus; *Censum et patrimonium populi Romani, ante rapuit quam Imperium.*

And Appian, deriding the scrupulositie of the auncient Romaines, that would not touch that Treasurie but in extremitie of warre against the Celtes or Galles, saith; that Cæsar might lawfullie take it; for that hee had vanquished and subdued the Galles; vwhereby the Romaines had no further cause to feare them.

F 2.

CHAP.

Denunciante Pompeio pro hostibus habiturum qui recipi, defussissent melius et neutrius partis, futurum sibi numerum, futuros pronunciant. Suetonius. 75. Cicero. 10. Eripit. ad Atticum. Plutarch. Lucan. Appian. Florus.

Non nisi per nocturnum robis perussis patebant templi latius, nullasque ferres, sine sanguine sacro, spectas, raptores opes. Lucan. lib. 3. Dignitate Cæsaris ira, nullus honor facit. Idem eodem.

alicuius et  
derationis et  
uum, Contu-  
mum.

## CHAP. XIII.

Cæsar leaueth the Cittie, goeth into Gallia,  
and treateth with the Mar-  
sellians.

*Cæsar, perceiving their resolution, after hee had spent there some few daies (that he might not lose any more time, and leaue those things undone which he purposely intended) hee left the Cittie, and went into the further Gallia. Vpon his arrivall there, hee understood that Pompey had sent into Spaine Vibullius Rufus, whom Cæsar had a little before taken at Corfinium and dismissed him: and that Domitian likewise was gone to take Marselleis, with eight Gallies, which he set out from Sicilia and Sardinia, and manned them with slaues, men infranchised, and his owne husbandmen. Sending, as messengers before, certaine young noble men of Marselleis, with who Pompey vpon his departure from the Cittie had earnestly dealt, that Cæsars new fauours, might not put out of their remembrance the old benefits which hee had done vnto them. Those of Marselleis hauing receiued this message, shut their gates against Cæsar; called into the Cittie the Albicans, barbarous & mountainous people (who of auncient time had held amitie with them, and dwelt vpon the hills aboue Marselleis) brought Corne from all the adiacent Regions: & Castles into the towne; set vp offices & forges to make Armes; repaired both their walles, their nauie, and their gates.*

*Cæsar called out vnto him some fiftene of the chiefeest men of Marselleis, and treated with them, that the beginning of the warre might not growe from that towne; who should rather follow the example of all Italie, then apply themselves to the will of any one man: not omitting such other perswasions as hee thought pertinent to a sound resolution. These men reported at Marselleis what Cæsar had deliuered, and by the common consent of the towne, returned this answer; That they understood, that the people of Rome was diuided into two parts, neither was it in them to iudge, or could they discern which of the two was in the right. The Leaders of these two factions, were Pompey and Cæsar, both speciall Patrons and Benefactors to their Cittie; of whom, one had augmented the publique reuenues of the State, and indowed it with the landes and territories of the Volgi, Arecomici, and the Heluij: The other, hauing conquered and subdued \* Gallias, gaue it vnto them; whereby their tributarie In-comes were much augmented; and therefore, as they were equallie bound to both for their fauours, so would they carie to both an equall respect, not ayding either of them against the other, or receiuing them within their gates.*

*Whilest these things were in handling, Domitius arrived at Marselleis with his shipping; and being receiued in, was made Gouvernour of the Cittie,*

and

and had the whole direction of the warre committed vnto him. By his appointment, the fleet was sent out into all Coasts; and such shippes of burthen as they found, they brought in: the nailes, timber, and tackling whereof, they tooke to mend and rigge out other ships. What Corne fouer was found in the Cittie, was brought in publique keeping; reseruing the surplus of victuall and prouision, for a siege, as occasion should require.

Cæsar, prouoked with these iniuries, brought three legions to Marselleis, determined to make towres and mantelets ready for an assault, and to build twelue new Galleis at Arles: which were armed, rigged, finished, & brought to Marselleis, within thirtie dayes after the timber was cut downe. Of these he made D. Brutus Admirall, and left C. Tribonius to follow the siege.

## OBSERVATION.

**R**om the Marsellians we may learne, that it is farre easier to say well then to doe well; for, howsoeuer they were able to discern the truth, and to giue an answer to Cæsar, well-beseeming the fame and opinion of their literature and knowledge (beeing an Academie little inferior to the best, and in latter times more frequented by the Romanes, for the studie of Oratorie and Philolophy, then Athens, or any other such chiefe seat of the Muses); yet in their actions they disauowed all: taking vpon them most vnseasonably to arbitrate those differences, and to shew their opinion of the quarell, by taking part with one faction. Wherein their error the more appeared, in that the partie grieued was not liable to their award, but rather had occasion to gaine thereby a double honor to himselfe; first, by forcing them, and then by pardoning their rashness. And yet some VVriters doe thinke, they did no more then they were tied vnto by former treaties, and leagues with the Empire (which they tooke to consist in Pompeys partie) whereof they were loiall & zealous confederates; as appeareth by their loue, when Rome was taken by the Gallies: for, hauing newes therof, and vnderstanding of the composition which was to bee made to raise the siege from the Capitoll, they provided all the gold & siluer they could get, & sent it to Rome for that seruice. In regard whereof, they were indowed with manie Priuiledges and Immunities, both in the Cittie, and elsewhere in the Empire. Howsoeuer, their hap being to respect more an exact obseruance of what had passed, then the fatall succeding course of things, drew vpon them a sharpe and bitter warre; whereof they could not bee freed, but by submitting themselves to his mercy whom they had reiected. And thus wee see verified that of the Poet;

*Quicquid delirant Reges plectuntur Achini.*

VVhich implieth also how dangerous it is, for men of authoritie and imployment, to be subiect to wilfull ambition. For, as their seruice is of great importance to government, when it is attended with well qualified affections; so are their motions as fearefull, which are carried with the violence of exorbitant

F 3.

passions:

*Augusto duum  
vetsissima poss  
Marsilia bona-  
rum artium sedes,  
Tacit. 3. Annal.  
Strabo. lib. 4.*

*Cumque alij fa-  
ma populi terro-  
re paucent,  
Phocas in du-  
bijs anxia offe-  
runt iuvencum,  
Non Graue le-  
uitate fidei,  
natque iura, et  
causas non fata  
sequi. Lucan. l. 3*

Horace.

By this G. H. B.  
it is plain that  
the place  
is not to be  
Marselleis.



passions: especially, considering the meanes they haue, either to misemploy the power of the State, or to giue way to such inconveniences, as may necessarily peruert all things but the ends they aime at: besides the aptness of a high spirit, not to doubt the truth of that saying which is attributed to Cæsar, *Sivolumandum est ius, regnandi gratia violandum est.*

## CHAP. XIII.

## Cæsar hasteth into Spaine.



Where these things were prepared and put in order, he sent C. Fabius, one of his Legates, with three legions, that had wintered about Narbone, before him into Spaine; commanding him with all speed and diligence to take the passage of the Pyrenean hills, which were kept at that time with the forces of L. Afranius:

and gave order for the other legions which wintered further off, to follow after. Fabius, according to his directions, made haste, put the Garizon from the passage, and by great iourneys marched towards Afranius Armie.

Vpon the arrivall of Vibullius Rufus, who (as it is formerly related) was sent by Pompey into Spaine, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro; Pompeys Legates (of whom the one governed the neerest Province of Spaine with three legions, the other, held the Country from the \*forrest of Castile, to the riuer \*Ana, with two legions; and the third commaunded the Vesciones and Lusitania, with the like number of legions) did so dispose and diuide their charges, that Petreius was appointed to bring his legions out of Lusitania, through the territories of the Vesciones, and ioine himselfe with Afranius: and that Varro, with his power, should keepe the further Province of Spaine. Which beeing so resolved & determined, Petreius having commaunded the Lusitanians to leuie horsemen, and other Auxiliarie forces; and Afranius likewise having made the like leuie, in the territories of the \* Celtiberi, \* Cantabri, and the rest of the barbarous Nations bordering vpon the Ocean: Petreius came speedily through the Vesciones to Afranius; and induced by the opportunitie of the place, by mutuall consent, resolved to keep the warre on foote neere about Ilerda.

There were with Afranius (as formerly hath been shewed) three legions, besides Targettiers of the neerer Province, & Buckler-bearers of the further Province, some 80 cohorts, and of both Provinces about 5000 horse. Cæsar had sent his legions into Spaine, accompanied onely with sixe thousand Auxiliarie forces, and three thousand horse, which had been with him in the former warres. And the Gallies at his request furnished him with the like number; besides the noblest and valiantest amongst them, of whom hee had made particular choice to follow him in that warre. To these were added the better sort of the Aquitani, and high-landers, borderers vpon the Province in Gallia. Hee was aduertised that

Pompey

Pompey was on his iourney, coming through Mauritania into Spaine; and that he would speedily be there with his legions: and thereupon, hee borrowed money of the Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiers, and gave it to his Armie; whereby hee gained two points: for, first hee ingaged the Captaines by that lone to endeavour his good successe; and secondly, bought the good affections of the souldiers by largesse and distribution. Fabius omitted no opportunity, to get the fauour of the Citties neere about him: which he labored aswell by Letters as Messengers, & had already made two bridges ouer the riuer \* Sicoris, distant one from another about foure miles. and ouer these bridges sent out his men to forrage; for he had spent all that was to be found on this side the riuer. The same thing, and vpon the same occasion, did the Leaders of Pompeys Armie; and oftentimes their Cavalry met & incountred together. And as it hapned, that 2 legions going out to forrage according to their daily custome, and had passed the riuer, the cariage & the Cavalry following after, vpon a sudden (by the ouerpestering of horses, and swelling of the water) the bridge brake; and the rest of the Cavalry was secluded & cut off from the legions. Which Petreius and Afranius perceiving, by the hurdles and planks that came downe the riuer; Afranius, presently by the bridge which was adioyning to the towne & his Camp, put ouer 4 legions, and all his Cavalry, & went to meet with Fabius his 2 legions. Vpon whose approche, L. Plancus that commaunded the legions, being constrained by necessity, tooke the upper ground, diuiding his men into two Battalions, & making their fronts to stand 2 contrary waies, to the end they might not be circūvented by the horsemen. And although the number were very farre vnequall, yet hee valiantly withstood very violent charges of the enemy. The Cavalry being thus ingaged, the Ensignes of two legions were descried as far off, which Fabius had sent by way of the further bridge, to second these other two; suspecting that which was come to passe, that the Commanders of the aduerse Army, would take the occasion and benefit of this accident, to cutt off our partie. Vpon whose approche, the battell ceased; and the legions on either side were brought backe into their Campes.

Heperios inter,  
Sicoris non vlti-  
mus Annis,  
Saxcus ingenti,  
quem poni Am-  
phiclitur arcu,  
Hibernas passu-  
rus aquas.  
Lucan. lib.

Plancus fuit  
Platius, a Pla-  
nitie pedum,  
Splayfooted.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



THE first obseruation may be taken, from this designe of Cæsars vpon Spaine, beeing at that time vnder the government and command of Pompey; The standing or falling whereof, did much import the successe of that warre: for which respect it was, that when Cæsar could not buckle with the person of his enemy, hee vsed all meanes to bear downe his authoritie, as the next in degree to his effience and beeing, and most concerning his honour and reputation. For, if heeooke from him those Provinces, which the State had commended to his charge, and left him no interest in the obedience of such, whom he might in a fort challenge for his owne people; what assurance could the other parts of the Empire haue in his protection? or what could hee elswhere expect of that which these refused him?

The

The excellencie of a Generall, is that perfection of iudgement commended by Aristotle, enabling him to discern, *quid primum*, or what is most materiall in that varietie of vndertaking, which falleth out in following a warre. And if that cannot with any conueniencie be attained, then to know the next point of importance, and so consequentie to distinguish the degrees of difference, as they stand ranked in the order of iudicious proceeding.

For the effectuall prosecuting of which designe, let vs take a short view of their forces on each side, according as we find them mustered in this chapter; that by the inequalitye of their troopes, we may iudge of the want or sufficiencye of their directions. Afranius, as it is said in the storie, had three legions, and Petreius two legions, together with 80 cohorts of Auxiliarie forces, supplied vnto them by the two Prouinces of Spaine; which cohorts equalled the number of eight legions: and so in all, made thirteene legions. And according to the vsuall rate at that time of 5000 in a legion, amounted to 65000 men, together with 5000 horse; which came to seauentie thousand men, or thereabouts. To confront so great an enemy, Caesar had five legions, 12000 Auxiliarie troopes from the Gallies, and peraduenture 10000 Eucati; which according to the former rate of a legion, did rise to 35000, or 40000 men at the most. Whereby the one exceeding the other, well neere in a double proportion of strength, and yet failing in correspondence of successe, calleth the verity of that prouerbe in question, *Ne Hercules contra duos*. Besides, the inequalitye of the place, where the triall was to bee made, being wholly denoted to the greater partie; which is a matter of no small consequence. For, hee that maketh warre in a Countrey, absolute in fauouring the enemye and confronting his purposes, had need of more forces then the aduerse partie, or better fortune in his proceedings. And therefore Fabius, to prevent such mischiefs as might grow by that advantage, fought all meanes to draw some of the townes to his faction; and to make himselfe friends for his better support and securitie, according to that which was said of old; That warre cannot be made without some peace.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Secondly, wee may obserue the meanes he vsed, to secure himselfe of the loyaltie of his Armie, and whollie to ingage the soldiier in his fortune. For, the money hee borrowed of the Tribunes and Centurions, was a speciall Tie of their affections to his seruice; forasmuch as no man wisheth ill to him, by vvhole welfare and prosperitie he hopeth to thrue; for, so (wounding himselfe through another mans bodie) the hurt would fall vpon his owne head: but rather desireth such an accomplishment of his hopes, as may make himselfe partaker thereof. And on the other side, the largesse he made vnto the souldiers, did so oblige their indeuour to his purposes, that they were thereby readie to performe as much as warlike Lælius had promised in his owne person, on the behalfe

Caesar had  
5000 men, or  
thereabouts.  
Caesar 35000.

Rabbis forth,  
that the Cretes  
or withethall  
good to his  
Debtors.

Lælius.

behalfe of the rest.

*Pectore si fratris gladium, iuguloque Parentis  
Condere me iubeas, plenaque in viscera partu  
Coniugis, inuita peragam tamen omnia dextra.*

Iucan. li. 1.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Hirdly, let vs consider the effects of diligence and prouident foresight, which doe oftentimes redeeme an Armie from a dishonourable overthrow; as may be learned from two circumstances in Fabius directions. First, in that he trusted not to one passage over the riuer Sicoris, but made two feuerall bridges, as well for the cōueniencie as the better securitie of his people. Secondly, vpon the occasion which the enemy might take by the breaking of the bridge, to distresse the legions on the other side of the water, hee presently sent out succours to prevent such a casualtie: which albeit might seeme to haue proceeded out of curious suspicion, or idle feare, yet fell out to be no more then was requisite and expedient. Which may teach a Generall to be carefull euen of possibilities; and to prevent contingencies, with the certaintie of industrious directions: accounting alwaies that which may happen, to be as certaine as any thing we most expect.

*Qui entro non  
siliu mus.*

*Quicquid fieri  
potest, quasi su-  
turum cogite-  
mus. Senec.  
Epist. 24.*

## THE FOURTH OBSERVATION.



Concerning Spaine, wee are to note, that the Romaines at first diuided it into two Prouinces, which they called the Neerer, & the Further; or according to Strabo, the Vtter and the Inner; and were separated asunder by the riuer Iberus. And thence also they were called *Cis Iberum, et ultra Iberum*. The Neerer Prouince, beeing the lesser, continued without alteration during the Romaines gouernment, and was sometimes called *Tarraconensis Prouincia*, of Tarraço, the principall towne of the same. But the Further, in processe of time was diuided into two partes; the one called *Betica*, and the other *Lusitania*: and so the whole Region of Spaine came to be diuided into three Prouinces. It was first entered by the Romaines, by occasion of the notable siedge of Sagunt: for, P. Scipio, hauing subdued the Carthaginians, reduced Spaine into a Prouince, and left it gouerned by Proconsuls, vnto the time of Cornelius Lentulus, & Lucius Stercinius. Afterwards, it was gouerned by Proprætors, and sometimes by Prætors, according as the Empire came to be enlarged; and had thereby many gouernments, for the preferment of such as had supplied the better places of dignitie in the State. Neutrhelesse, in the times of trouble, the Gouernours had alwaies Consularie power; as, in the warre against Scertorius, *Quintus Metellus*, Proconsull, et *Cn. Pompeius*, *Questor, cum Consulari potestate missi sunt*: And at this time, Pompey gouerned it by two Deputies or Legates. Touching the

Spaine.  
Ceterior, et P.  
terior.  
Ceterior, et  
Interior. lib. 3.

Anno 8 C. 555.

Lime.

the forme and figure of the Countrey, Strabo likeneth it to an Oxe hide: the necke whereof ioyneth to the Pyrenean hilles, which rise in towres from one Sea to another, as limits and bounds between France and Spaine; taking their name (as some thinke) from Pyrene, the Maid that Hercules deflowred, whom Sil. Ital. mentioneth.

*Pyrene celsa nimboſi verticis arce  
Diuiſos Celtis, late proſpectat Iberos;  
Atque aterna tenet magnis diuortia terris  
Hoſpitis Alcide crimen: qui ſorte laborum  
Gerionis peteret cum longa tricornis arma  
Poſſeſſus, Baccho, ſaua Bebrycis in aula  
Lugendam forma, ſine virginitate reliquit  
Pyrenem.*

*Deſtetumque tenent Montes per ſecula nomen.*

But according to the opinion more generally receiued, of the Greeke word *Pyes* for that Shepheards and Heardſmen ſet them once on fire, as witneſſeth Diodorus Siculus. And Ariſtole; in *Hiberia* (inquit) *combustiſt aliquando paſtoribus Syluis, calenteque ignibus terra, manifeſtum argentum deſluxiſſe: cumque poſtmodum terra motus ſuſperuenſiſſet, eruptis hiatibus, magnam copiam argenti collectam; atque inde Maſſilienſibus proventus non vulgares obtigiſſe.* The Countrey of Spaine is commended for many things, as may appeare by diuers Elogies: amongſt which, that of Claudianus the Poet is written, as though the Author had been a penſioner to the Kingdome.

*Quid dignum memorare tuis Hiſpania terris  
Vox humana valet? primo lauat aquore ſolem  
India: tu ſeſſos, exaſta luce, iugales  
Proluis, inque tuo reſpirant ſydera ſuſctu.  
Dines equis, frugum facilis, pretioſa metallis,  
Principibus ſecunda pijs.*

## CHAP. XV.

Cæſar, comming to his Armie, aduaunceth forward, and incampeth neere vnto the Enemie.



Within two dayes after, Cæſar came into the Campe with nine hundred horſe, which he had kept with him for a convoy. The bridge broken by the tempeſt, was almoſt reedified; and that which remained vndone, he commaunded to be finiſhed in the night. And hauing ſcene the nature and ſituation of the place, he left ſixe cohorts to keepe the Campe & the bridge, with all the cariages of the Armie. And the next day, putting

all his forces into a triple battell, he marched towards Ilerda: and there ſtanding awhile in Armes, offered battell, in an equall and indifferent place. Afranius brought out his forces, and made a ſtand in the miſt of the hill, vnder his Campe. Cæſar, perceiuing that Afranius at that time was not diſpoſed to fight, determined to incampe himſelfe ſome 400 paſes from the foot of the hill. And leaſt the ſouldiers ſhould be interrupted in their workes, by the ſudden assaults and incurſions of the enemy, he forbade them to fortifie it with a rampire or wall, which muſt neceſſarily be diſcovered and ſcene aſarre of; but cauſed a ditch to be made of fifteene foot in breadth, in the front of the Campe next vnto the Enemy. The firſt and ſecond battell (according as was directed) continued in Armes; and the third battell performed the worke behind them vnſcene, before it was vnderſtood by Afranius that Cæſar would incampe in that place. Which beeing finiſhed, he drew his legions within the ditch, and ſo ſtood in Armes all night.

The next day, he kept all his Armie within the ditch. And forasmuch as the matter to make the Rampire was to be fetched farre off, he kept the like courſe for the finiſhing of the reſt; allotting each ſide of the Campe, to be fortified by a ſeueral legion, with a ditch to be ſunk about, of the ſame ſcantling: and in the meane time, made the other legions to ſtand ready in Armes againſt the enemy.

Afranius and Petreius, to the end they might amuſe the ſouldier, and hinder the worke, brought downe their forces to the foot of the hill, and prouoked them to fight. Howbeit, Cæſar intermitted not the worke, truſting to 111 legions in Armes, and the munition of the ditch. The Enemy not making any long ſtay, or aduauncing further then the foot of the hill, ledde backe their troopes into the Campe. The third day, Cæſar fortified his Campe with a Rampire; and commaunded the reſt of the cohorts and the cariages which were left in the other Campes, to be brought vnto him.

## OBSERVATION.

It may be obſerued for Cæſars cuſtome throughout the whole courſe of his warres, to approche as neere the enemy as conveniently he could; that ſo he might the better obſerue his paſſages, and be ready to take the fauour of any opportunitie, which either the nature of the place, or the motions of the aduerſary would afford him. Which was the rather his aduantage, in regard of his dexteritie, and ſuperlatiue knowledge in the vie of Armes, together with the experience of his old legions: whereby he was able, not onely to improve his owne deſignes to the vtmoſt of an honourable ſucceſſe, but to returne the diſgrace of any attempt made vpon his Armie, vpon the heads of them that were authors of the ſame. For, otherwiſe, his accoſting ſo neere an enemy, might haue turned to his owne loſſe; as beeing full of hazard, & ſubiect to more casualties then hee that ſtandeth further off. And therefore the rule is; that he that deſireth to ſit neere his aduerſarie, muſt be exceeding circumspect, and ſure of ſome aduantage, either from

*Prænotum Cæſar Olympo, in neſtem ſubita circumdedit agmina ſoliſia, dum prima præſtant acies, hoſtesque ſeſellit. Luc. 1.4.*

from the place, or the ouer-awing power of his forces, or else out of his owne vertue, or by some other meanes, to ouer-sway the inconueniences which attend such ingagements. As may appeare by that which Frontinus obserueth hence, touching the straight, wher-into Caesar was fallen; being either to giue battell, which the enemy refused: or to make good that place, from whence he could not retire but with danger. Whereupon, a little before night hee stole the making of a ditch on the backe of his Armie; and retiring himselfe within the same, stood in Armes all night, for his better safetie.

The vse of such ditches are of much importance, and haue oftentimes redeemed an Armie from great extremities: and were so frequent vpon all occasions with the Romaines, that he that shall deny them to be good ditchers, shall doe them wrong. And not onely they, but other Nations, could tell how to make vse of the Spade.

Pericles of Athens, being forced by them of Peloponesus, into a place that had but two out-lets of escape, sunke a ditch of a great latitude, thwart one of the passages (as though he meant to keepe out the enemy) and set his soldiers to breake out the other way. The Peloponesians, thinking hee could noway escape by the passage where the trench was cut, applied themselves wholly to the other place, where the souldiers made shew of breaking out: whereby (through the help of bridges which he had formerly prouided) hee escaped ouer the ditch without resistance. Sometimes they added other helpe to these trenches, especially when they sought handsome meanes to get themselves away: whereof Sertorius may be an instance. VVho, hauing the enemy pressing him in the reare, and being to passe a Riuer, drew a ditch and a rampier at his backe, in the fashion of a halfe moone: which rampire, he heaped with wood and combustible matter; and so setting it on fire, kept off the enemy, and passed with ease ouer the water.

In like manner, Herculeius, one of Sertorius Legates, hauing rashly entered with a small power into a long and narrow passage, between two hills; & finding himselfe pursued by great forces of the enemy, sunke a crosse trench betwene the two Mountaines: and piling the rampire with wood, set it on fire, & so cut off the enemy.

## CHAP. XVI.

**Cæsars attempt to possesse himselfe of a small hill:**

*what disadvantage he ran into, by misling of his purpose; what meanes he vsed to recouer himselfe.*



Etweene the towne of Ilerda, and the next hill where Petrus and Afranius were incamped, there was a Plaine, of about three hundred paces; in the midst whereof stood a little Mole, rising higher then the rest: which if Caesar could get and fortifie, he hoped to cut off the enemy from the towne & the bridge, and from such victuals and prouisions as were brought

brought to the towne: whereupon, he took three legions out of the Campe, and hauing put them into order of battell, hee commanded the Antesignani of one legion, to runne before and possesse the place. Which being perceined, the cohorts that kept watch before Afranius Campe, were presently sent a neerer way to take that Mount. The matter came to blowes: but forasmuch as Afranius partie came first to the place, our men were beaten backe; and by reason of new supplies sent against them, were constrained to turne their backs, and retire to the legions.

The manner of fight which those souldiers vsed, was first to runne furiously vpon an enemy, to seize any place boldly and with great courage; not much respecting their orders or ranks, but fighting in a scattered and dispersed fashion. If they chanc'd to be thoroughly charged, they thought it no shame to giue way and retire; accustomed there-vnto, by frequenting the Lusitanians, and other barbarous people, vsing that kind of fight: as it commonly falleth out, that where the souldiers haue long lined, they get much of the vse and condition of those places. Notwithstanding, our men were much troubled thereat; as vnaccustomed to that kind of fight: for, seeing euery man leaue his ranke, and runne vp and downe, they feared least they should be circumvented, and sette vpon in flanke, and on their bare & open side; where-as themselves were to keepe their order, and not to leaue their places, but vpon extraordinary occasion.

Vpon the routing of the Antesignani, the legion that stood in the corner, left the place, and retreated to the next Hill; almost all the Armie being affrighted, vpon that which had happened beyond euery mans opinion, contrarie to former vse.

Caesar, encouraging his men, brought out the ninth legion to second them; by that meanes compelling the enemy (insolent of good successe, and shrewdly pursuing our men) to turne their backs, and to retire to the towne of Ilerda, and there to make a stand vnder the walles. But the souldiers of the ninth legion, caried on with endeuour, and going about to repaire their losse, they rashly followed the enemy into a place of disadvantage, and came vnder the Hill whereon the towne stood: and as they would haue made their retireit, they were charged afresh from the upper ground. The front of the place had an vnease broken ascent, and was on each side steepe; extended onely so much in breadth, as would serue three cohorts to imbattell in: neither could the Cavalrie come to helpe them. The Hill declined easily from the towne about foure hundred paces in length: and that way our men had some conuenience of retireit, from the disadvantage to which their desire had vnadvisedly led them. The fight continued in this place: which was very vnequall, both in regard of the straightnes thereof, as also for that they stood vnder the foote of the Hill, whereby no weapon fell in vaine amongst them. Notwithstanding, by prowesse and valour they patientlie endured all the woundes they received. The enemies forces were supplied and renewed, by such cohorts as were often sent out of the Campe through the towne, that fresh men might take the place of such as were wearied out. And the like was Caesar faine to doe, sending fresh Cohorts to that place to relieue the wearied.

G.

After

After they had thus continually fought for the space of five houres together, and that our men were much ouer-charged with an vnequall multitude; hauing spent all their weapons, they drew their swords, and ascended vpon the hill, to charge and assault the enemy: and hauing slaine a few of them, the rest were driuen to make a retreat. The cohorts being thus put backe to the walles, and some of them for feare hauing taken the towne, our men found an easie retreat. Our Cavaltrie did from a lowe ground get vpon the toppe of the hill; and riding vpon and downe betwene the two Armies, made our souldiers to retreat with better ease: and so the fight succeeded diuersly.

About scauentie of our men were slaine in the first onset. And amongst these was slaine Q. Fulginius, Capitaine of the first Hastate Centurie of the fourteenth legion; who, for his exceeding valour, was preferred to that place from the lower orders. And of Afranius partie were slaine T. Caelius, Centurion of a Primipile order, and foure Centurions more, besides two hundred souldiers. But such was the opinion of that daies business, that either side beliened they left with the better.

Afranius party was so perswaded, for that they long stood to handy blowes, and resisted the violence of our souldiers, although in all mens iudgement they were the weaker: as also, for that they first tooke and held the place which gaue occasion of that fight; & in the first encounter, compelled our men to turne their backs. Our men, in like manner, thought they had the better, in regard they had maintained fight for five houres together, in a place of disadvantage, & with an vnequall multitude: that they ascended vpon the hill with their swords drawne, and compelled their aduersarie to turne their back, & to retreat into the towne, mauer the disadvantage of the place.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**N this direction which Cæsar gaue, to take the little Hill betwene Ilerda and Afranius Campe, wee may obserue the danger depending vpon the mischewing of an action. For, the failing of a purpose, in seeking to obtaine that which would prouee of great aduantage, doth oftentimes drawe men into as great inconueniences. And as the end in every designe pretendeth gaine, so the meanes thereof doe giue way to hazard: from whence it consequently followeth; that such as are employed in execution, had neede to vse all indeuour, not to falsifie the groundes of good directions, by negligent or inconsiderate carriage; but rather, to make good any want or defect, by serious and warie prosecution of the same.

And the rather, for that it specially concerneth their good, that haue the charge and handling of commaundes; for, they first are like to feeble the smart of anie error committed therein; or otherwise, to haue the honour of anie fortunate successe, for as much as Vertue hath all her praise from Action.

Concer-

Concerning the vse of running, we are to vnderstand, that the Romaines (amongst other their exercises of Armes) had speciall practise of this, as auailable in foure respects, according as Vegetius hath noted; First, to the end they might charge the enemy with greater force and violence. Secondly, that they might possesse themselves with speed, of places of aduantage. Thirdly, that they might readily discouer, as should be found expedient vpon all occasions. And lastly, to prosecute a flying enemy, to better purpose and effect. And this, as Seneca saith, they practised in peace; that being accustomed to needlesse labour, they might be able to discharge necessarie duties. And Liuius, amongst the militarie exercises vsed by Scipio, to fit his men for those glorious exploits which hee afterwards atchieued, saith; That the first day, the legions ran foure miles in Armes. And Suetonius affirmeth, That Nero, hauing appointed a race for the Prætorian cohorts, caried a Target lifted vp before them with his owne hand. And that Galba did more admirably; for, being futed of purpose to make himselfe eminent, directed a field race with a Target, himselfe running as fast as the Emperours Chariot, for twentie miles together.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



THE second thing to be noted in these specialties, is the bold enterprise of Cæsars men, in charging the enemy with their swordes drawne, against the Hill; and making them to giue backe, had an easie and safe retreat from the danger wherein they were engaged. Whereby wee may obserue, that difficulties of extremitie, are neuer better cleered, then by aduenturous and desperate vndertakings: According to the condition of diseases, and distemperatures of the body; which being light & easie, are cured with milde and easie potions: but being grievous and doubtfull, doe require sharpe and strong remedies. VVhich doth also in like manner appeare throughout the whole course of Nature, and particularly in waights: for, as ponderous and heauie bodies are not mooued, but with a counterpoise of greater force; no more can extremities of hazard bee auoided, but by like perilous enforcements.

And hence groweth the difference betwene true valour and foole-hardy rashnesse; being but one and the same thing, if they were not distinguished by the subiect wherein they are shewed. For, to runne headlong into strange adventures, vpon no iust occasion, were to shew more leuitie then discretion: And againe, to vse the like boldnesse in cases of extremitie, deserueth the opinion of vertuous endeuour. As is well obserued by Homer, in the person of Hector, perswading the Troians that fiedde away, to stand and make head against the Grecians; This is the time, saith he, considering the danger wherein wee are, to vse that prowesse and courage which we boast of.

And accordingly, Diomedes censured Glaucus in the same place, for offering himselfe to the furie of the Grecians; Either thou art some God, saith he,

G 2.

or

Lib. 1. cap. 9.  
The vse of  
running.

Miles in media  
pace decurrit,  
sine vlla hostis, et  
superuacuo labo-  
re lassatur, vt  
sufficere neces-  
sario possit. Seneca  
Epist. 18.  
Lib. 2. 6.

Medici leuiter  
egrotantes, leu-  
iter curant: gra-  
uiores autem  
morbus, pericu-  
losas curationes  
et accipies ad-  
hibere coguntur.  
Cicero. 1. de offi-  
cijs.

Iliad. 6.

Victor sub-  
to Martep-  
dit. Lucan.  
4.

Omnis laus vir-  
tutis in actione  
constitit. Arift.  
Eth.

or else but a lost and forlorne man. VVhich may serue to learne vs the true vse of courage; that ordinarily is neuer more shewed then in misimployment.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**H**ave already, in the obseruations of the second Commentary of the warres of Gallia, discoursed particularly of the partes of a legion: Where it appeareth, that in Cæsars time, a legion consisted of fife thousand men, or thereabouts; and according to the sufficiency and experience of the souldiers, was diuided into three parts. The first and meanest of such as followed an Ensigne, were called *Hasitati*. The second, *Principes*. And the third and chiefe sort, *Triarij*: and according to this diuision, had their place and precedencie in the Armie.

Again, each of these three kinds, was diuided into tenne companies, which they called *Maniples*; and euery *Maniple* was subdiuided into two Centuries or Orders: and in euery Order there was a Centurion or Captaine. These orders were distinguished, by the numbers of the first, second, third, and so consequently vnto the tenth orders, which were the last & lowest of each of these three kinds. So that this Q. Fulginius, here mentioned, was Centurion of the first and prime order of the *Hasitati*: And T. Cæcilius, Centurion of the first order of the *Triarij*, which by excellencie was called *Primipilus*, or the Leader of the first companie of a legion.

Now, concerning their imbattelling, we are to note, that according to this former diuision of *Hasitati*, *Principes*, and *Triarij*, vpon occasion of fight, they made a triple battell, one standing in front to another; which we call the vanguard battell, and reareward. VVhere of the *Hasitati* were called *Antesignani*: not for that they had no Ensignes of their owne; for, euery *Maniple* had an Ensigne: but because they stood imbattelled before the Eagle, & other the chiefe Ensignes of the legion. To which purpose is that of Liue, *Pugna orta est, non illa ordinata per Hasitatos, Principesque et Triarios, nec ut pro signis Antesignani, post signa alia pugnaret Acies*. And againe; *Cadunt Antesignani: et nudentur propugnatoribus signa, sit ex secunda prima Acies*. Whereby it appeareth, that most of the chiefe Ensignes were with the *Principes*, which were called *Subsignani*, as the *Triarij* *Postsignani*.

Amongst other benefites of these so patticular diuisions of an Armie, that is not the least which is noted by Thucidides, *Vt iussa imperatoris breui spatio ad singulos milites deferri possent*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVII.

Cæsar, brought into great extreamity by ouerflowing of two Riuer.



**H**is enemy fortified the Mount for which they contended, with great and strong workes; and there put a Garizon. In the space of those two daies that these things were in dooing, there fell out vpon a suddaine a great inconuenience: for, such a tempest happened, that the like waters were neuer seene in those places. And further besides, the snow came downe so abundantly from the Hilles, that it over-flowed the bankes of the Riuer; and in one day, brake downe both the bridges which Fabius had made: and thereby brought Cæsar into great extreamity. For, as it is formerly related, the Campe lay betweene two Riuer, Sicoris and Cinga, being distant about 30 miles one from another. Neither of these Riuer were passable: so that all the Army were of necessity cooped up in that straightnes; neither could the Citties, which had formerly ranged themselves with Cæsars partie, furnish any supplies of victuall and prouision: nor such of the Armie as had gone far for forrage, being hindered by the riuer, could returne to the Campe; nor yet the great conuoies and reinforcements, comming to him out of Italy and Gallia, could gette to the Campe.

The time was very hard; for, there was neither old corne left of their winter prouisions, nor that on the ground was as yet ripe. The Citties and townes neere about were all emptied; for, Afranius before Cæsars coming, had caused all the Corne to be brought into Ilerda: and that which remained, was since Cæsars comming all spent. And for Cattell (which might haue relieved this necessity) by reason of the warre they were remooued by the bordering townes, and caried further off. Such as were gone out to forrage, and to seeke Corne, were by the light Armed Portingalls, and the Buckler-bearers of the heather Spaine, much troubled and molested: for, these men could easily passe the riuer, forasmuch as none of them vsed to goe to warre, without bladders for that purpose. On the contrary part, Afranius abounded with all necessary prouisions; great quantity of Corne was formerly provided and stored up; much was brought in from all the Provinces round about, hauing also great plenty of forrage in his Camp: for, the bridge at Ilerda afforded meanes of all these things without danger; and the Countrey beyond the riuer was whole and vntouched, which Cæsar could not come vnto by any meanes. The waters continued for many dayes together. Cæsar vsed all meanes to reedifie the Bridges: but neither the swelling of the Riuer would permitte him, nor yet the cohorts of the Enemy, placed on the bankes of the other side, suffer him to goe forwardes with it: which they might easilie hinder, both in regard of the nature of the riuer; the

G 3.

greatnes

Cæsar.

Cinga rapidus  
magis quam  
magnus.

greatness of the water; as also, for that they might easily cast their weapons from along the banke, vnto one place or point. Whereby it was very hard, at one and the same time (the Riuer running so violently as it did) to doe the worke, and to shunne the weapons.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**rst, we may obserue, that the strength of a multitude is not prui-  
ledged from such casualties as betide the weakenesse of particular  
persons; but doth oftentimes vndergoe extremities, which can  
neither by providence be preuented, nor remoued by industrie: &  
are such as proceede not from the induour of an enemy, but out of the cir-  
cumstances of time and place; together with such accidents as are interlaced  
with the same. In respect whereof it was, that Cambises told Cyrus; That in  
the course of warre he should meet with some occasions, wherein he was not  
to labour and contend with men, but with chaunces and things, which were  
not to be overcome with lesse difficultie then an enemy; and are the more  
dangerous, according as they giue way to scarcitie and lack of victuall. For as  
it is said in the same place; *Scis breui, finem habiturum Imperium, si comes-  
tu exercitus careat.*

The remedies whereof, are first, Patience; which is as requisite in a souldier,  
as either courage or any other abilitie: and in such cases keepeth an Army  
from discontentment and disorder, vntill meanes of better fortune. And se-  
condly, Good indeauour, which auaieth much in such chaunces; the effect  
whereof, will appeare by that which Cæsar wrought, to redeeme his Armie  
from these inconueniences.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning that which is heere noted of the Spaniards, thar made  
nothing of pasing a Riuer with the helpe of bladders, which the  
Romaines werereader to wonder at then to imitate; it is obser-  
ued, that as people exquisitely fashioned to a ciuill life, by a firme &  
settled policie of government, are firme and reall in the whole course of their  
proceedings, and accordingly doe shew their punctualitie, as well in their so-  
lemnities and priuate cariages, as in their magnificent and stately buildings;  
so on the other side, barbarous and rude Nations, that liue vnder generall and  
slight lawes, are as slight and rude in their actions; as amongst other things,  
may appeare by that the Spaniards thought it no scorn, to vse the help of blad-  
ders in pasing ouer a Riuer, as a deuise comming next to hand: which the peo-  
ple of a wife and potent State, would not haue done, but by a sure and substan-  
tiall bridge.

The vse of which bladders, as it hath been auncient amongst people of that  
nature, so it is continued in the same manner, by the Sauages, inhabiting Gron-  
land,

land, and the North parts of America; as appeareth by the discoueries made  
of late by the Moscouy Marchants, about the Northwest passage: from whence  
such as are imployed in those voyages, haue brought great and large bladders  
or bagges, made of Seale skinnes, ingeniously deuised to be filled and blowed  
with wind, and tied behind at their girdle, and at their collar, to helpe them-  
selues in swimming. And after the same easie fashion, the Indians of Peru, as  
Iosephus Acosta writeth (in stead of wood and stone) made their bridges ouer  
great Riuers of plaited Reedes, which they fastened to the bankes on each side  
with stakes: or otherwise of bundles of straw and weedes, by which, men and  
beasts (if there be any credit in his storie) passe ouer with ease. Howbeit, as  
when the ancient Greeks would note a man of extreame insufficiencie; They  
would say he could neither reade nor swim: So Cæsar seemed of the same opi-  
nion, by commending the skill of swimming, as a thing of much consequence  
in the vse of Armes. Whereof he made good experience in Egypt; where he  
cast himselfe into a small boate, for his better safetie: and finding it ouer-  
charged, and ready to sinke, he leapt into the sea, and swam to his Fleet, which was  
200 paces off, holding certaine papers in his left hand, about the water; and  
trayling his coate of Armes in his teeth, that it might not be left to the enemy.

Lib. 6. ca. 14.

## CHAP. XVIII.

Afranius marcheth with three legions, to cut off a  
party. The scarcitie of victuall in  
Cæsars Armie.



**I**t was told Afranius, of great troopes and conuoyes that were  
comming to Cæsar, but were hindered by the waters, and a  
boade there by the Riuers side: for, thither were come Ar-  
chers out of Ruthenia, and horsemen out of Gallia, with ma-  
nie carres & cariages, according to the custome of the Galles.  
There were besides, of all sorts, about sixe thousand men,  
with their seruants and attendants, but without order, or any knowne com-  
maund: for, every man was at his owne libertie, traouelling the Countrey with-  
out feare, according to the former freedome & safetie of the waies. There were  
likewise many young men of good ranke, Senators sonnes, and Knights of Rome,  
besides Embassadors from sundry States, & diuers of Cæsars Legates. All these  
were kept backe by the Riuer.

Afranius went out in the night time with three legions, and all his horse, to  
cut off this partie; and sending his Cavalrie before, sette vpon them vnawares.  
Howbeit, the Cavalrie of the Galles, put themselves speedily in order, and buck-  
led with them. And as long as it stood vpon indifferent termes, they being but  
a few, did withstand a great number of the enemy: but as soone as they disco-  
uered

Cæsar.



uered the Ensignes of the legions comming towards them, some few of them being slaine, the rest betooke themselves to the next hills.

This small time of encounter, was of great consequence for the safetie of our men: for, by this meanes, they had opportunitie to take the upper ground. There were lost that day 200 Archers, a few horsemen, and no great number of the souldiers boyes, together with the baggage. Victualls, by reason of all these things waxed very deere, as well in regard of the present want, as also for feare of future penurie, as commonly it happeneth in such cases; in so much as a bushell of Corne was worth fiftie pence. Whereby the souldiers grew weake for want of sustenance; and the inconueniences thereof, daily more and more increased. For, so great was the alteration which happened in a few daies, that our men were much afflicted with the extreame want of all necessary provisions: whereas they on the other side, having all things in abundance, were held for victors. Caesar sent vnto those States which were of his party, and in stead of Corne, gaue them order to furnish him with Cattell; dismissed souldiers boyes, and sent them to towne further off; relieuing the present scarcitie by all the meanes he could.

Afranius and Petreius, together with their friends, enlarged these things in their Letters to Rome: rumour and report added much heere vnto; as that the warre was euen almost at an end. These messengers and Letters being come to Rome, there was great concourse from all parts to Afranius house, much congratulation and reioicing for these things: and there-upon, many went out of Italy to Pompey, some to be the first messengers of the newes; others, that they might not seeme to expect the euent of the war, and so prooue the last that came to that partie.

When the matter was brought to these difficulties and extremities, and all the waies were kept by Afranius souldiers and horsemen; Caesar gaue order to the souldiers, to make such boates and Barks as hee had in former yeeres taught them the vse of in the warre of Britaine: the keeles whereof were built of light stufte, and small timber, and the vpper partes made with wicker, and covered with hides. Which being finished, he laded them vpon Carres, and carried them in the night some twentie two miles from the Campe. And in those Barks, transporting his souldiers ouer the riuer, vpon a suddaine possesst himselfe of a little hill, which lay continuent vnto the water side: which hill he speedily fortified, before the enemy had notice thereof. Afterwards, he brought ouer a legion to that place, and made a bridge from side to side in two daies space: and so the convoies, which had gone forth for provisions & forrage, returned backe in safetie; whereby he began to settle a course for provision of Corne.

The same day, he passed ouer the riuer a great part of his Cavalrie, who sailing unlooked for vpon the forragers (scattered heere and there without feare or suspicion) cut off a great number of men and cattell. Where-upon, the Enemy sending certaine Spanish troops, bearing little round bucklers, to second and relieue the forragers, they diuided themselves of purpose into two parts; the one to keepe and defend the booty which they had gotte, and the other, to resist and beate backe the forces sent to charge them. One of our cohorts, which had easilie runne out before the Armie, was intercepted, & cut off: the rest returned by the bridge into the Camp in safetie with a great booty.

THE

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Hese Rutheni inhabited that part of prouince where Rhodes now standeth: amongst whom Caesar had ordinarily a legion or two in Guarizon, for the better keeping of the Countrey in obedience, being a stout and warlike people, and vsing archerie, as appeareth in this place. Which, howsoeuer the course of time hath brought into vter contempt, yet let vs not scorne to take notice, that anciently it hath been vsed by such as performed the greatest feates of Armes: for, Hercules had but two sorts of weapons to archieue labours of so much variety; a Club for such monsters as would contest with his valour, and Boaw and Arrowes for others that kept further off. And in the old warre of Troy (if Homer may bee belieued) Pindarus, Duke of Lycia, hauing a stable of gallant Courfers, left them all at home, least hee should not find meanes at Troy, to giue them their ordinarie keeping; and came on foote with his boaw and arrowes, with such reputation of his deedes of Armes, that Aeneas fought him out in a conflict, to resist the rage and extreame presures of Diomedes. And on the contrary part, Teucer relieued the distressed Grecians from a hot and desperate pursute, by slaying with his boaw eight valiant Troians before he stirred his foote.

Concerning the vse of which weapon, howsoeuer it may seeme ridiculous (to such as vnderstand nothing but the course of the present age) to recall the long boaw to the seruice of a battell; yet they may remember, that the Graygoose wing gaue our forefathers such aduantage, that they wrought wonders amongst all Nations for deedes of Armes: which wee should imitate with as much hope of successe, if we could handle our boawes in any measure as they did. Of this I haue already formerlie treated.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



T is a saying as true as it is old, that An ill hap commeth not alone, but is alwaies attended with such consequents as will inforce other inconueniences; as may be obserued by this extremitie heere mentioned. For, the mischief was not bounded with the affliction which Caesar suffered for want of needfull prouision, notwithstanding the weight was such as could not bee borne by ordinarie patience: but the enemy enlarged it to his further advantage, vaunting of it as a helpelesse remedy, and making out dispatches to send victorie to Rome. VVhich gaue him yet further preiudice in the opinion of the world; and made those his enemies, that formerlie shewed no dislike of his proceedings. And thus euery ill chauce hath a taile of many other misfortunes; which if either prouidence or indeuour may preuent, it shall much import a Commander to auoide them.

THE

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**N**ecessitie maketh men constant in their sufferings, so Custometh easines and meanes of deliuerance; according as may appeare by this direction of Cæsar, which was wholly drawne from former experience. For, first the Boares heere prescribed, were such as he vsed in the warre of Britannie; and as far as may bee gathered out of the former Commentaries, were those he commaunded to be built for his second iourney: which he would now imitate, in regard of the flatnes of their bottomes, and not otherwise. For, it is not to be supposed, that those Barkes were couered with skinnes; vnlesse peraduenture hee vsed some such as these vpon occasion in that warre, not expressed in the storie.

Herodotus in his *Clie*, describeth the like; The boats (saith he) which come from Babylon, downe the Riuer Euphrates, are made by the Heardsmen of Armenia, of light Timber, in a round fashion, without beake or poope, & are couered with skinne, the hairie side inwarde; and in these they take their passage. Such as fish for Salmon in the Riuer of Seuerne, vse the like boates in all respects, which they call *Corradas* of *Corium*: beeing all couered with horsskinnes tanned. Secondly, the means he vsed to passe ouer without impeachement from the Enemy, by carying those boates in the night time vp the Riuer to a place of securitie, was such, the like whereof he had formerly practised in Gallia, to passe the Riuer Loier, beeing then guarded on the other side by the Enemy. Whereby we see, how much vse and continuance doth inable men, beyond others of smaller experience: according to that, *Dies Diem docet*.

CHAP. XIX.

The Mafsilians encounter with Brutus at Sea,  
and are beaten.



**W**hile these things were done at Ilerda, the Mafsilians (by the direction of L. Domitius) rigged and set out 17 Gallies, whereof eleuen were couered; besides many lesser vessels which went along with them, to make the Nauie seeme the greater for the astonishment of the Enemy. In these they put a great number of Archers, and many Albickes, of whom wee haue formerly made mention; encouraging them both by rewards and promises. Domitius required certaine shippes for himselfe, and them he filled with Shepheards and Countrymen, which he had brought thither with him. The Nauie beeing thus furnished, set forward with great confidence towards our shipping, whereof D. Brutus was Admirall, and lay

lay at Anker at an Iland right ouer against Mafsellies. Brutus was far inferior to the enemy in shipping; but Cæsar hauing picked the chiefeft and valiantest men out of all the legions, as well of the *Antesignani* as Centurions, put them aboard the Fleet, they themselves requiring to bee employed in that seruice. These men had prepared bookes, and grapples of Iron, and had likewise furnished themselves with many Piles and Darts, and other sorts of weapons: and understanding of the Enemies coming, put to sea, and encountered with the Mafsilians. They fought on either side very valiantly and fiercely; neither were the Albickes much inferior to our men in prowesse, beeing rough mountainous people, exercised in Armes: and hauing a little before fallen off from the Mafsilians, did now remember the late contract and league they had made with them. The Shepheards, in like manner (a rude and vntamed kind of people, stirred up with hope of liberty) did strue to shew their valour in the presence of their Maister.

The Mafsilians, trusting to the nimblenes of their shipping, and in the skill and dexteritie of their Pilots, did frustrate (in a deluding manner) the shooke of our shippes, when they came violently to stemme them. And, forasmuch as they had sea-roume enough, they drew out their Nauie at length, to compasse and inclose our men about: And sometimes, they would single out one of our ships, and set vpon them with diuers of theirs together, and wipe off a side of their oars in their passage along by them.

When they came to deale at hand (leauing aside the art and skill of the Pilots) they tooke themselves to the stoutnes and valour of the Higlanders. Our men were faine to vse worse oare-men, and more vnskillfull Pilots; who beeing lately taken out of shippes of burden, did not well knowe the true names of the tackling, and were much troubled with the heauines and sluggishnes of the shipping; which beeing made in haste of vnseasoned timber, was not so nimble or ready for vse. But, as the matter came to handie blowes, every single shippe did willingly vnder-take two at once; and hauing grappled with either of them, fought on each side, entering valiantly the enemies shippes, killing a great number of the Higlanders and Shepheards. Part of the ships they sunke, some they tooke with the men, & the rest they beate backe into the Hauen. That day the Mafsilians lost nine shippes, with those that were taken. This newes was brought to Cæsar at Ilerda.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**H**auing formerly obserued the manner of their sea-fight, consisting of three parts; The first was, their nimble & skillfull managing of their shippes, either forceably to assault, or to laviue and beare off, as might fall for their best aduantage: wherein the Mafsilians, by reason of the skillfulnesse of their Pilots, had great confidence. The second, was their fight before they came to grappling, as well with great engines, such as were their Balista and Catapulta, casting stones and logs of wood one against another, as also with slings, arrowes and darts; resembling our great artillerie, and

Sea-fight.

and small shot; for which purpose, their shippes were built with fore-cattles & turrets, and other aduantages of height, for their casting weapons. The third, was their grappling and forceable entry; wherein, forasmuch as the matter was referred to the arbitrement of valour, the legionarie souldier caried the cause. Whence we may obserue, that their legions were the nurseries of their valiant and worthy men, as well for the sea as the land: beeing fitted by the discipline of their Militaric exercises, to vndertake any seruice subiect to humane industrie; whereof they gaue an account woorthie the Schoole wherein they were instructed.

Neither is it seene at any time, but that such kingdomes as make care to traine vp their men in Academies of vertuous Actualitie, doe alwaies keepe their honour at a high price; affording, at all times, men of absolute and compleat cariage, both for desigment and performance.

#### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**H**auae a little before shewed out of Liuius, that the *Antesignani* were ordinarily taken for the *Hastati*; which, beeing the easiest sort of souldiers, according to the generall diuision of a legion, doth seeme to contradict the passage in this Chapter, *Sed delectos ex omnibus legionibus fortissimos viros Antesignanos, Centuriones Caesar ei classi attribuerat*. For the better cleering whereof, we are to note, that as the *Hastati*, or first battell of a legion, were generallie taken for the *Antesignani* (as standing before the Eagle, or other the chiefeft Ensignes, which were alwaies amongst the *Principes* or second battell); so euery Maniple, hauing an Ensigne in the midst of the troope, the souldiers that stood in front before the Ensigne, were likewise called *Antesignani*, and were the best souldiers in the Companie: for, the Centurion, standing alwaies in the head of the troope, was accompanied with the valiantest and worthiest men; the rest, filling vp the reare, comforted with the Lieutenant, who there-vpon was called *Tergidux*.

Whence wee may admire the temperature and disposition of a Romaine Armie, beeing first generally diuided into three battells, whereof the meaneft were in the vauntguard, to make triall of their strength, and to spend the heat of their young blood in the first affront of an enemy: The *Veterani*, or olde souldiers, beeing left in the reareward, to repaire any losse, which either force or casualtie should cast vpon their Leaders. And againe, to counterpoise the selues, in such a manner as the weakest might not alwaies goe to the wall, their priuate Companies were so ordered, that the best men were alwaies in front. Whereby they made such an exquisite temper, as kept euery part of the Armie in their full strength.

CHAP.

#### CHAP. XX.

### Vpon the making of this Bridge, the Enemy resolueth to transferre the warre into Celtiberia.



**V**pon the making of this Bridge, Fortune suddenly changed. The enemy, fearing the courage and valour of our Cavalrie, did not so freely range abroad as they had wont to do; Sometimes seeking forrage within a small distance of the Camp, to the end they might find a safe and easie retreat if occasion required: Sometimes fetching a great compasse about to avoid the guardes & stations of our horsemen. And if they had receiued but the least check, or had but desiered the Cavalrie as farre off, they would haue cast downe their burdens, and fledde away.

At last, they omitted forraging for many daies together, and (which was neuer vsea by any Nation) sent out to seeke it in the night. In the meane time, those of Osea and Caliguris, beeing in league together, sent Embassadors to Caesar, with offer of their seruice, in such sort as he should please to commaund it. Within a few daies, the *Tarraconenses*, *Lacetani*, and *Ausetani*, together with the *Illurganoneses*, which border vpon the Riuer Ebrus, followed after. Of all these hee desired supplies of Corne, and prouision: which they promised to furnish; and accordingly got horses from all quarters, and brought graine into the Campe. In like manner, the Regiment of the *Illurganoneses*, vnderstanding the resolution of their State, left the Enemy, and came vnto him with their Colours: and suddenly a great alteration of things appeared.

The bridge beeing perfected, great Citties and States beeing come in vnto him, course settled for prouision of Corne, and the rumour blowne ouer of the succours and legions, which Pompey was said to come withall, by the way of Mauritania; many other townes further off, revolted from Afranius, and claue to Caesars partie.

The Enemy, beeing much affrighted and abashed at these things, Caesar (to auoide the great circuit by which hee continually sent his horsemen about by the bridge) hauing got a conuenient place, resolved to make many trenches of thirtie foote in breadth, by which he might draine some part of the riuer Sicoris, and make it passable by a foord. These trenches beeing almost made, Afranius and Petreins did therevpon conceive a great feare, least they should be cut off altogether from victuall and forrage; forasmuch as Caesar was very strong in horse, and therefore they determined to leaue that place, and transferre the warre into Celtiberia: bring the rather there-vnto induced, for that of those 2 contrarie Factions, which in the former warre had stood for L. Sertorius, such Citties as were subdued by Pompey, did yet stand in awe of his Name and Authoritie:

H.

and

Caesar.

Osea.  
Caliguris.

# Obseruations vpon the first

and that such, as from the beginning had continued firme vnto him, did intirely loue him, for the great benefites they had receiued from him; amongst whom Cæsar's name was not knowne. There they expected great succours both of horse and foote, and made no doubt but to keepe the warre on foote vntill winter.

This aduice being agreed vpon, they gaue order to take vp all the boates that were on the riuer Iberus, and to bring them to Oſogesa; a towne sited vpon Iberus, twentie miles from the Campe. There they commanded a bridge of boates to be made; and transporting two legions ouer Sicoris, fortified their Camp with a rampier of twelue foote in height: which being known by the Discoverers, Cæsar by the extreame labour of the souldiers, continued day and night in turning the course of the water; & at length brought the matter to that passe, that the horsemen (with some difficulty) durst aduventure ouer: but the foot troopes, hauing nothing aboue the water but their heads, were so hindered as well by the depth of the Riuer, as the swiftness of the streame, that they could not well get ouer. Notwithstanding, at the same instant of time, newes was brought of the making of the bridge ouer the Riuer Iberus, and a foord was found in the riuer Sicoris.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**st, concerning the places heere mentioned, the Reader may take notice, that Ilerda (now known by the name of Lerida) standeth vpon the Riuer Sicoris, in the Prouince of Catalonia; and being sited vpon a hill, is inclosed round with a wall of hewen stone, in a pleasant and fertile Countrey, both for Corne, wine, oyle, and fruite: as it is graphicallie described by Lucan;

*Colle tumet modico, leuique excreuit in altum  
Pingue solum tumulo, super hunc fundata vetusta  
Surgit Ilerda manu; placidis prælabitur undis  
Hesperios inter Sicoris non ultimus amnes:  
Saxeus ingenti quem pons amplectitur arcu,  
Hibernas passurus aquas.*

It was formerly a Vniuersitie, and at all times famous for salt meates & pickled fish. Where vnto Horace alludeth, when hee tolde his booke, That although it so fell out that no man would regard it, neuerthelesse, it might serue at Ilerda to wrap Salt-fish in.

*Aut fugies Picam, aut vnctus mittêris Ilerdam.*

Oſca, now called Hueſca, a towne likewise of Catalonia, in former time surnamed *Pitrix*; where Sertorius kept the sonnes of the Grandes of Spaine, as pledges of their loyalty; vnder pretext of learning the Greeke and Latine tongue, which he had there caused to be taught, in forme of an Academie.

In

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In this towne his hap was to befallaine by Perpenna, as Paternulus recordeth the storie; *Tum M. Perpenna pratorius, & proscriptis, generis clarioris quam animi, Sertorium inter canam Aetofca interemit; Romanisque certâ victoriam, partibus suis excidium, sibi turpissimam mortem, pessimo auctora uit facinore:* Which Aetofca, is by all men taken for this Ofca.

The inhabitants boast of nothing more at this day, then that S. Laurence was a Cittizen of their towne.

Calaguris, now Calahorra, is seated vpon a hill on the bankes of Iberus; the people whereof are famous for their constancie, and faithfulness to their Commanders, and specially to Sertorius: as appeareth by that of Valerius Maximus; *Quò perseverantius interempti Sertorij cineribus obsidionem Cn. Pompei frustrantes, fidem præstarent, quia nullum iam aliud in orbe eorum supererat animal, uxores suas, natosque, ad usum nefaria dapis verterunt; quoque diutius armata iuuentus, viscera sua visceribus suis aleret, infelices cadauerum reliquias salire non dubitauit.*

Neuerthelesse, Afranius tooke the in the end, by continuall siege; amongst whom that antiquitie of Bebricius is very remarkable, which is yet extant neere to Logronno,

DIIS. MANIBVS.  
Q. SERTORII.  
ME. BEBRICIUS. CALAGVRITANVS.  
DEVOVI.  
ARBITRATVS.  
RELIGIONEM. ESSE.  
EO. SVBLATO.  
QVI. OMNIA.  
CVM. DIIS. IMMORTALIBVS.  
COMMVNIA. HABEBAT.  
ME. INCOLVMEM.  
RETINERE. ANIMAM.  
VALE. VIATOR. QVI. HEC. LEGIS.  
ET. MEO. DISCE. EXEMPLO.  
FIDEM. SERVARE.  
IPSA. FIDES.  
ETIAM. MORTVIS. PLACET.  
CORPORE. HVMANO. EXVTIS.

In memorie of whose fidelitie, Augustus Cæsar tooke a band of these people for a guard to his person. In this towne was Quintilian the Rhetorician borne; and being brought from thence to Rome, in Nero his time, was the first that taught a publike Schoole for salarie: as witnesseth Saint Hierome; *Quintilianus ex Hispania Calaguritanus primus Rome publicam Scholam tenuit, et salario cohonestatus publico claruit.*

Celtiberia was the Countrey lying along the Riuer Iberus, inhabited by people comming out of Gallia Celtica: where vpon Lucan saith;

H 2

profu-

Lib. 2.

Calaguris.

Lib. 7. cap. 6.

Suetonius in  
Augusto.  
Colores Calaguritanorum.  
Ad Eusebii  
Chronicon.

Celtiberia.

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*profugique à Gente vetusta  
Gallorum Celta, miscentes nomen Iberis.*

Florus calleth them *Hispania Robur*. And Valerius Maximus affirmeth, That they were alwaies glad of warre, as beeing to end their life in happines and honour; and lamented their ill fortune to die in their beddes, as a miserable and shamefull end.

*Hic pugna cecidisse decus, corpusque cremari  
Tale nefas: caelo credunt, superisque referri,  
Impassus carpat si membra iacentia vultus.*

Their Armes and weapons were of singular raritie: for, besides the water of Bilbo, which gaue them an invincible temper; they had also a peculiar fashion of working them, as witnesseth Diodorus Siculus: hiding their plates of Iron in the earth, vntill the worst and weakest part were eaten out with rust, and of that which remained, they made very hard swords.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE suddaine alterations of warre, are like the changings of mens mindes vpon small accidents; which are so forceable to shake out resolutions, as made a great Philosopher, to describe a man by the propertie of *mutabile Animal*. And is no vnable scene in this; That Afranius, in the compasse of a few daies, triumphed of Cæsars ouerthrow, and fled away for feare of his power. Whence we may note the aduantage coming to a partie, when they shake off any eminent distresse: for, as the extremitie thereof threatneth ruine and destruction, so the alteration bringeth with it an opinion of victorie. And surely, such is the condition of all sorts of Miserie, that when the storme is ouer, and the bitterness of the affliction alaid, good times come redoubled vpon the Patients; as though the vicissitude of things, did inforce contrary effects. And therefore, a Commaunder, knowing the aduantage of such an opportunitie, must indeuour to improue the same, as may best serue to a speedie end.

### CHAP. XXI.

The Enemy setteth forward, and is staid  
by Cæsar.



**T**HE Enemy, ther-vpon thought it expedient for him to make the more haste; and therefore leauing two Auxiliary cohorts for the safe keeping of Ilerda, hee transported all his forces ouer the Riuer Sicoris, and incamped himselfe with the two legions, which formerly he had caried ouer. There remained nothing for Cæsar to doe, but with this Caualrie to impeache

and

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and trouble the enemy in their march. And forasmuch as it was a great compasse about, to goe by the bridge (whereby it would come to passe, that the Enemy would get to Iber a farre neerer way) hee passed ouer his horsemen by the foord. About the third watch, as Petreius and Afranius had raised their Camp; vpon a suddaine, the Caualrie shewed themselues in the reare; and swarming about them in great multitudes, began to stay and hinder their passage. As soone as it beganne to bee day light; from the upper ground where Cæsar lay incamped, it was perceiued, how the reareward of the enemy was hard laid to by our Caualrie, and how sometimes they turned head againe, and were neuertheless broken and rowted: sometimes their Ensignes stood suddenly still, and all their foote troopes charged our horse, and forc't them to giue way; and then turning backe, went on their way againe. The souldiers walking up and down the Camp, were grieued that the enemy should so escape their handes, whereby the matter would consequently be spun out into a long warre: and went vnto the Centurions and Tribunes of the souldiers, praying them to beseech Cæsar not to spare them for any danger or labour; for, they were ready and willing to passe the Riuer where the horse went ouer. Cæsar, mooued through their desire and importunity, albeit he feared to expose his Army to a riuer of that greatnes, yet he thought it expedient to put it to triall: and therefore commaunded, that the weakest souldiers of all the Centuries should bee taken out, whose courage or strength shewed a disabilitie to vnder-take that seruice: and these he left in the Campe, with one legion to defend the same, bringing out the other legions without carriage or burden; and hauing set a great number of horses & cattell both aboue and belowe in the riuer, hee transported his Army ouer. Some few of the souldiers, being caried away with the streame, were succoured and taken up by the horsemen; insomuch as not one man perished.

The Army caried thus ouer in safetie, hee ranged them in order, and marched forward with a three-fold battell. Such was the endeuour of the souldiour, that albeit they had set circuit of sixe miles to the foord, and had spent much time in passing the riuer; yet by the ninth houre, they did ouertake the enemy that rose about the third watch of the night.

Assoone as Afranius and Petreius had discovered the legions as farre off (being terrified with the noueltie of that pursuit) they betooke themselues to the upper ground, and there imbattelled their troopes. In the meane time, Cæsar refreshed his Armie in the fildes, and would not suffer them (beeing wearie) to giue battell: and as they tried againe to goe on in their march, he followed after and staid them; whereby the enemy was forced to incampe sooner then was purposed: for, there were hilles a little before them; and for sixe miles together, the passages were very difficult and narrow.

By which meanes (beeing aduanced betweene the hilles) they hoped to bee free from Cæsars Caualrie; and by keeping the passages, to hinder the Armie from following after; to the end they themselues, might without perill or feare, put their forces ouer the riuer Iberus: which by all meanes was to bee effected. Neuertheless, being wearied with traauailing and fighting all day, they put off the businesse to the next morning.

H 2.

Cæsar

Three of the clock in the afternoon.

Cæsar also incamped himselfe on the next hill; and about midnight, some of their partie being gone out from the Campe, some-what far off, to fetch water, were taken by the horsemen. By them, Cæsar was aduertised, that the Enemy with silence began to remoue, and to lead their troopes out of their Campe. Whereupon, he commaunded the signe of rising to be giuen, and the cry (dislodging and trussing vp their baggage) to be taken vp, according to the discipline and vse of souldiers.

The Enemy, hearing the cry, fearing least they should bee impeached in the night, and forced to fight with their burdens on their backs, or to be shutte vp in those straight passages by Cæsars horsemen, staied their iourney, and kept their forces within their Campe.

OBSERVATIONS.



His passage ouer Sicoris, was in the same manner as hee caried his Armie ouer the Riuer Loier, in the seauenth Commentarie of the warre of Gallia; *Vado per Equites invento, pro rei necessitate opportuno, vt Brachia modo atque Humeri, ad sustinenda arma liberi ab aqua esse possent, disposito equitatu, qui vim fluminis frangerent, incolumem exercitum transduxit.*

The horse that stood about, brake the force of the water, & those that were belowe, tooke vp such as were ouercome with the streame; and withall, gaue courage to the souldier to venture with better assurance, seeing the passage impaled in, on each side, to keepe them frō miscarrying. His attempt vpon Sicoris, to abate the swelling pride of that Riuer, by diuiding it into many streames, was in imitation of the first Cyrus; who taking displeasure at the Riuer Cyndes, next vnto Euphrates the greatest Riuer of Asyria, drew it into three hundred and threescore chanelles.

Croesus, not finding the Riuer Halis passable by a foord, and hauing no meanes to make a bridge, sunke a great trench behinde the Campe, from the vpper part of the Riuer, and so drew all the water behind his Armie.

Vegetius hath a particular discourse of passing an Armie ouer a Riuer, whether it be by bridge or boate, or by wading, or swimming, or any other way: to which I referre the Reader.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXII.

Afranius seeketh to take the Straites betweene certaine Mountaines; but was preuented by Cæsar.

(..)



THE next day following, Petreius went out secretly with a few horse, to discover the Countrey; and for the same purpose, some went likewise out of Cæsars Campe. L. Decidius Saxo, was sent with a small troope to view the site of the Place, and either party returned with the same report: that for five miles, the way was open and champain, and afterwards, very rough and mountainous; and whosoever first tooke those straights, might easily impeache the enemy from going further. The matter was disputed in the Councell of warre, by Petreius and Afranius; the time of their setting forward, was debated: Most of them thought it fit to take their iourney in the night; for, by that means, they might com to those straights before it were perceined. Others were of opinion, that it was not possible to steale out in the night; as appeared by the cry of rising, taken up the night before in Cæsars Campe, upon their remoouing: and Cæsars horsemen did so range abroad in the night, that all places and passages were kept & shut up. Neither were they to giue occasion of night fights, but to auoid the same by all the meanes they could; forasmuch as in ciuill dissension, the ordinary souldier would rather suffer himselfe to bee ouer-maistered by feare, then continue firme in the allegiance which he had sworne vnto: whereas, in the day time, euery man hath shame and dishonor before his eyes; together with the presence of the Centurions and Tribunes: with which respects, a souldier is restrained, and kept within the bounds of duty. And therefore, the attempt was by all meanes to be vndertaken in the day time, although it fell out to some losse; yet neuertheless, the body of the Armie might passe in safetie, and possesse that place which they sought for.

This opinion preuailing in their consultation, they determined by breake of day the next morning to sette forward. Cæsar, hauing diligently viewed the Countrey; as soone as day began to appeare, drew all his forces out of his Campe, and marched forward in a great circuit, keeping no direct way. For, the waies which lead to Iberus and Oëtogesa, were taken up with the Enemies Campe; insomuch as they were to passe ouer great and difficult valleis. And in many places, broken Rocks and stones did so hinder them, that they were necessarilie to giue their weapons from hand to hand, the souldiers lifting vp one another, and so they passed most part of the way. Howsoever, no man thought much of the labour, for that they hoped to giue an end to all their trauell, if they could keep the enemy from passing ouer the Riuer Iberus, and cut off his victuals.

*Attollunt campo  
gemine iuga  
saxorum, val-  
le caua media:  
cellus laui ardua  
cellos continet  
colles, tuta quos  
inter opaco au-  
fractu latere  
via: quibus bo-  
ste posito fauci-  
bus, emitti ter-  
rarum in denia  
diartem, inque  
seras gentes Ca-  
sar videt? Lucan. lib. 4.*

*Itē sine vllō or-  
dine, aut, rapti-  
ue fuga cōver-  
te bellum, et  
faciem pugne  
vultuq; inferte  
minaces. Lucan  
lib. 4.*

## Obseruations vpon the first

At the first, Afranius souldiers ranne ioyfully out of their Campe to see the Armie, casting out words of derision & reproche, that for want of victuall, they sledge and returned to Ilerda; for, the way they held, was quite contrary to that they intended: whereby they seemed to goe backe againe: and the Commanders themselves, did much approoue their owne counsell, that they had kept their troopes within the Campe. For, that which confirmed the in their opinion, was, that they perceived they were come out without their cariages: whereby they hoped, necessity would not suffer them to continue long there. But when they saw the troopes by little and little to wind to the right hand, and that they perceived, how those that were in front, had fallē backward beyond their Camp, there was no man so dull, but thought it expedient presently to march out, and make head against them. Whereupon, they cried to Arme; and all their forces, excepting some few cohorts which were left to keepe the Campe, went out, and marched directly towards Iberus.

The whole business consisted in speed and celeritie, which of the two should first take the straights, and possesse the hills. Caesars Army was hindered by the difficultie of the way: and Afranius partie was retarded by Caesars Canallry. The matter was come to that vpshot, that if Afranius party did first get the hills, they might happily quit themselves of danger; but the baggage of the whole Armie, and the cohorts left in the Campe could not be saued: for, being intercepted & secluded by Caesars Armie, there was no meanes to relieue them.

It fell out, that Caesar first attained the place; and being come out from among those great Rocks into a plaine champaine, put his Army in order of battell against the enemy.

Afranius, seeing the enemy in front, and his reareward hardly charged by Caesars Canallry, got the aduantage of a smal hill, & there made their stand: and from thence sent 4 cohorts bearing round bucklers, vnto a Mountaine, which in all mens sight was higher then the rest; commaunding them to runne as fast as they could, and possesse that hill, intending to follow after with all his forces; and altering his course, to gette along the ridges and toppes of the Mountaines to the tops.

As the cohorts were aduanced forward by an oblique circuit, Caesars Canallry perceiuing their intendement, sette vpon them with such violence, that they were not able any time to beare their charge, but were all cut in peeces in the sight of both Armies.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**P**retorius and Afranius, in their Councell of warre, resolved by all meanes to shun night encounters, as a thing full of hazard and vncertainie, and apt for looseness and disobedience: for, the night, being neither a discoverer of errors, nor yet a distinguisher either

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of actions or persons; but wrapping vp both the vertuous & the faultie in her Mantle of obscuritie, doth not admit of directions, to follow an opportunitie, or to help a mistaking: but rather giuing way to Impunitie and licentious confusion, leaueth no hope of what is wished: VWhereas the light is a witness of euery mans demeanour, and hath both honour & rebuke to make dutie respected.

For which causes, Curio (as it followeth in the next Commentarie) in his harange before that vntimely expedition against king Iuba, reiected their aduice that would haue had him let forward in the night; *At etiam ut media nocte profiscamur addunt: quod maiorem credo licentiam habeant qui peccare conantur: Namque huiusmodi res aut pudore aut metu tenetur, quibus rebus nox maxime aduersaria est.*

And, that the danger may appeare as well by effect as by discourse, let the Reader take notice of that battell by night, between Antonius Primus, on the behalfe of Vespasian, and the Vitellian legions neere vnto Cremona. Whereof Tacitus hath this description; *Praelium tota nocte varium, anceps, atrox; his, rursus illis, exitiabile. Nihil animus aut manus, ne oculi quidem prouisu iuuabant.* &c. And thus are all night workes condemned, wherein either order or honour are of anie moment.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**H**aeue already noted, in the former Commentaries, the vse of exact and particular discouerie of the Countrey, where a partie is engaged: then which, nothing doth more aduantage a Commander to expedite the happie issue of a warre. For, by that meanes, he is not onely able to iudge of any motion which the enemy shall offer, and to giue sure directions to frustrate and make void the same; but also to dispose himselfe, according as shall seeme expedient for his safetie. VWherein, if a place of such consequence as is heere mentioned shall by designe be ayimed at, this historie sheweth, how much it importeth either partie to obtaine it: and therefore Caesar had reason to make his passage through Valleys and Rocks, rather then to lose victorie, for want of labouring a little in an vneasy way.

This Lucius Decidius Saxo, or Didius Saxo, imploied in this discouerie, was afterward aduanced by Caesar, to bee Tribune of the people; whereat Tullie was so much offended. How can I omit (saith he) this Decidius Saxo, a man brought from the furthest end of the world: whom we see Tribune of the people, before we euer saw him a Cittizen.

## CHAP.

*Neque in victoria decus, nec in fuga flagitium. Tacit. Hist. li. 2*

*2. Historie.*

*Oratio. 13 Philippi.*



CHAP. XXIII.

Cæsar refused to fight vpon an aduantage offered,  
contrary to the opinion and desire of  
all men.

**H**ere was an opportunitie then offered of doing something to purpose; neither was Cæsar ignorant thereof. Such an ouerthrowe giuen before their faces, did consequentlie so discourage them, that it was thought they would not indure a charge: especially, beeing compassed about with the Cavalrie, in an indifferent and open place, where the matter was to be decided by battell. Which was on all sides instantly desired at Cæsars hands: for, the Legates, Centurions, and Tribunes of the souldiers, came ioyntly vnto him, desiring him to make no doubt of giuing battell; for, all the souldiers were very ready, and forward there-vnto: whereas the contrary partie had shewed many arguments of feare and discouragement. First, in that they did not succour their fellowes. Secondly, in as much as they had not houged from the Hill, which they had tooke for a retreat. Neither had they withstood the charge and incursion of the Cavalrie, but had thronged pell mell together, and confusedly mingled their Ensignes one with another; no man either keeping his place, or his colours. And if they had feared the inequality and disadvantage of the Place, they might haue taken some other of more indifference; for, certainly they could not long stay where they were, but must depart from thence for want of water.

Cæsar was in hope to end the matter, without either blowe or wound of his men; forasmuch as he had cut off the enemy from victuall. And why then should he lose a man, although it were to gaine a victory? Why should he suffer his valiant and well-deseruing souldiers, to be so much as hurt or wounded? Or why should he put the matter to the hazard of Fortune? especially, when it nolesse concerned the honour and reputation of a Commaunder, to vanquish an enemy by direction and aduice, then to subdue them by force of Armes: being moued, withall, with a tender commiseration of such Cittizens of Rome, as were consequently to be hazarded or slaine in the fight; where-as hee desired to worke out his owne Ends with their safety.

This opinion of Cæsars, was disallowed by most men: and the souldiers would not sticke to speake plainly amongst themselves; forasmuch as such an occasion of victorie was ouerslipped, that when Cæsar would haue the, they would not fight. Hee, notwithstanding, continued firme in his opinion; and fell a little off from the enemy, to lessen and abate their feare and amazement. Petreius and Afranius, vpon the opportunity giuen them, with-drew themselves into their Camp. Cæsar, having possessed the Hilles with guarisons of souldiers, and shut vp all the passages leading to Iberus, incamped himselfe as neere as he could to the enemy.

The

The Commanders of the aduerser partie, beeing much afflicted that they had absolutely lost all meanes of provision of victuall, and of gaining the Riuier Iberus, consulted together of other courses. There were two waies left open; the one to returne to Ilerda, and the other to Tarracon. And while they were considering of these things, it was told them, that such as went out for water, were very much pressed by our Cavalrie. Where-vpon, they placed many courts of guard, as well of horse, as Auxiliary footement, interlacing the legionary Cohorts amongst them; and began also to raise a rampier from the Campe to the watering place, that the souldiers might safely, without feare, fetch water within the boundes of their fortification. Which worke, Petreius and Afranius diuided betweene themselves; and for the perfecting of the same, had occasion to goe farre off from the Campe: by meanes of whose absence, the souldiers taking libertie of free speech one with another, went out; and as any man had an acquaintance or neighbour in each others Campe, they sought him out. And first, they all gaue thanks to all our party, that they had spared them when they were terrified and amazed the day before: in regard whereof, they acknowledged to hold their lines by their fauour: And afterwards, inquired how they might safely yeeld themselves to their Generall, complaining that they had not done it in the beginning, and so haue ioyned their forces with their ancient friends and kinsmen.

And hauing proceeded thus farre in their communication, they require assurance for the lines of Afranius and Petreius; least they should seeme to conceiue mischief against their Generalls, or betray them in seeking their owne safetie. Which things beeing agreed vpon, they promised to come with their Ensignes to Cæsars Campe; and ther-vpon, sent to Cæsar some of the Centurions of the first Orders, as Deputies to treat of peace.

In the meane time, they invited their friendes on either side into the Camps; in as much, as both their lodgings seemed but one Campe. Many of the Tribunes of the souldiers, and Centurions, came to Cæsar, recommending themselves to his fauour: and the like did the Grandes and chiefe Princes of Spaine; who they had commaunded out, to take part in this warre, and to remaine with them as hostages and Pledges. These inquired after their old acquaintances and auuncient hostes, by whom each man might haue acceffe to Cæsar with some commendation. In like manner, Afranius his sonne dealt with Cæsar, by the mediation of Sulpitius a Legate, touching his owne and his fathers life. All things sounded of ioy, and mutuall congratulation, of them that had escaped such eminent dangers: and of vs, that seemed to haue effected such great matters without bloodshed. In as much as Cæsar (in all mens iudgement) reaped great fruit of his accustomed clemencie and mildnes; and his counsell was generally approoued of all men.

Et quamvis nullo maculatus sanguine miles, quæ potuit secus se, timet. Lucan. lib. 4.

Hospiti ille ciet nomen, vocat ille propinquum: admovent hunc studiis confor puerilibus atas: nec Romanus erat qui non agnouerat iussu. Lucan. lib. 4.

THE

THE OBSERVATION.



His Chapter containeth a passage of that note and eminencie, as the like is not read in anie storie. For, if we search the recordes of all Nations, from the very birth of Bellona, vnto times of latter memorie, it will no where else appeare, that a Generall spared any advantage to purchase a victorious name, by the bloodshed and ruine of his enemies: and that contrary to the will and desire of his Armie, that had vndergon such difficulties and hazards, to giue an end to that warre. Contrary to his knowledge and late experience of the mutability and change of time and fortune. Contrary to the surest rule of warre; *Dolus an virtus, quis in hoste requirit?* And contrary to the vse of Armes, which are alwaies bent against an enemy to subdue him.

This is the fruit of that other part of Military knowledge, which men doe rather admire then attaine vnto, no lesse concerning the honour of a Commander; *Consilio, superare quam gladio*, and was a maine stepp to raise him to the Empire. For, how soeuer the souldier (to preuent further labour) stood hard for blood, not respecting that of the Comick, *Omnia prius experiri verbis, quam a mis sapientem decet*: yet if Caesar had bene so inurious to Nature, as to haue left them to their owne desires, and suffered their furie to haue violated the law of humanitie, more then was requi site for victorie; they would afterwards haue loathed themselves, and cursed their swords for such vnreasonable execution: and may be doubted, would haue reuenged it vpon his head, before the time came to strike the fatal stroke of the execution of that State. Esteeming it also a part of diuine power, to saue men by troopes, according to that of Seneca; *Hec diuina potentia est, gregatim, ac publice seruare*. And therefore, hee chose rather to displease the souldier for the present, then to lose that honour which attendeth the sparing of home-bred blood. Whereof forraine enemies are not altogether so capable.

CHAP. XXIII.

Petreyus breaketh off the Treatie, and new sweareth the Souldiers to the Partie.



Afranius, being aduertised of these passages, left the worke which hee had begonne, and with-drew himselfe into the Campe; prepared (as it seemed) to take patiently whatsoeuer should befall him. But Petreyus was no way dismayed thereat; for, hauing armed his household familie, hee went flying with them, & a Pratorian cohort of Buckler-bearers, together

together with some few stipendarie horse of the barbarous people, whom he was wont to keepe about him, as a guard to his person: and came suddainly and vnlooked for, to the Rampire; brake off the souldiers treaty; thrust our men off fro the Campe; killing such as he could apprehend. The rest got together, & affrighted at the suddainenes of the danger, wrapt their coates about their left armes, and with their swords drawne, defended themselves from the Buckler-bearers and Horsemen: and trusting to the meerenesse and propinquity of their Campe, they tooke courage and got safely thither, being protected by the Cohorts that had the guard at the Campe gates.

This being done, Petreyus went weeping about to the Maniples, calling the souldiers, and beseeching the not to leaue and forsake him, nor yet Pompey their Generall, that was absent: nor to deliuer them over to the crueltie of their aduersaries. Presently there-vpon, a great concourse of souldiers was about the Pratory, requiring that euery man might take an oath; not to abandon or betray the Army or their Generalls, nor yet to enter into priuate consultation thercof without consent of the rest. He himselfe first tooke an oath to this effect, & caused Afranius to take the same. The Tribunes of the Souldiers and Centurions, followed in order: and after them, the souldiers were brought out according to their Centuries, and were sworne the same oath.

They caused it also to be proclaimed, that whosoener had any of Caesars souldiers, should cause them to be brought out; and being brought forth, they slew them publicly before the Pratorian Pavilion: But most men concealed such as were with them, and in the night time, sent them out ouer the Rampire. Whereby it came to passe, that the terrour where-with the Generalls had affrighted the, the cruelty they had shewed in punishment, together with the vaine religion of the new oath, had taken away all hope of yielding for the present: and quite changing the souldiers mindes, had reduced the matter to the former course of warre.

Caesar, for his part, caused diligent inquiry to bee made, of such souldiers as came into his Campe during the time of the treaty, and sent them away in safety. But of the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions, many of their voluntarie accord remained with him: whom afterwards he held in great honour; and aduanced the Centurions, and such Romaine Knights as were of the better ranke, to the place and dignity of Tribunes.

The Afranians were sorely laid vnto in their forraging, and watered likewise with great difficultie. Many of the legionarie souldiers had store of Corne, being commaunded to take provision with them from Ilorda for twenty two daies: But the Buckler-bearers, and Auxiliary forces, had none at all, hauing also but small meanes to provide and furnish themselves; for which cause, a great number fledde daily to Caesar.

Iunior amplius  
tibus esse sepa-  
rat, et multo di-  
stibat sangui-  
nem pacem. Luc.

Inter mensasque  
torosque, qua  
modo complexu  
suerunt petora  
cadant. Lucan.  
lib. 4.

Hoc squidē solo  
ciuium crimine  
belli duc causa  
melioribus eris.  
Lucan. lib. 4.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**T**hat every man is the maker of his owne fortune, is evidently seene in the severall cariages of these two Generalls. For, Afranius gaue way to the souldiers treatie, and resolued to suffer whatsoever that transaction should cast vpon him. But Petreius, opposing himselfe to their desires, raised new troubles, had further designs, and another fortune. Wherein, so much as the euent of things riseth according as they are first directed, either by weake or strong resolutions; it better suiteth the temper of a souldier (howsoever the successe fall out with our desires) rather to be fittie in what he wisheth; then to make his owne easines, the ready meanes of his aduersaries happines.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**V**ertue at all times hath had this priuiledge in the difference & degrees of State and Condition, to make a Noble mans word, equall to a Common mans oath: but the integritie of former ages, had a more generall prerogative, auouching euery mans promise for the strictnesse of an oath. Hence it was, that the Romaines, vpon their inrollement for a war, gaue but their promise to the Tribune of the souldiers, to keepe such ordinances as their *Militia* required: vntill at length, that the corruption of time (falsifying the simplicitie & truth of words) did inforce them to giue an oath, as the surest bond of faith and obedience: as it is noted by Liuius at large; The souldiers (saith hee) which was neuer before that time practised, were sworne by the Tribunes, to appeare vpon summons from the Consuls, and not to depart without leaue. For, vntill then, there was nothing required of them but a solemne promise (which the horsemen made by their Decuries, and the foote troops by their Centuries) not to leaue their Colours by flight, or through feare, nor to forsake their rank, vntill they were either to assault an enemy, to take vp an offensive weapon, or to saue a Cittizen; & being at first but the offer of a free mind, was now by the Tribunes required by obligation of an oath.

The forme of this oath was diuersly varied, as appeareth by Aul. Gel. and more specially in the times of the Emperours: for, Caligula made this addition to the souldiers oath; That they should hold neither their liues nor their children, dearer vnto them then the Emperour Caius and his sisters. Concerning the respect had of this Militarie oath, that which Tully reporteth of Cato is of excellent note. \* Popilius, having charge of the Prouince of Macedonia, had (amongst other Romaine youthes) Catos son, a young souldier in his Armie; and being occasioned to dismiss a legion, discharged likewise young Cato, being one of that legion: but he, desirous to beare Armes in that war, continued still in the Armie; wherevpon, Cato writ from Rome to Popilius, requiring him, that if he suffered his sonne to remaine in that warre, hee would by any meanes sweare him againe: for, being discharged of his first oath, hee could not lawfullie fight against the Enemy.

Euer

Euer since Constatine the great, the souldiers were sworne by a Christian oath, as Vegetius noteth, to obey all things the Emperour should command them; not to leaue their warfare without licence, nor to shun death for the seruice of the Publique weale. And at this day, amongst other Nations, an oath is giuen to the souldier vpon his inrollement, to this effect; Well and lawfully to serue the King, towards all men, and against all, without exception of persons. And if they knowe any thing concerning his seruice, to reueale the same incontinentlie; not to leaue their Colours, without leaue either of the Generall, or his Lieutenant.

The auncient Romaines did charge their solemne and publique oathes, with many ceremonies: as appeareth by that form which was vsed in ratifying Treaties & Transactions; Their Heralds killed a hog, and cried out withall, that the like would happen to him that first falsified his faith.

Polybius reporteth, that he that read the oath wherby the Romans & Carthaginians sware their accord, had the haire of his head tied vp in an extraordinary manner: The parties invoking their Iupiter, to grant all prosperitie to him, that without fraud or deceit did enter into that agreement. But if (saith hee that tooke the oath) I shall either doe, or purpose otherwise; all the rest beeing safe and sound, let me alone (in the midst of the lawes and iustice of my Countrey, in my owne habitation and dwelling, and within my proper Temples and Sepulchers) perish most vnfortunatly, euen as this stone flieth out of my hand: and (as he spake those words) cast away a stone.

I doe not find the vse of a Military oath in our Nation. Howbeit, the common forme of our oath, is as ceremonious and significatiue as any other whatsoever: which may be obserued by the three parts it containeth, as I haue seene them alligorized in some Antiquities. For, first, the booke beeing alwaies a part of holie writ, implieth a renunciation of all the promises therein contained. Secondly, the touching it with our handes, inferreth the like defiance of our works, neuer to be successefull or helping vnto vs. Thirdly, the kissing of the booke, importeth a vaine mispending of our vowes and praiers, if wee falsifie any thing thereby averred.

CHAP. XXV.

The endeavour which Afranius vsed to returne to *Flerda*; but failed in his designe.



**H**EE matter beeing in this extremitie; of two meanes which were left vnto them, it was thought the readier and more expedient, to returne to *Flerda*. For, hauing left there behind the a little Corne, they hoped to take some good course for the sequell. Tarraco was further off, & thereby subiect to more casualties concerning their passage. In regard whereof, they resolued

12.

Lib. 2. cap. 5.

Lib. 3. Histo.

Cæsar.

resolved of their former course, and so dislodged themselves.

Cæsar, hauing sent his Cavalrie before, to incumber and retard the rearguard, followed after (himselfe) with the legions. The hindmost troopes of their Armie, were constrained (without any intermission of time) to fight with our horsemen. And their manner of fight was thus; Certaine expedite Cohorts, free of cariages, marched in the reare of their Army, and in open and champaine places, many of these Cohorts made a stand, to confront our Cavalrie. If they were to ascend up a Hill, the nature of the place did easily repell the danger wherewith they were threatned; forasmuch as such as went before, might easily from the higher ground, protect them that followed after: but, when they came to a valley or descent, that those that were in the former ranks, could not helpe them in the reare; the horsemen from the upper ground, did cast their weapons with great ease and facility vpon the Enemy. And then continually they were in great hazard and danger: and still as they approached neere vnto such places, they called to the legions, and willed them to make a stand with their Ensignes, and so by great force and violence, expelled our Cavalrie.

Who being retired backe, they would suddainly take a running, and get all downe into the valley. And presently againe, being to ascende into higher ground, they would there make a stand: for, they were so farre from hauing help of their owne Cavalry (whereof they had great number) that they were gladd to take them betweene their troopes, (being much affrighted with former encounters) and so to shelter and protect them: of whom, if any chanced (vpon occasion) to stray aside out of the rout the Army held, they were presently attached by Cæsars horsemen.

The fight continuing in this manner, they proceeded slowly on their way, and aduanced forward but by little and little; and oftentimes, stood still to succour and relieue their party, as then it fell out. For, hauing gone but foure miles on their way (being very hardly laide to, and much pressed by our Cavalrie) they tooke to an exceeding high hill; and there putting themselves into one front of a battell, fortified their Campe, keeping their cariages laden vpon their horses. As soone as they perceived that Cæsars Campe was sette, and that the tents were vp, and their horses put to grass; they rose suddainly about mid-day, vpon hope of some respite, by reason of our horse put out to feeding, and went on their journey.

Which Cæsar perceiuing, rose and followed after, leauing a fewe Cohorts to keepe the cariages: and about the tenth houre, commanding the forragers and horsemen to be called backe, and to follow after; instantly the Cavalrie returned, and betooke themselves to their accustomed charge.

The fight was very sharpe in the reare, insomuch as they were ready to turne their backs. Many souldiers, and some of the Centurions were slaine. Cæsars troopes preaced hard vpon them, and threatned the ouerthrowe of their whole Armie; insomuch, as they had neither meanes to chooe a fit place to incampe in, nor to proceede forward in their march. Whereby they were necessarilie informed to make a stande, and to pitch their Campe farre from any water, in an vnequall and disadvantageous place: but Cæsar forbore to meddle with them,

for

for the same reasons that haue been formerly declared: and for that day, would not suffer the souldiers to set up their Tents, that they might bee the readier to follow after, at what time soeuer by night or by day they should offer to break away.

The Enemy, hauing obserued the defect of our Campe, imploied all that night in aduancing their workes, and in casting their Camp with an opposite front to our Armie. The like they did all the next day; but so it fell out, that by how much their Campe was brought further on, and the fortification grew neerer to finishing, by so much further off they were from water: and so remedied one euil with a worse mischiefe. The first night, none of them went out of their Camp to fetch water: and the next day, they led out all their troopes together to water, but sent no man out to forrage. Whereby Cæsar, finding them oppressed with manie inconueniences, chose rather to force them to a composition, then to fight with them.

THE OBSERVATION.

**I**N this troublesome and confused retreat, which these Commaunders vnderooke, to regaine the aduantages that formerly they had quitted at Ilerda, we may obserue the difficulties attending a weaker partie, when they would free themselves from the pressures of a strong confronting enemy. For, the frailtie of humane fortune, is alwaies so yoked with incomberances, and hath so many lets from the native weaknesse of it owne indolour; that if the opposition of forraire malice, shall therewithall unhappilie concurre, to stoppe the current of our desires, there is little hope of better successe, then that which the ordinarie condition of extremitie doth afford: which is, to hazard the perill of a wound, in seeking to auoide the smart of a rodde; and to fall into Scylla, vpon a desire wee haue to shunne Charybdis, according as it befell this partie. Wherein let vs further note the aduantage which a Commander hath, either to take or leaue, when he is able to ouer-maister the Enemy in Cavalrie: for, the horsemen, seruing an Armie Roiall, by making discoueries, by forraging, by giuing rescue vpon a sudden, by doing execution, and retarding an Enemy in his march, if (ouer-awed by the Cavalry of the Enemy) they cannot performe these seruices as is requisite; the contrary partie is the stronger by so many aduantages.

*Incidit in Scyllam, cupiens vitare Charybdim.*

CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar went about to inclose the Enemy, and he to hinder Cæsar.

**H**owbeit, Cæsar laboured to inclose them about with a ditch and a rampier, to the end he might with better ease hinder their suddaine sallies and eruptions, to which he thought the Enemy would necessarily betake themselves.

Cæsar.

I 3:


The

The Enemy being straightned for want of forrage, and to the end also they might be the readier to escape away, caused all their horses of cariage to be killed: and in these workes and consultations were two daies spent. The third day, a great part of Casars workes being already perfected, the enemy (to hinder the business intended, concerning the fortifications) about two of the clocke in the afternoon, made the Alarm, brought out the legions, and imbattelled themselves under their Campe. Caesar calleth back the legions from their worke; and commaunding all his horse to troope together, putteth his Army in battell. For, hauing made such a shew of unwillingness to buckle with the enemy, against the will of the souldier and opinion of all men, he found himselfe subiect thereupon to much inconuenience: howbeit, he was resolved (for the reasons already specified) not to strike a battell; and the rather at this time, for that the space betwene his Campe and the enemies, was so little, that if he had put the to flight, it could not haue much auailed him, for the gaining of a perfect and absolute victorie. For, their Campes were not aboue 2000 foote asunder; whereof the Armies tooke up two parts, and the third was left for incursion and assault. So that if hee had giuen battell in that neereness of the Campe, they would haue found a speedy retreat vpon their ouerthrow. For which cause, hee resolved to stand vpon his defence, and not to giue the onset and charge them first.



Afranius had put his Army in a double battell: the first, consisting of fine legions; and the Auxiliary cohorts, which vsually serued in the winges, were now placed for succours, and made the second battell.


Casars Armie was ordered in a triple battell; the first was of foure cohorts, a peece of the fine legions: the second, of three; and the third againe of three of each legion, following in order. The Archers and Slingers were in the midst, & the Cavalrie on the sides. Being thus both imbattelled, they seemed to obtaine their severall ends; Caesar, not to fight vnlesse he were forced to it: and the Enemy, to hinder Casars fortification. But the matter being drawn out in length, they stood imbattelled vntill sunne setting: and then returned both into their Campes.

#### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

ntra opinionem enim militum, famamque omnium videri pralio diffugisse, magnū detrimentū afferebat, saith the historie. Whence we may obserue two points; First, that a Commander in striking a field, must partly be directed by his Armie: for, he may neither fight against the liking of the souldier, nor with-hold them frō fighting when they are willing to imbrace it, if other circumstances doe indifferentlie concurte there-withall. For, when men are cōmaunded to doe what they would doe, the matter is throughlie vndertaken; and the issue is commonlie answerable to the readines of their desires: but, being restrained in their affections, and put besides their aptness of their voluntarie disposition, there groweth such









such a contrarietie betweene the Generalls order, and the souldiers obedience, as will hardly sympathise to beget good fortune.

And if a Leader of that fame and opinion, and so well knowne to his Army as Cæsar was, grew into distaste with his souldiers, vpon so good causes which he had to shunne a battell; what hazard that Commander runneth into, who sildome or neuer gaue argument of his resolution in this kind, may be conceived by this passage. The second thing which I note, is, that a Generall must learne especiallie to disguise his intendements, by making shew of that which he meaneth not. For, albeit the more iudicious sort of men are not so well satisfied with pretences as with deedes: yet forasmuch as the condition of Princes, contrary to the manner of priuate persons, requireth such a direction of busines, as may rather sure with fame and opinion, then with particular ends; it behooueth them to vse such glosses, as may take away all petulant and sinister interpretations, howsoeuer their courses may aime at other purposes. And certainly, the generalitie of people, are better paid with apparances then with truth; according as Machauell hath obserued. But concerning Cæsar, that which Ephicrates said of himself, hauing imbattelled his Army to fight; That he feared nothing more, then that his enemy knew not his valour: may more properlie be said heere. For, there was nothing abused the Enemy more, or made them take vp so many Brauados, or vse so much delay before they came to composition, but that they knew not Cæsar. For, as the Eagle is able to mount aloft, in all seasons and temperatures of the ayre; so was his sword steeled, to make way through all resistance.

*Ceteris mortali-  
bus in eo stant  
consilia quid si-  
bi conducere pu-  
tent. Principum  
diuersa fors est,  
quibus practica-  
rum ad sanctū  
dirigenda. Ta-  
cit.*

*L' vniuersale,  
de gli huomini si  
passe, così di  
quello che paie,  
come di quello,  
che è anzi: mol-  
te volte si muo-  
uono più per le  
cose che paiono,  
che per quelle  
che sono. Lib. 1.  
Sop. Tit. Liv.  
cap. 25.  
Omnis aier A-  
quila penetrabi-  
lis.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N the next place, the manner of their imbattelling commeth to be obserued: which generally in all Editions runneth thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legio V. et III. in subsidijs locum alaria cohortibz obtinebat: Cæsaris triplex sed primam aciem quaterna cohortes ex V. legione tenebant. Has subsidiaria, terna, et rursus alia totidem suæ cuiusque legionis subsequebantur: sagittarij funditoresq; media obtinebantur acie, equitatus latera cingebat:* And needeth the helpe of some excellent Criticke, to make it haue answerable sense to the other parts of this historie. For first, how shall we vnderstand those wordes, *Acies Afraniana duplex, legio V. et III. in subsidijs*? Shall we take the meaning to be, that the first legion stood in front, and the other stood for succours behind? Or shall we take it with *Faernus*; *Acies Afraniana duplex: ex legione prima, et tertia, in subsidijs locum alaria cohortes obtinebant*? But neither by the one, or by the other, is there found more then two legions: whereas there is expresse mention of fise, besides the cohorts of the Countrey. And therefore, as not knowing other more probable, I haue translated it according to Lipsius correction, and made the text thus; *Acies erat Afraniana duplex, legionum quinque: et in subsidijs locum alaria cohortes, obtinebant.*

Their manner  
of imbattelling

*Lib. 4. de mili-  
tia Romana.*

The

The first battell consisted of five legions; and the second, of the Spanish and Auxiliarie forces. The like helpe must be sent to Caesar; for, otherwise, the text doth afford him but few cohorts: standing thus, *Primam aciem quater-na cohortes, ex quinta legione, tenebant. Has terna, et rursus alia &c.* For, undoubtedly, Caesar had five legions equall to Afranius; but, being farre inferior vnto him in Auxiliarie troopes, was driuen to a more artificiall diuision; to helpe his weakeness in that point. And therefore, as the same Critick hath mended it, we are to read, *Quater-na cohortes ex quinque legionibus*: which bringing forth this sense; In the first battell were five times foure cohorts; in the second, five times three cohorts, and as many in the third battell. And by the addition of *una cuiusque legionis*, it appeareth, that euery legion was so diuided into three parts, that it had foure cohorts in the first battell, three in the second, and three in the last.

Concerning the space which their Armies imbattelled tooke vp, it appeareth, that the whole distance betwene their Campes, contained two thousand foote; whereof either Armie tooke vp one third, beeing 666 foote, 111 paces, a little more then a furlong: but that altered more or lesse, as place and occasion required.

CHAP. XXVII.

The Treatie of Peace.



**H**HE next day, Caesar went about to finish and end the fortification which he had begun; and the Enemy, to try whether they might find a forde in the Riuer Sicoris, and so get ouer. Which beeing perceined, Caesar caried ouer the light armed Germanes, and part of the Cavalrie, and disposed them in guard along the Riuer banke. At length, beeing besieged & shut up on all sides, and hauing kept their horses without meate foure daies together, besides their extreame want of water, wood and corne, they required parlee: and that (if it might be) in some place out of the presence of the souldier. Which Caesar denied, unless it were in publique. Whereupon, Afranius his sonne was giuen in hostage to Caesar; and so they presented themselves in a place of Caesars appointing.

And in the hearing of both the Armies, Afranius spake to this effect; That he was not to be offended, neither with them nor with the souldier, for beeing faithfull and obedient to the Generall Cn. Pompeius; but now, hauing made sufficient proofe of their dutie, they had also thoroughly suffered for the same, hauing indured the extracमितie of want in all necessarie prouisions: Inasmuch as now they were shut up as women, kept from water, kept from going out, oppressed with a greater waight of griefe in bodie, and of dishonor in their reputation, then they were able to beare: and therefore did confesse themselves to be vanquished and

and ouercome: praying and beseeching, that if there were any mercie left, they might not vndergoe the extremitie of Fortune. And this hee deliuered as humbly and demissiuely as was possible.

To which, Caesar answered; That these tearmes of complaint and compassion, could be vsed to no man more vnproperly then himselfe: for, where-as euery man else did his duty; he onely, vpon fit conditions of time and place, refused to fight with them, to the end all circumstances might concurre to a peace: Albeit his Army had suffered much wrong, in the death and slaughter of their fellowes; yet he had kept and preserved such of their party as were in his power, and came of their owne accord to moue a peace. Wherein they thought, they went about to procure the safety of all their fellowes: so that the whole course of his proceeding with them, consisted of clemency. Howbeit, the Commanders themselves, abhorred the name of Peace, & had not kept the lawes either of treatie or truce: For, they had caused many simple men to be massacred and slaine, that were deceived by a shew of treaty. And therefore it had befallen them, as it happeneth for the most part to peruerse and arrogant persons, to seeke and earnestly to desire that which a little before they had foolishly contemned.

Neither would he take the aduantage of this their submission, or of any other opportunitie of time, either to augment his power, or to strengthen his partie: but he onely required, that those Armies might be discharged, which for many yeeres together had been maintained against him. For, neither were those fixe Legions for any other cause sent into Spaine, nor the souldiers inrolled there, nor so many and so great Nauies prepared, nor such experienced and skilfull Commanders selected and appointed (for none of these needed to keepe Spaine in quiet) nothing heereof was prepared for the use and behoofe of the Prouince, which (by reason of their long continuance of peace) needed not any such assistance. All these things were long agoe provided in a readinesse against him: New formes of government were made and ordained against him; That one and the same man, should be resiant at the gates of Rome, haue the whole superintendencie and direction of the Cittie business: and yet notwithstanding, hold two warlike Prouinces for so many yeeres together, being absent from both of them.

Against him, and for his ruine, were changed the ancient Rights and Customs of Magistracie, in sending men at the end of their Pretorship or Consulship, to the government of Prouinces, as was alwaies accustomed; but in lieu of them, were chosen some that were allowed & authorized by a few. Against him the prerogative of age did nothing preuaile: but, whosoever they were that in former warres had made good proofe of their valour, were now called out to command Armies. To him onely was denied, that which was granted to all other Generalls; that when they had happily brought things to an end, they might dismisse their Armie, and returne home with honour, or at the least, without dishonour.

All which things, hee notwithstanding both had and would suffer patientlie; neither did he now goe about to take their Army from them, and retaine them in pay for himselfe, which hee might easily doe: but that they should not haue means

*At nunc sola  
mili est grande  
causa saluatis  
cuius donanda  
Caesare credere  
vita.*

meanes to make head against him. And therefore, as it was said before, they should goe out of the Prouinces, and discharge their Army; if they did so, hee would hurt no man: But that was the onely and last meanes of peace.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**H**ere is not any one vertue, that can challenge a greater measure of honour, or hath more prerogatiue either amongst friends or enemies, then fidelitie. For which cause it is, that men are more strict in matters committed to their trust, for the behoofe of others, then they can well be, if the same things concerned themselves. And yet neuertheless, there is a *Quatenus* in all indeuours, and seemeth to be limited with such apparencie, as true affection may make of a good meaning: & was the ground which Afranius tooke to moue Caesar for a pardon: *Non esse aut ipsi aut militibus succensendum, quod fidei erga Imperatorem Cn. Pompeium conseruare voluerint; sed satis iam fecisse officio, satisque supplicij tulisse.* &c. which hee deliuered in a stile futing his fortune. For, as Cominæus hath obserued; Men in feare, giue reuerent and humble words: and the tongue is euer conditioned to be the chiefeft witness of our fortune.

On the other side, Caesar produced nothing for his part, but such wrongs as might seeme valuable to make good those courses which he profecuted: as first, iniuries done by them, and that in the highest degree of blame against his souldiers, that went but to seeke for peace. Iniuries done by their Generall, in such a fashion, as spared not to euert the fundamentall rights of the State, to bring him to ruine and confusion. Wherby hee was moued to indeuour that, which Nature tieth euery man vnto, *Propellere iniuriam*: and hauing brought it to these tearmes wherein it now stood, he would giue assurance to the world, by the reuenge he there tooke, that hee entered into that warre for this onelie end, that he might liue in peace: and so required no more but that the Armie should be dismissed.

## CHAP. XXVIII.

## The execution of the Articles agreed vpon.

**T**HE conditions propounded, were most acceptable & pleasing to the souldiers; as might appeare by them: for, being in the condition of vanquished persons, and there vpon expecting a hard measure of Fortune; to be rewarded with libertie, & exemption of Armes, was more then they could expect: inasmuch, as where there grew a controuersie of the time and place of their dismissal, they all generally

standing

standing vpon the rampier, signified both by their speeches and by their handes, that their desire was it might be done instantly; for, it could not bee provided by any assurance, that it would continue firme, if it were deferred vntill another time. After some dispute on each side, the matter was in the end brought to this issue; that such as had houses & possessions in Spaine, should be discharged presently, and the rest at the Riuer Varus. It was conditioned, that no man should be iniured, that no man should be forced against his wil, to be sworne under Caesars commaund.

Caesar promised to furnish the with Corne, untill they came to the riuer Varus: adding withal, that whatsoeuer any one had lost in the time of the warre, which should be found with any of his souldiers, should be restored to such as lost it, or if it were not to be had, he paid the value thereof in money. If any controuersie afterward grew amongst the souldiers, Petreius & Afranius of their owne accord brought the matter from time to time before Caesar. As, when the Souldiers grew almost into a mutiny for want of pay, the Comaunders affirming the pay day was not yet come, it was required that Caesar might understand the cause, and both parties were contented with his arbitrement.

A third part of the Army being dismissed in those two daies, hee commaunded two legions to march before their Army, and the rest to follow after, and continually to incampe themselves not farre from them: and appointed *Q. Fufius Calenus*, a Legate, to take the charge of that business. This course being taken, they marched out of Spaine to the Riuer Varus, and there dismissed the rest of their Armie.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**T**HE Riuer Varus diuideth Gallia Narbonensis, from Italie; and was thought an indifferent place to discharge the Armie, wherby there might be an end made of that warre. Vwherein if any man desire to see a parallell drawne, betweene Caesar and the other Leaders for matter of warre, it shall suffice to take the issue for a square of their directions; being drawne to this head within fortie daies after Caesar came within sight of the Enemy, as Curio noteth in his speech to the souldiers.

Cato, seeing the prosperous successe of Caesar against Pompey, said there was a great vncertaintie in the gouernment of their Gods: Alluding peraduenture to that of Plato in his Politickes, where hee saith; that there are ages, wherein the Gods doe gouerne the world in their owne persons: and there are other times, wherein they altogether neglect the same; the world taking a course quite contrarie to that which the Gods directed. But Lucan spake from a surer ground, where hee saith;

*Victrix causa Dijs placuit; sed victa Catoni.*

And thus endeth the first Commentarie.

Varus fluminis.  
Hoc pectus,  
victos ne secum  
vincere cogas.  
Luc.

Rerum ab even-  
tu, facta notan-  
da putes.  
Lib. 2. Ciuil.

# THE SECOND COMMENTA- rie of the Ciuill Warres.

( . . . )

## THE ARGVMENT.

**T**his Commentarie hath three speciall parts; The first, containing the siege of Marselleis: the strange vvorks, and extreame indeauours to take and to keepe the Towne. The second expresseth the vaine labour which Varro, Pompeies Lieutenant, vndertooke, after that Afranius and Petreius were defeated, to keepe the Prouince of Andolozia out of Cæsars power and commaund. And the third part consisteth of the expedition Curio made into Affrica; and endeth with his ouerthrowe.

## CHAP. I.

### The preparations for the siege, aswell within as without the Towne.



*W*hilst these things were dooing in Spaine, C. Trebonius the Legate, beeing left to besiege Marselleis, had begunne in two places to raise Mounts, to make Mantilets and Towres against the Towne: One, next vnto the Port where the Shippes lay, and the other, in the vvay leading from Gallia and Spaine into the townne, iust vpon the creeke of the sea, neere vnto the mouth of the Rhone. For, three parts of Marselleis are in a manner washed with the sea: and the fourth is that which giueth passage by land; whereof that part which belongeth to the Castle (by reason of the nature of the place, fortified with a deepe ditch) would require a long and difficult siege. For the perfecting of those vvorks, Trebonius had commaunded out of all the Prouince, great store of horses for cariage, and a multitude of men; requiring them to bring rods to make Hurdles, and other materials for the worke: which beeing prepared and brought together, hee raised a Mount of fourescore foote high.

Cæsar.

K.

But

But such was the provision, which of ancient time they had stored up in the towne, of all equipage and necessities for the warre, with such provision of munition and engines, that no Hurdles made of roddes or Osiers, were able to beare out the force thereof. For, out of their great Balista, they shot beames of wnelue foote long, pointed with Iron, with such force, as they would pearce through foure courses of Hurdles, and sticke in the earth. Whereby they were forced to roofo their Gallery, with timber of a foote square, and to bring matter that way by hand. To make the \* Mount, a Testudo of sixtie foote in length was alwaies caried before, for the leuellling of the ground, made of mighty strong timber, covered and armed with all things which might defend it from stones, or what else should be cast vpon it. But the greatnes of the worke, the height of the wall, together with the multitude of Engines, did retard and hinder the proceeding thereof.

Moreover, the Albici did make often sallies out of the towne, setting fire to the mounts and to the turrets; which were kept by our souldiers with great facilitie and ease, forcing such as salied out to returne with great losse.

OBSERVATIONS.

**H**aving described in the former Commentaries these Engines & workes heere mentioned, the Reader may please (for his better satisfaction) to review those places; as also further to note, that the word Artillery, was brought downe to these ages from the vse of ancient Engines, which consisted of those two primitiues, *Arcum* and *Telum*. And, according as diuersitie of Art & wit found meanes to fit these to vse and occasions, so had they severall and distinct names; whereof I find chiefly these, *Balista*, *Catapulta*, *Tolenomes*, *Scorpiones*, *Onagri*: Of each of which, there are diuers and severall sorts; as first, of the *Balista*, some were called *Centenaria*: others, *Talentaria*, according to the weight of the bullet or weapon they shot. Of the rate and proportion whereof, Vitruvius, and his learned interpreter Daniel Barbarus, haue made accurate description. Againe, some were made to shoote stones: as appeareth by that of Tacitus, *Magnitudine eximia, quartadecima legionis Balista ingentibus saxis hostilem aciem prornabat*; and others, to shoote dartes and piles of timber, headed with Iron; as is manifested by this place. Moreover, the manner of bending of these Engines made a difference, some being drawne vp with a winch or screw, and some with a wheele, some hauing long armes, and others hauing short: but the strings were generally either all of sinowes or of womens haire, as strongest & surest of any other kind. Of these, Vegetius preferreth the *Balista*, and the *Onagri*, as vnresistible when they were skilfully handled. The word *Onagri*, as Amianus Marcellinus noteth, was of a later stampe, and imposed vpon those Engines which former time called *Scorpiones*; and was taken from the nature of wilde Ases, that are said to cast stones backward with their feete at the Hunters, with such violence, that oftentimes they dashed out their braines.

In

In the time of Barbarisme, all these Engines were generally called *Mangonella*: as appeareth by Viginierus, in his Annotations vpon Onofander. Which is likewise shewed, by that which Maister Camden hath inserted in the description of Bedfordshire, concerning the siege of Bedford Castle, in the time of Henry the third, out of an Authour that was present; *Ex parte orientali fuit vna Petrarua, et duo Mangonella, quae quotidie turrum infestabant: et ex parte occidentis duo Mangonella, quae turrum veterem contriuerunt, et vnum Mangonellum ex parte Australi, &c.* But our powder hauing blowne all these out of vse, it were to no purpose to insitt longer vpon them.

And of Mangonellum, a batterer or breaker, commeth our English word Mangle.

CHAP. II.

The Marsellians prepare themselves for a Sea-fight.



**I**N the meane time, L. Nasidius beeing sent by Cn. Pompeius with a Nauie of sixteene shippes (amongst which, some serued had their beake-head of Iron) to the succour and supply of L. Domitius and the Marsellians, he passed the straights of Sicilie before Curio had intelligence thereof: and putting into Messana, by reason of the suddaine terror of the principall men, and the Senate that tooke themselves to flight, he surprised one Ship in the road and caried her away, and so held on his course to Marsellies. And, hauing sent a small Barke before, he certified Domitius and the rest, of his comming; exhorting them by all meanes, that ioyning their forces with his supplies, they would once againe giue fight to Brutus Nauie.

Cesar.

Messina.

The Marsellians, since their former ouerthrowe, had taken the like number of shippes out of their Arcenall, and new rigged and trimmed them, and with great industrie furnished and manned them for that seruice: for, they wanted neither Oare-men, Mariners, Sailers, nor Pilots, fit for that purpose. To these they added certaine Fisher-boates, and fenced them with sights and coverings, that the Oare-men might be safe from casting weapons; and these he filled with Archers and Engines. The Nauie beeing thus furnished and prepared, the Marsellians (incited and stirred up with the prayers and teares of old men, women and maides, to giue help and defence to their Cittie in time of extreame danger; and to fight with no lesse courage and confidence then formerly they had accustomed) went all aboard with great courage, as it commeth to passe through the common fault of Nature; whereby we put more confidence in things vnscene and vknowne, or otherwise are more troubled thereat: according as it then happened. For, the comming of Nasidius had filled the Cittie full of assured hope and courage: and therevpon, hauing a good wind, they left the Port, & came & found Nasidius at Taurenta (a Castle belonging to the Marsellians) & there fitted themselves for a fight; encouraging each other againe, to a valiant cariage of that seruice, and consulting how it might be best performed.

Tolous.

The right Squadron was giuen to the Marsellians, and the left to Nasidius. And to the place repaired Brutus, hauing increased the number of his Shippes: for, those sixe which he tooke from the Marsellians, he had added vnto the other which Caesar had caused to be made at Arleata, and had mended them since the last fight, and fitted them with all necessaries for men of warre. And there-vpon, exhorting his souldgers to contemne the Enemy, as a vanquished partie, hauing already foiled and ouerthrowne them when they were in their strength, they set forward against them with great assurance.

Out of the Campe of C. Trebonius, & from all those higher places they might easily perceiue and see in the Cittie, how all the youth which remained in the towne, and all the aged, with their wiues and children, did from the publike places of guard, and from the towne walles, stretch out their handes towards heauen: or otherwise runne to their Churches and Temples; and there prostrating themselves before their Images, did desire victorie of their Gods. Neither was there any of them all that did not thinke, the event of all their fortunes to consist in that daies seruice: for, the chiefest of all their able men, and the best of all sorts and degrees, were by name called out, and intreated to goe aboard, to the end if any disaster or mischance should happen, they might see nothing further to be indeauoured for their safetie; and if they ouercame, they might rest in hope to saue their Cittie, either by their owne valour or by forraigne helpe.

OBSERVATIONS.

**C**ommunis fit vitiō natura, ut inuisis, latitantibus, atque incognitis rebus, magis confidamus, vehementiusque exerceamur, ut tum accidit. In cases of hazard, things brought vnto vs by report, doe more abuse our iudgement, either in conceiuing too great hopes, or yielding too much to distrust, then any matter present can moue or inforce: for, these perturbations attending vpon our will, are enlarged more according to the qualitie of our desires, then as they are directed by discourse of reason; and so draw men either easily to belieue what their wishes doe require, or otherwise to reiect all as vterly lost.

The vncertaintie whereof, and the disappointment ensuing those deceivable apprehensions, hath brought the hope of this life into very slight account, being reckoned but as the dreame of him that is awake; and as *Pia fraus*, or a charitable delusion, to support vs through the hard chaunces of this world, and to keepe mans hart from breaking: for, euery mans helpe is hope; which neuer affordeth present reliefe, but asswageth the bitternesse of extremities, by *Dabit Deus his quoque finem*.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

The fight, and the Marsellians  
ouerthrowne.



HE fight beeing begun, the Marsellians were wanting in no point of valour: but bearing in mind such exhortation as a little before had beene giuen the by their friends, they fought so resolutely as though they meant not to fight againe; or as if any one should chauce to miscarie in that battell, he should make account that he did but anticipate for a small moment of time, the fatall end of his fellow Cittizens, who vpon taking of the towne, were to vndergoe the same fortune of warre. Our Shippes putting on by little and litle, were glad to giue way to the nimbleness and mobility of their shipping, which by the skill of their Pilots were well managed. And if it happened that our men had found meanes to grapple with any of their shippes, they presently came on all sides to their reskew. Neither did the Albici shew themselves backward when the matter came to hands, or were they inferiour to our men in courage or valour. Moreover, out of the lesser Shippes were cast infinite numbers of darts, and other weapons, wherewith our men busied in fight were suddainely wounded.

In this conflict, two of their Triremes, hauing spied Brutus shippe (which by her flagge might easily be discerned) came violently against him from two contrary parts: but the danger being foreseene, Brutus did so preuaile through the swiftnesse of his Ship, that he a little out-stript them; whereby they coming with their full swinge, did so encounter one another, that they were very much shaken with the blowe: for, the Beake-head of one beeing broken off, the water was ready to come in on all sides. Which beeing obserued by some of Brutus partie that were neere about, they set vpon them (beeing thus distressed) and quicklie sunke them both.

The Shippes that came with Nasidius, were found of no vse; for, there was not offered there vnto them, either the sight of their Countrey, or the exhortations and prayers of their kinsfolkes and allies, as motiues to hazard their lines in that quarrell: so that of them there was none wanting. Of the Ships that came out from Marsellies, five were sunke, and foure taken. One escaped with Nasidius fleet, which made towards the hither Spaine. One of them that remained, was sent before to Marsellies; who comming as a messenger before the rest, and approaching neere vnto the towne, all the multitude ran out to heare the newes: which beeing once knowne, there was such a generall mourning and desolation, as though the towne were instantly to be taken by the Enemy. Notwithstanding, they left not off to make ready such necessaries, as were requisite for defence of the same.

K 3.

ORSER-

Caesar.

## OBSERVATIONS.



His was the second fight the Marsellians made, to keep the sea open for the ayde and reliefe of the Towne; beeing otherwise straightlie besieged by land, and yet not so tenderly cared as their shutting vp by sea: the free passage whereof, brought in all their profit in time of peace, and their succours in times of warre; for which regard it was, that they commended to their gods, the successe of that enterprise, with as much deuotion, as teares, vowes and prayers could expresse.

The benefit a Towne besieged receiueth from an open inlet by sea, cannot be better manifested, then by the siege of Ostend; for, by that occasion specially, it indured the most famous siege that was in Christendome these many yeeres. This L. Nalsidius, was rather a constant friend to the cause, then a fortunate Admirall: for afterwards, he refused not to take the like ouerthrow for Pompey the sonne, at Leucades, as hee did now for the father. And surely it falleth out (whither it be through the vncertainety of sea-faring matters, or that men haue fairer pretences at sea, to auoid occasions of hazard, then are found at land; or that *Pauca digna nascuntur in Mari*, according to the proverbe, or for what other cause I knowe not) that there are few of those which fought honor in this kind, who haue attained the least part of their desires. And yet neuertheless, some there are of famous memorie: as \* Barbarussa, atour of the Leuant seas: Andreas Auria, of Genua, renowned for his great exploits vpon the Turke: together with diuers of our owne Nation; as namely, Sir Francis Drake, who for skill and fortune at sea, is held matchable with anie other whatsoeuer: Besides, M. Candish, for viages to the South, and Sir Martin Furbisher, for discoueries to the North.

Howbeit, these latter times haue aduantage without comparision of former ages, through the inuention of the Sea compass with the needle: which was not found out little more then three hundred yeres agoe, by one Flauus, borne in the kingdome of Naples; without which, no shippe can shape a course in the Ocean: and to which nothing can be added, more then to find a perfect & ready direction for longitudes.

CHAP.

## CHAP. IIII.

## The workes which the legionarie Souldiers made against the Towne.

(\* \*)



I was obserued by the legionarie souldiers, that had the charge of the right part of the work, that it would much aduantage them against the often eruptions and sallies of the Enemy, if they built a towre of Bricke vnder the towne wall, in stead of a Hold or receptacle: which at first they made lowe and little, onely for the repelling of suddaine assaults. Thither they vsually retreated: and from thence, if they were ouer-charged, they made detie foote square, and the walles thereof fine foote thicke: but afterwards (as vse and experience is the maister of all things) it was found by insight and industrie of men, that this towre might be of great vse, if it were raised to any height, and was accordingly performed in this fashion.

When it was raised to the height of a storie, they so framed the floore, that the ends of the ioystles did not yttie out beyond the sides of the towre; least any thing might be thrust out, on which the fire which the enemy should cast might take hold: and then paved that floore, with as much bricke as the Mantelers and Gabbions would suffer to bee laid. Vpon this tarras thus made, they laide crosse beames along the sides, as a foundation to an vpper storie, for the toppe and couering of the towre. And vpon these beames they raised crosse timbers, thwarting each other for the sides of the towre, and coupled them at the top with side beames.

These crosse timbers were longer, and bare further out, then the square of the towre; that there might be meanes to fasten coverings and defences, against the blowes and darts of the Enemy, whilst the workemen were finishing the walles and sides of that building. The toppe or vpper storie of this towre, they likewise paved with bricke and clay, that no fire might fasten on it; and laid Matteresses on the toppe thereof, to the end the floore might not be broken, with any weapons shot out of Engines, nor the pavement shinered in peeces with stones cast out of Catapults.

Moreover, they made three nettings, or mats of Flawscrs, equall in length to the sides of the towre, and foure foote in breadth. And vpon those three sides which confronted the Enemy, they fastened them vpon poles to hang before the towre: which kind of defence they had in other places tried to be of prooffe, & not to be pearced with any weapon or engine. And as one part of the towre came to be couered, finished, and fortified, against any violence of the enemy, they carried their

Caesar.



their Mantelets and defences to the rest vnfinisht. The top of which towre, they framed vpon the first storie, and then raised it vp with wrinches or scres, as farre as the close netting would serue them for a defence. And so covered with these shelters and safeguards, they built vp the sides with bricke; and then againe scrwing vp the toppes higher, they fitted the place to build the sides higher: and as they came to the height of a story, they laid the ioyles of the floore in such sort, as the ends thereof were hid and covered with the wall or sides that were of bricke, and so from that story, they proceeded to another, by scrwing vp the top, and raising their netting. By which meanes, they built very safely sixe stories, without any wound or other danger at all; and left windowes and loopeholes in the sides, for the putting out of Engines in such places as they thought conuenient. When by means of that towre, they were in hope to defend the works neere about it, they then made a Musculum or mouse of sixtie foote in length, & of two foote timber square, to conuay them safely from this towre of Bricke, to another of the Enemies, and to the towne wall: wher of this was the forme; They cut two side ground sils of equall length, and made the space betweene them to containe foure foote; vpon them they erected little columnes of fine foote high, and ioyned them together, putting braces in an easie sloping in such distiances, and rafterers were to be placed to beare vp the rooffe: and vpon those braces they laid rafters of two foote square, fastening them both at the ridge, and at the euings, with plates and bolts of Iron. They lathed the rooffe with lath of foure fingers broad; and so the building beeing made with a gable ridge handsomly fashioned, the top was laid all ower with clay, to keepe the Mouse from burning; and then covered with tiles, which were fenced with leather, to the end they might not be washed away with pipes or gutters of water, which might bee laid to fall vpon them. And least those hides should be spoiled, either with fire or great stones, they laid Matteresses vpon them.

This worke being whollie finished neere vnto the towre, through the help and meanes of defensive mantelets and gabions; suddenly before the enemy was aware, with a shippe-engine and rollers put vnder it, they brought it so neere a towre of the enemies, that it ioyned to the vvall thereof. The townesmen, beeing vpon a suddaine appalled thereat, brought the greatest stones they could get, and with leauers, tumbled them doune from the vvall vpon the mouse; but the strength of the vvorke did not shrinke at the blowes, and whatsoeuer fell vpon it, slid downe the sloping of the rooffe. Which when they perceived, they altered their purpose, and got pots of Rosin and Pitch, and setting them on fire, threw them downe vpon the Mouse; which tumbling downe from the rooffe, were remooued away with long hookes and poles. In the meane time, the souldiers that were within the Mouse, pulled out the lower stones that were in the foundation of the towre. This Mouse or Mantilet, was defended by our men out of the bricke towre, with vveapons and engines: and by meanes thereof, the Enemy was put from the vvall and the turrets, so that they could not well defend the same. Many of the stones beeing sapped out of the foundation of the towre, part thereof suddenly fell, & the rest leaned, as though it would not stand long after.

O B.

OBSERVATIONS.

**H**Orasmuch as it requireth the labour of an industrious penne to shadow out the effects of Industrie; I will onely produce the euidence of these workes, to shew the power it hath in humane actions, rather then by any maimed or shallow discourse, weaken the force of so great an Engine. VVherein, first it may be noted, how in these and the like attempting indeauours, one thing drawes on another, according as practise maketh ouerture to maisteries: For, our vnderstanding growing by degrees, hath no intuitive facultie to discern perfection, but by little and little worketh our exactness; making every Morrow, yelterdaies scholler, as reason findeth meanes of discourse from causes to effects, or from effects to causes.

And so this Towre, made at first but for a retreat of defence, gaue occasion to let them see the like, or better vse thereof in the offensive part, if it were raised to a height conuenient for the same: vvhich they performed with as much Art as the wit of man could vse in such a worke. For, hauing made the first storie, they then made the rooffe, for the shelter and safetie of the souldier: and scrwing it vp by little and little, they built the sides, hauing fenced the open space with netting, for auoiding of danger; arming it with bricke and clay against fire, and with Matteresses against stones and waights. And then againe they proceeded to the making of that Mantilet or Musculum, which gaue them passage to the wall; building it with strong or rather strange timber, of two foote square, framed so artificially with braces, and ridging rafters, and those so fitted, as neither fire, water, weapon, nor weight, could preuaile against it. And thus they laboured to gaine their owne ends, and bought Fortune with immeasurable indeauour.

CHAP. V.

The Marsellians got a truce of the Romaines, and brake it deceitfully.



**H**E Enemy, beeing then much appalled at the suddaine ruine and fall of the towre, and greatly perplexed at so vnexpected a mischiefe; and withall, strooke with a feare of the wrath and indignation of the Gods, and of the sack & spoile of their Cittie, they came all vnarmed, thronging out of the gates, wearing holy attire vpon their heads, and stretching out their submissiue hands to the Legates and the Armie. Vpon which noueltie, all hostilitie ceased for the time, & the souldiers with drawing themselves from the assault, were caried with a desire of hearing and vnderstanding what would passe at that time.

Cæsar.

Inermes cum insulis.

When

## Obseruations vpon the second

When they came to the Legates to the Army, they cast themselves all downe at their feete, praying and beseeching that things might be suspended vntill Casars arriual. They saw plainly that their towne was already taken, their works were perished, their owne towre demolished; and therefore they desisted from making any further defence: there could be no let to hinder them from present spoile and sacking, if vpon Casars arriual they should refuse to obey his Mandates. They shewed further, that if their towre were absolutely ouerthrowne, the souldiers could not be kept from entering the towne in hope of pillage, and would thereby bring it to a final destruction.

These, and many the like things, were uttered by them very moouingly (as men learned and eloquent) with great lamentation and much weeping: where-by the Legates (mooued with commiseration) with-drew the souldiers from the fortifications, put off the assault, and left a small guard to keepe the works. A kind of truce beeing through pittie and commiseration thus made and concluded, Casars coming was expected; no weapon was cast, either from the towne wall, or from our side: in so much, as euery man left off his care and diligence, as though all had been ended. For, Casar had by Letters giuen straight charge to Trebonius, not to suffer the towne to bee taken by assault, least the souldiers (mooued through their rebellion and contempt, together with the long trauell they had sustained) should put all aboute foueteene yeeres of age to the sword: which they threatned to doe, and were then hardly kept from breaking into the towne; taking the matter very grieuously, that Trebonius seemed to hinder them from effecting their purposes. But the enemy, beeing people without faith, did onelie watch for time and opportunity, to put in practice their fraude and deceit.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**T is a saying of an ancient Writer, that As our attire doth couer the bodie, so it doth vncouer the nakednes of the mind. Wherevpon it is, that men haue found meanes to sute themselves vpon occasion, according to the disposition of their inward affections, as they are either dilated with ioy, or contracted with sorrow, lifted vp with weale, or huddled with affliction. And accordingly, these Marcellians, in token of their humilitie & submission, came out, wearing an attire here called *Insula*; which Seruius describeth to be a kind of Coife, made after the forme of a Diademe, with two pendants on each side, called *Vitta*.

Those which the Romans vsed of this kind, were fashioned like a Pyramid: the point whereof, did signifie the \* Elements, ascending vpwards in such a pointed fashion; and by the two pendants or bands, were denoted the Water and the Earth; beeing made whollie of wooll, as Festus writeth; *Insula sunt filamenta lanae, quibus Sacerdotes, hostiae, et templa velabantur*: to shew humblenesse and simplicitie, wherof wooll is a Hieroglyphick. For, no kind of beasts haue more need of ayde and succour then Sheepe: and there-vpon it was, that all Suppliants were attired with tresses of wooll. Or otherwise, as some will haue

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haue it, That the habit of the Petitioner, might call to remembrance the flexible disposition, which is well-beseeming those that haue power and meanes to giue helpe and reliefe: According to the vse of Heathen ages; wherin their Images of their Idols, had their feete tied with cordes of wooll: to shew the mildnes and easines which vpon deuote supplications was founde in diuine Powers; whereof wooll was a *Symbolum*.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



HE Marcellians, beeing an ancient progeny of the Greekes, notwithstanding the long descent of time, and alteration of aire, did keepe a touch of the naturall of that Nation, as well in such straines of eloquence, as were familiar vnto them about other people, as in subtiltie and duplicities of dealing. Which passage of the Marcellians, is obserued by Tully, as a matter enforcing the due praises of Eloquence, and the vse it hath vpon all occasions to draw consent, with the sweetnes of a well tuned tongue, about that which may be attained either by Engines or a strong hand. VVherein, if we should goe about to compare the force of Armes, with the power of a graue discourse, & set a souldier Parallel to an Orator, there might hence be taken diuers probable reasons, to second that saying, which hath been thought to saour more of vaine-glorie, then of true iudgement; *Cedant arma togæ, concedat laurea linguae*: Or at least, to make a resemblance of Plutarchs two VVratlers, of whom one beeing alwaies cast, did neuerthelesse perswade the other that he cast him; and so, howsoeuer he became foiled, yet left the place with an opinion of victorie: And is alwaies more easily effected, when it is attended with cunning and deceit, according to that of Valerius Maximus; *Efficacissima vires perfidia, mentiri et fallere*. But, as it is obserued by Philip de Commines, The example of one sole accident, is sufficient to make manie men wise: so this may serue to teach succeeding times, not to trust to words, whereof there is no hold; but to ratifie such compositions with irrenocable performances.

## THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Hirdly, we may note, how farte the anger of a Romaine Armie was extended, vpon such prouocations as are heere mentioned, viz. *Ad interficiendos pueros*, to the slaying of all the males about foueteene yeeres of age; for, from that stage of life, they accounted all in the ranke of men: According to the institution of Tarquinius Priscus; who in his triumph of the Sabines, made a speciall Oration in the praise of his owne son, that had assaulted and strooke the Enemy in those warres, beeing then but 14 yeeres of age: and ther-vpon, gaue him libertie to weare mans apparrell; which was that *Toga pretexta* (edged or faced with Purple) whereof their histories make so often mention.

But

Macrobi. lib. 1.  
Saturnal. ca. 8.

Græca fide omnia agere.  
Oratio pro Flacco.

Aequalis est virtutisque dignitas, iusti preces, necessestas, omnis conditio nobilitate efficiat. Tum cum in praesentibus, quæ presentia magis exigunt, sunt Valens: et Valens statuerunt L. in ciuilibus L. C. de officio. Picar. Et in ciuilibus causis vicarij comitis: multum antequam, in multibus negotijs, comitis vicarij. Enlos casus raris vni solo exspecta. Antea. Peret.

Macrobi. lib. 1.  
Saturn. cap. 6.

## Observations vpon the second

But to define precisely heereof, were to mistake the furie of the souldier: for, howsoever the rule is certaine from the law of Nature, that no finite cause can be infinite in effect, or that a mortal hate should haue a boundlesse reuengeryet occasion made it variable, and as irregular as that of Alexander: who sometimes saued all, & at other times (as at the taking of Tyre) saued none at all, but such as had taken the protection of the Temple. The inhumane crueltie of the Turkes, exceedeth all former hostilitie in this kind; for, they neuer saueanie out of commiseration, but for priuate vse: and doe rather chule to destroy mankind, then suffer it to liue for any other purpose then their owne.

### CHAP. VI.

*The Marfellians, taking aduantage of the Truce, consumed with fire all the Romaine workes: which were afterwards reedified.*



After a few daies, when our men were growne remiss & carelessse, suddainly about high noone, as some were gone one way some another, and others wearied with continuall labour, had giuen themselves to rest, the weapons beinge cased and laid up; they rushed out of their gates, & comming with the wind that then blew hard, they set our workes on fire: which was so caried and disperfed with the wind, that the Mount, the Mantilets, the Telsudo, the Towre and the Engines, were all on fire at once, and were burned downe and consumed before it could be knowne how it came.

Our men, astonished at so suddaine and vnthought-of an accident, caught vp such weapons as were next at hand, and others, running speedily fro the Camp, set vpon the Enemy, but were hindered from following them as they fledde, by Engines and Arrowes from the towne wall. They, on the other side, beinge retired vnder the protection of the wall, did at their ease burne downe the Mount and the brick towre: and so, many moneths labour, was through the perfidiousnesse of the Enemy, and the force of the tempest, consumed & brought to nothing in a moment of time. The Marfellians attempted the like the next day after, havinge opportunitie of the like tempest; and with greater confidence sallied out, & threw much fire vpon the other mount and the towre. But as our men the day before (expecting nothing lesse then to be surprised in that sort) had neglected more then ordinary their vsuall guards, beinge now made wiser by that which had happened, they had made all things ready for defence: by which means, hauing slain a great number, they draue the rest backe into the towne, without effecting any thing.

Trebonius beganne againe to reedifie such workes as were ruinated and consumed with fire, and that with greater alacritie of the souldier then before.

For,

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For, when they saw their great labours and indeanours sort to no better success, beinge ruined by the treacherie of the Enemy, it was a great gall vnto them to haue their valour thus derided. And, forasmuch as there was nothing left in all the Countrey for the raising of a Mount, all the trees beinge already cut downe, and brought farre and neere to make the first Mount, they beganne a Mount of a strange and vheard-of fashion, raised with two side-vallies of bricke, beinge sixe foote thicke apeece, and ioyned together with floores. The valls were of equall distance, to the latitude of the former Mount, which was all of solide matter: and where the space betweene the valls, or the weaknesse of the work did require it, there were piles driuen betweene, and beames and planks laid athwart for the strengthening thereof. The floores, made betweene those valls, were laid with hurdles, and the Hurdles were covered with clay.

The souldiers beinge thus sheltered, on both sides with a wall, and defended in front by Mantilets and Gabions, did safely, without danger, bring whatsoeuer was necessary for that building; wherby the worke was caried on with great speed: and the losse of their former continuall labour, was in a short time recovered againe, through the admirable dexterity and valour of the souldier. To conclude, they left gates in the valls, in such places as were fittest for sallies.

When the enemy perceiued, that what they hoped could not be repaired againe in a long time, was with a few daies labour, reedified & finished (wherby there was no place left to practise deceit, or to sallie out with aduantage; neither was there any means left by which they could preuaile, either by force of Armes, or by fire to consume our workes; and understanding likewise, that by the same manner of fortification, all that part of the towne, which had passage and acesse from the firme land, might be encompassed with a vvall and with towres; that their souldiers should not be able to stand vpon their workes; and perceiuing withall, that our Army had raised a countermure, against the wall of their towne; and that weapons might be cast by hand vnto them; that the vse of their Engines (wherewith they much trusted) was by the neereness of space quite taken away; and lastlie, that they were not able to confront our men (vpon equall teames) from their valls, and from their turrets, they descended to the same Articles of rendry and submission, as were formerly agreed vpon.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Ence wee may obserue, that a Generall cannot bee too secure of an Enemy, that standes vpon teames to render vp a place. For, the action beinge but voluntarily by constraint; if happen the constraining force be remooued, then that doth cease which is voluntarie: and so it commeth by consequent to a retuall. As appeareth by this passage of the Marfellians; who beinge brought into hard teames, as well by their two ouer-throws at Sea (whence they

L.

extracted

Est ita natura  
et arabit, ut co-  
munes mley?  
supra quam dici  
possit, sciant, si  
vident vnu e-  
vntas virtuti  
non respondet.  
Paul. in esse.

## Obsurations vpon the second

expected no further succour) as also by the siege laid so close by land (where they were so violently assaulted, that their towers of defence made passage for the Romaines to enter vpon them) did neuertheless (vpon cessation of those forcements) alter their purpose, and entertained new hopes: which maketh good that saying, *Timeo Danaos et dona ferentes.*

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**S**Econdly, we may obserue, that a will, forward to vndergoe labour, doth neuer stick at any difficultie, nor is at all dismayed with the losse of anie paines: but is rather redoubled in courage and industrie; especially beeing edged on with a desire of reuenge. Which (if Homer may haue credit) doth alwaies adde a third part to a mans strength; as appeared by Diomedes, beeing hurt in the shoulder with one of Pindarus arrows: for reuenge whereof, hee exceeded himselfe in a *sesquiterce* proportion of valour, and slew more Troianes by a third part then otherwise he could.

Howsoeuer, as there is nothing so hard, but is subiect to the endeavour of the minde: so there is nothing so easie, as to dispossess our selues of that intent care, which is requisite in these imployments. For, these Romaines, that through the greatnes of their spirits had made such first and second workes, as the memorie thereof will last with the world, were surprisid when they lay in the *Interim*, as it were vnbeent, in as great remissnes and neglect (how-soeuer drawne vnto it by deceit) as if they had beene able to doe no such matter as is here reported. And therefore it behooueth a Commaunder, to keepe his Armie alwaies seasoned with labour; forasmuch as *Exercitus labore proficit, otio confenescit.*

### CHAP. VII.

Varro raiseth great troopes, to maintaine Pompeis partie in Spaine; but, to no purpose.



**M**arcus Varro, in the further Prouince of Spaine, hauing from the beginning vnderstood how things had passed in Italie, & distrusting how matters would succeed with Pompey, did oftentimes giue out very friendly speeches of Caesar; that Pompey had by way of preuention gained him to his party, & honoured him with a Lieutenantie, whereby hee was obliged in dutie to him: Howbeit, in his particular disposition, he stood no less affected to Caesar; neither was he ignorant of the duty of a Legat, to whose trust and fidelitie, the gouernement of the Prouince was left, as in depositio,

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vpon condition to be rendered up at all times and seasons, as hee that commaunded in chiefe should require it: He likewise knew very well what his owne forces were, and what was the affection and disposition of all the Countrey towards Caesar.

This was the subiect of all his speeches, without any shew of inclining either to the one or to the other. But afterwards, when he heard that Caesar was ingaged at Marselleis, that Petreius forces were ioyned with Afranius Armie, that great aides were come vnto them, that euery man was in great hope and expectation of good successe; and that all the hither Prouince had agreed together, to undertake Pompeis cause, as also what had after happened concerning the want of victuals at Ilerda (all which things were writ, with aduantage, vnto him by Afranius) he then vpon that alteration changed his mind according to the times, and leuied souldiers in all parts of the Prouince: and hauing raised two compleat legions, he added vnto them some thirty cohorts of the Countrey souldiers, to serue for wings to the Army; gathered together great quantity of Corne, as well for the supplie of the Marsellians, as for the prouision of Petreius and Afranius.

Moreouer, he commaunded them of Gades to build and provide tenne Gallies; and ordered further, that many other should be made at Hispalis. Hee tooke all the money and the ornaments out of Hercules temple, and brought the same into the towne of Gades, and in lieu thereof sent sixe Cohorts out of the Prouince to keepe the temple. He made Gaius Gallonius (a Romaine Knight and a familiar friend of Domitius, and sent by him thither to recouer some matter of inheritance) Governour of the towne. All the Armes (as well priuate as publique) were brought into Gallions house. He himselfe made many bitter inuectiues against Caesar; affirming, that a great number of the souldiers were revolted from him, and were come to Afranius: which hee knew to be true, by certaine and approoued Messengers.

The Romaine Cittizens, residing in that Prouince, beeing much perplexed & affrighted thereat, were therevpon constrained to promise him 190 thousand Sesterces in ready money, for the service of the Common-weale, besides twentie thousand waight of siluer, together with one hundred and twentie thousand bushels of Wheate. Vpon those Citties and States which fauoured Caesars partie, he laid greater impositions: for, such as had let fallen speeches, or declared themselves against the Common-weale, he confiscated all their goods, and put a Garrison vpon them; giuing iudgement himselfe vpon priuate persons, & constraining all the Prouince, to sweare allegiance to him and to Pompey.

And beeing in the end aduertised what had happened in the hither Prouince, he prepared for warre, with a purpose to dispose thereof in this manner: His resolution was to keepe two legions with him at Gades, with all the shipping and the Corne: for, knowing that the whole Prouince did intirely affect Caesars Cause, he thought it best for him (hauing made good prouision of shipping and Corne) to keepe the island.

L 2.

THE

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**B**lerue first, how dangerous it is, for such as stand newtrall between two parties (bearing no affection but to their owne ends) to declare themselves, vpon such apparances as commonly happen in the flux and reflux of a warre: for, if their iudgement faile as Varro did, they are then forced to redeeme their error, with more offices of partialitie then can afterwards be excused; and so runne into a further degree of enmitie, then the party for whom they suffer. And certainly, whether it bee that newtrallitie refuseth to take part with the right (which in matter of controuersie must needs stand on one side) or whether it fauoureth of an ill nature, to shew no sympathising affections, with such as otherwise haue correspondence with them; or for what other cause I knowe not: but sure it is, that Newtralls, attending nothing but their owne aduantage, are of no better esteeme, then the bird whereof Leo Africus writeth; which when the King of Birds demaunded tribute, would alwaies ranke himselfe amongst the Fish: and when the King of Fishes required his seruice, would alwaies be with the Birds. Or then the Weather-cock, whereof there is no other vse then *Indicare regnantem*.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE Island of Gades, was knowne to the Romaines by the name of Tartessus;

*Hic Gadis vrbs est dicta Tartessus prius.*

The towne of Gades was indowed, as Dion witnesseth, by Iulius Cæsar, with the liberties and priuiledges of Rome. To which effect Plinie writeth; *Oppidum habet Ciuium Romanoru, quod appellatur Augusta vrbs Iulia Gaditana*. It was a towne of great fame: as appeareth by that of Iuba, king of Mauritania, who made ambitious sute, to haue the title of *Duumviri*, or Two-men of the towne; as Fessius noteth, in his Description of the Sea-coast.

*At vis in illis tanta, vel tantum decus  
Aetate prisca, sub siderum fuit:  
Rex ut superbus omniumque prapotens  
Quos gens habebat forticium Maurusia,  
Octauiano principi acceptissimus  
Et literarum semper in studio Iuba,  
Interfluoque separatus Aequore  
Illustriorem semet, vrbs istius  
Duumviratu crederet.*

In

In this Island stood Hercules temple; to which, as well Romaines, as other noble Aduenturers of all Nations, made often repaire, to performe their vowes vpon atchieuements of deedes of Armes: which solemnitie was not omitted by Hanniball, before his expedition into Italie.

Amongst other Altars in this Temple, there was one dedicated to Penurie and Art; signifying that Art driueth away Penurie, as Hercules put to flight & subdued Monsters. Those of Asia, and the Mediterrane parts, tooke this Island to be the furehest end of navigation: for, the Atlantick sea admitted no further passage, for want of a load-stone to direct them in that vastness. And therefore Pindarus saith, That it is not lawfull for wife men nor fooles, to know what is beyond the straight of Gebraltar, the way in the Ocean beeing 1000 leagues broad. In this towne of Gades, was borne L. Cornelius Balbus, who at his death gaue a legacie to the Romaine people, 25 pence *per Pole*; together with Iunius Brutus Columella, that writ so excellently *De re Rustica*.

*Et mea quam generat Tartessi litore Gades.*

It is now called Cales Males, and was sacked by our English, 1596.

Hispalis, surnamed Romulensis, from the Romaine Colonie that was planted there, is seated vpon the Riuer Beatis, in a very pleasant and fertile Countrey, and especially for oyles. The towne is now the Staple for the West Indies, and a very Nurserie of Marchants. Arias Montanus, that great Theologian, was borne in this Cittie.

Josephus Aco-  
sta hath ob-  
serued, that the  
sea hath no  
part about one  
thousand lea-  
gues from the  
land.

Hispalis.  
Senill.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**C**oncerning these CXC thousand Sesterces, the learned cannot satisfie themselves with any congruent interpretation thereof. For, if we take them in the Newter, for vij pound x shillings apiece, it amounteth to 1492000 pound, which is thought too much: if in the Masculine, it will rise not to about 1400 pound, which is deemed too little. And therefore the Criticks do mend the place, and read *H-S centies nonagies*, which bringeth out 142500 pound: and is thought agreeable to the meaning of the Authour.

CHAP. VIII.

The Prouince and the legions reuolt from Varro.  
*Cæsar settlenth Spaine, and returneth  
to Marcellies.*



*Lbeit Cæsar was called backe into Italie for many great and important causes, yet he was resolved to leaue no sparke or appearance of warre remaining behind him in Spaine; for that he knew Pompeis deserts to bee such, as had gained him many followers and dependants in the hither Prouince. And therefore hauing sent two legions into the further Spaine, vnder the*

Cæsar.

conduct of *Q. Cassius*, Tribune of the people, he himselfe made forward by great journeys, with sixe hundred horse; sending an Edict before him, to summon the Magistrates, and chiefe men of the Citties and Townes, to appeare before him by a day at Corduba. Vpon publication of which Edict, there was no Cittie in all that Prouince, that sent not some of their Senate by the day appointed, to Corduba: Neither was there any Romaine Cittizen of note, that presented not himselfe there at that time.

The Princes and States beeing assembled, of their owne accord they shut the gates against Varro, set watch and ward vpon the walls and in the towres, and retained with them two cohorts, called by the name of *Colonica* (which came thither by chance) for the safe keeping of the towne. At the selfe same time, the Inhabitants of *Carmona* (which is the strongest towne of all the Prouince) cast out the Cohorts that were by Varro put into their Citadell, and shut them out of their towne. Whereby, Varro was the rather moued to make haste to Gades with his legions, least hee should bee hindered and cut off, either in the way, or in his passage ouer from the Continent: such and so fauourable was the generall affection of the whole Prouince towards Caesar. And being some-what aduanced on his journey, he received Letters from Gades, that as soone as it was knowne there of the Edict which Caesar had published, the chiefe of the Gaditans agreed with the Tribunes of the souldiers, which were in *Guarizon*, to expell Gallion out of the towne, and to keepe the Cittie and the Island for Caesar. Which beeing resolved vpon, they sent him word to leaue the towne of his owne accord, while hee might doe it without danger; and if he refused, they would then take such further order as they should find expedient. Gallionius, moued with feare, dislodged himselfe and went out of Gades.

These things beeing diuulged abroad, one of the two legions, knowne by the name of *Vernacula*, tooke vp their Ensignes, went out of Varros Campe (he himselfe standing by and looking on) and retired themselues to *Hispalis*; and there sate downe in the Market-place, and in common porches, without hurting anie man. Which the Romaine Cittizens, there assembled, did so well like of, that euery man was very desirous to entertaine them in their houses. Whereat Varro, beeing much astonished, altered his iourney, towards *Ilipa Italica*, as hee gaue it out; but soone after was aduertised by some of his friends, that the gates were shut against him. Wherevpon, being circumsented and fore-closed from all other addresses, he sent to Caesar, to aduertise him that he was ready to deliuer up the legion, to whomsoever he should please to appoint. To which purpose, he sent him *Sex. Caesar*, commanding the legion to be deliuered to him.

Varro, hauing giuen up his charge, came to Caesar at Corduba, & there gaue him a true account of the cariage of his office. The monies remaining in his hands he deliuered up, and gaue an Inuentory of the Corne and shipping which were in any place provided. Caesar, by a publique Oration made at Corduba, gaue thanks generally to all men; as first, to the Romaine Cittizens, for the indeauour they vsed to be Maisters of the towne. Secondly, to the Spaniards, for druing out the *Guarizons*: to them of Gades, that they trauesed and prevented the projects of the aduersaries; & had restored the selues to libertie; to the Tribunes of the souldiers,

diers, & Centurions, that were come thither to keepe the towne, for that by their valour & magnanimity, the resolution of the townsmen was assured and confirmed. He remitted such leuies of money, as the Romaine Cittizens had promised Varro for the publique seruice. He restored the goods confiscated, of such as had spoken more freely then was pleasing; and gaue diuers rewards, both publique and private: the rest he satisfied with hope of good time for the future. And hauing staid there two daies, he went to Gades: where he gaue order that the monies and monuments, which were transferred fro *Hercules temple* to a private house, should be caried backe againe to the Temple. Hee made *Q. Cassius* Governor of the Prouince, & left with him foure legions. He himselfe, in a few daies (space, with those ships which *M. Varro*, and those of Gades (by his commaundement) had made, came to Tarraco; for, there the Embassadors of almost all the hither Prouince, did attend his comming: and hauing receiued them with priuate and publique honour, in the same fashion as formerly hee had vsed, hee left Tarraco, and came by land to Narbone, and from thence to *Marfellies*: where he receiued first aduertisement of the law made at Rome, for creating of a Dictator; and that himselfe was named thereunto, by *M. Lepidus*, Prator.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**T is one of Caesars peculiars, recorded by Suetonius, that hee neuer left behind him any sparke or suspicion of waite, least it might be said hee did not thoroughly conquer where hee came. For, hee that doth a busines to halie, hath as much more to doe before it bee done: and the remainder in matter of warre, groweth commonly to a greater head then that which first gaue occasion of Armes; like fire, which is smothered for a time, to breake out afterwards with greater furie. And therefore, that he might not be thought to prouoke an Enemy rather then subdue him, hee neglected all occasions how important soeuer, which might draw him into Italie; to the end he might settle Spaine in a peace, answerable to an absolute victorie: Which he easily effected, hauing ouer-maistered the chiefe of the party, and turned their troopes out of the Countrey, as men altogether mistaken in the matter. The same whereoffo preuailed with the rest, that rather then they would stand out, they forooke their Commanders. And hauing thus remoued all occasions of force, hee then proceeded to take away all doubtfulness, which might accompanie a new reconciliation, by shewing such respects as well becomed ancient desert.

For, first, he made a publique acknowledgement of their generall loue and affection towards him; and then taking notice of particular seruices, ingaged them further, with honours and rewards; righted such as were oppressed by the aduersie partie; remitted all leuies and taxations (to shew the difference betwene his and the Enemies fauour) & filled all men with hope of good times; as knowing that faire words, accompanied with large promises, are powerfull instruments to work out whatsoever is desired. And so hee tooke a little more

time to fettle thofe Prouinces without further trouble: as believing in the pro-  
uerbe; that, What is well done, is twice done.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**M** Varro heere mentioned, made more profefion of knowledge  
and Artes, then any other of his Nation, beeing thereupon ftiled  
by the name of *Doctus*; & yet in the iudgement of learned Phi-  
lofophers, was fitter to perfwade then to teach. Tully, beeing  
deprived of publique offices, handled Philofophy a little in his  
owne language: Pliny and Seneca, leffe then Varro or Tully. But what are  
theſe to Aristotle or Plato? Or rather, what hath learning to doe with a Ro-  
maine Generall? whoſe knowledge conſiſted in their Militarie difcipline, and  
in the powerfull meanes of victorious indeauour. Wherein Varro was as ig-  
norant, as was Don Raymundus, the eleventh King of Arragon, in managing  
of Armes; who taking his ſword in one hand, and his buckler in the other, held  
the horſe bridle in his teeth. Howbeit, if *Qui minus facit, minus peccat* were  
a good excuſe, it were fitting to make him blameleſſe, that deſerued fo well of  
learning aboue all others of that Empire. But forasmuch as his actions ap-  
peare fo farre inferiour to that which is conceiued of his vnderſtanding, let  
that be acknowledged which is true, that *Consideratè agere plarè eſt, quam co-  
gitare prudentè*.

This Ilipa Italica, was the chiefe towne of the Turditani in Andolozia; and  
is coniectured by the ruines yet remaining, to ſtand ouer againſt Seuill.

Tarraco is that which is now called Arragon, a Colony of Scipio his plan-  
ting, whereof the Prouince taketh appellation; which is extended (as Plinie  
wittneſſeth) from Catalonia to Nauarre, and Caſtile, along the Alpes. Blaſe  
de Vigenere reporteth, that in the yeere 516, there was a Councell held at Tar-  
raco, by tenne Biſhops; wherein it was decreed, that Sunday ſhould alwaies  
beeing preſentlie after Euening prayer (or their Veſpers) on the Saturday.  
From whence it is, that the Spaniards doe not worke at all after that time, and  
deceate vpon Saturdaies at ſupper, the head, the feet and the entralls of ſuch  
fleſh as is killed in the Shambles (together with other prettie bits which they  
call *Morſillus*) without prohibition or ſcruple of conſcience. In this towne of  
Tarraco, was borne Paulus Oforius, that noble Orator.

Corduba, otherwiſe called Colonia Patricia, was held the next of worth &  
dignitie to Seuill, but for excellent wits, to be preferred aboue all the townes  
of Spaine; for, heere firſt were borne the two Senecas, the father the Rhetori-  
cian, and the ſonne the Philoſopher: together with their kinsman, Annaus  
Lucanus, the diuine Poet, of whom Martiall writeth;

*Duoſque Senecas unicũque Lucanũ  
Facunda loquitur Corduba.*

Befides, of later times, Auenzoar, Auicenna, and Auerrois, as excellent  
a Philoſopher, as the other was a Phyſitian: of whoſe workes

Fama

*Fama loquetur Anus.*

And from hence come thofe Cordouan ſkinnes, ſo much in requeſt.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**C** Concerning the office of a Dictator, whereunto Cæſar was named  
by the Prætor Lepidus, we are to obſerue, that the Dictatorſhippe  
was the greateſt place of dignitie in their gouernment, as Polibius  
noteth. The Conſuls, ſaith hee, hauing each of them but twelue  
Liſtors apeece, that caried bundles of Rods before them, as enſignes of Magi-  
ſtracie, the Dictator had alwaies 24; to ſhew that the ſoueraigne power diuided  
betweene the two Conſuls, was then reduced to one ſole command. The oc-  
caſions of eſtabliſhing a Dictator, were diuers; howbeit, it was commonlie  
to take order in ſome great matter of conſequence, which fell out to be extra-  
ordinarie, and required the command of one man. And as it is in the ſaſtes  
or records of the Capitoll; either *Reipub: regend: cauſa*, as was this firſt Dic-  
tatorſhip of Cæſars: or otherwiſe, *M. Fabius, Ambuſtus Dict: ſeditionis ſedan-  
de cauſa*: And at another time, *Cn: Quintius Varus Dictator, clauſi figendi cau-  
ſa*: which was one of the ſuperſtitions they vſed in time of peſtilence, and ſo  
diuers the like: of all which, there is this forme expreſſed by Tully; *Si quando  
duellũ grauius, diſcordiæ Ciuium creſcunt vnus ne amplius ſex meſes, niſi  
ſenatus creuerit, idem iuris quod duo Conſules teneto, iſque aue ſiniſtra dictus  
Magiſter Populi eſto*.

But, forasmuch as *Magiſter Populi* was a harſh and odious name to the peo-  
ple, they called him by a more modeſt name, Dictator: whereof Varro giueth  
this reaſon; *Dictator quod à Conſule dicebatur, cuius dicto audientes omnes eſ-  
ſent*. And as none could name a Dictator but the Conſull (for Cæſar was na-  
med by the Prætor in an extraordinary time) ſo none could be named to that  
place, but ſuch as were or had been Conſulls; *Conſulares legere ita lex inbe-  
bat de Dictatore creando lata*. To which may bee added the circumſtance of  
time, which was alwaies in the night; *Noctè deinde ſilentio vt mos eſt Papyri-  
um Dictatorem dixit*. The Dictator had ſoueraigne power, but limited for a  
time: which was commonly fixe Moneths; whereby they are ſpecially diſtin-  
guiſhed from Monarkes: and thereupon, Cicero adiudgeth Sillas Dictator-  
ſhip to be a meere tyranny, and ſo doth Plutarch Cæſars; becauſe both were  
prorogued beyond the time preſcribed by the law. Cæſar held this Dictators  
place but elcuen daies, and then left it off: but afterwards had it for his life, and  
ſo came to be ſtiled *Dictator perpetuus*.

CHAP.



CHAP. IX.

The Marcellians giue vp the Towne.



**H** E Marcellians beeing much oppressed, and almost worne out with all sorts of inconueniences, & brought to an extreame exigent of victuall, defeated and ouerthrowne in two fights at sea, broken & cut in peeces oftentimes in their sallies out, afflicted with a grievous pestilence through Gods appointment, and alteration of diet (for, they liued of nothing but of old Panick and mustie Barly, which was long before laid vp in publike for this purpose) their towne beeing ouerthrowne, and a great part of their vtall downe; out of hope of any succours fro the Prouinces, or of other Armies, which they knew were come into the hands and power of Caesar, they seriously determined (without fraude) to giue vp the towne. But a few daies before, L. Domitius, vnderstanding their resolution, hauing got three shippes (whereof two hee assigned to his familiar friends, the third he tooke himselfe, and taking the oportunitie of a troublesome storme) put to sea: which beeing perceived by the shippes that by Brutus commandement did continually guard the mouth of the Hauen, they vvaied their Ankers, & made after them. Notwithstanding, that, wherein Domitius was, held on her course, and by the helpe of the foule weather got out of sight. The other two, beeing afraid of our shippes, returned back into the Hauen.

The Marcellians, according as was commaunded, brought their Armes and Engines out of the towne, drew forth their shipping, both out of their Hauen and their Arcenalls, and deliuered vp their publike treasure: which things beeing accomplished and performed, Caesar, willing to saue them, rather for the Nauie and antiquity of the towne, then for any merit of theirs, left two legions there for a Guarizon, and sent the rest into Italie. He himselfe tooke his way towards Rome.

OBSERVATIONS.



**H** ENCE wee may obserue, that when men refuse to be led by reason, as the best meanes to guide them to conuenient ends, they are commonly constrained by the commanding warrant of Necessitie, to vnder-goe the same thing vpon harder conditions. As it happened to the Marcellians, who not regarding the Armie then present, and ready to take a strict account of their answers (which with good excuse doth command a newtrall State) chose rather to be shut vp with a siege; that of all miseries is accounted the worst: and therein so carried themselves, as they left no stone vnremoued to make good their refusal; but for want of better helps, brought their Fraude to play a part, to their greater

disaduantage.

disaduantage. And if the Conquerour had not tooke all occasions to shew his clemencie, they might happelie haue paid deare for their contempt. But where either desert or other motiues wanted, there *nomen et vetustas* was sufficient to make Caesar constant to his owne ends: which, as neere as the course wherein he was engaged would afford him, were alwaies leuelled at the generall applause of his actions; taking that to be no little helpe to worke himselfe into the foueraintie of the State: obseruing it the rather in cases of great and happy successe; which are euer more restrained then lesser fortunes. Howsoeuer, it cannot be denied, but that Clemencie is a propertie of excellent honour: which Caesar shewed in sauing the towne.

In maxima fortuna, minima licentia est. Sallust.

Seruare propriam fortunam, Seneca de clement. lib. 1.

CHAP. X.

Curio transporteth two legions into Affricke.



**A** Bout the same time, C. Curio set saile from Sicilie to passe into Affricke: and making no account at all of Atius Varus forces, he caried with him but two legions of the foure which were deliuered him by Caesar, together with five hundred horse. And after he had bene at Sea two daies and three nights, he arrived at a place called Aquilaria, distant twenty two miles from Clupea; where there is a very commodious Roade for shippes in Sommer, sheltered on each side with two large and eminent Promontories. L. Caesar, the sonne, attended his coming at Clupea, with tenne Gallies; which being taken from the Pirats in the late vvarres, and laid aground at Vtica, were repaired and new trimmed by Varus: and beeing afraid of the great number of his shippes, for sooke the sea, and ranne his Gallie on shore; and leaving her there, fled by land on foote to Adrumetum, a towne kept by Confinius Longus, hauing one legion onely in guarizon.

Caesar.

The rest of Caesars Nauie, seeing their Admirall sle away, put into Adrumetum. M. Rufus the Treasurer, pursued him with twelue shippes, which Curio had brought with him out of Sicily, to vvaist the shippes of burthen; and finding the Gallie left vpon the sand, he towed her off, and returned to Curio with his Nauie. Curio sent Marcus before with the shippes, to Vtica: and he himselfe set forward thither by land with the Armie, and in two daies iourney came to the Riuer Bragada; where he left C. Caninius Rebilus, the Legate, with the legions, and went himselfe before with the Cavalry, to view a place called Cornelius Campe: which was held very fit and conuenient to incampe in, beeing a direct ridge of a hill, shooting out into the Sea, steepe and broken on each side, and yet sheluing by a little more gentle descent, on that side which was next Vtica; beeing distant from thence (if the neerest way were taken) a little more then a mile. But in that shortest cut, there rose a Spring, in that part which was furthest

off

--- quae Bragada fuit: aqua fons salutaris aruit. Luc. lib. 4.

off from the sea, and so made a marish or bogge: which whoeuer would auoid, must fetch a compass of fixe miles to goe to the towne.

A view beeing taken of this place, Curio beheld asfarre off, Varus Campe, ioyning to the towne wall, at the gate called Bellica; maruailously fortified through the strong situation of the place, hauing the towne on the one side, and a heate which stood before the towne on the other: and by reason of the great circuit of building which it contained, made a narrow and difficult passage to the Campe. Hee obserued, further, great store of carriages, which by reason of this suddaine alarm, were brought out of the Countrey towards the towne: for the intercepting whereof, he sent the Cavalry. And at the same instant, Varus likewise had sent out of the towne, D.C. Numidian horse, and C.C.C. foote, which King Iuba (a few daies before) had sent to Utica, for the strengthening of that partie. His Prince had acquaintance with Pompey, by reason that his father lodged with him, and bare a spleene to Curio, for the law which he preferred when hee was Tribune of the people, for the confiscation of Iuba his kingdome. The Cavalry on either side met together, and the Numidians were not able to abide the charge of our men; but some one hundred and twenty beeing slaine, the rest be-tooke themselves backe to the Campe at the towne.

In the meane time, vpon the arrivall of our Gallies, Curio commaunded it to be proclaimed, that such Victuallers, and shippes of burthen, as were in the Bay at Utica (beeing in number about two hundred) and would not presentlie come to the Cornelian Campe, should be held and taken for enemies. At which Proclamation, vpon an instant of time, they all waied anchor, and came to the place whither they were commaunded: whereby the Army abounded with all necessarie provisions. This beeing done, he returned to the Campe at Bragada; and by the acclamation of the whole Army, was saluted by the name of Imperator.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Chapter beginneth with the third part of this booke, containing Curio his passage into Affrick: concerning whom, it is to be obserued, that in the beginning of these broiles, no man was more enemy to Caesar, nor made more bitter inuectiues to the people against him, then he did in his Tribune-ship; but afterwards fell off, & was gained by the voluptuous inticements of M. Anthonie, together with a huge mass of money which Caesar sent him. Whereupon, he plaied the turn-coate, and with might and maine assited that Partie; preuailing much with the Comunalitie, by his eloquent and perswasive speeches: the liuely force whereof, is able to stirre vp affection in stones. For which cause it is, that Velleius Patercul. noteth, That no man brought a more burning or dangerous fire-brand to the kindling of those Ciuill warres, then did Curio; beeing a man of an excellent discourse, audacious, prodigall of his owne and of other mens, subtle, ingenious, extreame vitious, and alwaies well spoken, to the ruine of the publike weale. Which sweetnesse of words came vnto him by inheritance,

as Plinie witnesseth; *Vna familia Curionum, in qua, tres continua serie oratores extiterunt.* Of whose monstrous prodigality, the same Authour hath made a very large account. And out of these ouer-weening humors it was, that he became so vnwarie as to diuide his Armie; neglecting the Enemy, and the variableness of warre; which altereth as the Moone, & keepeth no constant shape whereby it may be known. Concerning the dismembering of an Armie, lightly, and vpon heedlesse rashness, Cyrus giueth graue aduice, in the beginning of the sixth booke of Xenophon. To which (for the present) I refer the Reader.

Clupea was a towne in Affrick, named by Plinie, *Oppidum liberum*, & sited vpon the Promontorie of Mercury, in the territories of old Carthage: it was so called, because it caried the forme of a Target retorted; and for the same cause it was called Aspis:

*In Clypei speciem curuatis turribus Aspis.*

This Promontorie, which Curio chose to incampe in, was famous for three things. First, it was reputed the place where Antaeus the Giant dwelt, which Hercules slew, by strangling him in his Armes; that hee might not touch the Earth, from whom it is said, he receiued fresh strength. Secondly, P. Cornelius Scipio, that subdued Affrick, made that place his chiefe Camp of strength: and so it came to be called Cornelius Campe. And lastly, for this expedition which Curio made, to lose two legions, and himselfe withall; as vnwilling to see the morow, after such a losse: for, *Vita est audis, quisquis non vult, mudo secum perire, mori.*

CHAP. XI.

Curio marcheth to Utica: his Cavalry put to flight great troopes comming from king Iuba. His Armie was strangely possessed with an idle feare.



HE next day, hee brought his Army to Utica, and incamped himselfe neere vnto the towne: but before the fortification of his Campe was finished, the horsemen that stood Centinell, gaue notice of great forces of horse and foote, coming towards Utica, from king Iuba: and at the same time, a great dust was seene rise in the aire, and presently the first troopes began to come in sight. Curio, astonished at the novelty of the thing, sent his horse before, to sustaine the first shock, and to stay them: he himselfe, calling the legions with all speed from their worke, imbattelled his Army. The Cavalry, incountering with the Enemy (before the legions could be well unfolded and put in order) did put to flight all the Kings forces, that came marching without feare or order; and slew a great number of the foote troopes: but the horse, making haste, got almost

Lib. 7. cap. 1.  
Lib. 36. cap. 1.  
Nima consule  
mantis est. i.  
sph. lib. 1. cap.  
4. de bello In  
daico.

Sil. Ital.

Seneca Trag.

Cesar.

# Obferuations vpon the fecond

all fafe into the towne, by the way of the fea-shore. The next night after, two Centurions, of the Nation of the Marfi, fledde from Curio, with twentytwo of their fouldiers, to Atius Varus.

Thefe Centurions, whether it were to please Varus, or otherwife fpeaking as they thought (for, what men wifh, they eafily belieue: and what they think, they hope others doe thinke the fame) did confidently affirme, that the mindes of the whole Army, were altogether alienated from Curio; and that it was very expedient, that the Armies should come in fight, and find meanes to fpeake together. Varus, being perfuaded to that opinion, the next day, early in the morning, drew his legions out of the Campe: the like did Curio; either of them putting their forces in order, vpon a fmall Valley which lay betweene both their Armies.

There was in Varus Armie, one Sex. Quintilius Varus, who (as it is formerly declared) was at Corfinium; and being let goe by Caesar, went into Affrick. It fortuned that Curio had caried ouer thofe legions, which Caesar had formerly taken at Corfinium: fo that a few Centurions being laine, the Companies and Maniples remained the fame. This occafion being fo fitly offered, Quintilius (going about Curio his Army) began to befeech the fouldiers, that they would not forget the firft oath they had taken, to Domitian, and to him their Treafurer: nor beare Armes againft them, that had runne the fame fortune, and endured the fame fieve; nor fight for thofe, who (by way of reproche) had called them fugitiues. To thefe hee added fome promifes, to put them in hope of a good recompence, out of his owne liberality, if they would follow him and Atius.

Having deliuered this vnto them, Curio his Army flood mute, and declared not themfelues by any figne, either one way or other: notwithstanding, Curio his Campe was afterwards poffeffed with a great feare and fufpicion: which was quickly augmented, by diuers reports raifed vpon the fame. For, euery man forged opinions and conceits; and out of his owne feare, added fome thing to that which hee had heard of another. Which when it was fped from one author to many, and one had received it from another, it feemed there were many authors of the fame thing. For, Ciuill warre is alwaies compounded of fuch men, as hold it lawful to doe and follow what and whom they please.

Thofe legions, which a little before were in the fervice of the Enemy, did willingly imbrace what was offered them; for, old acquaintance, had made them forget what benefites Caesar had lately beftowed on them: being alfo of diuers Countries and Nations; and not all of the Marfi or Peligni, as thofe the night before, which were their Cabin-mates and fellow fouldiers: where-vpon, they tooke occafion, to publiſh abroad in worſe tearmes, that which others had vaine-ly giuen out; and ſome things were coined by thofe, that would ſeeme moſt diligent in dooing their duty.

THE

## Commentary of the Ciuill Warres.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**O**bferv first, from the reuolt of theſe Centurions, that a fellow or two of ranke and fafhion, falling from a Partie, doe gaine eaſie credite to their aduertilements, by averting any thing which the Enemy deſireth. Whence it is, that ſo much as fugitiues can little otherwiſe auail (one man being but as no man) they ſeek fauour and reputation with the Partie they flie vnto, by their aduile and diſcouerie; and conſequently, the remuneration of eſpiall, which according to the preſident made by Fabius to the Spies of Cluſine, is worth a mans labour.

And herein, Reuolters (ſpecially thoſe of iudgement) are very dangerous inſtruments; not onely in weakening or making fruſtrate ſuch deſignes as may be contriued againſt an Aduerſarie: but alſo in diſcouering the ſecrets of their owne Partie, and diſcloſing of that which is abſolute and well, vntill it be made knowne. For, there is no ſubſtituting thing ſo perfect, but hath alwaies ſome part or other open, to giue an eaſie paſſage to deſtruction: according to that of the Poet;

*Omnia ſunt hominum tenui pendencia filo.*

And therefore, it is no ſmall meanes of preſerving each thing in being, to make ſhew of ſtrength, and conceale weakneſſes, as the registers of affured ruine: for which cauſe it is, that fidelitie is commended, as the foundation of humane ſocietie; and perfidious treachery, diuulging the ſecret imperfections thereof, is the plague and bane of the ſame.

*Lib. lib. 10.*

*Fides fundamētum ſocietatis humanae: perfidia vero eiusdem poſuiſſe. Plato, l. 5. de legib.*

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



**A**s there is nothing more dangerous in an Armie, then feare: ſo there is nothing ſooner bredde to diſturb a multitude, then this paſſion; which metamorphoſeth a troope of men into a heard of Deere. For, hence it appeareth, that one Therſites is able to leuine a whole Army; & an idle conceit, bred in the weak thoughts of ſome Treſantas, begetteth oftentimes a maine cauſe of diſtruſt throughout all the Party: which, as it ſpreadeth abroad, is fo deliuered from one to another, as the Reporter (not believing what he telleth) addeth alwaies ſome-what to make the hearer believe, what he could not himſelfe. And ſo weak mindes doe multiplie the vaine apprehenſion of idle humours, in ſuch a faſhion, as there is more hurt in fearing, then in the thing which is feared.

Epaminondas was more fortunate then all others in this kind: for, while hee ledde the Thebanes as their Commander, they were neuer taken with any ſuddaine affrightment, nor poſſeſt with any Panick terror, to bereaue them of their ſenſes, or falſifie the truth of their vnderſtanding:

M 2.

being

*The Spartans called all cowards Treſantas. Plutarch.*

*Plus in metuen do eſt mali, quā in illo ipſo quod timeatur. Cic. ad Torquatum.*

*Plutarch.*

being all (as it seemed) of the lame mind with the Generall; who accounted no death so honourable as that which came by warre. Howbeit, such is the frailtie of humane nature, & so strange are the convulsions of the mind, that a Commander must expect to meet with times; wherein, his men will stand in danger of nothing so much as their owne infirmities; being troubled rather with strong apprehensions, then for any danger of the thing feared.

CHAP. XII.

Curio disputeth the matter in a Councell of Warre.

**F**OR which causes, a Councell of warre being called, they beganne to deliberate what course was to be taken. There were some opinions which thought, that it was very expedient to assault and take Varus Campe, for that there was nothing more dangerous then idleness, for the breeding and increase of such imaginations as the souldiers had conceived. Others said, it were better to try the fortune of a battell, & to free themselves by valorous indeauour, rather then to be forsaken and abandoned of their owne party, and left to vnder-goe most grievous and extreame torments. There were others which thought it fit, to returne about the third watch of the night to Cornelius Campe; that by interposing some respite of time, the souldiers might be better settled, and confirmed in their opinions: and if any mischance further happened, they might (by reason of their store of sleeping) with more ease and safety, returne backe to Sicily.

Curio, misliking both the one and the other, said; That there wanted such good resolution in the one opinion, as it abounded in the other; for, these entered into a consideration of a dishonourable and vnseeming flight: and those were of an opinion to fight, in an vnequall and disadvantageous place. For, with what hope (saith he) can wee assault a Campe so fortified, both by Nature and Art? Or what haue we gained, if with great losse and damage, wee shall goe away and giue it ouer? As though things well & happily atchieued, did not get to the Commander, great good will from the souldier; and things ill caried, as much hate. Concerning the removing of our Campe, what doth it inferre but a shamefull retreat, a despaire in all men, and an alienation of the Army? For, it is not fit, to giue occasion to the prudent and well-advised, to imagine that they are distressed: nor on the other side, to the ill disposed, that they are redoubted or feared; and the rather, because feare in this kind, will giue them more liberty to doill, and abate the indeauour of good men in well-deseruing. And if (saith he) these things are well knowne vnto vs already, that are spoken of the revolt and alienation of the Army (which, for mine owne part, I think either to be altogether false, or at least, lesse then in opinion they are thought to be) is it not better to dissemble and hide them, then that they should be strengthened and confirmed by vs?

Ought

Ought we not, as we doe hide the wounds of our bodies, to couer the inconueniences of an Armie, least we should minister hope or courage to the Adversarie? But some there are that aduise to set forward at midnight, to the end (as I imagine) that such as are desirous to offend, may performe it with more scope and licentiousnesse. For, such disorders are repressed and reformed, either with shame or feare: to both which the night is an enemy. And therefore, as I am not of that courage, to thinke without hope or meanes, that the Enemies Campe is to be assaulted; so on the other side, I am not so fearefull, as to be wanting in that which is fitting: but am rather of opinion, that we try all things before wee yeeld to that; and doe assure my selfe, that for the most part, wee are all of one mind concerning this point.

OBSERVATIONS.

**I**N matter of Geometry, Rectum est Index sui, et obliqui; being equall to all the parts of rectitude, and vnequall to obliquity: so is it in reason and discourse. For, a direct and well grounded speech, carieth such a naturie equalitie with all it parts, as it doth not onely approue it selfe to be leueled at that which is most fitting, but sheweth also what is indirect and crooked, concerning the same matter; and is of that consequence in the varietie of projects and opinions, and so hardly hit vpon, in the lame discourse of common reason, that Plato thought it a peece of diuine power, to direct a path free from the crookednes of error, which might lead the straight and ready way to happie ends. And the rather, forasmuch as in matter of debate, there are no words so waightly, but do seeme balanced with others of equall consideration: as heere it happened, first those that pointing at the cause of this distemperature, convicted Idleness for the Authour of their variable and vnsettled mindes: And, as Zenophon hath obserued, very hard to be indured in one man, much worse in a whole familie, but no way sufferable in an Army; which the Romaines called *Exercitus ab exercitio*. For remedy whereof, they propounded labour without hope of gaine, & such seruice as could bring forth nothing but losse. Others, preferring securitie before all other courses (as beleeuing with Liuius, that Captaines should neuer trust Fortune further then necessitie constrained them) perswaded a retreat to a place of safety, but vpon dishonourable termes. Which vneuenness of opinions, Curio made straight by an excellent Maxime in this kind; thinking it conuenient to hold such a course, as might neither giue honest men cause of distrust, nor wicked men to thinke they were feared. For, so he should be sure (in good termes of honor) neither to discourage the better sort, nor giue occasion to the ill affected to doe worse. And thus winding himselfe out of the labyrinth of words (as knowing that to bee true of Anniius the Prætor, that it more importeth occasions to do then to say; being an easie matter to fit words to things vnfolded and resolved vpon) he brake vp the Councell.

Confiliū dare, eorum que inter homines diuini-  
finium.

Omni orationi oratio equalis opponitur. Sext. Philof.

Curium semper dicit ut ament. Luc. lib. 4. lib. 1. Cyrope.

Ducis multo loco, nisi quantum ne- cessitas exigit, se commutare for- tunc de sent. lib. 12.

Ad summā rerū pertinet, cogitare magis quā a- gendū quā quā loquendū: facile erit, explicare consilij ac- modum vbius verba. Liv. 33.

## CHAP. XIII.

Curio calleth a generall assembly of the souldiers;  
and speaketh vnto them, concerning their  
feare, and retraction.



THE Councell beeing risen, he gave order for a Conuocation of the Armie; and there called to remembrance what they had done for Caesar, at Corfinium: how by their fauour and furtherance, he had gained the greatest part of Italie, to bee on his side. For, by you (saith hee) and by your indeauour, all the rest of the Municipall townes, were drawne to follow Caesar: and therefore, not without iust cause did hee at that time repose great assurance in your affections towards him; and the aduersē partie concerned as great indignation and spite against you. For, Pompey was not forced away by any battell: but beeing preiudicially by your act hee quitted Italy. Caesar hath recommended me, whom he held neer vnto himselfe, together with the Provinces of Sicily and Affricke (without which he cannot defend the City and Italy) to your trust and fidelitie. There are some which sollicite and perswade you to reuolt from my command: for, what can they wish or desire more, then to make it but one worke, to bring vs both to ruine and overthrowe, and to ingage you in a most detestable wickedness? Or what worse opinion can they conceiue of you, then that you should betray them, that professe themselves wholly yours? and that you might afterwards come into their power, who take themselves vndone by your meanes?

Haue you not vnderstood what Caesar hath done in Spaine? two Armies beaten; two Generalls defeated; two Provinces taken; and all within forty daies, after he came in view of the Enemy? Those, whose forces were not able to make resistance when they were whole & entire, how is it possible they should hold out, being beaten and discomfited? You that followed Caesar when the victory stood doubtfull; now Fortune hath adiuuged the Cause, and determined of the issue of the Warre, will you follow the vanquished Partie? They came out, that they were forsaken and betrayed by you, and doe remember you of the former oath you tooke: but did you forsake L. Domitius, or did he forsake you? Did not he thrust you out, and expose you to all extremity of fortune? Did hee not seeke to saue himselfe by flight, without your knowledge or priuie? Were you not preserved and kept aliue by Caesars clemencie, when you were abandoned & betrayed by him?

How could he tie you with the oath of alleageance, when (having cast away his sheafe of Rods, and laid downe his authority) he himselfe was made a private person, and became captiuat to the command of another mans power? It were a strange and new religion, that you should neglect that oath, wherein you stand now ingaged; and respect the other, which was taken away by the rendry of

of your Generall, and the \*losse of your libertie. But beleene you thinke well of Caesar, and are offended at mee, that am not to preach of my merits towards you; which as yet consist in my good will, and are unworthy your expectation: & yet souldiers haue alwaies used to seeke reward vpon the shutting up of a war, which what euent it will haue, make you no doubt. And why should I omit the diligence which I haue already used, and how the business hath hitherto proceeded? Doth it offend you, that I transported the Armie ouer in safetie, without losse of any one shippe? That at my coming, I beat and disperfed at the first onset the whole flecte of the Aduersaries? That twice, in two daies, I ouercame them onely with the Cavalrie? That I drew two hundred Ships of burthen out of the Road and Port of the Enemy? and haue brought them to that extremitie, that they can be supplied by provision, neither by sea nor by land? All this good fortune, and these Commanders reiected and forsaken? which will rather embrace the ignominie you receined at Corfinium, or your flight out of Italy, or the rendering up of Spaine, or the preiudiciall successe of the warre of Affricke. Truly, for mine owne part, I was desirous and content to be called Caesars souldier: but you haue stiled me with the title of Imperator. Which if it repent you, I doe willingly quit my selfe of your grace, and returne it back vnto you: and doe you, in like manner, restore mee to my name againe; least you should seeme to giue me honour which might turne to my reproche.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the handling of this accident, the difference cometh to be observed, betwene a Councell of warre, and a Concio, or conuocation of the souldiers. The first was more particular, consisting of some choice men, and those the most eminent in the partie; *is qui non vniuersum populum, sed partem aliquam adesse iubet, non comitia, sed concilium edicere debet.* Their conuocation or preaching was more generally, the whole Armie beeing conuented together, to bee fitted by perswasion and discourse, to follow the resolution taken by a Councell; and was properly called *Adlocutio*, and sometimes *Conuentus*: Cicero perfectam Epistolam Caesaris in conuentu militum recitat. The parties called to a Councell, were according as the Generall valued the occasion: for, sometimes the Legates and Tribunes were onely consulted; and now and then the Centurions of the first Orders, together with the Captaines of horse, were called to their assistance: and oftentimes, all the Centurions. But howsoever, Curio resolved out of his owne iudgement, as great Commanders commonly doe; and is specially obserued by Piere Matthien, of the French King: who euer loath to heare the opinion of his Captaines, but alwaies findes his owne the best.

\* Caput dimi-  
nutione.

Diminutus ca-  
pite apparetur,  
qui ciuitate mi-  
natus est, aut ex  
familia in aliam  
adoptatus: et  
qui liber alteri  
manu proprio  
datus: et qui in ho-  
stium potestate  
venit: et cui a-  
qua ignique in-  
terdictum. Liv.

In summo Im-  
peratore qua-  
runt he virtutes  
iuste debent:  
Scientia rei mi-  
litari, virtus,  
auctoritas, feli-  
citas. Cicero pro  
leg. Manilia.

Aulus Gell. lib.  
15. cap. 27.

Com. 5. bell.  
Gall.

Tom. 2. lib. 4.

THE

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Monſt other ſtraines of this diſcourſe, it is acknowledged, that Rome could not ſtand without Sicilie; and the reaſon was, for the plenie of Corne which it brought forth: for, Sicily was alwaies reputed as the Granier or Barne of Rome, and accordingly cared by the Senate, as a place without which their Cittie could not continue. The graine of that Iland, is hard, like horne; and cannot well be broken or ground into Meale, vntill it be wet with water, and then dried in the ſhade, rather then in the ſunne: by meanes whereof, it yieldeth ſo exceedingly, that it is accounted twenty in the hundred, better then any ponent Wheate; eſpecially, for that it will keepe long in their Vautres and Caues vnder the earth, and ſildome or neuer take heate, beeing of it ſelfe ſo hard and dry.

The gluttonous vſe of fleſh, hath made men ignorant of the vertue and ſtrength of Corne, which the Romaines better vnderſtood; for, their legions neuer fedde on fleſh, as long as they could get Corne. *Pecora, quod ſecundum poterat eſſe inopia ſubſidium*, ſaith Caſar. And in another place; *Vt complures dies militis frumento caruerint*, *Pecore è longinquioribus vicis adactis extremam famem ſuſtentarent*. And in the ſame place, *Quo minor erat framenti copia, Pecus imperabat*. And againe, *Non illis hordeum cum daretur, non legumina recuſabant*. *Pecus vero, cuius rei ſumma erat in Epirocopia, magno in honore habebant*.

By which places it appeareth, that they neuer ſell to fleſh, but when they wanted Corne. Which is doubtleſſe a firmer nutriment, leſſe excrementall, & of better ſtrength, then any other fooode what-ſo-euer; as containing the prime ſubſtance of Meate, and the ſpirit of Wine: for, *Aqua vite*, is as well made of Wheate, as of the lees of Wine. Fleſh is good to make Wraſtlers of a groſſe and heauie conſtitution, as Plutarch noteth: but the Romaine ſouldier ſtood in need of an effectuell and ſnowy vigour, able to vndergoe cariages, ſitter for a Muſtlien a Man; together with ſuch workes, as later ages doe rather heare then beleue, and was attained by feeding onely vpon bread.

The Rabbines & Thalmudiſts doe write, That the Giants of the old world, firſt ſell to the eating of fleſh; making no difference between a man & a beaſt, but grew ſo execrable, that they made women caſt their fruite before their time, to the end they might eate it with more tenderneſs and delicacie. Which is alſo ſaid to be practiſed by the Caniballs, vpon the firſt diſcouerie of the Indies. Viginere reporteth, that he knew ſome great Men in Fraunce, ſo friand, that they cauſed oftentimes Does ready to foane, to be killed, and the young ones tooke out aliuie, to be made meate for monſtrous appetites. But there is no indifferent Parallel to be drawne, betweene the lobriente of the ancient Romaine ſouldier, and the gluttony of theſe times; farre exceeding that of Agamemnon, which Achilles noted with words of high reproach, calling him Hogs-head of Wine, eyes of a Dogge, and hart of a Deare.

THE

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Hirdly, from this elaborated and well-couched ſpeech, wee may note, that Eloquence is a very beautifull ornament to Princes, and great Commanders; beſides the vſe it hath, to leade a multitude to ſuch ends as is wiſhed: for, ſmooth words preuaile where force booteth not. According to that of Cicero, *Cum populum perſuaderi poſſe diffidimus, cogi fas eſſe non arbitremur*.

CHAP. XIII.

Curio bringeth out his troopes, and putteth Varus Army to flight.



HE ſouldiers, mooned with this Oration, did oftentimes interrupt him in his ſpeech; ſignifying with what grieſe they did indure the ſuſpicion of inſidelitie. And as hee departed from the Aſſembly, euery man exhorted him to be of a good courage, and not to doubt of gining battell, or to make triall of their fidelitie and valour. By which meanes, the mindes and diſpoſition of all men beeing changed, Curio reſolued (out of a generall conſent) as ſoone as any occaſion was offered, to giue battell.

The next day, hauing brought out his forces, he made a ſtand, and imbattelled them in the ſame place where he ſtood in Armes the day before. And Varus likewise drew out his troopes, whether it were to ſolicite the ſouldier, or not to omit the opportunity of fighting, if it might be afforded in an indiſſerent place. There was a valley (as we haue formerly declared) betweene the two Armies, of no very hard or difficult aſcent; and either of them expected who ſhould firſt come ouer it, to the end they might fight in a place of more aduantage: when vpon a ſuddaine, all Varus Cavalry that ſtood in the left Cornet of the Armie, together with the light armed ſouldiers that ſtood mingled amongſt them, were ſcene deſcending into the Valley. To them Curio ſent his Cavalrie, together with two cohorts of the Marrucians. The Enemies horſemen were not able to indure the firſt incounter of our men; but hauing loſt their horſes, fledde backe to their party. The light-armed men that came out with them, being left and forſaken, were all ſlaine by our men in the view and ſight of Varus whole Army. Then Rebilus, Caſars Legate (whom Curio for his knowledge and experience in matter of warre, had brought with him out of Sicily) ſaid; Curio, thou ſeeſt the Enemy: why makeſt thou doubt to vſe the opportunitie of time? Curio, without making any other anſwere, then willing the ſouldiers to remember what they had aſſured vnto him the day before, commaunded them to follow him, & ran formoſt himſelfe. The Valley was ſo comberſome and difficult, that in gaining the

Eloquētia principis maximè ornamento eſt. Cic. 4. de ſulbus

Lib. 1. ſamil. Epist.

Caſar.

## Obseruations vpon the second

the ascent of the hill, the formeſt could hardly get vp, unleſſe they were liſted vp by the followers. Howbeit, the Enemy was ſo poſſeſſed with feare, for the flight & ſlaughter of their fellowes, that they did not ſo much as thinke of reſiſting; for, they tooke themſelves all to be already ſurpriſed by the Cavalrie: ſo that before any vveapon could be caſt, or that our men could approche neere vnto them, all Varus Armie turned their backs, and fled into their Campe.

In this flight, Fabius Pelignus (a certaine ſouldier of one of the inferior Companies of Curio his Armie) hauing ouertaken the firſt troope of them that fledde, fought for Varus, calling after him with a loude voice; as though hee had been one of his owne ſouldiers, and would either aduiſe him, or ſay ſome-thing elſe to him. And, as he, being often called, looked backe, and ſtood ſtill (inquiring vwho hee was, & what he would?) he made at Varus ſhoulder (which was vnarmed) with his ſword, and vvas very neere killing him; howbeit, he auoided the danger, by receiuing the blowe vpon his target. Fabius was inſtantly incloſed about, by ſuch ſouldiers as were neere at hand, and ſlaine.

In the meane time, the gates of the Campe were peſtered, and thronged, with multitudes and troopes of ſuch as fledde away; and the paſſage was ſo ſtopped, that more died in that place without blowe or wound, then periſhed either in the battell, or in the flight. Neither wanted they much of taking the Campe; for, many left not running vntil they came to the towne. But the nature of the place, and the fortification of the Campe, did hinder their acceſſe: and Curio his men comming out (prepared onely for a battell) wanted ſuch neceſſaries as were of uſe for the taking of the Campe. And therefore Curio caried backe his Army, with the loſſe of no one man but Fabius. Of the Aduerſaries were ſlaine and wounded about ſixe hundred: vwho vpon Curio his departure, beſides many other that ſained themſelves hurt, left the Campe for feare, and went into the towne. Which Varus perceiuing, and knowing alſo the aſtoniſhment of the Armie, leauing a Trumpeter in the Campe, and a fewe Tents for ſhew, about the third watch, he caried his Armie with ſilence out of the Campe into the towne.

## OBSERVATIONS.



It is a part of wiſdome, and oftentimes a maine helpe to victorie, to attend the aduantage of an Enemies raſhneſſe, and to ſee if his follie will not make way to his ouerthrowe. Whereof Curio made good uſe: for, he kept his Armie in the vpper ground, vntill the Cavalrie of the Aduerſarie were looſely fallen into the Valley; and then ſet vpon them, and cut them all in peeces. The ſight whereof, masked the whole Armie, & kept Curio in ſafety, vpon the like diſaduantage, in the comberſome paſſage of the ſame Vale: by meanes whereof, he put to flight the whole forces of the Enemy, and made a great ſlaughter in the Party. Wherin I may not forget that trick of a Romaine ſpirit, whereby the Authour commeth memorable to poſteritie, in calling after Varus by name, to make him the ſacrifice for both the Hoſtes. Whence we may obſerue, that when a battell is ioyned pell-mell, no

man

## Commentary of the Ciuill Warres.

123

man can be aſſured in his owne valour, nor ſhare out his fortune by the length of his ſword; but is often-times ſubiect to weakneſſe of contempt, and vanquiſhed by ſuch as cannot be compared vnto him but in ſcorn.

I haue heard it reported, that at the battell of Eureux, *Maturine* (that known woman in France) tooke priſoner & diſarmed a Cavalero of Spaine: Vwho beeing brought before the King, and by him demanded whole priſoner he was, or whether he knew the partie that had forced him? Anſwered, no; but that he knew him to be a gallant man of Armes. Where-at the king ſmiled: and the Gentleman, vnderſtanding what fortune he had run, was as much diſmaied as a man poſſible could be, that conſidered, *Quod ferrum aequat in bello, robuſtioribus imbecilliores.*

Zenoph. lib. 7. Cyrops.

## CHAP. XV.

Curio leaueth Vtica to meeete with king Iuba: his Cavalrie ouerthroweth the forces led by Sabura; which led him on to his ouerthrowe.



HE next day, Curio prepared to beſiege Vtica, incloſing it about vwith a ditch and a rampier. There were in the towne, a multitude of people vnacquainted vwith warre, through the long peace they had inoyed: and the inhabitants ſtoode very affectionate to Caſar, for many benefiſts they had receiued from him. The reſt of the multitude conſiſted of diuers ſorts of men, much terrified and aſfrighted by the former incounters: vwhere-vpon, every man ſpake plainly of giuing vp the towne; and dealt with Pub. Attius, that their fortunes and liues might not come in danger, through his pertinacie and vvilfulneſſe.

While theſe things were adooing, there came meſſengers from King Iuba, ſignifying the King was at hand with great forces, and voulded them to keepe and defend the towne: vwhich newes, did much incourage and confirme the vvaue- ring and aſfrighted mindes of the Enemy. The ſame vvas alſo reported to Curio: vwhere-vnto for a vvhile he gaue no credit; ſuch vvas his confidence in the ſucceſſe of things. And now withall, came Letters and Meſſengers into Affrick, of that vvhich Caſar had ſo fortunately atchieued in Spaine: and being abſolutely aſſured vwith all theſe things, he was perſwaded the king durſt attempt nothing againſt him. But when he found by aſſured diſcouery, that his forces were within twenty ſiue miles of Vtica, leauing his workes already begunne, he vwith-drew himſelfe into Cornelius Campe; and beganne there to fortiſie his Campe, to get Corne and other prouiſions, and to furniſh it with all neceſſaries materiall for a defence: and ſent preſently a diſpatch into Sicily, that the two legions, and the reſt of the Cavalry might be ſent vnto him.

The



The Campe where in he lay, was fitly accommodated to hold out the vuarre, as well by reason of the nature of the place, as the artificiall fortifying thereof, the neereness of the sea, and the plenty of water and salt; whereof there was great quantitie brought thither, from the Salt-pittes neer adioyning. No stiffe could be wanting, through the great store of wood which was about the place, nor yet any Corne, for the plenty that was to be found in the cōfining fieldes: and there-vpon, by the aduice and approbation of all men, Curio resolved to attend his other forces, and to draw out the warre in length.

These things beeing thus disposed, by the consent & liking of all men, he heard by some that lately came out of the towne, that Iuba was called back, by occasion of a vuarre happened vpon the confines: and that by reason of the controuersies and dissensions of the Leptitani, he was detained at home in his kingdome; but that Sabura his Lieutenant was sent with some competent forces, and was not farre from Vtica. To which reports, giuing too light and easie credit, he altered his purpose, and resolved to put the matter to triall of battell: where-vnto his youthfull heate, the greatnes of his courage, the successe of former time, & his confidence in the managing of that vuarre, did violently lead him. Being caried on with these inducements, he sent the first night all the Cavalry to the River Bragada, where the Enemy lay incamped vnder the command of Sabura: but the king followed after with all his forces, and lay continually within fixe miles, or there-about.

The horsemen sent before, and making their iourney in the night, set vpon the Enemy at vnawares: and not thinking of their approche: for, the Numidians lodge, scattered here and there in a barbarous manner, without any gouernment or order. And surprising them thus, oppressed vwith sleepe, and scattered vpon the ground, they slew a great number of them: the rest, in great terror & amasement, escaped by flight. Which seruice, beeing thus executed, the Cavalrie returned to Curio, and brought the captiues vnto him. Curio was gone out about the fourth watch of the night with all his forces, hauing left five cohorts for a garrison to his Campe: and hauing marched fixe miles, he met with the Canalic, understood what was done, and inquired of the captiues, who was Generall of the Campe at Bragada? They answered, Sabura. Omitting for haste of his way to informe himselfe of the rest: but turning himselfe to the next Ensignes, said; You see souldiers that the confession of the captiues doe agree, vwith that which was reported by the fugitiues. For, the king is not come; but hath sent some small forces, which cannot make their partie good with a few horsemen: and therefore, hasten to take the spoile vwith honour and renowne; that we may now at length, begin to thinke of rewarding your merits.

OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T is obserued by Marcellinus, that when misfortune commeth vpon a man, his spirit groweth so dull and benumbed, as his senses seeme to be dismissed of their charges. Which appeared heere in Curio: who, hauing taken a prouident and sure course, such as was approoued in euery mans iudgement, and beleemed well the wisdom of a Commaunder, did neuertheless, contrarie to all sense and discretion, forgoe the same; and cast himselfe vpon the hazard of that which fugitiues had vainely reported. Concerning which, as it is noted, that Incrēdūlitie is hurtfull onely to the vnbeleuer; so this passage proueth, that for a Commaunder to bee too light of beliefe, is a danger to the whole Partie, and bringeth many to ruine, that had no part in that Creede. Cæsar, in the relation heereof, noteth three speciall things in Curio, that caried him head-long to this disaster, and may serue as markes to auoid the like Syrtes.

The first, was *Iuuenilis ardor*, his youthfull courage and heate: which is alwaies attended with strong affections, futing the qualitie and temperature of the bodie, being then in the prime height of strength, & accordingly ledde on with violent motions; where-as age goeth slowly and coldly forward, and is alwaies surer in vndertaking, then hot-spurre youth. And albeit, no man in cold blood could better aduize then Curio, or fore-see with better prouidences: yet his youthfull boldnesse, ouer-swaied his discouurse; and drew all to a mischiefe, in despite of his wisdom.

The second, was *Superioris temporis prouentus*, the happy issue of former proceedings: which of all other conditions, is to be suspected, and needeth Gods assistance more then any other fortune; for that no man sooner erreth, or is more vncaple of order, then such as are in prosperitie. And therefore, Plato refused to make lawes for them of Syrene; as a matter of great difficulty, to giue ordinances to men that were in happinesse. And doubtles, such is the exorbitance of our nature, that nothing better informeth it then crosses; which are as instructions and warnings, for the preuenting of ruining calamities. Wherein, Curio was not beholding to Fortune at all; that dandled him in her lap for a while, to cast him out at length, head-long to his ruine. It had been much better, she had exchanged a frowne with a fauour, rather then to haue giuen him much good together, and reserue an irrecoverable disgrace for the vvp-thor.

The third, was *Fiducia rei bene gerenda*: which sauoureth more of follic then any of the former, beeing alwaies an argument of an imprudent man, to assure himselfe of good fortune: for, Presumption, beeing euer accompanied with Negligence, is subiect to as many casualties, as thole that goe vnarmed vpon extremitie of danger. And these were the three things that miscaried Curio. Out of which we may obserue with Xenophon, that *ingens et arduum opus est recte imperare*.

*Itemus ipse quodam, manus inuentibus scilicet, belicari sentis hominum obstanti. Amm. Marcell.*

*Solis incredulis noxia res incrementis. Plinio, de vit. Mosi.*

*Helictiores quā lentiores res plurimū melius rempūb. administrant. Thucydides.*

*Relus secundis maxime deus impiorandus. Lib. 1. Cypri. Felicis et moderations diuinitis contrarium. Sen.*

*quem blanda vitiorum, Duce turamala belis fortuna recepit. Luc. lib. 4.*

*Imprudens fiducia. Pl. fortunam sibi sperare. Seneca de beneficiis.*

*Inaucta semper minus presumptio et sui negligens. Euseb. Lib. 1. de Iussi Cypri.*

CHAP. XVI.

Curio purfueth the Enemy, with more  
haste then good fuffeffe.

**T**hat which the Caudrie had exploited, was certaine-  
lie a matter of great feruices, especially the small number of them,  
being compared with the great multitude of the Numidi-  
ans: & yet notwithstanding, they spake of these things, with  
greater ostentation then the truth would beare; as men are  
willing to divulge their owne praises. Besides, they shewed  
much spoile which they had taken: Captiues and horses were brought out, that  
whatsoeuer time was omitted, seemed to be a let and hinderance to the victory;  
by which means, the desires and indeauours of the Souldiers, were no way  
short of the hope which Curio had conceived. Who, commanding the Caudrie to  
follow him, marched forward with as much haste as he could; to the end he might  
find the Enemy distracted and astonished, at the slight and ouerthrowe of their  
fellowes: but the horsemen, hauing trauelled all night, could by no means follow  
after. Whereby it happened, that some staid in one place, some in another: yet  
this did not hinder or discourage Curio in his hopes.

Suba, being aduertised by Sabura of the conflict in the night, sent instantlie  
two thousand Spanish and French horse, which he kept about him for the safetie  
of his Person, and such of the foote-troopes as he most trusted to succour and re-  
lieue him: hee himselfe, with the rest of the forces, & forty Elephants, followed  
softly after. Sabura, suspecting by the horsemen comming before, that Curio  
himselfe was at hand, imbatelled all his forces; commanding them, that vnder  
a pretence of counterfeit feare, they should retire by little and little: himselfe,  
when occasion serued, would giue them the signe of battell; with such other di-  
rections as should be expedient.

Curio was strengthened in his former hope, with the opinion of the present oc-  
casion. For, supposing the Enemy had fled, hee drew his forces from the upper  
ground into the Plaine; wherein, after he had marched a good space (the Army  
hauing trauielled sixteen mile) hee made a stand. Sabura gaue the signe to his  
men of beginning the battell, ledde on his Army, went about his troopes, to ex-  
hort and courage his souldiers: Howbeit, he used his foot-men onely for a shew a  
farre off, and sent the Caudrie to giue the charge. Curio was not wanting to  
his men; but wished them to set all their confidence in their valour. The sould-  
iers, howsoeuer harried and wearied, and the horsemen (although but a verie  
few, and those spent with trauell) yet wanted no courage or desire to fight. But  
these being but two hundred in number (for, the rest slaid by the way) what  
part of the Army soeuer they charged, they forced the Enemy to giue way: but  
they could neither follow them farre as they fledde, nor put their horses to anie  
round or long curreie.

At

At length, the Caudrie of the Enemy, beganne from both the wings to cir-  
cumuent our Army, and to mall them downe behind: and, as our Cohorts issued  
out from the battell, towards them, the Numidians (through their nimblenesse)  
did easily auoid the stocke; and againe, as they turned backe to their ranks,  
inclosed them about, and cut them off from the battell: so that it neither seemed  
safe to keepe their order and place, or to aduance themselves out, and vnder-goe  
the hazard of aduenture.

OBSERVATIONS.

**T**HE Principles and Maximes of VVarre, are alwaies to bee held  
firme, when they are taken with their due circumstances: for, eue-  
rie Rule hath a qualified state, and consisteth more in cautions and  
exceptions, then in authoritie of precept. It is true, that nothing  
doth more aduantage a victorie, then the counsell of Lamachus, the third  
Duke of the Athenians; which was, to set vpon an Enemy, when he is affright-  
ed and distracted: for, so there is nothing to be expected (on his behalfe) but  
despaire and confusion. But, either to be mistaken therein, or otherwise to  
make such haste to obserue this rule of warre (as Curio did) that the best part  
of the Armie shall lie by the way, and the rest that goe on, shall be so spent with  
labour, as they are altogether vnfit for seruice, and yet (to make the matter  
worse) to bring them into a place of disadvantage, to encounter a strong and  
fresh Enemy, is to make the circumstances ouer-way the Rule, and by a Max-  
ime of VVarre, to be directed to an ouerthrowe: Neglecting altogether that  
which is obserued by Sextus Aurelius Victor; *Satis celeriter fit, quicquid com-  
mode geritur.*

Thucid. lib. 7.

CHAP. XVII.

Curio defeated and slaine; Some few of the Ar-  
mie get passage to Sicily: the rest, yeeld  
themselves to Varus.

**T**HE Enemy was oftentimes reinforced by succours from  
the King: our men had spent their strength, and fainted  
through weariness: such as were wounded, could neither  
leauie the battell, nor be conuained into a place of safetie. The  
whole Army, being incompassed about with the Caudrie  
of the Enemy (whereby despairing of their safety, as men  
commonly do, when their life drawes towards an end) they  
either lamented a their owne death, or recommended their friends to good fortune,  
if it were possible that any might escape out of that danger: all parts were filled  
with feare and lamentation.

Cesar.

N 2.

Curio,

Curio, when he perceined the souldiers to be so affrighted, that they gaue eare neither to his exhortations nor intreaties, he commanded them (as the last hope they had of safety) that they should all flie vnto the next hills, and thither hee commanded the Ensignes to be caried. But the Cavalrie, sent by Sabura, had also preoccupied that place; whereby our men began to fall into vnter despaire, and partly were slaine as they fled by the horsemen, or fell downe without wounding. Cn. Domitius, General of the horse, standing with a few horsemen about him: perswaded Curio to saue himselfe by flight, and to get the Campe; promising not to leaue or forsake him: but Curio confidently. eplied, that hee would neuer come in Cæsars fight, hauing lost the Army committed vnto him; and there-vpon, fighting valiantly, was slaine.

A few horsemen saued themselves from the furie of the battell; but such of the Rereward, as staied by the way to refresh their horses, perceiuing a farre off, the rout and flight of the vvhole Army, returned safe into the Campe. The footmen were all slaine, to a man. M. Rufus the Treasurer, beeing left by Curio in the Campe, exhorted his men not to be discouraged. They praied and besought him, they might be transported into Sicily. Hee promised the they should; and to that end gaue order to the Maisters of shippes, that the next euening they should bring all the Skiffes to the shore. But such was the astonishment and terror of all men, that some gaue out, that Iuba his forces were already come: Others, that Varus was at hand with the legions; and that they saw the dust of the Army marching towards them: whereas there was no such matter at all. Others, suspected the Enemies Naue would speedily make to them; inasmuch as euery man shifted for himselfe: such as were already on ship-board, made haste to be gone. Their departure, gaue occasion to the ships of burthen to follow after.

A few small Barks were obedient to the commaund: but the shore being thronged with souldiers, such was the contention, which of all that multitude should get aboard, that some of the Barks were sunke with preace of people, & the rest, for feare of the like casualtie, durst not come neere them. Whereby it happened, that a few souldiers, and Maisters of families (that through fauour or pittie preuailed, or could swim vnto the shippes) were caried backe, safe, into Sicily. The rest of the forces, sending by night some of the Centurions as Embassadors to Varus, rendered themselves vnto him.

The next day after, Iuba seeing the Cohorts of these souldiers before the towne, cried out presently, that they were part of his booty: and thereupon gaue order, that a great number of the should be slaine; and, selecting a few out of the rest, sent them into his kingdome: Varus complaining in the meane while, that his faith and promise was violated, and yet durst not resist it. The King rode into the towne, attended with many Senators, amongst who was Ser. Sulpitius, & L. Damasippus: and remaining there a few daies, gaue such order for things, as he thought fit, and then returned to his kingdome, with all his forces.

OBSER-

## OBSERVATIONS.



ND this was the period which Diuine power made, to the hopefull beginning of Curio's desaigne vpon Africk; & happened so suddenlie, as they were lost ere they were aware: Like a tempest at Sea; that swallowed vp vessels in the same place, where a little before they swam most proudly, and in the like irrecouerable manner. For, warre is not capable of a second error; one fault beeing enough to ruine an Armie, and to disable Curio for euer dooing the like: of whom Lucan hath left this memoriall;

*Haud aliam tanta Ciuem tulit indole Roma,  
Aut cui plus leges deberent recta sequenti,  
Perdita nunc primum nocuerunt secula, postquam  
Ambitus, et luxus, et opum metuenda facultas,  
Transuerso mentem dubiam torrente tulerunt,  
Momentumque fuit matatus Curio rerum,  
Gallorum captus spolijs et Cæsaris Auro.*

His bodie lay vnburied, as a witness of Numidian hate (which is alwaies extreme, like the heat of the Countrey) and of Iuba's particular reuenge, for rendering an Edict to the people, to confiscate his kingdome.

To conclude this Commentary; The losse either Partie sustained vnto this stage of the Warre, was in these particulars: Pompey was driuen out of Italic, lost Marseilleis, and both the Provinces of Spaine; Cæsar received this losse in Africk, besides that in the Adriatick sea, where Antonius miscaried, whereof he maketh no mention in these Comentaries. And as when Iupiter weighed the fortune of the Greekes, and the Troians, in a paire of Ballance, it fell out the Greekes had more ill lucke then the Troians; to the fortune of these Parties beeing weighed, by the relation made thereof, it falleth plainly out, that Pompey had the worle.

And thus endeth the second Commentarie.



N 3.

THE

*Latissimum nu-  
mina robis cres-  
cendi posuere  
modum. Lucan.  
Eodem ubi iuge-  
runt nauigia  
forbentur.  
Seneca Epist. 4.  
Non est in bello  
bis peccare. Plu-  
tarch.*

*Nullo comestus  
Curio Iusto.*

*Hom. Iliad. 8.*

# THE THIRD COMMENTARY of the Ciuill Warres.

( . . . )

## THE ARGUMENT.

**T**HE former Bookes, containe the drifts and designes which these famous Chieftes attempted, and prosecuted, while they were asunder. And now commeth their buckling at hand to be related; together with the iudgement which the VVarre gaue of the Cause in question, on Cæsars behalfe.

### CHAP. I.

Cæsar giueth order at Rome, for matter of Credit and Usury, and other things.



**C**ÆSAR the Dictator, holding the assembly for election of Magistrates; Julius Cæsar, and Pub. Seruilius were created Consuls: for, in that yeere he was capable by law to be chosen there-vnto. These things beeing ended, forasmuch as hee found that credit was very scant throughout all Italy, and that money lent vpon trust, was not paid; he gaue order that Arbitrators should be appointed to make an estimation of possessions & goods, according as they were valued before the vvarre: and that the Creditors should take them at that rate for their moneys. For, this course he thought to be fittest, and most expedient; as well for the taking away of any feare of composition, or new assurances, for the quitting and abolishing of all debts (which do commonly fall out vpon vvarres and ciuill broiles) as also for the keeping and preseruing of the Debtors credit.

In like manner, he restored the ancient course of Appcale, made by the Prætors and Tribunes, to the people; as also certaine courses used, in suing for Magistracie (which were taken away by a law made in Pompeis time, when hee kept the legions about him in the Cittie) and likewise reformed such iudgements in sutes and trialls of law, as were giuen in Cases, when the matter in controuersie was heard by one Iudge, and the sentence pronounced the same day by another Iudge. Last of all, where-as diuers stood condemned, for offering their seruice vnto him in the beginning of the Ciuill vvarre, if he should thinke it fit to accept thereof:

N 4.

Cæsar.

# Obseruations vpon the third

thereof: and holding himselfe as much obliged vnto them, as if he had vsed it; he thought it best expedient for thē, to be acquitted by the people, rather then by his commandement & authority: least hee should either seeme vngreatfull, in not acknowledging their desert; or arrogant in assuming to himselfe that, which belonged to the people.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**C**æsar, as he was Dictator holding the assembly for the choice of Magistrates; himselfe, with P. Seruius Iscauricus, were made Consuls, in the yeere of Rome 705: which was iust tenne yeeres after his first Consulshippe: whereby he became capable thereof, by the law published by Sylla; wherein it was provided, That no man should be chosen to an office, within tenne yeeres after he had supplied the same. In this yeere, happened all these things, which are contained in this third Commentarie: as Patereulus noteth in these words;

C. Cæsar, and P. Seruius being Consuls, Pompey was miserably massacred, after three Consulships, and three Triumphes; and was slaine, the day before his birth day, being aged 58 yeeres. The Choice day, was regularly the first of Ianuary: and the Assembly was called *Comitium Centuriatum*.

Touching the difference of these Assemblies, the parties present thereat, the manner of the choice, and other circumstances appertaining, the Reader may receive information at large, by Roscius. Onely it is to be remembered, that *Comitia Centuriata* were neuer holden without consent of the Senate. And forasmuch as the cheefe part of them were with Pompey, Lucan taketh exception at this Creation.

— marentia testā  
Cæsar habet, vacuūque domos, legēque silentes:  
Clausaque institio tristis fora. Curia solos  
illa videt Patres, plena quos urbe fugauit.

The Persons, that were suters for the Consulshippe, were called *Candidati*; who oftentimes vsed extraordinarie meanes to attaine the same: which moued Pompey to make a law, That no man should sue for publique offices, by bribes, or other corrupt courses, and was called *Lex de Ambitu*; which indeed was but renewed: for, the same was set on foote, Anno Vrb. 395, by Petilius, Tribune of the people: and renewed againe, by Pub. Cornelius Græchus, Anno 572: and within a while after, made capitall, as farre as banishment concerned the partie. Coponius was so condemned, hauing bought a voice, with an \* Amphora of Wine. The law, which Pompey now made, was very strict, as Dio noteth: for, it was ordained, That vpon producing of witnesses, the Process should end in a day, giuing the Accuser two houres, to lay open the matter; and the Defender three, to make answer: and the Iudgement instantlie followed. The rigour of which law, Cæsar here reformed.

THE

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## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE second thing I obserue, is the difficultie of taking vp money vpon credit, in time of trouble or warres: which Cæsar expresseth in these termes; *Cum fides tota Italia esset angustior*. The word *Fides*, hath euer been taken for a reall performance of any promise or agreement; which Tully calleth the foundation of Iustice, and the very prop of a Common-weale: taking the Etymon to growe, *quia fiat quod dictum*. According to that of Nonius Marcellus; *Fides nomen ipsum videtur habere cum fit, quod dicitur*. And for that Men commonly are covenant keepers, not so much by the perfection of their nature, as out of strictness of law, it falleth out, that where there are no lawes, there is no performance; and consequentlie, little or no credit either giuen or kept in time of Warre, because *Silent leges inter arma*.

Cæsar, to provide for this inconuenience, appointed Commissioners to rate euery mans lands and possessions, as they were valued before the warres, and to satisfie the Creditors with the same. Which Plutarch explaineth in this manner; That the Creditors should take, yeerely, two parts of the reuenue of their Debtors, vntill such time as they had paid themselves: and that the Debtors should haue the other third, to liue withall. Whereof it seemed he had some light, by a president in the Consulshippe of Valerius Publicola, which is extant in Liui; *Noni Consules sanebrem quoque rem lenare aggressi, solutionem aris alieni, in publicam curam verterant, quinque viris creatis, quos mensarios, ab dispensatione pecunie appellarunt*.

This generall acquittance for debts, the Romans called *Novæ Tabulæ*: In this respect, as Cælius Rodiginus hath it, *Quod cum pecunia credita oberratis condonantur, novæ mox cooriuntur Tabulæ, quibus nomina continentur novæ*: and is nothing else, then what is ordinarie amongst our Bankrupts, compounding for so much in the pound with their Creditors, vpon new assurance, and other securitie, whiche they called *Novæ Tabulæ*; agreeing to that of Tullie: *Tabulæ verò novæ quid habent argumenti, nisi ut emas mea pecunia fundum, eum tu habeas, ergo non habeam pecuniam*.

Concerning matter of Usurie, which was the ground of this mischief, Tacitus noteth it, as an old and deadly disease, and the cause of many seditions in that Empire; and is neuer better likened, then to the biting of a Serpent, called an Aspicke: which, vpon the infusion of her venom, putteth the Patient into a heauie slumber; and in a short time, bringeth all a mans substance to death and destruction. And there-vpon, it is called *Fennus à factu*, from the fertile and ample increase of money. For, as Bassill noteth, The Labourer loseth the seed, and contenteth himselfe with the fruit or increase: but the Usurer, will haue the fruit, and yet not lose the seede. Whereby there must needs growe great increase. The law of the twelue Tables, was, *Ne quis vnciario fœnore amplius exerceo*.

And is vnderstood for one in the hundred. The highest rate was *Centesima Vjura*; when the hundred part of the principall was paid euery month to the Creditor.

Lib. 1. offic.  
Nec enim villa res vehementius rempub. continet quam fides.  
Lib. 2. offic.

In the life of Iulius Cæsar.

Lib. 7.

Lib. 7.

2. Offic.

Vetus vrbis sanebre malum, et seditionum discordiarumque creberrima causa. Annal. 6.

## Observations vpon the third

Creditor, and was twelue *per Cent*. The next was *Usura deum*, when the Debtor paid eleuen in the hundred for a yeere. The third *Dextans*, which was *x. per Cent*. *Dodrans ix. Bes viij. Septunx usura, vij. Semis vi. Quincunx v. Triens iiij. Quadrans iiij. Sextans ij. Vnciaria*, one in the hundred. Howbeit, *Ca-* to condemned all kind of vltury: for, being demaunded, *Quid maximè in re familiari expedit?* respondit bene pascere: quid secundum? satis bene pascere? quid tertium? bene vestire: quid quartum? arare: et cum ille qui quæsierat dixisset, *Quid sanerari?* *Quid hominè inquit occidere?* Allowing (as it seemeth) no meanes of getting money, but those which Aristotle tooke to be most agreeing to Nature: which is from the fruites of the earth, and the increale of our cattell; with such other courses as are aunswerable therevnto.

## CHAP. II.

### A particular view of Pompeis forces.



**I**N the accomplishing of these things, as also celebrating the Latine Holidiaes, and holding the Assemblies of the people, hauing spent eleuen daies, he gaue ouer his Dictatorship, left the Cittie, and came to Brundisium. For, he had commaunded seauen legions, and all his Cavalrie to repaire thither: howbeit, he found no more shipping ready, then would hardly transport fiftene thousand legionary souldiers, and five hundred horse; the want whereof, seemed to hinder him from bringing the warre to a speedy end. Moreouer, those forces which were shipped, were but weak; in regard that many of them were lost in the warres of Galia, and lessened likewise by their long journey out of Spaine: besides that, the vnwholsome Autumne in Apulia, and about Brundisium, had made the whole Army ill disposed; beeing newly come out of the sweet aire of Gallia and Spaine.

Pompey, hauing had a yeeres space to provide himselfe of men and munition, and neither warre nor enemy to trouble him, had got together a great Navy out of Asia, from the Cyclad Iles, Corcyra, Athens, Pontus, Bythinia, Syria, Cilicia, Phœnicia, and Egypt; and had caused another as great a fleet to bee built in all places fit for that purpose; had raised great summes of money out of Asia, and Syria, and of all the Kings, Dinastes, Tetrarches, and free States of Achaia; and had likewise compelled the Corporations of those Prouinces to contribute the like sum. He had inrolled nine legions of Romaine Cittizens, five which he had transported out of Italy, one old legion out of Sicily (which beeing compounded and made of two, he called the Twin) one out of Crete and Macedonia, old souldiers, who beeing discharged by former Generalls, had resided in those Prouinces; two out of Asia, which Lentulus the Consull had caused to be inrolled: besides, he had distributed amongst those legions, vnder the name of a supply, a great number of the Iesaly, Bæotia, Achaia, and Epyrus.

Amongst

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Amongst these, he had mingled Anthonies souldiers: and besides these, he expected to be brought by Scipio, out of Syria, two legions. Of Archers out of Creta, Lacedemon, Pontus, and Syria, and the rest of the Citties, he had three thousand; sixe cohorts of Slingers; two Mercenary, & seauen thousand horse. Whereof Deiotarus had brought sixe hundred Galls; Ariobarzanes five hundred out of Cappadocia; Cotus out of Thracia had sent the like number, vnder the leading of his sonne Sasalis. From Macedonia came two hundred, commaunded by Rasipolis; a Captaine of great fame and vertue. From Alexandria came five hundred, part Galls, & part Germanes; which A. Gabinus had left there with King Ptolomy, to defend the Towne. Pompey, the sonne, had brought with the Nauie, eight hundred of his shepheards and seruauants. Tarcondarius, Cassor, & Donilaus, had sent three hundred out of Gallogracia; of whom, one came himselfe, and the other sent his sonne. Two hundred were sent out of Syria, by Comagenus of Antioch, whom Pompey had presented with great gifts: most of which were Arbalestriers on horsebacke.

To these were added Dardanes, Bessis; partly for pay and entertainment, and partly got by command or fauour; besides Macedonians, Thessalians, & diuers other Nations and Citties: insomuch as he filled up the number formerly spoken of. He provided great quantity of Corne out of Thessaly, Asia, Creta, Cyrenia, & the rest of those Regions. He determined to winter at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, & all the maritime townes, to keepe Caesar from passing the Sea: and to that end, he had laid and disposed his Nauie all along the Sea-coast. Pompey, the son, was Admirall of the Egyptian shippes; and Lelius Triarius, of those that came out of Asia. Cassius commaunded them of Syria, and C. Marcellus, with Pomponius, the shippes of Rhodes. Scribonius Libo, and M. Octavianus, had charge of the Achaian Nauie: Howbeit, M. Bibulus commaunded in chiefe in all sea causes; and to him was left the superintendencie of the Admiraltie.

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



**C**ONCERNING these Latine Ferie, it is to be noted, that the Romaines had two sorts of Ferie, or Holy-daies; the one called *Annales*, which came alwaies to be kept on a certaine day: and there-vpon were called *Anniuersarij*. The other, *Conceptine*; which were arbitrarie, and solemnized vpon such daies, as the Magistrates & Priests thought most expedient, whereof these Latine Ferie were chiefe; and were kept on Mount Albano, to Iupiter Latior, for the health and preleruation of all the Latine people, in league and confederacie with the people of Rome, and were solemnized in remembrance of the truce betweene those two Nations: during which feast, the Romaines held it vnlawfull to make any warre. The sacrifice was a white Bull, kild and offered by the Consulls, and the flesh distributed to the inhabitants of Latinum: according to an ancient Treatie of alliance betweeen them; engrauen for a perpetuall memory, in a Columne of brasse. The particulars whereof, are expressed at large, by Dionisius Halicarnassensis.

Latine Ferie.

Lib. 4. de Antiquis. Roma.

THE

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE second thing comming to be noted, is the view taken of Pompeys forces; which are nine compleat legions, besides the supplies heere particularly mentioned, sent from such as bare affection to that Party: and, by indifferent calculation, might amount in all, neere about three-score thousand men, together with the fauour of the Countrey, where the triall was to be made by the stroke of Warre.

In which Muster, were the souldiers of C. Antonius; whose misfortune these Commentaries haue either willingly forgot, or some other chance hath wip't it cleane out. Howbeit, Florus hath it recorded, that Cæsar hauing sent Dolabella and Antonius to seize vpon the Straights, and entrance of the Adriatick-sea, the one tooke hold of the coast of Slaunonia, and the other neere vnto Corfew: when vpon a suddaine came Octavius and Libo, Pompeys Lieutenants, and with great forces (they had aboard their shippes) surprized both the one and the other; whereby Antonius was constrained to yeeld vp fiftene Companies, which were these souldiers of Antonius heere mentioned.

Rasipolis, or Rasculpolis, was a Thracian of great fame, that followed Pompey; and his brother Rasculus tooke himselfe to Cæsar, vpon an appointment made betweene themselves: for, finding in the Countrey where they dwelt, two great Factions in opposition, & doubting which Partie to take, they diuided themselves; as the best approued part of Neutrallitie: And held likewise the same course, in the warre betwene Brutus and Octavius, continuing vnto the battell of Philippi. Vpon the issue whercof, Rasculus demanded no other reward for his seruice, then the life of his brother: which was easilie graunted.

This Bibulus, Pompeis high Admirall, was fellow Consull with Cæsar, in the yeer of Rome 694: but Cæsar so out-stript him in the managing of things, that he much suspected himselfe, as insufficient for the place: which made him keepe his house all that yeere. Whereupon came this Distich;

*Non Bibulo quicquam nuper, sed Cæsare factum:  
Nam Bibulo fieri Consule nil memini.*

CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth ouer into Greece, returneth his shipping to Brundisium. Octavius besiegeth Salones.



Cæsar, vpon his arriuall at Brundisium, called the souldiers together; and shewed them, that forasmuch as they were almost come to an end of all their labours and dangers, they would now be content to leaue willingly behind them their seruants and carriages in Italy, and goe aboard, cleere of those incumberments; to

the end, the greater number of souldiers might be taken in; and that they should expect the supplie of all these things, from victorie, & his liberality. Euery man cried out, That he should command what he would, and they would willingly obey it.

The second of the Nones of Iannary, he waied Anchor, hauing (as is formerly shewed) shipped seauen legions. The next day, he came to land at the Promontorie of Ceraunium, hauing got a quiet roade amongst the Rocks, and places of danger. For, doubting how he might safely venture vpon any of the knowne Ports of that Coast (which he suspected to be kept by the Enemy) he made choice of that place, which is called Phasalus: and there arriving in safetie with all his ships, he landed his souldiers.

At the same time, Lucrecius Vispillo, and Minutus Rufus (by order from Lælius) were at Orick, with eigheteene shippes of Asia: and M. Bibulus, was likewise at Corfew, with one hundred and tenne shippes. But neither of these two durst come out of the Port, although Cæsar had not in all about twelue shippes of warre, to wast him ouer; amongst which, he himselfe was imbarcked. Neither could Bibulus come soone enough, his shippes being vnready, and his Mariners ashore; for that Cæsar was descried neere the Continent, before there was any bruite of his comming in all those Regions. The souldiers being landed, hee sent backe the same night the shipping to Brundisium; that the other legions, and the Cavalrie, might be brought ouer.

Fufius Calenus, the Legat, had the charge of this seruice, and was to vse all celeritie in transporting ouer the legions: but setting out late, and omitting the opportunity of the night wind, they sailed of their purpose, & so returned back. For, Bibulus being certified at Corfew of Cæsars arriuall, and hoping to meete with some of the shippes of burthen, met with the emptie shippes, going backe to Brundisium: and hauing taken thirty of them, he wreacked his anger (conceiued through griefe and omission) and set them all on fire, consuming therein, both the Maisters, and the Mariners; hoping by the rigour of that punishment, to terrifie the rest.

This being done, hee posselt all the Coast, from Salones to Orick, with shippes and men of warre, appointing guardes with more ailligence then formerly hath been vsed. He himselfe, in the depth of Winter, kept watch a ship-board, not refusing any labour or duetie, nor expecting any succour, if he happened to meet with Cæsar. But after the departure of the Liburnian Gallies from Illyricum, M. Octavius, with such shippes as he had with him, came to Salones; and there hauing incited the Dalmatians, and other barbarous people, drew Isca from Cæsars partie. And finding that he could not moue them of Salones, neither with promise nor threatnings, he resolved to besiege the Towne. The Place was strong by nature, through the aduantage of a Hill; and the Romaine Cittizens (there inhabiting) had made towres of wood to fortifie it within: but finding themselves too weake to make resistance (being wearied out and spent with wroundes) they fell at length to the last refuge of all: which was, to enfranchize all their bond-slaves, about the age of fourteene yeeres; and cutting their womens haire, made Engines thereof.

O.

Their



## Obferuations vpon the third

Their resolution being knowne, Octavius incompassed the towne about with five Campes: and at one instant of time, beganne to force them by siege, and by assault. They, being resolved to vnder-goe all extremities, were much pressed through want of Corne; and there-upon, sending Messengers to Caesar, sought helpe of him: other inconueniences, they endured as they might.

And after a long time, when the continuance of the siege, had made the Octavianians remisse and negligent (taking the opportunitie of the noone time, when the Enemy was retired aside, and placing their children and women on the wall, that nothing might seeme omitted of that which was vsuall) they themselves, together with such as they had lately enfranchized, brake into the next Campe vnto the Towne. Which being taken, with the same violence they set vpon another, and then vpon the third, and so vpon the fourth, and in the end, vpon the fift; driuing the Enemy out of all the Campes: and, hauing slaine a great number, they forced Octavius, and the rest remaining, to betake them to their ships; and so the siege ended. For, Octavius, despairing to take the Towne, the Winter approaching, and hauing receiued such losses, retired to Pompey at Dyrrachium.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**T hath beene generally conceiued, that there is little or no vse of women in times of vvarre, but that they are a burthen to such as seek honour by deedes of Armes; and doe better sute the licentiousnesse of peace, then the dangers of warfare. Whereof Andromache is made an instance; from that which Homer reporteth of her teares, sighes, & praiers, to with-draw Hector from those valorous exploits, which hee vnder-tooke for the defence of Troy: and therefore, are by Ouid, wished to handle the distaffe and the spindle; and leaue the warre, as fitter for men, then the weakenesse of their Sex.

colūmque

*I cape cum calathis, et flamma pollice torque:  
Bella relinque viris.*

Neuerthelesse, it cannot be denied, that howsoeuer the tendernesse of women, doth require a pasciue course of life, vnder the shelter of a safe roofoe, rather then in the bleake stormes of actiue indeauour; yet there haue beene some Viragos, that haue ouer-topped the pride of men in points of war: amongst whom, Semiramis may leade the rest; together with Tomyris, Cyrus Mistresse by conquest. As also Zenobia, that subdued the Persians; and Helena, Queene of the Russes.

Besides other noble spirits, that could answere such as told them newes of the death of their sonnes in battell; That they had brought them into the world for that onely purpose. Which do proue, as well a reall as a potentiall aptnes of that Sex, to the vse and practice of Armes.

And

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And if any man (as vnwilling to afford them so much worth) will knowe wherein they auail the fortune of a Warre, he may take notice, that euen in expeditions (wherein they are most subiect to exceptions) they alwaies giue acceptable alsistances to their Husbands, both in their prouisions, and otherwise; and are such Companions, as can hardly be left at home, without danger of greater hazard.

But in places besieged, vwomen doe not onely afford haire to make ropes, if need require (as it tell out in this siege) but are able to cast peeces of Mill-stones vpon the Enemy, with better fortune some-times then any other man: and haue thereby slaine the Generall, to the raising of the siege, and sauing of the Citie.

But to take instances of later times: it is not to bee forgotten, that when the Arch-Duke Mathias (after the death of Count Mansfield) commaunded the Christian Armie, at the siege of Strigonium; while the Turkes, within the Castle, were making works for a retreat, the women (in the meane time) made good the breaches; and there bestowed such store of Wild-fire, that the Italian Squadrons (commaunded by Aldobrandine) being ioyned poldron to poldron, to peace into the breach, seemed all of a fire at once, and were forced to fall off with great terrour and confusion.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Towne assaulted by a warlike Enemy, is not kept or freed with Charmes or Spells; or as the Inhabitants of Tomby, in the East Indies, draue away the Portugalls, with Hiues of Bees, when they were possessed of the walls: but with such valour as may ouer-maister the Enemy, and extend it selfe to the taking of fiue Campes, if need require; which was performed by these Inhabitants of Salones.

### CHAP. III.

Caesar sendeth to Pompey, touching a Peace;  
taketh in Oricum, Apolonia, and  
other places.



It is before declared, that Vibullius Rufus (one of Pompeis Lieutenants) was twice taken by Caesar, and dismissed; once at Corfinium, and a second time in Spaine. Him did Caesar deeme (in regarde of the fauours which he had shewed him) to bee a fitt person, to bee sent with a Message to Pompey;

O 2.

Pompey;

Caesar.

Quod haustis  
qui vromi le-  
namentum?  
Tac. l. 3. Annal.  
Fix praenti  
custodia manere  
vlla conuenit  
eodem.

Iudg. 9.

Ann. 1595.

liad. 6.

12. Metam.

Insp. h. 1.  
Herodot. l. 2.  
Thucyd. l. 2.  
Sicym. l. 2.  
Metam.

Pompey; and the rather, for that hee understood, that hee was in good account and credite with him.

The summe of his Commission was, to tell him, That it becomed them both, to give an end to their vniuersall, to lay downe their Armes, and not to tempt Fortune any longer; either side had bene sufficiently afflicted with losse and damages: which might serue for instruction and example to auoide other inconveniences. Hee, for his part, was driuen out of Italy, with the losse of Sicily, Sardinia, with the two Prouinces of Spaine, as also of the Cohorts of Italie, together with one hundred & thirty cohorts of Romaine Cittizens in Spaine; himselfe, with the death of Curio, with the losse of the Affricane Armie, and with the rendry of the souldiers at Corfew: and therefore they should haue regard of themselves, and of the Common-wealth.

They had good experience by their owne losses, what Fortune could do in war. This was the onely time to treat of peace, whilst either Party stood confident in his owne strength, and seemed of equal might & power. But, if Fortune should chaunce to sway to one side, he that thought hee had the better end of the stasse, would neuer barken to any conditions of peace, nor content himselfe with a reasonable part, because his hope would giue him all.

Concerning the Articles of Treatie forasmuch as they could not agree thereof themselves, they ought to seeke them from the Senate and people of Rome. In the meane while, it was fitte that the Common-wealth and themselves should rest satisfied, if (without further delay) both of them did take an oath in the presence of their Armies, to dismisse their forces within three daies next following: and send away their Auxiliarie troopes, wherein they so relied; and consequently, to depend vpon the iudgement and decree of the people of Rome. For assurance whereof, on his behalfe, hee would presently discharge as well his forces in the field, as those in guarizon.

Vibullius, hauing receiued these instructions from Caesar (thinking it no lesse requisite to aduertise Pompey of Caesars arriual, that hee might consult of that, before he deliuered what hee had in charge) posted night and day, taking at euery stage fresh horse; that hee might certifie Pompey, that Caesar was at hand with all his forces.

Pompey was at that time in Caudania, and went out of Macedonia, to Winter in Apolonia, and at Dyrrachium. But, being troubled at the newes, he made towards Apolonia by great iourneyes, least Caesar should possesse himselfe of the maritimie Citties.


Caesar, hauing landed his forces, went the next day to Oricum. Vpon his approach, L. Torquatus, who commaunded the towne under Pompey, & had there a guarizon of Parthins, shutting the gates, went about to defend the place, commaunded the Grecians to take Armes, and make good the vualles. But they, refusing to fight against the power and authoritie of the people of Rome, and the townsmen indeauouring of their owne accord to receiue him in; hee opened the gates, despairing of all other succours, and gaue vp both himselfe and the towne to Caesar, and was entertained by him in safetie. Oricum being taken-in by Caesar, without any further delay he went to Apolonia.

His

His coming being heard of, L. Straberius, the Gouernour, began to carie vater into the Citadell, to fortifie it, and to require pledges of the inhabitants. They, on the other side, denied to giue any, or to shutte their gates against the Consul, or of themselves to take a resolution, contrary to that which all Italy & the people of Rome had thought conuenient. Their affections being knowne, he secretly conuained himselfe away. The Apolonians sent Commissioners to Caesar, and receiued him into the towne. The Beldinnes followed their example; and the Amatines, together with the rest of the consuing Citties. And to conclude, all Epirus sent vnto Caesar, promising to doe what he commaunded. But Pompey, vnderstanding of these things, which were done at Oricum and Apolonia, fearing Dyrrachium, posted thither night and day. Howbeit, vpon the report of Caesars approche, the Armie was so astonished, that for haste on their way, they left their Ensignes in Epirus, and the consuing Regions: and many of them (casting away their Armes) seemed rather to flie, then to march as souldiers.

As they came neere to Dyrrachium, Pompey made a stand, and caused the Campe to be intrenched, when-as yet the Army was so affrighted, that Labienus stood out first, and tooke a soleme oath, Neuer to forsake Pompey, but to vndergoe what chance soeuer Fortune had allotted him. The same oath tooke the Legates; being likewise seconded by the Tribunes of the souldiers, and Centurions, and by all the Army, that tooke the like oath.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

 Num est tempus (saith Caesar) de pace agendi, dum vterque sibi confidit, et pares ambo videntur. Which may serue for an excellent Rule, to point out the fittest & seasonablest time, for composition betweene two opposite Parties. For, as in quantities, equality begetteth equalitie, and disparitie, alike vneuenesse of nature: so, in other things: as namely, in Treaties of Agreement, the conditions doe commonly rise to either Partie, according as they stand ballanced in the scale of Equalitie; or otherwise, as the difference of their meanes shall allot the. For, if that be true in the extremitie, which Curtius hath, That Lawes are given by Conquerers, and accepted vpon all conditions, by them that are subdued; it doth consequently follow in the Meane, that men find dealing proportionable to their fortune. To which purpose is that of Plato, where he saith, That Peace and Quietnes consist in equalitie; as Trouble and Motion are alwaies in inequality.

Leges à victoribus dicuntur; accipiuntur à victis. lib. 4. Quietem, in æqualitate; motum, in inæqualitate, semper constitutum in Timæo.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**T appeareth heere, by the fright and astonishment of Pompeis Armie, that the course he tooke to abandon Italie, was out of no good aduice or direction. For, where he might with farre more honour, and no lesse hope of successe, haue contested with Cæsar, in the place where the warre brake out, and kept him to a taske which should haue held him from the conquest of Spaine, or such other atchieuements as he easilie wrought in the absence of his Aduersaries: it fell out, that his departure into Greece, sorted to no other end, then by time to abate the edge of the forwardest courages, and to suffer a numerous Armie, to be daunted with noise and clamors of continuall victories, gotten vpon a part of themselves; and then to giue occasion to the Conquerour to come in the taile of Fame, and take them disarmed of expectation, to their great amazement.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar tooke vp his lodging for Winter. Bibulus, distressed at Sea for want of provisions, seemed desirous of a Treatie: which, being caried on the other side with good caution, brake off againe.

**C**æsar, vnderstanding that his passage to Dyrrachium was thus intercepted, did forbear his haste, and incamped himselfe vpon the Riuer Apfus, in the confines of the Apoloniens; that by the meanes of his Guards and Forts, such Citities as had well deserved of him, might be in safety: & there determined to winter, in Tents of skinn, and to attend the comming of his other legions out of Italy. The like did Pompey, pitching his Campe on the other side of the Riuer Apfus; and there assembled all his troopes and forraigne aydes. Calenus, hauing (according to Cæsars directions) imbarked the legions, and Cavalrie at Brundisium, and taken in as many as his shipping would containe, he set saile: but being gone a little out of the Port, hee received Letters of aduice from Cæsar, that all the Hauens and the Sea-coast was kept with the Enemies fleet. Where-upon, hee made againe into the Hauens, and called backe all the shippes: onely one, holding on her course, without regard of the command, carying no souldiers, but belonging to priuate men, arrived at Oricum, and there was taken by Bibulus; who spared neither bond nor free, of as many as were of age, but put all to the sword. Whereby it happened, that in a moment of time, by great chaunce the whole Army was saved.

Bibulus, as is before declared, lay at Oricum with his Nauie. And as hee kept

the Sea and the Ports from Cæsar; so was hee kept from landing in any of those Countries: for, all the Sea-coast was kept by Guardes and Watches, set along the shore, that he could neither water, get wood, nor bring his shippes to land vpon any occasion: In somuch as hee was brought into great straightnes and exigent, for want of all necessaries; and was constrained (besides all other provisions) to fetch his water and wood from Corfew. And one time amongst the rest, it happened, that the weather being foule, they were forced to relieue themselves, with the deaw which in the night time fell vpon the skinnes, that covered the Decks of the shippes. All which extremities they patiently indured; and would by no meanes be brought to leaue the Ports, or abandon the Sea-coast.

But as they were in these difficulties, and that Libo, and Bibulus were come together, they both of them spake from a ship-board, to M. Acilius, and Statius Marco, Legates (of whom one was Gouenour of the Towne, & the other had the charge of such Guardes as were along the shore) signifying, that they would willingly talke with Cæsar, of matters of great consequence, if they might haue leaue. For a better shew and assurance whereof, they intimated some thing concerning a Composition. In the meane time, they earnestly desired there might be a truce: for, the thing they propounded, imported matter of great weight, which they knew Cæsar exceedingly affected; and it was thought that Bibulus was able to worke some what to that purpose.

Cæsar at that time, was gone with one legion to take in some townes further off, and to set a course for provision of Corne, which was brought sparingly vnto him; and was then at Buthrot, opposite to Corfew. Being certified there by Letters from Acilius and Marco, of that which Libo and Bibulus had required, he left the legion, and returned himselfe to Oricum. At his arriuall thither, they were called out to treat. Libo came forth, and excused Bibulus, for that he was exceeding cholericke, and had besides conceived a great anger at Cæsar, about the Aedilitie and Pratorship: and in regard of that, he did shyn the Conference, least a matter of that vtility and importance, should be disturbed by his intemperate cariage. Pompey is, and was euer desirous, that matters might be accorded, and that Armes might be laid aside; but they, of themselves, could doe nothing therein; forasmuch as by the generall resolution of a Councell, the superintendency of the warre, and the disposition of all things, were referred to Pompey: Howbeit, when they vnderstood what Cæsar required, they would send instantly a dispatch vnto Pompey, and be a meanes that he should accomplish all things with good satisfaction. In the meane time, let there be a truce; and vntill an answer might be returned from him, let neither Partie offend one another. To this he added some what concerning the Cause in question. To which, Cæsar did not thinke it fit at that time to make any answer: nor doe we thinke there is cause now to make mention thereof.

Cæsar required, that it might bee lawfull for him, to send Embassadors to Pompey without danger; and that they would undertake, that such as he sent, might be well intreated, or take them into their charge, and bring them safely to Pompey. Concerning the Truce, the course of the warre fell out to be so caried, that they, with their Nauie, did keepe his ships and succours from comming vnto him;

him; and he, on the other side, did prohibite them from landing, or taking in fresh water: and if they would haue that granted vnto them, let them cease guarding of the Coast; but if they would continue that, then would he continue the other. Notwithstanding, hee thought the Treatie of accord might goe on, albeit these were not omitted; for, he tooke them to be no impediment thereto. They would neither receiue Cæsars Embassadors, nor undertake for their safeties; but referred the whole matter to Pompey: onely they instanced, and very vehemently urged the Truce. But Cæsar, perceiuing that all this speech tended onely to auoid the present danger, and to supply themselves of such wants where-with they were straightned, and that there was no condition of peace to be expected, he began to thinke of prosecuting the warre.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



**I**n contraſting with a Partie, it is duly to be cared, that War be not shrowded vnder the faire name of Peace; so a Truce demanded by an Enemy, is to be handled sparingly & with suspition: as a thing neuer commonly required, but when necessity doth moue them thereto; and not to be granted, but as it may inferre the like aduantage. But to yeeld to a suspension of Armes, aduantageous to an Enemy, & no way gainefull to them that consent vnto it, is neither allowable by reason, nor Cæsars example. And if occasion proue it requisite, it must be but for a little time: for, a Prince armed in the field, that shall entertaine a Truce for any long season, shall see his Armie consumed both in courage, and in the parts thereof, which will fall afunder of themselves; and was the meanes by which Lewis, the eleuenth, put-by Edward the fourth, king of England, from going on with a warre that might haue giuen him the possession of the Crowne of France. Whence it is, that such as seeke a Peace, desire no more then a cessation of Armes, for some reasonable time, as an introduction enforcing the same.

Concerning leagues, we are to note that there are found three differences. The first, is a league of Peace: which by the Apostles rule, should extend to all men, *Habete pacem cum omnibus*: and by example of holy Patriarches (Iſack with Abimelech, Iacob with Laban) may lawfully bee made with Heathen Princes; beeing as the golden chaine, that tieth all the Nations of the earth in peaceable communitee. The second, is a league of Entercourse, or Commerce; which is likewise by the same Patriarch, sending for Come into Egypt, and Salomons entercourse, with Hiram king of Tyre, together with diuers other examples, allowable with Infidels. For, Nature, being rich in variety of commodities, doth therefore diuide her workes amongst the kingdomes of the earth, that there might be a mutuall entercourse of exchange, betweene the partes of the same. The third, is a league of mutuall Assistance; such as Iſtophat made with Achab: & is hardly safe with any Prince; but no way allowable with Infidels.

Touching

Touching the Persons to be offered in a Treatie, it is to bee obserued from Bibulus, that no man, whose presence may either giue offence, or whose intemperance may any way interrupt a courtie sorting to a happy issue, is fit for any such imployment.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



**H**ere were, in Rome, certaine Officers called *Aediles*, ab *Aedibus*; as hauing the care of houses & buildings, both publique and priuate, that they might be built and maintained in such manner as was agreeable to the ordinances of that State, together with other things whereof they had the charge. *Nunc sum designatus Aedilis* (saith Cicero) *habeo rationem quod a populo Romano acceperim, mihi ludos sanctissimos maxima cum cerimonia, Cereri Liberoque faciendos. Mihi Floram Matrem populo plebique Romanae, ludorum celebritate placandam: mihi ludos antiquissimos qui primi Romani sunt nominati, maxima cum dignitate ac religione, Ioui, Iunoni, Minervaeque esse faciendos. Mihi sacrarum Aedium procuracionem; mihi totam urbem tuendam esse commissam, ob earum rerum laborem et solitudinem fructus illos datos, antiquiorem in senatu sententia dicenda locum. Togam pretextam, cellam curulem, ius imaginis, ad memoriam posteritatemque prodendam.* Wherein it is to be noted, that these shewes and Plaies, were alwaies made and set forth at the charge and costs of the Aediles: and thence it was, that the allowing or disallowing of all Play-bookes belonged vnto them. Moreover, they had the charge of all the publique buildings and works of the Citie, together with the prouision of victuall and Corne. And, for the misling of this office, was Bibulus angry with Cæsar; and would not be regained vpon any condition.

In Verrem.

The publication of their secular Plaies, was cried in these words: *Conuenite ad ludos spectandos, quos neque spectant quicquam nec spectaturus est. Sueto. in Claudio.* *Nolentis amicis exere, difficile. Xenop. de factis et dict. Socratis.*

CHAP. VI.

Bibulus dieth. Cæsar vseth meanes to procure a Treaty of Peace; but preuaileth not.



**B**ibulus, beeing kept from landing many daies together, and fallen into a grieuous sicknesse, through cold and extreame labour (and hauing no meanes of help, nor yet willing to forgoe his charge) could no longer withstand the violence of the disease. Hee beeing dead, there was none appointed to take his charge; but every man commanded his owne fleet. The hurly burly beeing quieted, which Cæsars suddaine arrivall had moued, Vibullius, with the assistance of Libo, together with L. Lucceius, and Theophanes, to whom

Cæsar.

whom Pompey was wont to communicate matters of greatest importance, resolved to deliuer what Caesar had recommended vnto him: & entering into the relation thereof, was interrupted by Pompey, forbidding him to speake any further of that matter. What use or neede haue I (saith he) either of my life, or of the City, when I shall be thought to enioy it by Caesars fauour? neither can the opinion thereof be remoued, vntill the warre be ended; that of my selfe I returne backe into Italy, from whence I am come.

Caesar vnderstood this, from those that were present when hee spake it: and yet notwithstanding, hee indeauoured by other meanes, to procure a Parlee of peace. For, the two Campes of Pompey and Caesar, were onely separated by the Riuer Apfus, that ranne betweene them; where the souldiers had often Colloquies, & by agreement amongst themselves, threw no weapon during the time of their treatie. Where-vpon, he sent P. Vatinius, a Legat, to the Riuer banke, to utter such things as did chiefly concerne a Peace; and to aske oftentimes with a loud voice, Whether it were not lawfull for Cittizens, to send to Cittizens, touching a treaty of peace? being a thing permitted to the Thienes of the Pyreneian Mountaines: or at least, to moue that Cittizens should not in Armes contend with Cittizens? And hauing spoken much very respectfully, as well concerning his owne well-fare, as the safetie of all the rest, he was heard with silence, by the Souldiers on both sides.

At length, it was answered from the other Party, that A. Varro did offer himselfe for a conference the next day; so that the Commissioners on both sides, might come and goe in safety, and deliuer freely their opinions: for which, a certaine time was then appointed. The next day, great multitudes of either side, presented themselves at the place assigned; and great was the expectation thereof, euery man seeming to incline to peace. Out of which troope stept fourth T. Labienus, and spake softly touching the peace: and at last, entered into altercation with Vatinius. In the middle of their speech, were weapons suddenlie cast from all parts: which hee auoided, beeing covered and defended with Armes. Notwithstanding, many were wounded; and amongst others, Cornelius Balbus, M. Plotius, L. Tiburtius, Centurions, besides many other souldiers. Then said Labienus, Leane off, therefore, to speake of any composition: for, vnlesse Caesars head be brought, there can be no peace.

## OBSERVATIONS.



His small peece of the Storie, containeth diuers notable passages of extremitie, in the cariage of Pompey, and others of his Partizans. As first (to take them as they lie) that of vvilfulnesse in Bibulus: who neither sicknesse, nor despaire of helpe, could moue to intermit the taske he had vnderaken; but chose rather to suffer vnto death, in approuing his zeale to the Cause, then to giue himselfe a breathing time for the sauing of his life: and may serue to admonish any other Bibulus, to value his life about that, which a stiffe and wilfull opinion may leade him vnto, beyond the measure of honorable

honourable indeauour, or what elie may any way be iustly expected; least in struiuing to doe much, hee happen to doe nothing: for, that cannot be vnderstood to bee vwell done in an other mans behalfe, that is not well done in his owne.

The second, is Pompeis resolution; beeing so extreame, as no composition, or other thing whatsoever, could giue him satisfaction, but onely a victorious end of that warre. Our prouerbe saith, Better a leane agreement, then a fat remedie. And the casualties of warre, may moue an experienced Commaunder, to imbrace a safe and quiet peace; as knowing, that he that goeth about to vex another, shall haue his turne of suffering the like misseases: and as warre beginneth, when one partie listeth, so it endeth, when the other side plealeth.

— facilis descensus Auernei:  
Sed reuocare gradum, superasque evadere ad oras,  
Hoc opus, hic labor est.

And therefore, let no Commaunder, how great soeuer, refuse all peace, but that which is bought by extremitie of warre; least the euent (whereof there can be no assurance) fall out as it happened to Pompey: but rather with the vse, let him learne the end of Armes: which is, to make straight that which is crooked; and out of discord and dissension, to draw meanes of a happie peace.

To which may be added, that other of Labienus, as farre in extremitie as either of the former; whom nothing would satisfie but Caesars head. It cannot be denied, but that he strooke at the roote; for, his head, was the head of that warre. But to say it, rather then to doe it, was no argument of Labienus worthinesse. For, as Polybius noteth; It is common to most men to magnifie themselves, with words full of wind: yea, and more then that, to follow their designs with impetuous violence. But, to direct their vndertakings to a successfull issue, and to remoue by industrie, or prouidence, such hinderances as happen to trauerse their hopes, is granted but to a few; and now denied to Labienus, notwithstanding this Brauado. And therefore, let such Commaunders, as are in good opinion and esteeme with their Generall, bee well wary of imbarcking their partie in any cause, further then may beecome the wisdom and experience of iudicious Leaders; as belieuing in that of Metellus to king Bocchus: Omne bellum sumi facile, ceterum acerrime desinere: non in eiusdem potestate initium eius et finem esse: incipere cuius etiam ignauo licere; deponi, cum victores velint.

*Frustra sapit,  
qui sibi non sapit.*

*Aeneid. 6.*

*Lib. 16.*

*Successum fortuna, experientiam laus sequitur Varro, ex Gellio.*

*Salust.*

## CHAP. VII.

Cælius Rufus, moueth sedition in Italie,  
and is slaine.

**A**T the same time, M. Cælius Rufus, the Prator at Rome, vnder-taking the business of debts, in the beginning of his Magistracie, placed his seate by the Chaire of C. Trebonius, Prator of the towne; promising to be assisting to any man, that would appeale vnto him, concerning valuation and payment to be performed by Arbitrators, according as Cæsar had ordained. But it came to passe, as well through the equity and indifferencie of the Decree, as through the lenitie of Trebonius (who was of opinion, that those times required an easie and milde execution of iustice) that none were found, from whom the beginning of the Appeale might growe, for to pretend povertie, or to complaine of particular misfortune, and of the calamity of those times; or otherwise, to propound the difficulties of selling their goods by an out-rope, was euery mans practice: but for any man to acknowledge himselfe to bee in debt, and yet to keepe his possessions whole and vntouched, was held a very strange impudencie: so that there was no man found that would require it.

Moreover, Cælius caried a very hard hand, to such as should haue receiued benefite thereby. And hauing made this enturance (to the end he might not seeme to haue vnderooke a shamefull or dishonest cause) he published a law, that there should be no Interest paid, for any Monies let out vpon consideration, for thirtie fixe daies of the time agreed on. But when he perceived, that Seruilius the Consul, and the rest of the Magistrates did oppose themselves against him, therein, and finding it not to sort with his expectation (to the end hee might incite and stirre vp the humours and spirits of men) hee abrogated that law, and in steede thereof, made two others. The one, which cut off the yeerely rents that Tenants were accustomed to pay their Land-lords, for the houses they dwelt in: and the other, Touching new assurances, and the abolishing of old debts. Where vpon, the multitude ranne violently vpon him, and (hauing hurt diuers that stood about him) pulled him out of his Chaire.

Of these things, Seruilius the Consul made relation to the Senate: who ther-vpon decreed, That Cælius should be removed fro his Pratorship. And by means of that Arrest, the Consul interdicted him the Senate, and also drew him from the Speaking Place, as he went about to make a speech to the people. Cælius, moued with shame and despight, made as though hee would goe to Cæsar; but sent Messengers secretly to Milo, condemned to banishment for killing Clodius. And hauing recalled him into Italy, that by great gifts and reuwards had gained to his party the remainder of the Company of Fencers, hee ioyned himselfe with him: and then sent him before to Thurin, to excite and stirre vp the Shepheards to sedition; he himselfe going to Casselline.

At

At the same instant, his Ensignes and Armes being staied at Capua, besides his family suspected at Naples, and their attempt against the towne, perceiued; their other designes being discovered, and their Partizans shut out of Capua: fearing some danger, so far as much as the inhabitants had tooke Armes, and held him as an Enemy, hee let fall his former determination, and brake off his iourney.

In the meane while, Milo, hauing sent Letters to the Municipall townes, that what he did, was by the authority and commandement of Pompey, according as he receiued it from Bibulus, he applied himselfe, and solicited such as were in debt: with whom preuailing nothing, hee brake vp diuers prisons, and began to assault Cosa in Thurin: & there he was slaine by Q. Pedius the Prator, with a stone which he cast from the vvall.

Cælius, going on (as he gaue out) towards Cæsar, hee came to Tury, where, when he had moued diuers of the inhabitants, and promised money to the French and Spanish Caualrie, which Cæsar had put there for a Guarizon, he was in the end slaine by them. And so the beginning of great Matters, which put all Italy in feare and trouble, by the indirect practises of the Magistrates, and the iniquitie of the times, had a speedy and easie end.

## OBSERVATIONS.



**I**T is to be noted, for the better vnderstanding these Passages, that of those which were chosen Prators, the two chiefest remained at Rome; the one, to administer iustice to the Cittizens, which was called *Prator Urbanus*, who in the abience of the Consul, had the superintendencie of the affaires of the State, assembled the Senate, receiued Packets, made Dispatches, and gaue order in all things: which place was now supplied by Trebonius. The other was called *Prator Peregrinus*: whose office was, to order the causes and lites of forrainers and strangers; where vnto Cælius was chosen: and, beeing of a turbulent and vnquiet spirit, tooke occasion vpon this rent in the State, to raise new garboiles, fit for his owne purposes; as hauing learned, what Aristotle teacheth, That all things which are already stirred, are more easly moued, then other natures, that are yet in quiet. And there-vpon, hauing power by his office, to decide causes of Controuersie, hee remoued his Tribunall, and placed it hard-by where Trebonius saie, to the end he might oppose the Decrees he made, for the prising of goods, to satisfie Creditors, and draw the people to appeale vnto him; publishing with-all, certaine dangerous Edicts, on the behalfe of those that were in debt.

This Cælius was Ciceros scholler, for Oratorie; and in the opinion of Quintilian, was thought worthy to haue liued longer, if he had been of a staied and settled cariage; but now must stand for an example of a wilfull Magistrate.

Touching *Rostra*, which I haue translated the Speaking-place, it was a part of their Forum, where the Consuls, and other Magistrates, spake vnto the people, wherein was built a Chaire or Pulpit, of the beake-heads of ships,

P.

which

Gnomia com-  
ta facilius quam  
quiescentia mo-  
uuntur. De Me-  
chanica.

Liuie, lib. 8.

## Obferuations vpon the third

which the Romaines tooke from the *Antiatij*, and there-vpon tooke the name of *Roftra*; memorable amongst other things, for-that Antonie fetre Tullies head betweene his two hands, in the Chaire, where he had often fopken moft eloquently, and with as many good words, as were euer found in humane Oratorie.

### CHAP. VIII.

*Libo* taketh an Iland right ouer-againft the Hauen of *Brundufum*; and is beaten off by a stratagem.



*Libo*, departing from *Oricum*, with his flete of fifty fhippes, came to *Brundufum*, and tooke an Iland, which lieth ouer-againft the Hauen, as a place of great importance, by which our Army muft neceffarily come forth: & fhutting in all the Ports, and parts of that fhore, as alfo fuprizing by his fudaine comming, certaine fhippes of burthen, hee fetre all on fire, fawing one laden with Corne, which hee tooke along with him. Whereby he put our men into a great feare; and landing certaine fouldiers and horfemen in the night time, hee diflodged the Cavalrie that were there in Guarifon: and fo preuailed, through the aduantage of the Place, as hee writ to Pompey, that he might draw the other fhipping on fhore, and new trimme them; for, hee would vnder-take, with his flect alone, to hinder thofe forces from comming to *Cæfar*.

*Antonius* was then at *Brundufum*: and trufting to the valour of the fouldiers, armed out threefcore Skiffes, belonging to great Shippes; and fencing them with hurdles and planks, put certaine choise fouldiers in them, difpofing them in feuerall places along the fhore: and further comaunded two *Triremes* (which hee had caufed to bee made at *Brundufum*, for the exercife of the fouldiers in rowing) to goe out to the mouth of the Hauen.

*Libo*, perceiving thefe to come out fome-what loofely, and hoping to intercept them, fent out fise *Quadriremes* to attack them: which were no fooner come neere vnto our fhippes, but the old fouldiers that were aboard, fledde backe into the Port.

The Enemy, caried on with a defire of taking them, preaced after fomerwhat rafhly, and vnaduifedly: when at length, vpon a fignall giuen, the Skiffes came fuddainely out from all parts, fetre vpon them, and at the firft fhock tooke one of the *Quadriremes*, with all the oare-men and fouldiers in her; the reft they compelled to flie away fhamefully. To which loffe, this was further added, that they were kept from water, by the Cavalry which *Antonius* had difpofed along the Coaft: through neceffity whereof (as alfo by reafon of the ignominie received) *Libo* departed from *Brundufum*, and gaue ouer the fieg.

Many

## Commentary of the Ciuill Warres.

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Many moneths were now paff, and the Winter came hard on, and yet neither the fhipping nor the legions, came from *Brundufum* to *Cæfar*. And fome opportunities feemed to be omitted, for that the wind was good oftentimes; which *Cæfar* thought they would haue taken. And the longer they ftaid there, the ftraighter was all the Coaft guarded and kept, by fuch as commaunded the flect; beeing now in great hope to hinder their paffage. Which they did the rather in-deauour, becaufe they were oftentimes reprocured by Letters from Pompey, for that they did not impeach *Cæfars* comming at firft: which hee did to make them the more carefull, to hinder thofe fupplies. And, in attending fo from day to day an opportunity of paffage, it would waxe worfe & worfe, the winds growing more eafie and gentle.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**B**Y how much eafier it is to keepe the out-let of one Port, then to guard the Coaft of a large Country: by fo much was *Libo* more likely to preuaile, in seeking to fhut vp the Hauen of *Brundufum*, to hinder thefe fupplies from coming vnto *Cæfar*; then the other, that went about to guard all the Maritime parts of *Epirus*, to keepe them from landing, after they were at Sea.

But fuch is the vncertaintie of enterprifes of warre, that albeit our courfe be rightly fhapen, yet it doth often faile of leading vs to that which is defired. For, howfoeuer hee was poffeffed of this Iland, that lay thwart the mouth of the Hauen, and had thruft out the guard of horfemen, and fo became confident of blocking vp the Port: yet there was means found by the aduerfe Partie, to giue him fuch an affront, as made him quit the place with more difhonour, then could be recompenced by anything hee got.

Incerte sunt res bellica. Thucid.

### CHAP. IX.

*Cæfars* fupplies paffe ouer into Greece, and take landing.



*Cæfar*, troubled at thefe things, writ very fharpely to them at *Brundufum*, not to omit the opportunity of the next good wind, but to put to Sea, and to fhape their courfe to *Oricum*, or to the Coaft of *Apollonia*; becaufe there they might runne their fhips on ground: & thefe places were freeft from Guardes, by reafon they could not ride farre from the Ports. They, according to their accuftomed courage and valour (*Marcus Antonius*, and *Eufius Calenus* directing the bufineffe, and the Souldiours them-felues beeing forwarde there-vnto, as refufing no danger for *Cæfars* fake) hauing

*Cæfar*.

P 2.

got



got a South vwind, waied Anchor, and the next day, passed by Apolonia and Dyrrachium: but beeing discovered from the Continent, Quintus Coponius, Admirall of the Rhodian Nauie, lying at Dyrrachium, brought his shippes out of the Hauens. And as he had almost (vpon a slack wind) ouer-taken our men, the same South wind began at length to blowe stiffe, by which meanes they escaped: yet did not he desist from pursuing them; but was in hope, by the labour & industrie of the Mariners, to ouer-way the force of the tempest, and followed them, notwithstanding they were past Dyrrachium, with a large wind. Our men vsing the fauour of Fortune, were neuer thelesse afraid of the Enemies Nauie, if the wind should chance to slacke: & hauing got the Port called Nimphaum, three miles beyond Lissus, they put in with their shippes.

This Port lay sheltered from the South-west vwind, but was not safe from a South vwind: howsoeuer, they accounted an ill roade lesse dangerous then the Enemies fleet: & yet they were no sooner put in, but the wind (which had blown southerly for two daies together) did now most happily come about to the South-west.

And heere a man may see the suddaine alteration of Fortune; for, they which of late stood in feare of a dangerous Roade, were now by that occasion, receiued into a safe harbour: and those which threatned danger to them, were forced to bethinke themselves of their owne safetie. So that the time thus changing, saved our Partie, and sunke theirs. Insomuch, as sixteene of the Rhodian shippes were all shaken in peeces, and perished with shipwrack: and of the great number of oare-men and souldiers, part were dashed against the Rocks & slaine, and part were taken up by our men: all which, Caesar sent home in safetie. Two of our shippes comming short, and ouer-taken with the night, and not knowing where the rest had taken shore, stood at an Anchor, right ouer against Lissus. Them did Otacilius Crassus, Gouvernour of Lissus, goe about to take with Skiffes, and other little shippes, which he had prepared for that purpose; & withall, treated with them, of yeelding themselves, promising life and safety, vpon that condition.

One of the shippes carried two hundred and twentie men, of the legion made of young souldiers; in the other, were lesse then two hundred old souldiers. And heere a man may see, what assurance and safety consisteth in courage and valour of mind; for, the new made souldiers, terrified with the multitude of shippes that came against them, and spent with Sea-sickness, vpon oath made not to receiue any hurt, did yield themselves to Otacilius: vho, being brought all vnto him, were contrary to his oath, most cruelly slaine in his sight. But the souldiers of the old Legions (howsoeuer afflicted with the inconuenience of the tempest, and noisomnesse of the Pompe) did not slacke any thing of their ancient valour: for, hauing drawen out the first part of the night in conditions of treatie, as though they meant to yeeld themselves, they compelled the Maister to runne his shippe a-shore: and hauing got a conuenient place, they there spent the rest of the night.

As soone as it was day, Otacilius sent foure hundred horse, which had the guard of that part of the coast, with others of the guarizon, to assault and take them:

them: but they, valiantly defending themselves, slew diuers of them; and so got to our men in safetie. Where-vpon, the Romaine Cittizens, residing in Lissus (vvhich towne, Caesar had formerly giuen them to bee kept and guarded) receiued in Antonius, and assisted him with all things needfull. Otacilius, fearing himselfe, fled out of the towne, and came to Pompey.

Antonius sent backe the greatest part of the shippes that had brought ouer his troopes (vvhich were three legions of old souldiers, one of new souldiers, and eight hundred horse) to transport the rest of the souldiers and horse, that remained at Brundisium: leauing the Pontones, which are a kind of French shipping, at Lissus; to this end, that if happely Pompey, thinking Italy to be emptie and vn-furnished, should carry ouer his Army thither, Caesar might haue meanes to follow him: and withall, sent Messengers speedily to Caesar, to let him knowe where the Armie was landed, and what men he had brought ouer.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



**D**olus an virtus quis in hoste requirit, is not so iustifiable by the lawes of true vertue, as that of Achilles; who professed to hate that man more then the gates of hell, that promised one thing, and purposed another. Neither do the Iurists conclude otherwise; hauing, for the more apparencie of truth, drawne it to a Question, *An perfidia in perfidum vri, Ius sit?* alleaging Labienus practice, against Comius of Arras, together with that which admitteth no Answer, that their example standeth as a president, to deale with them, as they deale with others. But, to falsifie religion, as Otacilius did, and to make an oath the Broker of vnworthy ends, is abhorred by God and Man, and accordingly succedeth.

The most remarkable instance in this kind, is that (which is to be wished were forgotten) of Lewis King of Hungaria: who, hauing concluded the honourablest peace, that euer Christian Prince had before that time made, with any of the Turkish Sultanes, and confirmed the same by an oath, taken vpon the holy Euangelist, did neuer thelesse, at the perswasion of Iulian, a Cardinall (who tooke vpon him, by power from the Pope, to dissannull the league, & absolve him from the oath) breake the peace, & gaue battell to Amurath at Varna (where the Infidell tooke occasion impiously to blasphem, in calling for vengeance on such, as in their deedes had denied the God-head of their most sacred and blessed Lord) and was there slaine, to the vtter ruine of his kingdom, and the reproche of Christian Name. Neither did the Cardinall escape the vengeance, which his treacherie had drawne vpon that roiall Armie: but beeing there wounded vnto death, was found lying in the high way, by *Gregorie Sanose*, ready to giue vp the ghost; & seemed but to stay to take with him, the bitter curses of such as passed by, flying from the battell, as the due reward of his perfidious absolution.

Aenead. 2.  
Homers 9. Iliad.

Hirtius lib. 8.  
de bello Gallico.

Plad. 1. 1. 1.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**I**N case of difficultie and hazard (as Cæsar noteth) there is alwaies great helpe in a good courage. For, whether it be, that good hap attendeth a valourous cariage, or that vertue bee able to remoue all opposition, or what other cause there is besides; but thus it falleth out, that such as entertaine a noble resolution, are euer safest in extremitie of perill; and in steed of losse, get honour and renewne.

Brafidas found a Mouse amongst dried figs, which bit him so that hee let her goe, and there-vpon said, to those that stood by; That there was nothing so little, that could not saue it selfe, if it had a hart to defend it selfe against such as assaulted it.

And herein we may obserue that to be true, which the Poet hath deliuered; *Seris venit usus ab annis*: Time and Practice, doe much auaille to perfit this courage in the mindes of Men of Warre; as knowing afore-hand the weight of such labours, and hauing incountered the like dangers, euen to the redeeming of themselves from the iawes of death. Whence it is, that the Comick saith, No man can possibly come so well furnished to any course of life, but that time and experience doe alwaies teach him what he knew not before: where-as others, that goe rawlie to worke, are so daunted with the vnusuall lookes of war, as they (forgetting the profession of Armes) doe run head-long into the danger they seeke to auoid; being able to giue no other account of their seruice, but that they marched Many bodies, and but a few Men.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**B**lutarch, Valerius Maximus, Appian, Suetonius, and Lucan, doe all write, that Cæsar, impatient of the stay of his forces at Brundisium, imbarcked himselfe in a small Frigate, of twelue oares, disguised in the habit of a slaue, and put to sea to fetch his Legions; notwithstanding, all the Coast swarmed with the Enemies shipping: but meeting with a cōtrarie wind, which would not suffer him to get out of the River Anius, the Maister commaunded the Mariners to cast about, and get to shore. Where-vpon, Cæsar discovering himselfe, encouraged him to goe forward, for-that he carried Cæsar and his fortunes.

The Maister, forgetting all danger, made out againe, to get to sea; but was by force of the tempest driuen to returne, to Cæsars great grieefe. And albeit there is no mention made heereof in these Commentaries, yet the authoritie of so many graue Authors, is not to be contemned.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

Cæsar hasteth to meet with Antonius, and preuenteth Pompey.



Cæsar and Pompey, had both intelligence, almost at one instant of time, of Antonius fleet; for, they saw it passe by Apollonia, and Dyrrachium, and directed their iourneys along the Coast after them: but they vnderstood not for a while where they were landed. Howbeit, hauing notice thereof, either of them tooke a contrarie resolution. For, Cæsar purposed to ioyne with Antonius, as soone as possibly he might: and Pompey resolved to hinder their meeting, and by ambushments (if he could) to set vpon them at vnawares.

The same day, either of them drew their Armie out of their standing Camps, vpon the River Apfus: Pompey secretly, and by night; Cæsar openly, and by day: but Cæsar had the greater circuit to fetch, and a longer iourney to goe up the River, to find a Foord. Pompey, hauing a ready way, and no River to passe, made towards Antonius by great iourneys: and when hee vnderstood that hee came neere vnto him, chose a conuenient place, and there bestowed his forces; keeping euery man within the Campe, and forbidding fires to be made, that his coming might be the more hidden. Whereof Antonius beeing presently aduertised by the Greekes, he dispatched Messengers to Cæsar, and kept himselfe one day within his Campe. The next day, Cæsar came vnto him. Vpon notice thereof, Pompey left that place; least he should be intrapped betwene two Armies, and came with all his forces to Asparagus (which appertained to them of Dyrrachium) and there, in a conuenient place, pitched his Campe.

OBSERVATIONS.



Here two Armies are in a Country, and one of them hath succours comming to renforce them, each of those Parties, are by the example of these glorious Commanders (*cæteris paribus*) to make towards those succours: the one, to cut them off; and the other, to keepe the standing. And to that end, it futed Pompeis condition to go secretly; howsoeuer Cæsar noteth it, as a touch to his valour: so on the other side, it stood not onely well enough with Cæsars Party, to goe openly, but also was an argument of his courage and magnanimity, and might raise him estimation in the opinion of the Greekes. The disadvantage which Pompey could take thereby, was the danger to bee inclosed with Armies: which he, foreseeing, auoided.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

Scipios preparation in Asia, to come into Greece, to assist Pompey.



**A**Bout this time, Scipio, hauing sustained diuers losses, nere the Mount Amanum, did neuerthelesse call himselfe by the name of Imperator; and, there-upon, commanded great summes of money to be leuied of the Citties and Potentates of those quarters: taking, fro the generall Receiueis of that Prouince, all the Monies that were in their hands for two yeeres past, and commanding them to disburse (by way of loane) the recit for the yeere to come; and requiring horsemen to be leuied throughout all the Prouince. Hauing gathered these together, hee left the Parthians, being neere Enemies vnto him (who a little before had slaine M. Crassus, the Generall, and besieged M. Bibulus) and drew the legions out of Syria; being sent specially thither to keepe and settle that Prouince, much amuzed through feare of the Parthian vvarre.

At his departure, some speeches were giuen-out by the souldiers, that if they were ledde against an Enemy, they would goe; but against a Cittizen and Consul, they would not beare Armes. The Army being brought to Pergamum, and there garizoned for that Winter in diuers rich Citties, he distributed great largesse and gifts; and for the better assuring of the souldier vnto him, gaue them certaine Citties to risle.

In the meane time, he made bitter and heauie exactions of money, throughout all the Prouince: for, he put a tribute vpon slaves and free-men by pole, set impositions vpon the pillars and doores of houses, as also vpon graine, oare-men, armes, ingines, and carriages; and whatsoeuer had a name, was thought fitte to yeeld money, by way of imposition: and that not onely in Citties and Townes, but almost in euery Village and Castle: wherein, he that caried himselfe most cruelly, was held both the worst thief man, and the best Cittizen.

The Prouince was at that time full of Officers and Commandements, pestered with Ouer-seers and Exactors: who, besides the money leuied by publike authoritie, made their particular profit by the like exactions. For, they gaue-out, they were thrust out of their houses, and their Countrey, and in want of all necessities; to the end they might with such pretences, couer their wicked & hatefull courses. To this was added, the hard and heauie vsury, which oftentimes doth accompany vvarre, when all moneyes are drawn and exacted to the publike: wherein the forbearance of a day, was accounted a discharge for the whole. Whereby it happened, that in those two yeeres, the whole Prouince was ouer-growne with debts: and yet, for all that, they stuck not to leuie round summs of money, not onely from the Cittizens of Rome, inhabiting in that Prouince; but also, vpon euery Corporation, and particular Cittie: which they gaue out, was by

by way of loane, according to a Decree of Senate, commanding the Receiueis to aduaunce the like summe by way of loane, for the yeere to come.

Moreover, Scipio gaue order, that the Monies which of old time had bene treasured-up in the Temple of Diana at Ephesus, should be taken out, with other Images of that Goddesse: but as hee came into the Temple (hauing called vnto him many of the Senators that were there present) hee receiued a Dispatch from Pompey, That Caesar had passed the Sea with his legions; and that, setting all things apart, hee should hasten to him with his Armie. These Letters being receiued, he dismissed such as he had called vnto him, and beganne to dispose of his journey into Macedonia, setting forward vwith in a few daies after: by which accident, the Treasure at Ephesus was saued.

OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T is Seneca his conceit, that Iron, beeing of that excellent vse in things pertaining to Mans life, and yet so much vnder-valued to Gold and Siluer, will admit of no peace, as often as there is question of Money; but raisth continuall garboiles & extremities, as a reuenge that the World doth misvalue it: and sell out as true in those better Ages, as it dooth in these daies, that are of baser Metall. For, what greater violences in the State of Rome, then those concerning Tributes and Impositions? A particular whereof, may be made out of this Chapter. For, first, wee find a Tribute by pole, without respect of state or condition; which they called *Capitatio*. And then a second, as grievous as that, beeing a taxe laid vpon euery dore in a house, which they called *Ostiaria*: whereof Iuliy maketh mention, in the eight Epistle of his third Booke. And lastly, an other vpon euery pillar in a mans house, which they called *Columnaria*: mentioned likewise by Cicero, *Columnarium vide ut nullum debeamus*. Howbeit, Alciatus vnderstandeth this, to be that we read in Dionysius Halicarnassus, That when Treasure failed at the siege of Modena, they laid an Imposition vpon euery tile that was found on the Senators houses in Rome: which gaue the *Trium-virat* occasion, to make the tiles as heauie to the rest of the Romaine Cittizens; and this, saith he, was called *Columnaria*.

Some Popes, out of their occasions, haue gone farre in this kind, & found meanes to lay Impositions vpon all things pertaining to the vse of man. Inso-much as Pasquill begged leaue to dry his shirt in the Sunne, before there were an Imposition laid vpon the Light. The rule is diuerly giuen in this behalfe, That the Fiske doe not swell about his proportion. Alexander is commended for making his Subjects the keepers of his Treasure. And Claudianus, giueth Honorius this Elogium;

*Nec tua priuatis crescent araria damnis.*

Basilius aduiseeth, that money thus raised, be not at any time dipped, either in the teares or in the blood of the people. But Tully draweth it to a more certaintie, by making Necessitie the square of such comands. *Da operam* (saith hee)

*Propter Aurum et Argentum nunquam pacem facit seruum. li. 14. Epist. 93. Feruum minus arum instrumentum. Aurum et argentum mortis Marcupia. Epist. 14.*

*Ostiaria.*

*Columnaria, 13 ad Atticum. Epist. 1.*

*In the Popacie of Sixt. Quintus, fiscus reipublice. quod ad crescentie, astus reliqui tabescent. Sext. Aurelius Victor.*

*In Paracet.*

2 De offic.

hee) vt omnes intelligant, si salui esse velint, necessitati esse parendum. And to the opening of priuate mens purses, is but to keepe them shut and safe, from such Enemies as would consume all; according as Scipio once answered, when the Romaines blamed him, for spending their Treasure: Howsoeuer, Scipio knew well what he did, in getting into his hand such store of Treasure; for, Warre cannot any way be maintained, but with plenty of Money: neither can any State continue, if the reuenew which supporteth the Common-weale, bee abated; as Tacitus hath well obserued, *Dissoluitur imperium, si fructus quibus respub. sustinetur diminuantur.*

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar sendeth forces into Theffalia, Aetolia  
and Macedonia; Scipio commeth  
into Greecc.

**C**æsar, beeing ioyned vwith Antonius, drew that legion out of Oricum, which hee had formerly lodged there, to keepe the Sea-coast; and thought it expedient to make triall of the Prouinces, and to aduance further into the Countrey. And, vwhere-as Embassadors came vnto him out of Theffalia & Aetolia, assuring, that if hee would send forces to protectt them, the Citties of those Prouinces would readily obay what hee commaunded: Hee sent L. Cassius Longinus, with the legion of young souldiers, called the sea-uen and twentieth, and two hundred horse, into Theffalia: and C. Calpurnius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a few horse, into Aetolia; exhorting them specially, to take a course for provision of Corne in those two Prouinces, which lay neere at hand.

He sent likewise Cn. Domitius Caluinus, with two legions, the eleuenth and the twelfth, and five hundred horse into Macedonia: of which Prouince (for that part thereof, which is called Franke or Free) Menedemus, a principall man of that Countrey, beeing sent as an Embassador, had professed exceeding great forwardnesse on their behalfe. Of these, Caluinius, vpon his comming, was entertained with great affection of the Aetolians: and, hauing cast the Gararison of the Enemy out of Caledone and Naupactum, became Maister of all Aetolia. Cassius arrived vwith the legion in Theffalia; and finding there two FaCTIONS, was accordingly received, with contrary affections.

Egesasetus, a man of ancient power and authoritie, fauoured Pompeis partie: and Petreius, a man of a most noble house, endeauoured by all meanes, to deserue vrell of Cæsar. At the same time also, came Domitius into Macedonia: and as Embassadors began to come thicke vnto him, from diuers States of that Prouince, it was told him, that Scipio was at hand with the legions, and came with

great fame and opinion of all men: vvhich is oftentimes a fore-runner of nouelties. He, making no stay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly with great furie towards Domitius; and when he came vwithin twenty miles of him, turned his course suddainly, to Cassius Longinus, in Theffalia: which he did so speedilie, that newes came together of his comming, and of his arriuall. For, to the end he might march with greater expedition, he left M. Fauonius at the River Haliacmon (vvhich diuideth Macedonia from Theffalia) vwith eight cohorts, to keepe the cariages of the legions: vvhoe hee commaunded them to build a Fort.

At the same time, the Canallie of King Cottus, which was wont to keepe in the Confinnes of Theffalia, came flying suddainly to Cassius Campe: wherewith, he beeing astonished (vnderstanding of Scipios comming, and seeing the horsemen, whom he thought to be his) made towards the hills which inclose Theffalia, and from thence marched towards Ambracia. And, as Scipio made haste to follow after, Letters ouer-tooke him, sent from Fauonius, that Domitius was at hand with the legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein hee was left, without Scipios helpe.

Vpon the receipt of vvhich Letters, Scipio altered both his purpose and his iourney; & leauing Cassius, made haste to help Fauonius: so that continuing his iourney night and day, he came vnto him in very good time. For, as the dust of Domitius Armie, approaching, was seene to rise, the fore-runners of Scipio his Armie was likewise discovered. Whereby it happened, that as Domitius induriedly did helpe Cassius, so did Scipio his speede saue Fauonius.

OBSERVATIONS.

**C**æsar, beeing now ready with his forces to proceed against Pompey, the first thing he did, was to make triall of the Prouinces of Greecc, and to get their fauour and assistance, for his better furtherance in contesting his Aduersarie. For, as an Armie standeth firme by two speciall meanes, first, in themselves, as they are able to resist any opposing force; and secondly, through the fauour of the Countrey, wherein they are engaged: so, on the other side, their ouer-throw either proceedeth from their owne weakenesse; or otherwise, when the Prouinces adioyning, doe refuse such mutuall respects, as may relieue the wants of a consuming multitude. And therefore, hauing got all the forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, hee sent out to try the affection of the Countrey, and to alter that in a moment, which Pompey had beene settling for a yeere together, and then resolved to attack him neerer.

And doubtlesse, if Scipio had not by chance interrupted their course, vpon his comming out of Asia, to aide Pompey, they had as easily got all Theffalia and Macedonia, as they did Aetolia: and were neuertheless so ordered & disposed, as they got more honour of Scipio, then he could win of them.

In Macedonia, qua velint sibi candida nasci, ad Haliacmon ducere, quæ nigra et fusca ad Asium.

hee) vt omnes intelligant, si salui esse velint, necessitati esse parendum. And to the opening of priuate mens purses, is but to keepe them shut and safe, from such Enemies as would consume all; according as Scipio once answered, when the Romaines blamed him, for spending their Treasure: Howfocuer, Scipio knew well what he did, in getting into his hand such store of Treasure; for, Warre cannot any way be maintained, but with plenty of Money: neither can any State continue, if the reueneue which supporteth the Common-weale, bee abated; as Tacitus hath well obserued, *Dissoluitur imperium, si fructus quibus respub. sustinetur diminuantur.*

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar sendeth forces into Theffalia, Aetolia  
and Macedonia; Scipio commeth  
into Greece.



Cæsar, beeing ioyned with Antonius, drew that legion out of Oricum, which hee had formerly lodged there, to keepe the Sea-coast; and thought it expedient to make triall of the Prouinces, and to aduance further into the Countrey. And, where-as Embassadours came vnto him out of Theffalia & Aetolia, assuring, that if hee would send forces to protect them, the Citties of those Prouinces would readily obay what hee commaunded: Hee sent L. Cassius Longinus, with the legion of young souldiers, called the sea-uen and twentieth, and two hundred horse, into Theffalia: and C. Calpurnius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a few horse, into Aetolia; exhorting them specially, to take a course for provision of Corne in those two Prouinces, which lay neere at hand.

He sent likewise Cn. Domitius Caluinus, with two legions, the eleuenth and the twelfth, and five hundred horse into Macedonia: of which Prouince (for that part thereof, which is called Franke or Free) Menedemus, a principall man of that Countrey, beeing sent as an Embassador, had professed exceeding great forwardnesse on their behalfe. Of these, Caluinius, vpon his comming, was entertained with great affection of the Aetolians: and, hauing cast the Gwarison of the Enemy out of Caledone and Naupactum, became Maister of all Aetolia. Cassius arriued with the legion in Theffalia; and finding there two Factions, was accordingly received, with contrary affections.

Egeasctus, a man of ancient power and authoritie, fauoured Pompeis partie: and Petreius, a man of a most noble house, endeauoured by all meanes, to deserue vrell of Cæsar. At the same time also, came Domitius into Macedonia: and as Embassadours began to come thicke vnto him, from diuers States of that Prouince, it was told him, that Scipio was at hand with the legions, and came with great

great fame and opinion of all men: which is oftentimes a fore-runner of nouelties. He, making no stay in any part of Macedonia, marched directly with great furie towards Domitius; and when he came within twenty miles of him, turned his course suddainly, to Cassius Longinus, in Theffalia: which he did so speedilie, that newes came together of his comming, and of his arriual. For, to the end he might march with greater expedition, he left M. Fauonius at the Riuer Haliacmon (which diuideth Macedonia from Theffalia) with eight cohorts, to keepe the cariages of the legions: where hee commaunded them to build a Fort.

At the same time, the Cavalrie of King Cottus, which was wont to keepe in the Confinnes of Theffalia, came flying suddainly to Cassius Campe: whereat, he beeing astonished (vnderstanding of Scipios comming, and seeing the horsemen, whom he thought to be his) made towards the hills which inclose Theffalia, and from thence marched towards Ambracia. And, as Scipio made haste to follow after, Letters ouer-tooke him, sent from Fauonius, that Domitius was at hand with the legions, and that he could not hold the place wherein hee was left, without Scipios helpe.

Vpon the receipt of which Letters, Scipio altered both his purpose and his iourney; & leauing Cassius, made haste to help Fauonius: so that continuing his iourney night and day, he came vnto him in very good time. For, as the dust of Domitius Armie, approaching, was seene to rise, the fore-runners of Scipio his Armie was likewise discovered. Whereby it happened, that as Domitius industriely did helpe Cassius, so did Scipio his speede save Fauonius.

OBSERVATIONS.



Cæsar, beeing now ready with his forces to proceed against Pompey; the first thing he did, was to make triall of the Prouinces of Greece, and to get their fauour and assistance, for his better furtherance in contesting his Aduersarie. For, as an Armie standeth firme by two speciall meanes, first, in themselves, as they are able to resist any opposing force; and secondly, through the fauour of the Countrey, wherein they are engaged: so, on the other side, their ouer-throw either proceedeth from their owne weakenesse; or otherwise, when the Prouinces adioyning, doe refuse such mutuall respects, as may relieue the wants of a consuming multitude. And therefore, hauing got all the forces together which he looked for, or could any way expect, hee sent out to try the affection of the Countrey, and to alter that in a moment, which Pompey had beene settling for a yeere together, and then resolu'd to attack him neerer.

And doubtlesse, if Scipio had not by chance interrupted their course, vpon his comming out of Asia, to aide Pompey, they had as easily got all Theffalia and Macedonia, as they did Aetolia: and were neuertheless so ordered & disposed, as they got more honour of Scipio, then he could win of them.

In Macedonia, que vocantur sub candida nascenti, ad Haliacmon ducere, que nigra et fusca ad Axium.

CHAP. XIII.

The Passages between Domitius  
and Scipio.

Cesar.



Scipio abode two daies in his standing Campe, vpon the Ri-  
uer Haliacmon, which ranne betweene him and Domitius  
Campe. The third day, as soone as it began to be light, he pas-  
sed his Armie ouer the Riuer by a Foord, and incamped him-  
selfe. The next day in the morning, he imbattled his forces  
before the front of his Campe. Domitius, in like manner,  
made no difficultie of bringing out his legions, resolving to fight. And whereas  
there lay a field of sixe miles, betweene both the Campes, he led his troopes imbat-  
telled vnder Scipios Campe; who neuer thelesse refused to moue any iote from his  
standing: yet for all that, Domitius souldiers were hardly kept from giuing bat-  
tell: but specially a Riuer, lying vnder Scipios Campe, with broken and vncasie  
bankes, did hinder them at that time.

Scipio, vnderstanding of their alacrity, and desire to fight; suspecting it  
might happen, that the next day he should be forced to fight against his will, or  
with great dishonour keepe himselfe within his Campe, hauing with great  
expectation in the beginning, gone on rashly, and vndisguisedly, was now disho-  
noured with a reproachfull end. For, in the night time he rose, without anie  
noise or warning for the trussing vp of the baggage; and passing the Riuer, re-  
turned the same way he came: and in an eminent place, nere vnto the Riuer,  
he pitched his Campe.

A few daies after, he laid an ambushment of horsemen in a place, where our  
men had formerly accustomed to forrage. And, as Q. Varus, Generall of the  
horse in Domitius Army, came out according to his ordinary vse, they set vpon  
him at a suddaine: but our men did valiantly sustaine the on-set; and euery man  
betaking himselfe speedily to his ranke, they altogether of their owne accord,  
charged the Enemy: and hauing slaine foure-score, they put the rest to flight,  
with the losse onely of two of their men.

OBSERVATIONS.



It appeareth heere, that to shew a readines and resolution to fight,  
vpon such grounds as are iustificable by the rules of Warre, is no  
small advantage to the prosperous carriage of the same. For, albeit  
Scipio was great in his owne strength, and as great in the opinion  
and expectation of men: yet when he found such an alacrity in the Enemy,  
to giue and take blowes, and a desire to entertaine seriously all occasions of  
giuing battell; he was so farre from prosecuting what he had pretended, as hee  
rather

rather chose the fortune of a safe retreat, and consequentie, to turne the ad-  
uantage which the world in opinion had giuen to his Armie, to his owne re-  
proach, and disadvantage: where-as on the other side, to bee found for the  
most part vnwilling to hazard the triall of a Field, or indisposed to fight vpon  
any occasion, doth inuite an Enemy to attempt that, which otherwise hee  
would not; and giueth them courage to beate him from all his purposes, as  
knowing the resolution of their Aduersarie, and the meanes they haue, either  
to take or leaue at their pleasure.

CHAP. XIII.

Domitius draweth Scipio to a losse, by an Am-  
bushment. Young Pompeis attempt  
vpon Oricum.



After these things, Domitius hoping that Scipio might  
be drawne to fight, hee made as though hee were in  
great want and scarcitie of Corne: and there-vpon,  
rising from the place wherein hee was incamped,  
with the usuall cry of remoouing, according to the  
custome of Warre, and hauing marched three miles,  
hee lodged all his Armie, with the Cavalrie, in a conue-  
nient and secret place.

Scipio, beeing readie to follow after, sent his horse-  
men, and a great part of his light-armed souldiers, to discover what way Do-  
mitius tooke: who, marching forward, as the first troopes came within the Am-  
bushment (suspecting some-what by the neighing of the horses) fell backe a-  
gaine. Those that followed after, seeing the former troopes so suddainly to re-  
tire, stood still.

Our men, finding themselves discovered, & thinking it in vaine to attend the  
rest, hauing got two troopes of horse within their reache, they contented them-  
selves with them: amongst whom, was M. Opimius, the Generall of the horse.  
The rest of these two troopes, they either put to the sword, or tooke aliue, and  
brought them to Domitius.

Cesar, as is before shewed, hauing withdrawne the Guarixons from along  
all the Sea-coast, left onely three Cohorts at Oricum, for the defence of the  
Towne: and to them, he committed the custodie and safe keeping of the Gallies,  
which he had brought out of Italy; whereof Acilius the Legate had the charge,  
being left Gouvernour of the towne. Hee, for the better securitie of the shipping,  
had drawn all the fleet into a back angle, behind the towne, and there fastened  
them to the shore: and in the mouth of the Hauen, had sunke a great ship, and set  
another by her, vpon which he built a towre, to keepe the entrance of the Port; &  
filled the same with souldiers, to defend the Hauen from any suddaine attempt.

2.

vpon

Cesar.

### Obseruations vpon the third

Vpon notice vvhetherof, Pompeis sonne, being Admirall of the Egyptian fleet, came to Oricum, and with many haulers and hookes, waded up the sunk shippes, and assaulted the other shippes, set by Acilius for the defence of the Hauens, with shippes vvherein hee had made towres, which stood by counterpoize, that hee might fight vwith aduantage of height, supplying continually fresh men: and attempting also, as well from the Land side, to take the towne by scaling Ladders, as by Sea vwith his Nauie; to the end he might distract and dismember the forces vwithin.

In the end, with extream labour, and multitude of weapons, hee ouercame our Partie, and tooke the shippe, hauing cast out such as had the guard: who fled all away vwith Skiffes and Boates. At the same time, being likewise seized of a small height, on the other side of the towne, in the nature of a Pence-insule, hee conuaid ouer foure small Gallies, with Rollers and Leuers, into the inner part of the Harbor, lying behind the towne; insomuch, as setting on each side vpon the Gallies tied vnto the shore, empty & vnfurnished, he caried foure of them away, and burned the rest.

This being done, he left D. Lalius, whom hee had taken from the Egyptian fleet, to keepe the passage, that no victuals, or other provisions, might be brought into the towne, either from Helide or Amantia: and hee himselfe, going to Lissus, found thirty shippes of burthen, vvhich Antonius had left vwithin that Hauens, and set them all on fire. And as hee went about to take Lissus, the souldiers which Caesar had put there for a guard on to the Towne, together with the Romaine Cittizens, & the towne men thercof, did so well defend the same, that after he had continued there three daies, and lost a few men in the siege, he left the place, without effecting any thing.

### OBSERVATIONS.



AN Ambushment is easily at all times laid: but to do it so that it may not be suspected, and in such manner, that the Enemy may fall into the danger thereof, is that which is to be ayimed at therein. And therefore, to giue the better colour to such designs, the tricke hath bene to pretend feare (and so flight) or want of Corne, or some what else, to draw the Enemy to follow after, with more boldnesse and resolution. And so to haue it wel done, there must be two deceits to assist each other; as in this of Dotnitius, to make shew of remouing, through scarcitie and want: and then to lie in waite for an aduantage: According to that of the Spaniard; *A vn Traydor, dos Aleuofos*. For, the preuention of such snares of deceit, the rule is generally giuen by Onofander, That the departure or falling away of an Enemy, is alwaies to be suspected.

And for the more securitie therein, experienced Commanders haue been carefull before they stirred their Armie, to make exact discouerie, euen to the place

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place where they intended to lodge. For, as in Physicke, it is the greatest part of the cure, to know the disease: so in matter of war, the danger is almost ouer, when it is perceived whence it may growe.

The manner obserued in discoueries, hath vsually been to send the Parties out in three Companies or troops; The first, consisting of a small number, to beat the way at ease, and to range about from place to place, as shall be found convenient: the second Companie, being some what stronger, to second and relieue the first, if there be occasion: and the third, able to ingage a good number of the Enemy.

And after this manner, Cyrus disposed of his fore-runners: as appeareth in Xenophon. But this, being subiect to the consideration of time and place, and other circumstances, may varie, as shall seeme expedient to the wisdome of the Generall.

### CHAP. XV.

Caesar marcheth towards Pompey; offereth him battaile; cutteth him off from Dyrrachium.



AFTER Caesar vnderstood that Pompey was at Asparagus, he marched thitherward with his Armie: and taking by the way the towne of the Parthians, wherein Pompey had put a Guard, the third day he came to Pompey, in Macedonia, and lodged himselfe fast by him. The next day hee drew out his forces, and putting them in order, presented him battaile. But when he found that he would not accept thereof, hee drew backe his Army into the Campe, and bethought himselfe of some other course. For, the next day, taking a difficult and narrow way, hee set forward with all his forces towards Dyrrachium: hoping either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the towne, or at least to cut him off, from all Conuoiues and Munition, which was there stored up for the whole provision of the warre; as afterwards it came to passe. For, Pompey being ignorant at first of his purpose, inasmuch as hee took a contrarie way, thought he had been driuen thence, through scarcitie and want of Corne. But, being afterwards aduertised by the discouersers vvhich came to him, hee rose the next day, in hope to meet him a neerer way. Which Caesar suspecting, exhorted the souldiers to indure a little labour with patience. And resting a small part of the night, in the morning he came before Dyrrachium, euen as the first troope of Pompeis Armie was discovered afar off: and there he cam, and himselfe.

Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, when hee could not accomplish his purpose, fell to a second resolution, and fortified his Camp in an eminent place, called Petra: from whence there was an indifferent passage to the shippes, and sheltered

Cyropa.

Caesar.

Quemque vocat  
collem Thaulan-  
tius insula Pe-  
tram. Lucan.



### Obferuations vpon the third

sheltered likewise the Hauen from certaine winds. Thirther he commanded part of the shippes to be brought, together with Corne, & prouision of victuall, from Asia, and such other Countries as were in his obedience.

Cæsar, doubting that the warre would proue long and tedious, and despairing of any succour of victualls from the Coast of Italie, for that all the shore was (with great diligence) kept by Pompeis partie: And that the shipping which in Winter hee had made in Sicilia, Gallia, and Italia, were staied and came not to him, hee dispatched L. Canuleius, a Legate into Epirus, to make prouision of Corne.

And forasmuch as those Regions were farre off, hee appointed store-houses and Magasins in certaine places, & imposed cariage of Corne vpon the Countrey bordering about them. In like manner, hee commaunded, what graine soeuer should be found at Lissus, Parthisis, or any other place, to be brought vnto him: which was very little, forasmuch as the Countrey there-about, was rough and Mountainous, and afforded no Corne, but that which was brought in from other places; as also, that Pompey had taken order in that behalfe, and a little before, had ransacked the Parthinians, & caused his horsemen to carie away all the Graine, which was found amongst them.

### OBSERVATIONS.



HE first thing that Cæsar did, after their approach neere one vnto another, was to offer battaile; as the best Arbitrator of the Cause in question, and most fitting the vlsance of the auncient Romanes. But, forasmuch as the indeuours of such as are in action, are alwaies ordered by him that is the Sufferer: and that Pompey refused to accept thereof, knowing himselfe to be much stronger in forces, better accommodated, hauing a farre greater partie in the Countrey, and the Sea whollie at his command (which aduantages, were like to end the bysiness, without hazard of a battaile) Cæsar bethought himselfe of some other project, which might take away the scorne of that refusal, by vndertaking such things, as much imported the state of his Aduersarie. For, in such cases, when an Enemie will not fight, some-what must be done, to cast dishonour, or greater inconueniences, vpon him; or at least, to make ouertures of new opportunities. And therefore, hee tooke a course, either to draw Pompey to fight, or to force the Towne, wherein all his prouisions of warre were stored vp; or other-wise, to cut him off from the same. The least of which, was a sufficient acquittance of any disgrace, which the neglect of this offer might seeme to inferre; Hauing thereby occasion to vse that of the Poet, *Iam sumus ergo pares.*

CHAP.

### CHAP. XVI.

## Cæsar goeth about to besiege Pompey.



Cæsar, being informed of these things, entered into a deliberation, vvhich he first tooke from the very nature of the place vvherein they were; for, vvhether-as Pompeis Campe was inclosed about vvvith many high and steepe Hilles, hee first tooke those Hilles, and built Forts vpon them: and then, as the condition of each place would beare, hee made works of fortification, from one Fort to another, and determined to inclose Pompey about vvvith a Ditch and a Rampier. And especially, vpon these considerations; for that hee was greatly straightwed through want of Corne, and that Pompey being strong in horse, hee might vvvith lesse danger, supply his Army from all parts with prouision: as also to the end hee might keepe Pompey from forraging, and so make his Cavalry vserviceable in that kinde. And further, that hee might abate and weaken the exceeding great reputation, vvhich Pompey had attained vnto amongst forraigne Nations, vvhich it should be noised throughout the world, that hee was besieged by Cæsar, and durst not fight.

Pompey would by no meanes be drawne to leave the commoditie of the Sea, and the towne of Dyrrachium, hauing there laid vp all his prouision of warre, Armes, vveapons, Engines, of what sort soeuer; besides Corne, vvhich was brought from thence to his Armie by shipping. Neither could hee hinder Cæsars fortifications, vnlesse hee would accept of battaile, vvhich for that time he was resolu'd not to doe; onely it remained, as the last thing hee could thinke of, to possesse himselfe of as many Hilles as he might, and to keepe as much of the Countrey as hee could, vvvith good and strong guard: and by that meanes, to distract, as much as possible hee might, Cæsars forces, as accordingly it fell out. For, hauing made twentie foure Castles and Forts, hee tooke in twentie fve miles of the Countrey in circuit, and did forrage within that space, and there caused many things to be set and planted by hand, which in the Interim, serued as foudle for horses.

And, as our men perceiued their fortifications to be caried, and continued, from one Castle to another, without intermission; they beganne to feare, least they had left some places to sallie out, and so vvvould come vpon them behind, before they were aware.

And the reason they made their vvorkes thus perfect, throughout the vvhole inward circuit, was, that our men might not enter in vpon them, nor circumuent them behind. But they (abounding in number of Men) exceeded in their works, hauing also on the inside a lesse compasse to fortifie.

23.

And,

Cæsar.

## Obersuations vpon the third

And as Caesar went about to take any place, albeit Pompey was resolved not to fight, or interrupt him with all his forces: neuertheless, hee sent out his Archers and Slingers, of which he had great numbers; by whom many of our men were wounded, and stood in great feare of the arrowes: and almost all the souldiers, made them coates, either of quilt or stiffening, or of leather, to keep them from danger.

To conclude, either Party used all force and meanes to take places, and make fortifications; Caesar, to shut vp and straighten Pompey what he could: & Pompey, to enlarge himselfe, and possesse as many hills as conueniently hee might; which gaue occasion of many skirmishes and encounters.

### O B S E R V A T I O N S.

**W**E may heere take notice, of the strangest enterprize, that euer was vndertakē by a iudicious souldier. For, where else may it be read or vnderstood, that a weaker Partie, went about to besiege a strong aduersarie, and to inclose a whole Country by Castles and Towers, and perpetuall fortifications from hill to hill; to the end he might shut him vp, as he lay incamped in the field? But herein appeare the infinite and restless indecadours of a Romaine spirit, and the workes they wrought to achieve their owne endes; and yet not besides the limits of reason. For, if that of Seneca haue any affinitie with truth, That a man is but a common, or rather contemptible thing, vnlesse he raise himselfe aboue ordinary courses; it is more specially verified in a Souldier: whose honour, depending vpon the superlatiue degree, must seeke out projects beyond all equalitie: and the rather, vpon such inducements, as are heere alleadged; which shew good reason he had to be so made.

## CHAP. XVII.

A Passage that happened betweene both Parties,  
about the taking of a Place.



**A**mongst these fights and incounters, it happened, as Caesars ninth Legion had taken a certaine Place, and there began to fortifie, Pompey had possesse himselfe of the Hill next adioyning there-vnto, and beganne to hinder our men from their worke. And hauing from one side an easie access vnto it; first with Archers and Slingers, and afterwards with great troopes of light-armed men, and engines of Battery, hee beganne to disturbe them in their busines. Neither were our men able, at one and the same time, to defend themselves, and goe on with their fortifications.

Caesar,

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Caesar, seeing his souldiers wounded, and hurt from all parts, commaunded them to fall off, and leaue the Place. But, forasmuch as they were to make their retreat downe the Hill, they did the more urge and preace vpon them; & would not suffer them to fall backe, for that they seemed to forsake the Place for feare. It is reported, that Pompey should then, in a vaine-glory, say to those that were about him. That he would be content to be taken for a Generall of no worth, if Caesars men could make any retreat from thence (where they were so rashly ingaged) without great losse.

Caesar, fearing the retreat of his souldiers, caused Hurdles to be brought, and sette against the Enemy, in the brimme of the Hills: and behind them, sunke a trench of an indifferent latitude, and incombered the place as much as possibly hee could. Hee lodged also Slingers in conuenient places, to defend his men in their retreat.

These things being perfit, hee caused the legions to be drawne backe. But Pompeys parties, beganne with greater boldnes and insolencie, to presse our people: and putting by the Hurdles, which were set there as a Baricado, they passed ouer the ditch. Which when Caesar perceived, fearing, least they should rather seeme to be beaten off, then be brought backe, whereby a greater scandale might consequently ensue, hauing almost from the mid-way encouraged his men, by Antonius, who commaunded that legion, hee willed that the signe of charging the Enemy should be given by a Trumpet, and gaue order to assault them.

The souldiers of the ninth legion, putting themselves suddainly into order, threw their Piles: and running furiously from the lower ground, vpon the steepe of the Hill, draue the Enemy head-long from them; who found the Hurdles, the long poles, and the ditches, to be a great hinderance vnto them in their retreat. It contented our men to leaue the place without losse: so that hauing slaine many of them, they came away very quietly, with the losse of some of their fellows. And hauing staid about that place awhile, they tooke other hills, & perfit the fortifications vpon them.

### O B S E R V A T I O N S.



**H**is Chapter sheweth, that aduantage of place, and some such industrious courses, as may be fitted to the occasion, are of great consequence in extremities of warre: but, aboue all, there is nothing more auailable to cleere a danger, then valour. Valour is the Hercules that ouer-commeth so many Monsters: and verifieth that saying, which cannot be too often repeated; *Virtute faciendum est, quicquid in rebus bellis est gerendum.* But of this, I haue already treated.

CHAP.

CHAP. XVIII.

The scarcitie which either Partie endured  
in this siege.



THE cariage of that warre was in a strange & vnusuall manner, as well in respect of the great number of Forts and Castles, containing such a circuit of ground within one continued fortification, as also in regard of the whole siege, and of other consequents depending there-vpon. For, who soeuer goeth about to besiege an other, doth either take occasion from the weakeness of the Enemy, daunted, or striken with feare, or ouercome in battaile, or otherwise being moued there-vnto by some iniurie offered; Whereas now it happened, that they were farre the stronger, both in horse and foote: and generally, the cause of almost all sieges, is to keepe an enemy from prouision of Corne. But Caesar, being then farre inferior in number of souldiers, did neuertheless besiege an Armie of intire and vntouched forces, especially at a time when they abounded with all necessary prouisions: for, every day came great store of shipping from all parts, bringing plenty of all things needfull: neither could there any wind blowe, which was not good, from some part or other.

On the other side, Caesar, hauing spent all the Corne he could get, far or neere, was in great want & scarcitie: and yet notwithstanding, the souldiers did beare it with singular patience; for, they remembered how they had suffered the like the yeere before in Spaine, and yet with patience and labour, had ended a great and dangerous warre. They remembered, likewise, the exceeding great want they endured at Aleſia, and much greater at Auaricum. And yet, for all that, they went away Conquerers of many great Nations. They refused neither Barlie nor Pease, when it was giuen them in stead of Wheate. And of Cattell (whereof they were furnished with great store out of Epirus) they made great account.

There is also a kind of roote, found out by them that were with Valerius, called Chara, which eaten with Milke did much relieue their want: & made with all, a kind of bread, whereof they had plenty. And when Pompeis Party happened in their Colloquies, to cast in their teeth their scarcitie and misery, they would commonly throwe this kind of bread at them, and scatter it in diuers places, to discourage them in their hopes. And now Corne beganne to be ripe, and hope it selfe did relieue their want, for that they trusted to haue plenty within a short time. And oftentimes the souldiers, in their watches and conferences, were heard to let fall speeches, that they would rather eate the barke of trees, then suffer Pompey to escape out of their hands.

Besides, they vnderstood, by such as ranne away from the Enemy, that their horse of service could scarce be kept alive; and that the rest of their Cattell were all dead: and that the souldiers themselves, were in no good health, through the narrowness of the place wherein they were pent: as also by meanes of the ill saour

and

and multitude of dead bodies, together with continuall labour, being vnaccustomed to trauaile and paines; but especially, through the extreame want of water: For, all the Riuers and Brookes of that quarter, Caesar had either turned another way, or dammed up with great works. And, as the places were mountainous, with some intermission, and distinction of Valleies, in the forme and fashion of a Cane or Denne: so hee stopped the same with great piles beaten into the ground, and interlaced with fagots and hurdles, and then strengthened with earth, to keepe backe the water; Insomuch, as they were constrained to seek lowe grounds, and Marish places, and there to sink Welles. Which labour, they were gladd to vnder-take besides their daily works, albeit these Welles stood farre distant from their Guarizons, and were quickly dried up with heat.

But Caesar's Armie was in exceeding good health, and had plenty of water, together with all kind of prouisions, excepting Wheate, which the season of the yeere daily brought on, and gaue them hope of store, Haruest being so neere at hand.

In this new course of warre, new policies and deuices of warfare were invented, and put in practice by either Partie. They, perceiving by the fires, that our Cohorts in the night time kept watch at the works, came stealing out, and discharged all their Arroues vpon them, and then presently retreated. Where-with, our men being warned, found out this remedy; that they made their fires in one place, and kept their watch in another.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

INASMUCH as all matter of attempt, doth much import the fortune of a warre, wee may not omit to take notice of the reasons heere expressed by Caesar, which are the true motives of vndertaking a siege. The first is drawn, either from the weakeness of an Enemy, or as hee is daunted with feare, or ouer-come in battaile. For, hauing there-vpon no confidence in his owne power, doth rest himselfe in the strength of the Place, which he holdeth and possesseth: which giueth their aduersaries occasion, to lay siege vnto their Hold; and either to force them, or shut them vp like women.

The second is, when one State hath offered iniurie to another (which alwaies importeth losse) beyond that which stood with the course of respect formerly held betwene them. For reuenge whereof, the other side laich siege to some of their Townies, to repaire themselves by taking in the same.

And thirdly, the final cause of all sieges, is to keep an Enemy from victuall, and other manner of prouisions; and so to take them by the belly, when they cannot take them by the eares. Which is a part so violent, in requiring that which is due to Nature, as it hath made the Father and the Sonne fall out for a Mouſe: as it hapned at Athens, besieged by Demetrius.

Plutarch.

THE

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**HE second thing worthy our consideration, is the patience and deportment of Cæsars souldiers, in their so great wants and necessities; as first, in helping themselves, with this roote called Ghara, described by Dioscorides, to be a little seed, tasting some what like Anis-seede, good to help digestion, and hauing such a root as a Carot, which beeing boiled, is very good meat; and is the same which our Physicians call Caraway-seed: where-with they serued their turne with such contentment, as they seemed to haue been trained vp in the Schoole of Frugalitie; a vertue worthy of all regard, and the onely meanes to make easie the difficulties of warre; beeing as necessary for a souldier, as the vse of Armes: and is that which was aimed at in the answer of Cyrus, to shew the seruices in a souldiers diet. For, beeing demaunded, what he would haue made ready for supper? Bread; saith he; for, we will suppe at the Fountaine.

Neither hath it been thought fit, to giue way to the naturall looseness of the stomacks appetite, vpon any occasion: but, to vse the like moderation in the time of plentie. For, Zeno tooke the answer of them, that would excuse their liberall expenses, by their abilitie of meanes, for no better payment, then they themselves would haue taken the excuse of their Cookes, for putting too much salt on their meat, because they had salt enough.

Cæsar punished his Baker, for giuing him better bread then his souldiers had. And Scipio castried a cupple of Romaines at the siege of Carthage, for feasting a friend in their Tent, during an assault. Which austeritie of life, raised the Romaines to that height of honour, and made them Maisters of the world, from the East to the Westerne Ocean.

Secondly, as a consequent of this contentment, we may note their resolution to hold on their course of siege, purposing rather to eate the bark of trees, then to suffer Pompey to escape their hands. It is an excellent point in a Generall, to keepe himselfe from irresolution; beeing a weakness of ill consequence, and not vnlike the disease of the Staggers, variable, vncertaine, and without bottom or bound: where-as constancie to purposes, produceth noble and worthy ends.

An instance whereof, is Fabius Maximus, who notwithstanding theroprouch and scandall cast vpon him, continued firme in his determination, to the sauing of his Country. And if it bee so well befitting a Leader, it is of much more regard in the souldier: especially considering that of Xenophon; *Non facile in officio potest miles contineri ab eo qui necessaria non subministrat.* For, as the same Author obserueth in another place, *Nullus est adeo fortis aut validus, qui possit aduersus famem aut frigus pugnando militare.*

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THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



**A**Mongst all the parts of the Romaine discipline, their Watch deserueth a particular description; supplying in the Armie, the office of the naturall eye in the bodie: which is, to giue notice of any approaching danger, for the preuenting of the same. Polybius hath left it to posteritie in this manner; Of each sort of the Legionarie foot, as namely, the *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarii*, and likewise of the horse, there was chozen one, out of the tenth and last Maniple, that was made free from watch and ward. This partie, as the Sunne began to decline, came daile to the Tent of the Tribune. & there had giuen him a little Tablet, wherein the watch-word was writ; which Tablet, they called *Tessera*: and then returning to his Companie, deliuered it to the Centurion of the next Maniple, and that Centurion to the next; and so in order, vntill it came to the first and chiefeest Companie, which was lodged next vnto the Tribunes: and by the Centurion thereof, was returned to the Tribune before Sunne setting.

And if all the Tablets were brought-in, then did the Tribune knowe, the word was giuen to all. If any wanted, they made inquirie, and by the notes of inscription, finding which was missing, they punished the default as they saw cause. And this was their watch-word, by which their Party was distinguished from an Enemie; and in likelihood (for Polybius doth not affirme so much) was by the Centurion giuen, to such of his Maniple as were to watch that night.

Their night watches were thus ordered; A Maniple, or Companie, was alwaies appointed to watch at the Generalls Pavilion. The Treasurer had three watches, and every Legat, two; A watch consisting of foure men, according to the generall diuision of their night into foure parts: each of those foure hauing his turne appointed him by lotte, for the first, second, third, or fourth watch, and the rest sitting by. The *Polites* kept watch without the Camp, and the *Decuries* of horse at the gates: besides, euery Maniple had a priuate watch within it selfe.

Of those that were appointed to watch, a Lieutenant of each Maniple, did bring to the Tribune in the euening, such as were to keepe the first watch of the night: and to them were deliuered lesser Tablets, then were giuen out at first, called *Tesserule*, appropriated to euery particular watch; one for himselfe, and three other for his fellowes.

The trust of going the Round, was committed to the horsemen: for, it belonged to the first Commander of horse, in each legion, to giue order to his Lieutenant, to appoint before dinner, foure young men of his troope, to goe the Round the next night; and in the euening, to acquaint the next Commander to appoint Rounders for the night following. These horsemen, being thus appointed, did cast lots for the first, second, third, and fourth watch; and then repaired to the Tribune: of whom they had order what, and how many watches

## Observations vpon the third

ches to visit, hauing receiued the watch-word before, from their Commaunder: and then all foure went to attend at the Tent of the *Primipile*, or chiefest Centurion of a Legion; who had the charge of distinguishing the foure watches of the night by a Trumpet.

When time serued, for him that was to goe the Round the first watch, hee went out accompanied with some of his friends, and visited those watches which were assigned vnto him. And if he found the watch-man waking, and in good order, he then tooke that Tablet from him which hee had receiued of the Tribune, and departed. But, if he found him sleeping, or out of his place, he tooke witnesse thereof, and departed. The same did the rest of the Rounders, as their watches fell out in course. And as the day beganne to breake, all the Rounders brought in the Tablets to the Tribunes. And if all were brought in, there was no more to doe: but if any wanted, it was found out by the Character, what watch had failed; which beeing knowne, the Centurion was called, and commaunded to bring those that were faultie. If the offence were in the watch-man, the Rounder was to proue it by witnesse: if not, it fell vpon himselfe; and a Councell of warre beeing presently called, the Tribune gaue iudgement to kill him with a club. And in this manner did the Romaines keep watch in the Campe.

## CHAP. XIX.

### A relation of diuers incounters, that happened betweene both Parties.



**I**N the meane time, Pub. Sylla, whom Caesar (at his departure from the Campe) had left to commaund the Armie, beeing certified thereof, came with two legions to succour the Cohort: at whose approach, Pompeys partie was easily beaten off, beeing neither able to indure the shooke, nor sight of our men. For, the first beeing put off, the rest gaue backe, and left the place: but as our men pursued them, Sylla called them backe, & would not suffer them to follow farre after. Howbeit, many men thinke, that if hee would haue pressed hard vpon them, the warre had ended that day. But in my opinion, he is not to be blamed; for, there is one charge and power peculiar to a Lieutenant, and another to him that commaundeth in Chief: the one, doing nothing but by order and prescription; and the other, disposing euery thing as hee shall thinke fit.

Sylla (in Caesars absence) hauing freed his men, was content there-vvith, & would no further ingage them in fight (which might happely prouoe subiect to ill fortune) least he should seeme to assume vnto himselfe, the place and authoritie of a Generall. There vvore certaine things that made the retreat of Pompeis men very difficult and hazardous. For, hauing ascended from a bottometo a Hill,

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Hill, they now found themselves vpon the top thereof. And as they were to make their retreat downe againe, they stood in feare of our men, preacing on the from the higher ground, neither was it farre from sunne-setting; for, hoping to end it speedily, they drew out the busines vntill it was almost night: whereby, Pompey was forced to take a resolution from the time, and to possesse himselfe of a Mount, no further from the Fort then out of shot. There hee made a stand, fortified the place, and kept his forces.

At the same time, they fought in two other places: for, Pompey, to separate and distract our troopes, assaulted diuers forts together, to the end they might not be succoured from the next Guarizons. In one place, Volcatius Tullus, with three Cohorts, sustained the assault of a Legion, & made them forsake the place. In another part, the Germanes sallying out of our works, slew many of the Enemy, & returned back to their fellowes in safetie. So that in one day, there were sixe severall fights; three at Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications: of all which an account beeing taken, there were found saine of Pompeys Partie, to the number of two thousand; with many Centurions, and other speciall men, called out to that vvarre. Amongst vvhom, vvvas Valerius Flaccus, the sonne of L. vvho, beeing Prator, had obtained the Prouince of Asia: besides, there were sixe Ensignes taken. Our Partie, lost not above twentie men in all those fights; howbeit, in the fort, there was not one man but was hurt.

Foure Centurions of one Cohort lost their eyes; and, for argument of their indauour, and great danger, they made report to Caesar, of thirtie thousand arrows shot into the fort, together with a Target of one Senua, a Centurion, which was shewed vnto him, beeing pearced through in two hundred and thirty places, whom Caesar (as hauing well deserued of him, and the Common-wealth) rewarded with sixe hundred pound sterling; and aduauced him from the Companies of the eight ranke, to be the chiefest Centurion, or *Primipile* of the Legion: for, it appeared, that by his meanes specially, the fort was saued. For, the Cohort, hee doubled their pay, as well in Money, as in Corne and Apparell: and rewarded them nobly, with ornaments of Militarie honour.

Pompey, hauing vvrought all that night, to fortifie his Trenches, the daies following, he built towres xxv. foote high; which beeing finished, he added mantlets to that part of the Campe. And after five daies, hauing gotte a darke night (shutting all the Ports of his Campe, and ramming them vp) in the beginning of the third watch, hee drew out his Armie in silence, and betooke himselfe to his old fortifications.

## OBSERVATIONS.



**H**He breach of the Historie in this place, is like a blotte in a faire Table, or as a gappe in a daunce of Nymphes, and dooth much blemish the beautie of this Discourse: But, for-as-much as it is a losse which cannot bee repaired, wee must rest contented with the vie of that vvhich remaineth.

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Euocati.

Millibus ducentis aris.

Primipilus.

## Observations vpon the third

Out of which, we may obserue the notice they tooke of well deseruing: according to the institution of their discipline, supported specially by *Premium* and *Pena*. The recognition whereof (according to the iudgement of the grauest Law-giuers) is the meanes to raise a State to the height of perfection. *Enim impendi laborem et periculum, unde emolumentū et honos speratur*. The Romaines, saith Polybius, crowned the valour of their souldiers with eternall honours. Neither did any thing so much excite them to the atchieuement of noble Acts, as their Triumphs, Garlands, and other Ensignes of publicke renowne: which Cæsar specially obserued about the rest. For, besides this which he did to *Cassius Sæua* (recorded by all the Writers of these warres) Plutarch relateth, that at his being in Britaine, he could not containe from embracing a souldier, that caried himselfe valiantly in defence of diuers Centurions. And where-as the poore man, falling downe at his feete, asked nothing but pardon for leauing his Target behind him; he rewarded him with great gifts, & much honour. Howbeit, the difference which *Salust* hath made in this kind, is too generally obserued, that it more importeth a Common-weale to punish an ill member, then to reward a good a&: for, a vertuous desire, is by neglect a little abated; but an ill man becomes vsufferable. And thence it is, that merit is neuer valued but vpon necessity. It is fit, that hee that will haue the honour of wearing a Lions skin, should first kill the beast, as *Hercules* did: but, to kill a Lion, and not to haue the skin, is not so auailable as a meaner occupation. *Anthony Gueuara* giueth another rule, obserued in that gouernement, which is the true *Idea* of Perfection: *En la casa de Dios jamas fue, ni es, ni sera, merito sin premio, ni colpa sin pena*.

## CHAP. XX.

### Cæsar moueth Scipio to mediate a Peace.



*A*etolia, *Acarnania*, & *Amphiloclis*, being taken by *Cassius Longinus*, and *Calpurnius Sabinus*, as is before declared, Cæsar thought it expedient to attempt and try *Achaia*, and to proceed further in that course: wherevpon he sent thither *L. Calenus*, and *Q. Sabinus*, and to them he added *Cassius*, with his Cohorts. Their coming being bruted abroad,

*Rutilius Lupus*, to whom Pompey had left the charge of *Achaia*, determined to fortifie the *Isthmus*, to keepe out *Euius*. *Calenus* in the meane time, with the fauour and assent of the States, tooke in *Delphos*, *Thebes*, & *Oricleonem*, besides some other places, which he tooke by force. The rest of the Citties, he laboured to draw to Cæsars party, by Embassages sent about vnto them: & therein was *Euius* occupied for the present. Cæsar, euery day following, brought-out his Army into an equal & indifferent place, to see if Pompey would accept of battell; in so much as he led them vnder Pompeis Camp, the vaward being within shot of the Rampier. Pompey, to hold the same & opinion he had attained, drew out his forces, & so imbatelled them before his Camp, that their reere-ward did touch the Rampier.

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*Rampier*; and the whole Armie was so disposed, that euery man was vnder the protection of such weapons as might be shot from thence.

While these things were dooing at *Achaia*, and at *Dyrrachium*, it was certainly knowne, that *Scipio* was come into *Macedonia*. Cæsar, not omitting his former purpose, sent *Clodius* vnto him: a familiar friend to both of them, and one whom *Scipio* had formerly so commended to Cæsar, that hee had taken him in the number of his neereft fauourites. To him hee gaue Letters and Messages, to be deliuered to *Scipio*: whereof this was the effect; that he had vsed all meanes for peace, and yet had preuailed nothing at all: which he tooke to be the fault of such as had the charge of the busines, being fearefull to treat with Pompey there-of in an vnseasonable time. But *Scipio* had that credit & respect, that he might not onely deliuer freely what he thought fitting, but might also (in some sort) restrain him, and reforme his error. For, being Commander in chiefe, ouer an Armie; besides his credit, he had strength to compell him. Which, if he did, euerie man wouold attribute the quiet of *Italie*, the peace of the Provinces, and the safetie & preservation of the Empire, to him onely. All these things did *Clodius* make knowne to *Scipio*: and for the first due, was well heard: but afterwards, could not be admitted to speech; *Fauonius*, reprehending *Scipio*, for going so far with him, as afterwards we vnderstood vpon the ending of the war: whereby he was forced to returne to Cæsar, without effecting any thing.

Cæsar, that he might with greater facilitie keepe in Pompeis Causlie at *Dyrrachium*, and hinder them from forrage, fortified and shutte vp two passages (vvhich, as we haue before declared, were very narrow) with great works, and there built Castles. Pompey, vnderstanding that his horseme did no good abroad, within a few daies, conuained them within his fortification by shipping. Howbeit, they were in extreame necessitie, and want of forrage: in so much, as hauing beaten off all the leaues of the trees, they fed their horses with young Reedes, brused, and beaten in peeces. For, they had spent the Corne which was sowed within the works, & were forced to bring food for their Cattel, from *Corcyra* and *Acarnania*, by long & tedious nauigation; and where it fell short, they made it vp with Barly, and so kept life in their horses: but afterwards, when-as not onelie their Barly, and other food was spent in all places, & the grasse & hearbs dried vp, but the fruit also wasted, and consumed off the trees, their horses beeing so leane, as they were not able to stand on their legges, Pompey thought it expedient, to thinke of some course of breaking out.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T may seem a cunning trick of Cæsar, & perhaps it was his end, to indeauor with faire pretences, to ingage *Scipio* so far in contriuing a Peace, as being Generall of an Armie, he might assume vnto himselfe a commanding authority; and there-vpon, bred such a iea-lousie, as would keepe Pompey and him asunder.

Neuerthelesse, it is euery way worth a mans labour, to make ouertures of peace howsoeuer: especially considering, how it changeth the relative in the

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Et morsu spoli-  
at iuuus, le-  
tumque minan-  
tes, vellere ab ig-  
notis dubias ra-  
dicibus herbas.

### Obseruations vpon the third

condition of men, which in warre, is *Homo homini Lupus*, and in peace, *Homo homini Deus*. And, prouing good, will doublelesse continue, if inconuenient, the sooner broken; and so the case is but the same it was before.

Secondly, we may note, that there is nothing so difficult, but pertinacie and restlesse labor, directed with diligent & intent care, wil in the end ouercome it: For, Caesar, that at the first seemed to vndertake impossibilities, going about to besiege a great part of a Country, & to shutte vp a huge Armie in an open place, did neuerthelessse (by indeauour) bring the to such extremitie of want, that if, as Democritus said, the Bodie should haue put the mind in sute, for reparation of losse, which her ambition and wilfull obstinacie had drawne vpon it, shee would neuer be able to pay damages.

Touching the *Isthmus*, which Rutilius Rufus went about to fortifie, it is a necke of earth, ioyning an Iland vnto the Continent. For, as the Inlet of the Sea, betwene two Lands, is called *Porthmus* (wher-vpon the towne of Porthmouth in Hamphire hath that appellation, as sited vpon the like Inlet) so any smal langer, or neck of earth, lying between two Seas, is called *Isthmus*. Whereof, this of Achaia is of speciall note in Greece; beeing the same that ioyned Peloponessus to the Continent, & was of speciall fame for the site of Corinth.

These necks of earth, called *Isthmus*, are of the nature of those things, as haue been often threatned, and yet continue the same. For, albeit the ambition of great Princes haue sought to alter the fashion of the earth in that behalle, yet I know not how their desires haue sorted to no end. *Perfodere navigabili Alueo has angustias tentauerit Demetrius Rex, Dictator Caesar, Caius Princeps, at Domitius Nero, infausito ut omnium patuit exitu incepto*. In the time of King Sesostris, and since, in the Empire of the Othomans, they went about to bring the Red-sea into Nile; but fearing it would be a meanes to drowne the Land, one Sea beeing lower then another, they gaue ouer the enterprife. And it may be vpon like consideration, or otherwise, fearing to correct the workes of Nature, they forbore to make a passage betweene *Nombre de Dios*, and *Panama*: and so to ioyne one sea to the other, as was said to be intended.

### CHAP. XXI.

#### An Accident which fell out by two Bretheren of Sauoy, in Caesars Armie.



Here were in Caesars Campe, two bretheren of Sauoy, *Ro-scillus* and *Aegus*, the sonnes of *Abucillus*, who for many yeeres together, was accounted the principall and chiefe man of that State: these were men of singular worth, and had done Caesar verie great service in all the warres of Gallia; and in that respect, Caesar had aduanced them to great & honorable Charges in their Countrey, and caused them

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them (extraordinarily) to be taken in the number of the Senators, and a bestowed much of the Enemies lands vpon them; besides great summes of ready money, & of poore had made them rich.

These men were not onely well respected by Caesar, but were in good account throughout all the Armie. Howbeit, relying too much on Caesars fauour, and puffed vp with foolish & barbarous arrogancie, they disdained their owne men, deceiuing the horsemen of their pay, and auerting all pillage from publike distribution, to their owne particular. The horsemen, prouoked with these iniuries, came all to Caesar, and complained openly thereof: adding further, that their troopes were not full, nor answerable to the List or Master-role, by which they required payment.

Caesar, thinking it no fit time of punishment, and withall, attributing much to the worth of the men, put off the whole matter, and chid them priuately, for making a game of their troopes of horse; willing the Cavalrie to expect a supply of all their wants from his fauour, according as their service had well deserved. Neuerthelessse, the matter brought them into great scandall and contempt with all men: Which they plainly perceiued, both by the speeches of other men, as also by that they might iudge themselves, their owne consciences accusing them. With which reproach, and shame, they were so moued (& thinking peraduenture that they were not quit thereof, but deferred vntill some other time) that they resolved to leaue the Armie, to seek new fortunes, and make prooffe of other acquaintances. And, hauing imparted the matter to a few of their followers, to whom they durst communicate so great a disloyaltie, first they went about to kill *C. Volusenus*, Generall of the horse (as after the warre was ended was discovered) that they might come to Pompey, vpon some deserved service: but after they found it hard to accomplish, they tooke vp as much money as they could borrow, as though they meant to haue paid their troopes, what they formerly had defrauded them of; and hauing bought many horses, they went to Pompey, together with such as were acquainted with their purposes.

Pompey, finding them Gentlemen of sort, liberally brought vp, attended with a great retinew, and many horses, and both of them very valiant, & in good account with Caesar; and withall, for that it was an vnusuall and strange accident, he ledde them about the works, and shewed them all the fortifications: for, before that time, no man, either souldier, or horseman, had fledde from Caesar to Pompey; where-as daily they came from Pompey to Caesar: especially, such as were inrolled in Epirus and Aetolia, which were at Caesars deuotion.

These two Bretheren, exactly vnderstanding all things in Caesars Campe (as well concerning such works as were perfect, as such others wherein men skilfull in warre might find defect; together with the opportunitie of time, & distances of places: as also the diligence of the Guardes, with the nature and indeauour of euery man that had a charge) related all particularly to Pompey.

Pompey Empor ante oculos videri putant qui peccauerunt. Cic. in orati. pro Milone.



OBSERVATIONS.

**W**E may heere obserue the sinceritie, & direct cariage of inferior Commanders in the Romaine Armie, by the scandall these two Sauoiers ranne into, for making false Musters, and defrauding the souldiers of their due: A matter so ordinarie in these our times, as custome seemeth to iustifie the Abuse. For, what more common in the course of our moderne warres, then to make gaine of Companies by mustering more then they haue in pay? & by turning that which is due to the souldier to their own benefite? The first wherof, if it be duellie weighed, is an offence of a high nature against the State; and the second, such an iniurie to the souldier, as can hardly be answered.

It is merilie (as I take it) said by Collumella, That, in foro concessum latrocinium. But, for those to whom is committed the safetie of a kingdom, to betray the trust reposed in them, by raising their meanes with dead payes, & consequently, steading the Cause with dead seruice; as also, by disabling their Companions & fellow-souldiers, from doing those duties which are requisite, for want of due entertainment, is a thing deseruing a heauie censure, & will doubtlesse fall out vnto them, as it did to these two Bretheren. The sequell wherof, will appeare by the storie, and confirme that of Xenophon; *Dij haud impuni: a relinquunt impia et nefaria hominum facta.*

CHAP. XXII.

Pompey, attempting to breake out, put Cæsars  
Partie to great losse.



**P**ompey, being informed of these things, and hauing formerly resolved to breake out, as is already declared, gaue order to the souldiers, to make them couerings for their Morions, of Osiers, and to get some store of Bauins and Fagots: which being prepared, hee shipped a great number of the light-armed souldiers, and Archers, together with those fagots, in Skiffes and Gallies. And about mid-night, drew threescore Cohorts out of the greater Campe, and the places of Guarizon, and sent them to that part of the fortification which was next vnto the Sea, and furthest off from Cæsars greatest Campe. Thither also he sent the shippes before mentioned, filled with light-armed men and fagots; together with as many other Gallies as were at Dyrrachium: and gaue directions how euery man should employ himselfe.

Cæsar had left Lentulus Marcellinus the Treasurer, with the Legion newly enrolled, to keepe that fortification; who, for that he was sickly, and of an ill disposition of body, had substituted Fuluius Posthumus as his coadiutor.

There

There was in that place, a Trench of fiftene foote deepe, and a Rampier against the Enemy, of tenne foote in altitude, and as much in breadth. And about sixe hundred foote from that place, was raised another Rampier, with the front the contrary way, but some-what lower then the former. For, some few daies before, Cæsar (feearing that place, least our men should bee circumvented with their shippes) had caused double fortifications to be made in that place; that if (peraduenture) they should bee put to their lists, they might neuer thelesse make good resistance. But the greatnesse of the works, and the continuall labour they daily inured, the fortifications being caried eightene miles in circuit, would not suffer them to finish it. Whereby it happened, that hee had not, as yet, made a Rampier along the Sea-shore, to ioyne these two fortifications together, for the defence thereof: which was informed Pompey, by these two Sanoiens, & brought great damage and losse to our people. For, as the Cohorts of the ninth Legion kept watch and guard vpon the Sea; suddainly, by the breake of day, came Pompeis Armie; which seemed very strange vnto our men: and instantly there-vpon, the souldiers from a shipboard, assaulted with their weapens, the inner Rampier; and the rest began to fill up the Trench.

The legionary souldiers, appointed to keepe the inner fortifications, hauing placed a great number of Ladders to the Rampier, did amuse the Enemy with weapons, and Engines of all sorts; and a great number of Archers were thronged together on each side. But, the couerings of Osiers which they ware on their head-pees, did greatly defend them from the blowes of stones, which was the onely weapon our men had for that purpose. And as our men were ouer-laid with all these things, and did hardly make resistance, they found out the defect of the fortification, formerly mentioned: and landing their men betweene the two Rampiers, they charged our people in the reare, and so driuing them from both the fortifications, made them turne their backs.

This Alarm being heard, Marcellinus sent certaine Cohorts to succour our men: who seeing them flie, could neither reasssure them by their coming, nor withstand the furie of the Enemy themselves: insomuch, as what reliefe so-euer was sent, was distracted by the feare and astonishment of them that fled away. Whereby, the terrour and the danger was made much the greater, and their retreat was hindered, through the multitude of people.

In that fight, the Eagle-bearer being grievously wounded, and fainting for want of strength, looking towards the horsemen; This haue I, said he, in my life time, carefully and diligently defended for many yeeres together; and now, dying, with the same fidelitie doe restore it vnto Cæsar: suffer not (I pray you) such a dishonour, the like whereof, neuer happened in Cæsars Armie, but returne it vnto him in safetie: by which accident, the Eagle was saued: all the Centurions of the first Cohort being slaine, but the first of the Maniple of the Principes: and now the Enemy, with great slaughter of our men, approached neere Marcellinus Campe.

The rest of the Cohorts being greatly astonished, M. Antonius holding the next Guarizon to that place, vpon notice thereof, was seene to come downe from the upper ground, with twelue Cohorts. Vpon whose coming, Pompeis Partie

## Observations vpon the third

as repressed and staied, and our men some-what reassured, giuing them time come againe to themselves, out of that astonishment. And not long after, Caesar hauing knowledge thereof by smock made out of the Forts, according to the use of former time, came thither also, bringing with him certaine Cohorts out of the Guarizons.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**I**T is an old saying, that Thieues handsell is alwaies naught. But, Traytors handsell is much worse: as appeareth by the falling away of these two Sauoions; who were the first that left Caesar in this war, and the first that brought Pompey good fortune: themselves standing culpable of as great an offence, as if they had alienated the whole Army. In the course whereof, we may see plainly that which I haue formerly noted; that it is an excellent thing to be still attempting vpon an Enemie, so it be done vpon good grounds and cautions: for, while Pompey stood vpon the defensive ward, the honour of the contention fell continually vpon Caesar. And doubtlesse, he that obserueth Caesars proceedings in the carriage of all his wars, shall find his fortune to haue specially growne, from his actiue and attempting spirit.

In this Eagle-bearer, we may see verified, that which Paterculus affirmeth of Mithridates, That a valiant spirit is sometimes great by the fauour of Fortune; but alwaies great in a good courage.

For these titles of degrees, as *Princeps prior*, and the rest here mentioned, hauing formerly discoursed at large of the parts of a legion, & the Hierarchie of their discipline, I will rather referre the Reader there-vnto, then bumbast out a volume with distastefull repetitions.

## CHAP. XXIII.

Caesar purposeth to alter the course of Warre;  
attempteth to cut off one of Pompeys Legions.

Caesar.

**C**æsar, vnderstanding of the losse, and perceiuing that Pompey was got out of the fortifications, and was incamped vpon the Sea, in such sort as he might freely goe out to forrage, & haue no lesse accessse with shipping then formerly hee had; changing his course of warre, which had not succeeded to his expectation, he incamped himselfe fast by Pompey. The works beeing perfected, it was obserued by Caesars Discoverers, that certaine Cohorts, to the number of a Legion, were brought behind a wood into the old Campe.

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Campe. The site of the Campe was after this manner: The daies before, Caesars ninth Legion, opposing themselves against Pompeis forces and working vpon the fortifications (as is before declared) had their Campe in that place, adioyning vnto a wood, and not distant from the sea aboue foure hundred pases. Afterwards, Caesar, changing his mind for some certaine causes, transferred his lodging some-what further off from that place. A few daies after the same Campe was posselt by Pompey. And forasmuch as hee was to lodge more legions in that place, leauing the inner Rampier standing, hee enlarged the fortification, so that the lesser Campe beeing included in the greater, serued as a Castle or Citadell to the same. Besides also, hee drew a fortification from the right angle of the Campe, foure hundred pases out-right, to a River, to the end the souldiers might venter freely, without danger. And he also changing his mind, for some causes not requisite to be mentioned, left the place too: so that the Campe stood empty for many daies together; and all the fortifications were as perfit as at the first.

The Discoverers brought newes to Caesar, that they had seene an Ensigne of a Legion caried thither. The same was likewise confirmed, from certaine Forts which stood vpon the higher grounds. The place was distant from Pompeis Campe, about D. pases. Caesar, hoping to cut off this legion, and desirous to repaire that daies losse, left two Cohorts at worke, to make a shew of fortifying, and he himselfe (by a contrarie way, in as couert a manner as he could) ledde the rest of the Cohorts, in number thirtie-three (amongst whom was the ninth legion, that had lost many Centurions, and was very weake in souldiers) towards Pompeys legion, and the lesser Campe, in a double battaile. Neither did his opinion deceiue him: for, he came thither before Pompey could perceiue it.

And albeit the fortifications of the Campe were great, yet assaulting it speedily with the left Corner, wherein he himselfe was, hee draue Pompeys souldiers from the Rampier. There stood a \* Turne-pick in the Gate, which gaue occasion of resistance for a while: and as our men would haue entered, they valiantlie defended the Campe; T. Pulcio, by whose meanes C. Antonius Armie was betrayed, as we haue formerly declared, fighting there most valiantly: yet neuer thelesse, our men overcame them by valour; and cutting vp the Turne-pick, entered first into the greater Campe, and afterwards into the Castle, and slew manie that resisted, of the legion that was forced thither.

But Fortune, that can doe much in all things, and specially in warre, doth in a small moment of time, bring great alterations; as it then happened: for, the Cohorts of Caesars right Corner, ignorant of the place, followed the Rampier which went along from the Campe to the River, seeking after the Gate, and taking it to be the Rampier of the Campe: but when they perceiued, that it ioyned to the River, they presently got ouer it, no man resisting them; and all the Canallie followed after those Cohorts.

\* Eritius.

OBSER-

OBSERVATIONS.

**P**ompey, hauing cleared his Armie of that siege, it booter not Caesar to prosecute his purpose any longer: for, when the end is missed, for which any course is vnderaken, it were folly to seek it by that means. We must rather chuse new waies, that may lead vs to the end of our hopes, then follow the old track, which is no way disabled: for, Albeit a wise man doth not alwaies keep one pale, yet still he holdeth one and the same way.

Secondly, that of Xerxes appeareth to be true, that Great attempts are alwaies made with great difficultie and danger. Wherein, the wisdom of the heathen world ascribed all to Fortune, as the sole cause of all Markable euents; and that which filled vp both the pages of all the Bookes, wherein men noted the course of things: *Clades in bello acceptæ, non semper ignauie, sed aliquando Fortuna temeritatibus impunita*, saith Archidamus; and is that which is ayimed at by Caesar.

CHAP. XXIII.

The fight continueth, and Caesar loseth.

**I**n the meane while, Pompey, after so long a respite of time, hauing notice thereof, tooke the first Legion from their works, and brought them to succour their fellows: and at the same time, his Cavalry did approach neere our horsemen; and our men that possessed the Campe, did discover an Army imbatell'd comming against them: and all things were suddainlie changed. For, Pompeys legion, assured with a speedy hope of succour, began to make resistance at the Decumane gate, and voluntarily charged our men.

Caesars Cavalry, being got ouer the Rampier, into a narrow passage, fearing how they might retreat in safetie, beganne to flie away. The right Cornet, secluded, and cut-off from the left, perceiving the terrour of the horsemen (least they might be indangered within the fortifications) betooke themselves to the other side, from whence they came: and most of them (least they should be surpris'd in the straites) cast themselves ouer workes of ten foote high, into the ditches: and such as first got ouer, being troden under-foote, by such as followed after; the rest, sau'd themselves, in passing ouer their bodies.

The souldiers of the left Cornet, perceiving from the Rampier, that Pompey was at hand, and that their owne side fledde away, fearing least they should bee shut up in those straights, hauing the Enemy both without and within them, thought

thought it their best course to returne backe the same way they came. Whereby there happened nothing but tumult, feare, and flight: insomuch, as when Caesar caught hold with his hand, of the Ensignes of them that fledde, and commaunded them to stand; some for feare left their Ensignes behind them, others, forsaking their horses, kept on their course: neither was there any one of them that would stand. Notwithstanding, in this so great a calamity and mishap, these helps fel out to relieue vs; that Pompey fearing some treachery (for that, as I think, it happened beyond his expectation, who a little before saw his men flie out of his Camp) durst not for a good while approach neere the fortifications: and our men, possessing the narrow passages and the Ports, did hinder the horsemen from following after. And so, a small matter fell out to be of great moment, in the carriage of that accident, on either side. For, the Rampier, which was caried from the Campe to the Riuer (Pompeys Campe being already taken) was the onely hinderance of Caesars expedite and easie victory: and the same thing, hindering the speedy following of their horsemen, was the onely safetie and help of our men.

In those two fights, there were wanting of Caesars men, nine hundred and threescore; and horsemen of note, R. Felginas, Tuticanus Gallus, a Senators son, C. Felginas, of Placentia, Agranius, of Puteolis, Sacrativirius, of Capua, five Tribunes of the souldiers, and thirtie Centurions. But the greatest part of these perished in the Trenches, in the fortifications, and on the Riuer bankes, prest to death with the feare and flight of their fellows, without any blowe or wound giuen them. There were lost at that time, thirtie two militarie Ensignes.

Pompey, vpon that fight, was saluted by the name of Imperator; which title he then obtained, and so suffered himselfe to be stiled: howbeit, he used it not in any of his Misdeeds, nor yet wore any Laurell in the bundle of Roddes caried before him.

Labienus, hauing begged all the Captines, caused them (for greater ostentation) to bee brought out in publike; and to giue the more assurance to such as were fledde there, from Caesars partie; calling them by the name of fellow souldiers, in great derision asked them whether old souldiers were wont to flie? and so caused them all to be slaine.

Pompeys partie tooke such an assurance and spirit vpon these things, that they thought no further of the course of vvar, but carried themselves as though they were already victors: not respecting (as the cause of all this) the paucitie of our men, nor the disadvantage of the place, and the straightnesse thereof, the Campe being possessed, and the doubtfull terror both within, and without the works: nor yet the Armie diuided into two parts, in such sort, as neither of them were able to help or succour the other. Neither yet did they adde to this, that the fight was not made by any valiant encounter, or in forme of battell, but that they receined more hurt from the narrownesse of the place, and from their owne disorder, then from the Enemy.

And to conclude, they did not remember the common chances, and casualties of vvarre: wherein oftentimes, very small causes, either of false suspicion, or of suddaine feare, or out of scruple of Religion, doe inferre great and heauie losses; as often as either by the negligence of the Generall, or the fault of a Tribune,

une, the Armie is mifordered: but as though they had overcome by true force of their prowesse, & that no alteration of things could after happen; they magnified that daies victorie, by Letters and report throughout the whole world.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**S**ometimes we may thinke to repaire a losse, and thereby hazard a greater misfortune. For, albeit the saying be common, that A man must seek his coate where he lost it, as Dicere do; yet there is alwaies more certaintie in seeking, then in finding: For, the circle of humane affaires, beeing caried round in a course, doth not suffer happinesse to continue with one Partie. And there-vpon it was, that Pittacus dedicated a Ladder to the Temple of Mitylene, to put men in mind of their condition: which is nothing else but going vp and downe. The life of a souldier is a meere Hermaphrodite, and taketh part of either sexe of Fortune; and is made by Nature, to beger Happines of Aduersitie, and Mischances of Good-happe; as if the Cause of all causes, by intermixing sweet with sower, would lead vs to his Prouidence, and consequently to himselfe, the first Mover of all Motions.

The diuersitie of these euent is so in chained together, as one seemeth to haue relation to the other: for, this taske admitted not of *Veni, vidi, vici*; nor went on with Alexander, marching ouer the Plaines of Asia, without rub or counterbuffe. But the busines was disposed, heere to receiue a blowe, & there to gaine a victory: And so, this losse at Dyrrachium, made the battell at Pharsalia the more glorious; and beautified the course of this vvarre, with variety of chances. The best vse of these Disasters, is that which Cæsius made of his crosse fortunes, *Mei casus, etsi ingrati, mihi tamen extitere disciplina.*

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



**A**s the Mathematicks, by reason of their certaintie, doe admitte demonstration, as well from the conclusion to the principles, as from the principles to the conclusion: so, in the actions of mans life, it is not hard to asigne the precedent causes, by the sequell; the euent, beeing oftentimes an vnderstanding ledge of things that are past. And although it doe no where appeare, what was the cause of Labienus leauing Cæsar, yet his insolent carriage towards these Capriues, may make at least a probable coniecture, that his reuolt proceeded from his owne disposition, rather then from any cause on Cæsars behalfe. For, where a man hath once done an iniurie, he wil neuer cease heaping one wrong after another, and all to iustifie his first error: Where-as on the other side, a noble spirit, free from ill desert, will demean himselfe, answerable to his first innocencie.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXV.

Cæsar speaketh to the Souldiers concerning this mishap; and forsaketh the Place.



**C**æsar, beeing driuen from his former purposes, resolved to change the vphole course of the warre; so that at one & the same time omitting the siege, and withdrawing the Guarizons, hee brought all the Armie into one place, and there spake vnto the souldiers: exhorting them not to thinke much at those things that had happened, nor to be amized therewith; but to counterpoise this losse (which was in a mediocritie) with manie happie and fortunate battailes they had gained.

Let them thank Fortune, that they had taken Italy without blowe or wound; that they had quieted and put in peace, both the Provinces of Spaine, full of warlike men, and directed by skilfull and practised Commaunders; that they also had subdued the fertile bordering Provinces: and likewise, that they should remember, with what facilitie they were all, transported in safetie through the midst of the Enemies fleets; not onely the Hauens and Ports, but all the coast being full of shipping.

If all things fell not out prosperously, Fortune was to bee helped by their industry. The losse which was receiued, might bee attributed to any man rather then vnto him: for, he had giuen them a secure place to fight in; had possesse himselfe of the Enemies Campe; driuen them out, and overcome them in fight. But whether it were their feare, or any other error, or Fortune herselfe, that would interrupt a victorie already gained, euery man was now to labour to repaire the damage they had sustained, with their valour: vobich if they did in deauour, hee would turne their losse into aduantage, as it formerly fell out at Gergonia; that such as before were affraid to fight, did of their owne accord, offer themselves to battell.

Having ended his speech, hee displaced some Ensigne-bearers. The Armie, there-vpon, conceined such a griepe of the blowe that was giuen them, and such a desire they had to repaire their dishonour, that no man needed the command either of a Tribune, or Centurion; and were withall, inflamed with an earnest desire of fighting: insomuch, as many of the higher Orders, thought it requisite to continue in the place, and referre the cause to a battell. But contrariwise, Cæsar was not assured of the terrified souldiers, and thought it expedient besides, to interpose some time for the settling of their minds; fearing likewise, least he should be straightned through scarcity of Corne, vpon the leauing of his fortifications. And therefore, without any further delay, giuing order for such as were

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wounded

Cæsar.

The Philosopher Crator, was wont to say, that To be no occasion of an ill hap, is a great comfort in any manner of aduersity. Plut. in consilio. Apo.

Ingenimonia non taurit.

### Obseruations vpon the third

wounded and sicke; as soone as it was night, hee conuailed all the cariages secretly out of the Campe, and sent them before, towards Apollonia, forbidding them to rest untill they came to their lodging; & sent one legion withall to conuoy them.

That being done, he retained two Legions within the Campe: and the rest, being ledde out at diuers Ports, about the fourth watch of the night, hee sent them the same way. And after a little pause (for the obseruing of Military order, and to the end his speedy departure might not be discovered) he commaunded them to take up the cry of trussing up their baggage; and presently setting forward, ouertooke the former troope, and so went speedily out of the sight of the Campe.

Pompey, hauing notice of his purpose, made no delay to follow after: but aiming at the same things, either to take them incombred in their march, or opposed with seare, brought forth his Armie, and sent his horsemen before, to stay the Reareward. But Caesar went with so speedy a march, that he could not ouertake them, untill hee came to the Riuer Genusus; vvhether, by reason of the high and vncasie banks, the Canabrie ouertooke the taile of the Armie, and ingaged them in fight. Amongst whom, Caesar opposed his horsemen, and intermingled with them foure hundred expedite souldiers, of them that had place before the Ensignes: it bo so much preuailed in the insounter, that they draue them all away before them, slew many of them, and returned themselves in safetie to their troopes.

Caesar, hauing made a iust daies march, according to his first determination, and brought his Armie over the Riuer Genusus, he lodged in his old Camp ouer against Asparagus, and kept all the souldiers within the Rampier, commaunding the horse that went out to forrage, to be presently taken in, by the Decumane Fort.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Albeit that of Cato be true, that an Error in fight is not capable of amendement: yet out of that which happeneth amisse, may alwaies be some-what gathered, to repaire the disaduantage, and to dispose a Partie to better cariage for the future. Accordingly we may note Caesars notable temper and demeanour, after so great a losse; recalling the courage of his souldiers, & setting their minds in a course of good resolution, with as many valuable reasons as humane wisdom was able to afford him: without which, all their other aduantages, either of valor or experience & vse of Armes, or their assuredness after so many victories, or what other thing soeuer, that made the excell all other Armies, had bene vtterlie buried in this ouerthrow. For his better furtherance wherein, he thought it fit to vse the help of time, before he brought them to the like triall. For, that which is said of griefe, It reason wil not giue an end

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end vnto it, time will; is to be vnderstood of any other palson of the mind: which cannot possible be so great, but time will consume it.

*Finem dolendi,  
qui consilio non  
securit, tempore  
imminet. Senec.  
Epist. 64.*

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He second thing which commeth to bee handled, is the manner of Caesars retreat; being as exquisite a patterne in this kind, as is extant in any storie: and is the rather to be considered, forasmuch as it is one of the principall points of Militarie Art, and woorthiest the knowledge of a Generall, To be able, vpon all occasions, to make a safe and sure retreat. For, those that can doe nothing else, can easily put themselves into a vvarre: but, to returne them home againe in safetie, is that which concerneth the honour of a Leader.

Many are the causes, that may moue a Commander to dislodge himselfe, and to leaue his Aduersarie for a time: but, the means to doe it safely depend specially vpon these two points; The one is, to aduance himselfe onward at first, as farre as possibly he can, to the end he may get the start, before the enemy be ready to follow him: and is taught by Xenophon; who, after the death of Cyrus, in the battell against King Artaxerxes, brought backe a thousand men into Greece, from an Armie of two hundred thousand horse, that preaced hard vpon them, for five hundred leagues together. Which retreat is exactlie storied by the said Author, in seauen bookes containing all the difficulties concerning this point: amongst which, we find this passage.

It much imported vs, faith hee, to goe as farre at first as possible we could; to the end wee might haue some aduantage of space before the Enemy, that preaced so neere behind: for, if we once got before, and could out-strip them for a daies iourney or two, it was not possible for them to ouertake vs; forasmuch as they durst not follow vs with a small troope, & with great forces they could neuer reach vs: besides the scarcitie and want of victuall they fell into, by following vs, that consumed all before them.

Thus farre goeth Xenophon. And according to this rule, Caesar ordered his retreat: for, he got the start of Pompey so farre the first day, by that eight mile hee gained in the after-noon, as it followeth in the next Chapter, that he was neuer able to ouertake him.

The second thing for the assuring of a retreat is, So to prouide against the incomberances of an Enemy, that hee may not find it easie to attack him that would be gone. Of all retreats which may any way be taken from example of Beasts, that of the Wolfe is most commended: who neuer flies, but with his head turned back vpon his aduersaries; and shewes such teeth, as are not to be trusted.

After the Wolfes manner marched Caesar: for, howsoeuer the body of his Armie retreated one way, yet they turned so terrible a countenance towards the Enemy, as was not to be indured. And vpon these two hinges, is turned the carriage of a skillfull retreat.

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### Obseruations vpon the third

Howbeit, for the better furtherance heereof, it shall not bee impertinent to adde heere-vnto some inuentions, practiced by great Commaunders, which may serue to amuse an Enemie, vvhile a Generall doth prepare himselfe to obserue the former points.

King Philip of Macedon, desirous to leaue the Romaine Armie, sent a Herald to the Consull, to demanda a cessation of Armes, while hee buried his dead: which hee purposed to performe the next day, with some care and solemnitie. Vvhich beeing obtained, hee dislodged himselfe secretlie that night, and was got farre on his way before the Romaines perceiued it.

Hanniball, to cleere his Armie from that of the Romaines, which was commaunded by the Consull Nero, about midnight made manie fires, in that part which stood next the Romaine Campe: and leauing certaine Pauillions and Lodgings, with some few Numidians, to shew themselues vpon the Rampier, hee departed secretlie towards Puteolis. As soone as it was day, the Romaines (according to their custome) approaching the Counterscarpe, the Numidians shewed themselues; and then suddainly made after their fellowes, as fast as their horses could carry them. The Consull, finding a great silence in the Campe, sent two Light-horsmen to discouer the matter: who returning, told him of the Enemies departure.

In like manner, Varus (as is formerlie related) left a Trumpeter in the Campe, neere Vtica, with certaine Tents; and about midnight, caried his Armie secretly into the Towne.

Mithridates, willing to leaue Pompey, that cut him off short; the better to couer his departure, made shew of making greater prouision of forrage then hee was accustomed: appointed conferences the next day: made great store of fires in his Campe; and then in the night escaped away.

The Persians, in the voiage which Solymán the Turke made against them, in the yeere one thousand five hundred fiftie foure, beeing driuen to a Place where the Ottomans thought to haue had a hand vpon them, gathered euerie man a fagot; and making a great heape thereof, set them all on fire, in the passage of the Turkes Armie: which burned so furiously, as the Persian escaped before the Enemie could passe by the fire.

CHAP.

### CHAP. XXVI.

Cæsar goeth-on in his retreat: Pompey  
ceaseth to follow him.

(..)



In like manner, Pompey hauing that day marched a full iourney, betooke himselfe to his former lodging at Asparagus. And, for that the souldiers were not troubled with fortifying their Campe, by reason all the woorkes were whole and intire, many of them went out farre off to get wood, and to seeke forrage. Others, rising hastily, had left a great part of their luggage behind them; and induced by the neerenesse of the last nights lodging, left their Armes, and went backe to fetch those things that were behind. Insomuch; as Cæsar, seeing them thus scattered (as before hee had conceiued how it would fall out) about high noone gaue warning to depart, and so ledde out his Armie; and doubling that daies iourney, hee went from that place about eight mile: Which Pompey could not doe, by reason of the absence of his souldiers.

The next day, Cæsar, hauing in like manner sent his carriages before, in the beginning of the night, set forward himselfe, about the fourth watch; that if there were any suddaine necessity of fighting, he might (at all occasions) be ready with the whole Armie. The like hee did the daies following: by which it happened, that in his passage ouer great Riuers, and by difficult and tumber some waies, hee receiued no detrimēt or losse at all. For, Pompey being staid the first day, and afterwards struing in vaine, making great iourneys, and yet not ouertaking vs; the fourth day came ouer following, and betooke himselfe to another resolution.

Cæsar, as well for the accommodatīg of his wounded men, as also for paying the Armie, reassuring his Allies and Confederates, & leauing Guardes in the Townes, was necessarily to goe to Apollonia: but hee gaue no longer time for the dispatch of these things, then could be spared by him that made haste. For, fearing least Domitius should beeing agayed by Pompeys arrivall, hee desired to make towards him with all possible celeritie: his whole purpose and resolution, insisting vpon these reasons; That if Pompey did follow after him, hee should by that meanes draw him from the Sea-side, and from such prouisions of warre as hee had stored up at Dyrrachium: and so should compell him to vnder-take the warre, vpon equal conditions. If hee went ouer into Italie, hauing ioynd his Armie with Domitius, hee would goe to succour Italie by the way of Illiricum. But, if hee should goe about to besiege Apollonia, or Oricum, and so exclude him from all the Sea-coast, hee would then besiege Scipio, and force Pompey to relieue him.

S 3.

And

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And therefore, having writ and sent to Cn. Domitius, what he would have done (leaving foure Cohorts to keepe Apollonia; one at Lissus, and three at Oriculum, and disposing such as were weake through their wounds, in Epirus and A-ernania) he set forward.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**O**mnem in isto itinere eius dies, saith the storie. Which giueth occasion to inquire, how far this iust daies journey extended. Lipsius saith, it was twentie-foure miles, alleaging that of Vegetius; *Militari gradu (saith he) viginti millia passuum horis quing; duntaxat assis conficienda: pleno autem gradu qui citior est, totidem horis viginti quatuor*; vnderstanding *istum iter*, to bee so much as was measured *militari gradu*. But he that knowes the marching of an Armie, shall easilie perceiue the impossibilitie of marching ordinarilie twentie-foure miles a day. Besides, this place doth plainly confute it; for, first, hee saith that hee made a iust daies journey: and then againe, rising about noone, doubled that daies journey, and went eight miles. Which shewes, that their *istum iter* was about eight mile: and so sureth the slowe conuieiance of an Armie, with more probabilitie then that of Lipsius.

## CHAP. XXVII.

Pompey hasteth to Scipio. Domitius heareth of the ouerthrowe.

**P**ompey also, coniecturing at Caesars purpose, thought it requisite for him to hasten to Scipio, that he might succour him if Caesar should chaunce to intend that way: but as it so fell out that he would not depart from the Sea-shore, and Corcyra, as expecting the legions and Cavalrie to come out of Italie, he would then attack Domitius. For these causes, both of them made haste, as well to assise their Parties, as to surprize their enemies, if occasion were offered: but Caesar had turned out of the way, to goe to Apollonia; whereas Pompey had a ready way into Macedonia by Caudania. To which there happened an other incouenience: that Domitius, who for many daies together had lodged hard by Scipios Campe, was now departed from thence, to make provision of Corne, unto Heraclea Senticia, which is subiect to Caudania; as though Fortune would haue thrust him upon Pompey. Moreover, Pompey had writ to all the States and Provinces, of the ouerthrowe at Dyrrachium, in farre greater tearmes then the thing it selfe was: and had noised it abroad, that Caesar was beaten, had lost all his forces, and fled away.

Which

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Which reports, made the waies very hard and dangerous to our men, & drew many States from Caesars partie: whereby it happened, that many Messengers beeing sent, both from Caesar to Domitius, and from Domitius to Caesar, were forced to turne back againe, and could not passe. Howbeit, some of the followers of Roscillus and Aegus (who as is before shewed, had fled vnto Pompey) meeting on the way vwith Domitius Discoverers (whether it were out of their old acquaintance, having lined together in the warres of Gallia; or otherwise, out of vaine-glorie) related all what had happened; not omitting Caesars departure, or Pompeis comming. Whereof Domitius being informed, and beeing but scarce foure houres before him, did (by the helpe of the enemy) auoid a most eminent danger, and met with Caesar at Eginum: which is a towne situate vpon the frontiers of Theffalia.

### OBSERVATIONS.

**T**oy is an opening and dilating motion; and oftentimes openeth the bodie so wide, as it letteth out the soule: which returneth not again. And in like manner, the causes of all such exultations, doe for the most part, spread themselves further then is requisite.

Pompey, having victorie in hope, rather then in hand, boasted as though all were his: Not considering, that the happinesse or disaster of humane actions, doth not depend vpon the particulars, rising in the course thereof, which are variable and diuers; but according as the event shall censure it. Wherevpon, the Ruffes haue a saying in such cases, that Hee, that laughs afterward, laughs too: as Caesar did.

*Humanarū actionum felicitas infelicitasque non ē singulari-vni recum parti-culā quā multo-ant et varie sed ex eventu iudicantur. D. onyf. Hal. lib. 9.*

## CHAP. XXVIII.

Caesar sacketh Gomphos, in Theffalia.

**C**aesar, having ioyned both Armies together, came to Gomphos, vvhich is the first towne of Theffalia by the way leading out of Epirus. These people, a few daies before, had of their owne accord, sent Embassadors to Caesar, offering all their meanes and abilities to be disposed at his pleasure; requiring also a Guarizon of souldiers from him. But now they had heard of the ouerthrowe at Dyrrachium: which was made so great, and so preuailed vwith them, that Androstenes, Prator of Theffalia (choosing rather to be a partaker of Pompeis victorie, then a companion with Caesar in aduersitie) had drawne all the multitude of seruants and children out of the Country, into the towne; and shutting up the Gates, dispatched Messengers to Scipio & Pompey, for succour to be sent vnto him, in that hee was not able to hold out a long siege. Scipio, vnderstanding of the departure of the Armies from Dyrrachium, had



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ad brought the legions to Larissa: and Pompey did not as yet approach neere vnto Theſſalia.

Cæſar, hauing fortified his Campe, commaunded Mantilets, Ladders, and ſurdles to be made ready for a ſurpriſe: which beeing fitted and prepared, hee exhorted the ſouldiers, and ſhewed them what need there was (for the relieving of their wants, and ſupplying of all neceſſaries) to poſſeſſe theſe ſelues, of an open and full towne; as alſo by their example, to terrifie the other Cities: and what they did, to doe ſpeedily, before it could be ſuccoured. Where-vpon, by the ſingular induſtrie of the ſouldiers, the ſame day he came thither, giuing the aſſault after the ninth houre (notwithſtanding the exceeding height of the walls) hee tooke the Towne before ſunne-ſetting, and gaue it to the ſouldiers to bee riled: And preſently remoouing from thence, came to Metropolis, in ſuch ſort, as hee out-went as well Meſſengers, as newes of taking the Towne.

The Metropolitans, inducd with the ſame reſpects, at firſt ſhutte vp their gates, and filled their valls with Armed men: but afterwards, vnderſtanding by the Captiues (whom Cæſar cauſed to be brought forth) what had happened to them of Gomphos, they preſently opened their gates; and by that meanes were all preſerued in ſafety. Which happineſſe of theirs, beeing compared with the deſolation of Gomphos, there was no one State of all Theſſalia (excepting them of Lariffa, which were kept in with great forces by Scipio) but yeelded obedience to Cæſar, and did what he commaunded. And, hauing gotte a place plentiful of Corne, which was now almoſt ripe, he reſolued to attend Pompeis coming; and there to proſecute the reſidue of that warre.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**L**ex ſaith, that the ſiege of that Place which we would quicklie take, muſt be proſecuted & vrged hard. Which rule, Cæſar obſerued: for, he followed it ſo hard, that he tooke the Towne fortified with exceeding high walls, in foure houres ſpace; or thereabouts, after he beganne to aſſault it. Which, Plutarch ſaith, was ſo plentifully ſtored of all neceſſarie prouiſion, that the ſouldiers found there a refection of all the miſeries and wants they ſuffered at Dyrrachium: in ſomuch as they ſeemed to be new made, both in bodie and courage; by reaſon of the wine, victuals & riches of that place: which were all giuen vnto them, according to that of Xenophon; *Lex inter omnes homines perpetua eſt, quando belligerantium vrbs capta fuerit, cum ea eorum eſſe qui eam ceperint, et corpora eorum qui in vrbe ſunt et bona.*

Appian ſaith, the Germanes were ſo drunke, that they made all men laugh at them: and, that if Pompey had ſurpriſed the in theſe diſorders, they might haue paid deare for their entertainment. Hee addeth moreouer (to ſhew the ſtiffeneſſe of the inhabitants againſt Cæſar) that there were found, in a Surgeons Hall, twentie-two principal Perſonages, ſtiffe-dead vpon the ground, without appearance of any wound, hauing their goblots by them: and hee that

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gaue the poiſon, ſitting vpright in a Chaire, as dead as the reſt. And as Phil- lip, hauing taken Acroliffe, in the Country of the Ictarians, drew all the reſt to his obedience, through the feare they conceiued of their viage: ſo the confi- deration of the calamitie which befell Gomphos, and the good intreacie which the Metropolitans found, by yielding vnto Cæſar, brought all the other Cities, vnder his commaund.

## CHAP. XXIX.

### Pompey commeth into Theſſalia: his Armie conceiued aſſured hope of victorie.



Pompey, a few daies after, came into Theſſalia, & there, calling all the Armie together, firſt gaue great thanks to his owne men, and then exhorted Scipios ſouldiers, that the victorie being already obtained, they would be partakers of the bootie, and of the rewards: and taking all the legions into one Campe, he made Scipio partaker both of his honour and authoritie, commaunding the Trumpets to attend his pleaſure, for matter of direction, and that he ſhould vſe a Pratoriall Pauillion.

Pompey, hauing ſtrengthened himſelfe, with an addition of another great Armie, euery man was confirmed in his former opinion; and their hope of victorie was increaſed: ſo that the longer they delaid the matter, the more they ſeemed to prolong their returne into Italie. And albeit Pompey proceeded ſlowlie and deliberately in the buſineſſe, yet it was but a daies worke, howſoeuer hee might be well pleaſed with authoritie and commaund; and to vſe men both of Conſular dignitie, and of the Pratorian order, as his vaſſalls and ſeruants.

And now they began to diſpute openly, concerning rewards, and dignities of Prelacie: and quoted out thoſe, which from yeere to yeere were to be choſen Conſuls. Others begged the houſes and goods of ſuch as were with Cæſar. Beſides, a great controuerſie that further grew betweene them in open counsell, whether L. Hertius were not to be regarded at the next election of Prators, being abſent, and imploied by Pompey againſt the Parthians. And, as his friends vrged Pompey with his promiſe giuen at his departure, requiring hee might not now be deceiued through his greatneſſe & authoritie; the reſt, running a courſe of as great danger and labour, ſaw no reaſon (by way of contradiction) why one man ſhould bee reſpected before all others. And now Domitius, Scipio, and Spinther Lentulus, began to grow to high words in their daily meetings, concerning Caſars Prieſthood: Lentulus alleadging, by way of oſtentation, the honour that was due to his age and authoritie; Domitius vaunting of the credit and fauour he had at Rome: and Scipio, truſting to Pompeis alliance. Moreover, Atilius Rufus accuſed L. Affranius to Pompey, for betraying the Armie in Spaine. L.

Domitius

Cæſar.

After dinner  
the chieftain  
in the afternoon

28. f.  
Oſſide and  
the potters  
of the  
potters  
of the  
potters

28. f. d. d. d. d.  
Cyl.

28. f. d. d. d. d.  
Cyl.

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mitius gave out in councell, That all such as were of the rank of Senators, should be inquired vpon by a triple Commission: and that those which were personally in the warre, should be of the Commission to iudge the rest; as well such as were at Rome, as those that did no seruice in this warre. The first Commission, should be to cleare such as had well-deserued, from all danger. The second, small: and the third, Capitall. And to conclude, every man laboured, either to haue a reward, or to bee auenged of his Enemy. Neither did they thinke so much of the meanes how to overcome, as how to vse the victorie.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Common.

**T**he Tale which the Emperour Frederick related to the Commissioners of Lewis the eleuenth, King of Fraunce (concerning the parting betwene them of the Territories of Charles, Duke of Burgundie) Not to tell the skin before they had killed the Beare; might well haue fitted these of Pompeys Partie, that contended for offices before they fell, and disposed of the skinnes ere they had tooke the Beares: Not sparing out of their impatiencie to tax Pompey of spinning out the warre, for the sweetnesse he found in authoritie & command; as Agamemnon did at Troy. Inasmuch, as Plutarch reporteth, That one Fauonius, imitating Catos feulity & freenes of speech, went about throughout all the Campe, demanding, Whether it were not great pitie, that the ambitious humour of one man, should keepe them that yeere, from eating the figs and delicate fruite of Thuculum? And all men, generally, stood so affected, as Pompey could not withstand their inforcements. For, as Florus saith; *Milites otium, socij morā, principes ambitum Ducis increpabant.* Onely Cato thought it not fitt, to hazard himselfes vpon a desperate man, that had neither hope or help, but in Fortune. But, as in most things besides, so in this he stood alone, and could not preuaile against a multitude.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**L**acere sibi ternas tabellas dari, ad indicandum ijs, qui erant ordinis Senatorij, saith the storie; which Tabellas, I haue translated Commissions, as best futing our English phrase: but the meaning was as followeth.

It appeareth by historie, that the Romaine people, as well in election of Magistrates, as in causes criminall, did giue their voices openly & aloud, for sixe hundred yeeres together; vntill one Gabinus, a Tribune of the people, perceiving that the Commons, for feare of the great Ones, durst not dispose of their voices freely, and as they would, published an Ediēt, that The people should giue their voices by Balating. Which law, Tully commendeth; *Grata est tabella qua frontes operit, hominum mentes tegit, datque eam libertatem quod velint faciant.* And in another place, hee calleth it *Principiū iustissimū*

In ord. j. p. Plan.

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*iustissima libertatis.* Vpon an election of Magistrates, the bails were giuen according to the number of the Competitors; that every man might chuse as he pleased.

In criminall Causes, every man had three: one marked with A. signifying Absolution, and another with C. for Condemnation, and another with N.L. for *Non liquet*, which they called *Ampliatio*, desirous to be further informed, which our Grand Iuries doe expresse by an *Ignoramus*. And in this manner, would Domitius haue had his fellow Senators either quired or condemned. The bails which were giuen vpon the making of a law, were two: one marked with V.R. which signified *Vt rogas*, that it might goe on: and the other with A. signifying *Antiquo*; reiecting it. For, as Festus noteth, *Antiquare est in modum pristinum reducere.*

And in this manner they would haue proceeded against Cæsars Partizans, being altogether mistaken, in the assurance of their happiness: the continuance whereof, depended vpon Vertue, and not vpon Fortune.

*Virtus felicitatis vna. nō fortuna. Dio. Halliar. lib. 2.*

### CHAP. XXX.

Cæsar, finding the Enemy to offer battell in an indifferent Place, prepareth to vndertake him.



**P**rovision of Corne beeing made, and the souldiers well resolved (to which end he had interposed a sufficient space of time, after the battell at Dyrrachium) Cæsar thought it time now to try what purpose or will Pompey had to fight. And therefore, drawing the Armie out of the Campe, hee imbattelled his troopes, first, vpon the place, and some what remooued from Pompeys Campe: but every day following, he went further off his own trenches, and brought his Armie under the hills whereon the Enemy lay incamped: which made his Armie daily the more bold and assured, keeping continually his former courage with his horsemen; who because they were lesse in number by manie degrees then those of Pompeys partie, hee commanded certaine lusty young men, chosen out of them that stood before the Ensignes for their nimble & swift running, to fight amongst the horsemen: and by reason of their daily practise, had learned the vse of that kind of fight. So that one thousand of our Cavalrie, in open and Champaine places, would when need were, vndergoe the charge of seauen thousand of theirs, and were not much terrified with the multitude of them. For, in that time they made a fortunate encounter, and slew one of the two Sauoien, that had formerly fled to Pompey, with diuers others.

Pompey, hauing his Campe vpon a hill, imbattelled his Armie at the lower foote thereof, to see if he could get Cæsar to thrust himselfe into an vnequall and disadvantageous place. Cæsar, thinking that Pompey would by no meanes bee drawne

Cæsar.

swne to battell, thought it the fittest course for him to shift his Campe, and to alwaies in moouing: hoping by often remooues from place to place, he should better accomodate for prouision of Corne, and withall, might vpon a march, find some occasion to fight. Besides, hee should wearie Pompeis Armie, not accustomed to trauell, with daily and continuall iourneys: and there-vpon, he gaue a signe of dislodging.

But, as the Tents were taken downe, it was a little before obserued, that Pompeis Armie was aduanced somewhat further from their Trenches, then ordinarily they were accustomed; so that it seemed they might fight in an equall and different place. Wherevpon, Caesar, when his troopes were already in the gates tting out; It behoueth vs, saith he, to put off our remouing for the present, and thinke our selues of fighting, as we haue alwaies desired; for, we shall not easie-herafter find the like occasion: and presently drew out his forces. Pompey (so, as it was afterwards knowne, was resolved (at the instance of all that were about him) to giue battell; for, hee had giuen out in counsell some few daies before, that he would ouerthrowe Caesars Armie, before the troopes came to ioyne battell.

And, as many that stood by wondered at it, I know, saith he, that I promise almost an incredible matter: but take the ground wherevpon I speake it, that you may vndergoe the business with more assurance. I haue perswaded the Cavalrie, and they haue promised to accomplish it, that whē they come neere to ioyne, they shall attack Caesars right Cornet on the open side; and so the Army being circumvented behind, shall be amused and routed, before our men can cast a vvenpon at them. Whereby, we shall end the warre without danger of the Legions, or almost without any wound received: which is not difficult or hard to doe, for vs that are so strong in horse; and withall, gaue order that they should be ready against the next day, forasmuch as the occasion was offered (according as they had often intended) not to deceiue the opinion which other men had of their prowesse and valour.

Labienus, seconding this speech, as contemning Caesars forces, extolled Pompeis resolution to the skies. Doe not thinke, Pompey, saith he, that this is the Army vvhether with he conquered Gallia, or Germania; I was present my selfe at all those battells, and doe not speake rashly vvhāt I am ignorant off. There is a very small peece of that Army remaining: a great part of them are dead, as cannot other wise be chosen, in so many battells. The Pestilence (the last Autumne) in Italy consumed many of them; many are gone home, and many are left in the Continent. Haue ye not heard, that the Cohorts which are now at Brundisium, are made and raised of such as remained behind there to recover their healths? These forces that ye see, were the last yeere gathered, of the Musters made in the hither Gallia; and most of them, of the Colonies beyond the Po: and yet all the flower and strength of them, was taken away in the last two ouerthrowes at Dyrrachium.

When he had spoken these things, he tooke a solemne oath, not to returne into the Campe but with victorie, exhorting the rest to doe the like. Pompey, commending him, tooke the same oath: neither was there any man that refused it.

These

These things beeing thus caried in the counsell, they rose vp, and departed, with great hope and ioy of all men; as hauing already conceived victorie in their minds: and the rather, because they thought that nothing could be spoken vaine-ly, by so skilfull a Commaunder, in so weightie and important a Cause.

OBSERVATIONS.



Concerning the fashion of the Cavalrie, in which either Partie reposed so much confidence, wee are to note, that the Romaines had two sorts of horsemen; the one compleatlie armed (according to their manner) and incorporated in the bodie of their Legions, whose entertainment, was thrice as much as the foote-men. *Aequo impotens postulatam fuit* (saith Liuius) *vt de stipendio equitum* (mercant autem triplex ea tempestate) *era demerentur*. And the other, were as light-horsemen, which they called *Alarj*.

Lib. 7.

The first sort were thus armed, as Iosephus witnesseth; They wore a sword on their right side, somewhat longer then that of the footmen, & caried a long staffe or speare in their hand, a Target at their horse side, and three or more Darts in a quiver, with broad heads, and not much lesse then their stauces; hauing such head-peecces and corselets as the foote-men had.

Lib. 3. Excid.

The light-armed men, had either light Darts, or Boawe and Arrowes. And doubtlesse, their chiefe service was with their casting weapons. And accordingly, Tully putteth his sonne in mind, of the praise hee had got in Pompeis Armie (where he commaunded a wing of horse); *Equitando, iaculando, omni militari labore tolerando*.

2. Offic.

And, as their service consisted in breaking their Stauces vpon an Enemy, & in casting their Darts; so wee exercise the practice of the former, in our triumphs at Tilt; and the Spaniards the later, in their *tocho di cane*.

Our moderne horsemen, are either Launciers, Petronelliers, or Pistoliers. The Petronelliers do discharge at a distance; making their left hand that holds the bridle, their rest: which is vncertaine, and to no great effect.

The Pistoliers, that will doe some-what to purpose, doe come vp close one to another, and discharge his Pistoll in his enemies necke, or vnder the corselet, about the flanke or seate of a man; and commonly misseeth not.

I haue seene a deuice to vse a Musket on horse-backe, which if it prooue as seruiceable as is by some conceiued, will be of great aduantage.

The manner of imbattelling their Armies.

**A**S Caesar approached neere vnto Pompeis Campe, hee obserued his Armie to be imbattelled in this manner; There were in the left Corner two legions, which in the beginning of these broiles, were by order and decree of Senate, taken from Caesar; whereof one was called the first, & the other the third; and with them stood Pompey. Scipio had the middle Squadron, with the legions he brought out of Syria.

The Legion of Cilicia, ioyned with the Spanish Cohorts, which Afranius brought with him, made the right Corner. These Pompey held to be very strong. The rest of the troopes were interlaced, betwene the middle Squadron, and the Corners, and made in all one hundred and tenne Cohorts, which amounted to fiftie-five thousand men: besides two thousand old souldiers, and men of note, whom he had called out to that warre, and dispersed them ouer all the Armie. The rest of the cohorts, which were seauen, he had left in the Campe, or disposed about the forts neere adioyning. The right Corner was flanked with a Riuer, that had high & cumbersome banks: and there vpon he put all his Cavalrie, together with the Archers and Slingers in the left Corner.


Caesar, obseruing his former custome, placed the tenth legion in the right Corner, and the ninth in the left; albeit they were very much weakened in the fights at Dyrrachium: but to this he so ioyned the eight, that he seemed almost to make one of two, and commanded them to succour each other. Hee had in all about eighty cohorts, which made twenty-two M. men. He left two cohorts to keepe the Campe, and gaue the left Corner to Antonius: the right to Pub. Sylla, and the middle Squadron to Cn. Domitius, and put himselfe opposite to Pompey. And withall, hauing well obserued these things (according as I haue formerly declared) fearing least the right Corner should be inclosed about with the multitude of the Cavalrie, he speedily drew sixe cohorts out of the third battell, & of them he made a fourth, to encounter the horsemen: and shewed them what hee would haue done; admonishing withall, that the victorie of that day consisted in the valour of those cohorts, commanding the third battell; and likewise the whole Armie not to ioine battell without order from him: which when he thought fit, he would giue them notice thereof by an Ensigne.

And going about to incourage them to fight, according to the vse of warre, he put them in mind of his fauours, and his carriage towards them from time to time; and specially, that they themselves were witnesses; with what labour and meanes he had sought for peace, as well by treaty with Vatinius, as also by employing Claudius to Scipio: and likewise how he had indeauoured at Oricum with Libo, that Embassadors might be sent to treat of these things. Neither was he willing at any time to misspend the souldiers blood, or to deprive the Common-wealth of either of those Armies.

This

This speech being delivered, the souldiers, both requiring and longing with an ardent desire to fight, hee commanded the signe of battell to be giuen by a Trumpet.

OBSERVATIONS.

 Concerning the order vsed in disposing these Armies, for the trial of this Cause, it appeareth by the storie, that Pompey set two Legions in his left Corner, which are heere named the first and the third. Howbeit, Lucan saith, that those Legions were the first and the fourth.

— Cornus tibi cura sinistri,  
Lentule, cum prima, qua tum fuit, optima bello,  
Et quarta legione datur.

The middle Squadron was ledde by Scipio, with the legions he brought out of Syria, which were also two; *Exspectabat cum Scipione ex Syria legiones duas*, as it is in the second Chapter of this booke.

In the right Corner, was the Cilician legion, with the Cohorts that Afranius brought out of Spaine: which, amounting to the number of a Legion, made that Corner equall to the left. And so of these sixe Legions, which were the strength and sinowes of his Armie, hee fashioned his battell into a middle Squadron, and two Corners. His other forces, being young souldiers, hee disposed in the distances, betwene the Corners and that middle Squadron.

Frontinus, speaking of this point, saith; *Legiones secundum virtutem, firmissimas in medio, et in cornu locauit; spacia his interposita Tyronibus supplenuit*. His number of men, by our text, was fiftie-five thousand; but Plutarch maketh them not aboue fortie-five thousand.

Caesar had not halfe so many men, and yet made a triple battell; but not so thick or deepe with Legions: for, in the right Corner he put the tenth Legion, and in the left the ninth and the eight; being both weake and farre spent, by the former ouer-throws. Of the other Legions he maketh no mention: but it seemeth they filled vp the distances betwene the Corners and the bodie of the Armie; and were as flesh to those sinowes & bones, which out of the prerogatiue of their valour, tooke the place of the Corners, and the middle bulke of the battell. And fearing least his right Corner should be circumuented, by the multitude of their Cavalrie, hee drew sixe Cohorts out of his third or last battell, to make a fourth battell to oppose the Cavalrie: which gorte him the victorie. For, howsoeuer the Text saith, *Singulas cohortes detraxit*: yet Plutarch saith plainly, that Those Cohorts he thus tooke, were sixe, and amounted to three thousand men: which riseth to the number of so many Cohorts. And Appian, agreeing herevnto, saith, that his fourth battell consisted of three thousand men. Frontinus likewise affirmeth, hee tooke out sixe Cohorts, *et tenuit in subsidio, sed dextro latere conuersas in obliquum*: Wherevnto that of Lucan agreeth;

Tenuit obliquas post signa cohortes.

T 2.

Which

Lib. 3. cap. 3.

Singulas Cohortes detraxit.

Lib. 3. ca. 3.

Lib. 7.

## Observations vpon the third

Which is thus to be vnderstood: that they turned their faces towards the left Corner of Pompeis Armie, that they might bee the readier to receiue the Cavalrie comming on to inclose Cæsars right wing; as beeing sure of the other side, which was fenced with a Riuer and a Marsh.

Touching Cæsars Speech to the souldiers, it seemed like that of Themistocles, at the battell of Salamina; where Zerkxes made a long Oration to encourage the Persians, and lost the day: The mistocles spake but a few words to the Greekes, and got the victorie. How-soeuer; one thing is not to bee omitted, that Plutarch, and such others as haue dipped their penne, either in the sweat, or in the blood of this battell, doe all agree, that Cæsar had not about twentie-thousand men.

## CHAP. XXXII.

### The Battell beginneth; and Cæsar ouercommeth.



Here was one Crastinus, in Cæsars Armie, called out to this warre, who the yeere before had ledde the first companie of the tenth Legion; a man of singular valour: who vpon the signe of battell giuen, Follow me, saith he, as many of you as were of my companie; and doe that indeauor to your Emperour, which you haue alwaies beene willing to performe. This is the onely battell remaining vnfought: which beeing ended, he shall be restored to his dignitie, and wee to our libertie. And withall, looking towards Cæsar, I will, saith hee, O Emperour, so carry my selfe this day, that thou shalt giue mee thanks, either aliu or dead. And when he had thus spoken, he was the first that ranne out of the right Corner: & about one hundred and twentie elected souldiers of the same Centurie followed voluntarily after him.

There was so much space left betwene both the battells, as might serue either Armie to meete vpon the charge. But Pompey had commaunded his men to receiue Cæsars assault, and to vnder-geoe the shock of his Armie, without moouing from the place wherein they stood (and that by the aduice of C. Triarius) to the end that the first running out & violence of the souldiers being broken, & the battell disordered, they that stood persit in their Orders, might set vpon the that were scattered & dispersed; hoping, the piles would not fall so forceable vpon the Armie standing still, as when they aduanced forward to meet them: And that it would fall out withall, that Cæsars souldiers, hauing twice as farre to runne, would by that meanes be out of breath, and spent with wearinesse.

Which, in my opinion, was against all reason: for, there is a certaine inclination and alacritie of spirit, naturally planted in euery man, which is inflamed with a desire to fight. Neither should anie Commander repress or restrain the same, but rather increase it, and set it forward.

Nor

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Nor was it in vaine of ancient time ordained, that the Trumpets should euerie where sound, and euery man take up a shout; but that they thought these things did both terrifie the Enemy, and incite their owne Party.

But our souldiers, vpon the signe of Battell, running out with their Piles ready to be throwne, and perceiving that Pompeis souldiers did not make out to meet them (as men taught with long vse, and exercised in former fights) stopt their course of their owne accord, & almost in the mid-way stood still; that they might not come to blowes vpon the spending of their strength: And after a little respite of time, running on againe, threw their piles, and presently drew their swords, as Cæsar had commaunded them. Neither were Pompeis souldiers wanting in this business; for, they receiued the piles which ouer cast at them, tooke the shock of the Legions, kept their ranks, cast their piles, and betooke them to their swords.

At the same time, the Cavalrie, according as was commaunded them, issued out from Pompeis left Corner, & the whole multitude of Archers thrust themselves out. Whose assault our horsemen were not able to indure, but fell backe a little, from the place wherein they stood: whereby Pompeis horsemen, beganne to presse them with more eagernes; and to put themselves in squadrons, to inclose the Army about. Which Cæsar perceiving, he gaue the signe of aduancing forward, to the fourth Battell, whom he had made out of the number of the Cohorts; who came with such a sling vpon Pompeis horsemen, that none of them were able to stand before them; and turning their backs, did not onely giue place, but fledde all as fast as they could, to the highest Hills: whereby, the Archers and Slingers, beeing left naked without succour, were all put to the sword. And with the same violence, those Cohorts incircled about the left Corner, notwithstanding any resistance that could be made by Pompeis partie, and charged them behind, vpon their backs.

At the same time, Cæsar commaunded the third Battell, which as yet stood still, and were not remooued, to aduance forward: by meanes of which fresh and sound men, relieuing such as were faint and wearie, as also, that others did charge them behind vpon their backs, Pompeis partie were able no longer to indure it, but all turned their backs and fledde.

Neither was Cæsar deceiued in his opinion, that the beginning of the victorie would growe from those Cohorts which hee placed in the fourth Battell, against the horsemen; according as hee himselfe had openly spoken, in his encouragement to the souldiers. For, by them, first the Cavalrie was beaten; by them, the Archers and Slingers were slaine; by them, Pompeis Battell was circumsented on the left Corner, and by their meanes they began to flie.

As soone as Pompey saw his Cavalrie beaten, and perceiving the part where-in hee most trusted, to be amused and affrighted, and distrusting the rest, hee forth-with left the Battell, and conuaid himselfe on horseback into the Camp. And speaking to the Centurions that had the watch at the Pratorian gate with a loud voice, as all the souldiers might heare, said, Keepe the Campe, and defend it diligently, to preuent any hard casualtie that may happen. In the meane while, I will goe about to the other Ports, to settle the Guards of the Campe.

T 3.

And

## Observations vpon the third

And hauing thus said, hee went into the Pratorium, distrusting the maine point, and yet expecting the euent.

### THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**P**ompey so caried himselfe in the course of this warre, as he rather seemed a sufferer then a doer; neuer disposing his Armie for any attempt or on-set, but onely when hee brake out of the place wherein he was besieged at Dyrrachium. And accordingly he gaue order, that In the maine action and point of triall, his souldiers should suffer and sustaine the assault, rather then otherwise. But, whether hee did well or no, hath since been in question. Cæsar vterly disliked it, as a thing contrary to reason. *Est quadam, saith he, animi incitatio atque a-*

*hcritas, naturaliter innata omnibus, qua studio pugnae incenditur; hanc non primere sed augere Imperatores debent.*  
Agreeable wherevnto, is that of Cato the Great; that In cases of battell, an Enemy is to be charged with all violence. And to that purpose it is requisite, to put the souldiers (at some reasonable distance) into a Posterne of vaunting and defiance, with menaces and cries of terrour; and then to spring forward in such manner, as may make them fall vpon their enemies with greater furie: As Champions or Wrestlers, before they buckle, stretch out their limbs, and make their flourish as may best serue to assure themselves, and discourage their aduersaries; According as we read of Hercules & Antæus.

*Ille Cleonai proiecit terga Leonis,  
Antæus libici, perfudit membra liquore  
Hospes, Olympiaca seruato more Palestre.  
Ille parum fidens pedibus contingere matrem,  
Auxilium membris, calidas insudit arenas.*

Howbeit, forasmuch as all men are not of one temper, but require severall fashions to tune their mindes to the true note of a battell, wee shall find severall Nations, to haue severall vsances in this point. The Romaines (as appeareth by this of Cæsar) were of auncient time accustomed to sound Trumpets, and Hoboies, in all parts of the Armie, and to take vp a great clamour and shout: whereby the souldiers (in their vnderstanding) were encouraged, and the Enemy affrighted. Where-as, contrariwise, the Greekes went alwaies with a close and silent mouth, as hauing more to doe then to say to their Enemies. And, Thucydides, writing of the Lacedemonians (the flower of Greece for matter of Armes) saith, that Instead of Trumpets, and Cornets to incite them, they vsed the sweet harmonie of Flutes, to moderate and qualifie their passions, least they should be transported with bridle's impetuosity.

It is reported, that Marshall Biron, the Father, seemed to dislike of our English march (hearing it beaten by the Drummes) as too slowe, & of no encouragement: and yet it to fitteth our Nation (as Sir Roger Williams then answered)

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(swered) as wee haue diuers times ouer-runne all France with it. Howlocuer, the euent of this battell is sufficient to disproue Pompeis errorr heerein, and to make good what Cæsar commaunded.

### THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**T**hese fixe Cohorts, which made the fourth battell, did so encounter Pompeis Cauallrie, that they were not able to with stand them. It is said, that Cæsar gaue them order, not to fling their Piles as commonly they did, but to hold the in their hands like a Pike or a laucelin, and make onely at the faces of those Gallants, & men at Armes on horseback. For the holding of them in their hands, I doe not vnderstand it, and can not conceiue how they could reach more then the next ranks vnto them in that manner. But for making at the faces of the Cauallrie, Florus saith, that Cæsar, as he galloped vp and downe the ranks, was heard to let fall bloody and bitter words, but very pathetically, and effectually for a victorie: as thus, Souldier, cast right at the face; Where-as Pompey called to his Men, to spare their fellow Citizens.

Eutropius, in his Epitome of Suetonius, affirmeth the same thing, both of the one and of the other: and Lucan seemeth to auerre the same, concerning that of Cæsar;

*Aduersosque iubet ferro contundere vultus.  
Frontinus hath it thus; C. Cæsar, cum in partibus Pompeianis, magna equitum Romanorum esset manus, eaque armorum scientia milites conficeret, ora oculosque eorum gladijs peti insisit, et sic aduersam faciem cadere coegit.*

### THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

**A**mongst these memorialls, Crassinus may not be forgotten, being the first man that began the battell, whom Plutarch calleth C. Crassinius; and saith, that Cæsar seeing him in the morning, as hee came out of his Tent, asked him what hee thought of the successe of the battell? Crassinus, stretching out his right hand vnto him, cried out aloud, O Cæsar, thine is the victorie; and this day shalt thou commend mee, either alieue or dead: And accordingly, brake afterwards out of the ranks; and running amongst the midst of his Enemies, with manie that followed him, made a great slaughter. At last, one ranne him into the mouth, that the swords point came out at his neck, and so slew him.

By him, and others of like courage and worth, was Cæsar raised from the extremitie of his wants, and the disgrace of his former losses, to the chiefeest height of earthly glory: And heerein might well assume, vnto himselfe, that which was formerly said of the people, *Magna populi Romani fortuna, sed semper in malis maior resurrexit;* Together with that of Plutarch, *Res inuicta Romanorum*

Lib. 4. cap. 2.

Lib. 7.

Lib. 4. cap. 7.

In the life of Pompey.

Florus.

## Observations vpon the third

Lib. 4.  
Pompeius, quoniam  
Pompeius vult  
non parat?

manorum arma. Lucan speaking of Sæua, formerly mentuoned, saith; He  
grew a great deale of valour to get Rome a Lord: but vpon Craſſinus, hee  
eth a heauie doome.

*Dij tibi non mortem, quæ cunctis paræ paratur, sed sensum post fata tuæ dent  
astute morti. Cuius torta manu commisit lancea bellum, primaque Theſſali-  
ano Romano sanguine tinxit.*

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### Cæsar preaceth hard after the Enemie, and taketh the Campe.

Cæsar.

**P**ompeis souldiers: beeing thus forced to flie into their Campe, Cæsar, thinking it expedient to giue them no time of respite, exhorted the Armie to vse the benefit of Fortune, and to assault the Campe: who, notwithstanding the extreame heate (for the business was drawne out vntill it was high noone) were willing to vnder-goe any labour, and to yeeld obedience to his commandements. The Campe was industriously defended, by the Cohorts that had the guard thereof; but much more stoutly by the Thracians, and other succours of Barbarous people. For, such souldiers as were fledde thither out of the battell, were so terrified in mind, and spent with wearinesse, that most of them (hauing laid aside their Armes, and Military Ensignes) did rather thinke how they might best escape, then to defend the Campe. Neither could they which stood vpon the Rampier, any longer indure the multitude of weapons; but fainting with wounds, forsooke the place: and presently fledde into the high Mountaines adioyning vnto the Campe; being ledde thither by the Centurions, and Tribunes of the souldiers.

In the Campe were found tables ready laid and prepared with linnen, together with cupboards of plate, furnished & set out; and their Tents strewed with fresh heaybes and rushes: and that of Lentulus, and aiuers others, with iuie, & many other superfluities, discovering their extreame luxurie and assurance of victorie. Whereby it was easily to be conceived, that they nothing feared the event of that day; beeing so carefull of such vnecessary delights. And yet for all this, they vpbraided Cæsars patient and miserable Army, with riot and excessse: to whom there were alwaies wanting such requisites, as were expedient for their necessary vses.

Pompey, when as our men were come vvitin the Campe, hauing got a horse, and cast away all Ensignes of Imperiall authoritie, got out at the Decumane gate, and made towards Larissa, as fast as his horse could cary him. Neither did hee stay there: but with the same speede (hauing got a few followers that escaped by flight) posting night & day, came at length to the Sea-side, with a troope of thirtie horse; and there went aboard a ship of burthen: complaining that his opinion

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onely deceived him; beeing (as it were) betrayed, by such as beganne first to flie: from vvhom hee hoped chiefly to haue had victorie.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**W**here-as it is said, that a dilatorie course is very profitable and safe; wee are to vnderstand it as a chiefe and maine point, in the dutie of an Embassadour, to temporise in things which are pressed hard vpon him; as beeing accountable for words and time: but no way charged with expeditions of warre. Wherein Protraction is oftentimes the interrupter of absolute victorie, and the onely supplanter of that which is desired. *Vincere scis Haniball, sed victoria vti nescis*, was a common by-word, and happened then well for the state of Rome. But now it fell out otherwise; hauing met with one that knew how to conquer, and how to follow victorie to purpose.

For, notwithstanding the battell he had fought, and the aduantage hee had thereby got, might haue seemed sufficient for one daies labour, yet hee would not let occasion passe, without taking the benefit that was then offered; and neuer ceased, vntill he had forced the Campe, and ouer-taken those that escaped the battell: and so made victorie sure vnto him, by driuing the naile home to the head. In regard whereof, he did not vsuite vs for his word or Motto, they call it, *Μὴ δὲν ἀνασχεδόντες*. BY. DEFERRING. NOTHING.

*Vtilis et tota rati-  
dilatio. Diony.  
Halic. lib. 8.  
Non committun-  
tur legatistri-  
remes aut loca,  
aut legiones, aut  
arces; sed verbal-  
et tempora. De-  
most. de falsale-  
gatione.*

*1. Labor in nego-  
tio, 2. fortitudo  
in periculo, 3. in-  
dustria in agen-  
do, 4. celeritas in  
cassiendo, were  
Cæsars proper-  
ties.*

## CHAP. XXXIII.

### Cæsar besieged those that were escaped into the Hills.

**C**æsar, hauing got the Campe, instantly required the souldiers not to looke after pillage and booty, and let slippe the meanes of ending the rest of their business: which, after hee had obtained, hee began to inclose the Hill about with works of fortification. They of Pompeis partie, distrusting the place, for that the Hill had no water, left it at an instant. And all those that were partakers of that fortune, made towards Larissa. Which Cæsar obseruing, diuided his forces, and commanded part of the Legions to remaine in Pompeis Campe, and part he sent back into his owne: leading foure Legions along with him, he tooke a neerer way to meet with them; and hauing gone sixe miles, he imbattelled his forces. Which they perceiuing, betooke themselves vnto a high Hill, vnder which ranne a River.

Cæsar, perswaded the souldiers, albeit they were spent with continuall labor all that day, and that night was now at hand, yet they would not thinke it much,

to

Cæsar.



cut off the River from the Hill by a fortification, to keepe them from watering the night. Which worke beeing perfected, they beganne by Commissioners to treat of conditions of yielding themselves. Some few of the Senators escaped in the night-time away by flight.

Cæsar, as soone as it was day, caused them all to come downe from the Hill into the Plaine, & there to cast away their Armes: which they performed without refusal: And casting themselves vpon the earth, their hands spread abroad, with bedding of many reares, desired mercie. Cæsar, comforting them, commanded they should stand vp: and hauing spoken somewhat touching his clemencie, a little to ease them of their feare, he gaue them all their lines with safetie; commanding the souldiers not to hurt any of them, nor that they should want any thing that was theirs.

These things beeing thus atchieued with diligence, hee caused other Legions to meet him from the Campe, sending those he had with him to rest themselves: and the same day came to Larissa. In that battaile, hee lost not above two hundred souldiers; but of Centurions, and other valiant men, hee lost thirtie. And Crassinus, fighting valiantly, was slaine (of whom wee formerly made mention) with a sword thrust into the face. Neither was that false which hee said as hee went to the battell: for, Cæsar was perswaded, that Crassinus behaued himselfe admirably in that fight, and did deserue as well of him as a man possibly could.

There were slaine of Pompeij's Armie, about fiftene thousand: howbeit, there were of them that yielded themselves, about twentie-foure thousand. For, such Cohorts as were in the Forts, did likewise yield themselves to Sylla: and manie fledde into the next Townes and Citties. Of Military Ensignes, there were brought out of the battell to Cæsar, one hundred and fourescore, with nine Eagles. L. Domitius, flying out of the Campe into the Mount, fainting for want of strength, was slaine by the horsemen.

OBSERVATIONS.



AND thus wee see the issue of that battaile, and the victory which Cæsar obtained, at as cheape a rate as could be imagined: for, there were slaine twentie-three M. of the enemy, and as manie taken, by rendering themselves, with the losse of two hundred souldiers, and thirty Centurions; amongst who was Crassinus: whose death obliged Cæsar to make this honourable mention of his valour. But as it is obserued by Dionysius Halicarnassensis, *Non Deus quispiam se ducibus, pro salute omniū qui certamen ineunt, sponsores sistit: nec ea conditione imperium accepimus, ut omnes homines deuincamus nullo ex nostris amisso.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXV.

*Lælius attempteth to block-in the Hauen at Brundisium: and Cassius fireth Cæsars shippes at Messine.*

(. .)



About the same time, D. Lælius came with his Nauie to Brundisium; and according as Libo formerly did, tooke the land in the mouth of the Port. And in like manner, Vatinius, Governour of Brundisium, hauing furnished and sent out certaine Skiffes, inticed out Lælius ships, and of them tooke a Galley, that was further shot out with two lesser shippes into the straights of the Port: & also had disposed his Cavalry along the shore, to keep the Mariners from fetching water. But Lælius, hauing the time of the yeere more fauourable and fitter for sayling, supplied his Armie with water from Corfew and Dyrrachium: neither could he be beaten off his designe, nor be driven out of the Port, or from the land, either with the dishonour of the shippes he lost, or with scarcitie and want of all necessaries, vntill hee heard of the battell in Theſſalia.

About the same time also, Cassius came into Sicilia, with the Nauie of Syria, Phænicia and Cilicia. And, vvhether-as Cæsars ships were diuided into two parts, Pub. Sulpitius, Prator, beeing Admirall of the one halfe, and lying at Vibone in the Straights: and M. Pomponius, Admirall of the other halfe at Messana; Cassius came first to Messana, and was arrined before Pomponius heard of his coming: by which meanes, he surprised him, distracted, and much amused, without any order or guardes. And finding a strong and fauourable wind, filled the shippes of burthen, with Rosin, Pitch and Towe, and like matter of firing: and sending them out to Pomponius Nauie, he burned all the shippes, beeing in number thirtie-five; amongst which there were twentie that had decks. By meanes vvhetherof, they conceined such a terrour, that albeit there was a legion in Guarizon at Messana, yet the Towne was hardly kept. And, but that certaine Messengers comming post, brought newes at the same instant of Cæsars victory, most men thought the Towne would haue beene lost: but the newes comming so opportunely, the towne was kept.

Cassius departed from thence, & went to Sulpitius fleet at Vibone; where the shippes beeing brought to shore, were there laid, for feare of the like danger, as formerly they had accustomed. Cassius, finding the wind good, sent in fortie shippes of burthen, furnished with matter to burne the Nauie. The fire hauing taken hold of both Cornets of the fleet, five of them were burned downe to the water. And as the flame beganne to be further caried with the wind, the souldiers of the old legions, which were left for the defence of the shipping, and were

Cæsar.

Constrata.

of

the number of them that wereicke, did not indure the dishonour: but getting aboard of their owne accord, put the fhippes from the fhoare; and fetting vpon Cafsius fleet, tooke two Gallies, in one of the which was Cafsius himfelfe: at hee, being taken out, with a Skiffe fledde away. And further more, they tooke two Triremes: and not long after, certaine newes came of the battell in Theffalia, fo that Pompeis-party believed it; for, before that time, it was thought to be but a thing giuen out by Cafars Legats, & other of his friends. Where-vpon, Cafsius departed with his Nauie, and left thofe places.

OBSERVATIONS.

**T**HE branches of a Tree doe receiue life from the ftocke, and the ftocke is maintained by the roote: which beeing once cut a-funder, there remaineth no life for ftocke or bough, leafe or branch. Accordingly it happened with this large-fpred Partie; the roote whereof was then in Theffalia: and beeing broken a-funder by the violence of Cafars forces, it booted not what Lælius did at Brundefium, or Cafsius, either at Maffina, or Vibone. For, all the parts were ouer-throwne with the bodie: and the fortune of the battaile ouer-lward other pettie loffes what focuers beeing fo pow'refull, in the opinion of the world, *Vt quò se fortuna, eodem etiam fauor hominum inclinat.* Or, as Lucan faich, *Rapimur, quò cuncta feruntur.*

CHAP. XXXVI.

Cæfar purfueth Pompey: who is flaine in Egypt.

**C**æfar, setting all other things apart, thought it expedient for him to purfue Pompey, into what parts foener hee fhould betake himfelfe, leaft he fhould raife new forces, and renewe the warre againe: and there-vpon, made forward euery day, as farre as his Cauallrie was able to goe; commaunding one Legion to follow after by leffer iourneis. There was a publication made in Pompeis name at Amphipolis, that all the youth of that Province, as well Greekes, as Cittizens of Rome, fhould come to bee inrolled for the warre. But it is not poffible to difcouer, whether Pompey did it to take away all caufe of fufpicion, that he might the longer hide his purpofe of flying away, or whether he went about by new leuies, to keepe Macedonia, if no man preaced hard after him.

How foener, he himfelfe lay at Anchor there one night. And calling vnto him his ancient Hofts and Friends, hee tooke fo much money of them, as would defray his neceffarie charges: and vnderftanding of Cafars comming, within a few daies hee arrived at Mitylen, where hee was kept two daies with foule weathere: and

and there, renforcing his fleet with fome Gallies hee tooke to him, hee went into Cilicia; and from thence to Cyprus. There hee vnderftood, that by the generall confent of the Antiochians, and fuch Cittizens of Rome as were there refiding, the Citadell was already taken to keepe him out: and that Meffengers were fent about, to thofe that were fled from his Party, into the bordering Citties, forbidding them to come to Antioche; for, if they did, they fhould hazard it with the danger of their heads. The like happened to L. Lentulus, vvhò the yeere before was Confull; and to Pub. Lentulus, of Confular dignity: and to fome other at Rhodes. For, as many as fled thither after Pompey, and came vnto the land, were neither receiued into the Towne, nor into the Hauens; but were commanded by Meffengers fent vnto them, to depart from thence, and forced to wey anchor againft their will: and now, the fame of Cafars comming, was fpredd abroad throughout all the Citties.

Where-vpon, Pompey, leauing off his purpofe of going into Syria, hauing taken what money hee found in Banke, befides what hee could borrow of his priuate friends, and putting aboard great ftore of Braffe for the vfe of vwarre, with eleuen thoufand Armed men (which hee had raifed partly out of the townes, and partly had forced vp, with Marchants, and fuch others of his followers, vvhom hee thought fit for this bufinefs) hee came to Pelufium. There by chauce was king Ptolomy, a child, within yeeres, with great forces making war againft his fifter Cleopatra; whom a few Months before, by meanes of his Allies and Friends, hee had thruft out of his kingdome: And Cleopatras Campe was not farre diftant from his.

Pompey fent vnto him, that in regard of ancient hofpitalitie, and the amitie hee had with his Father, hee might be receiued into Alexandria; and that hee would aide and fupport him with his vvealth and meanes, being now fallen into miferie and calamitie. But they that were fent, hauing done their meffage, beganne to fpeake liberally to the Kings fouldiers, which Gabinus receiued in Syria, and had brought them to Alexandria; and vpon the ending of the vwarre, had left them with Ptolomey, the father of this child. Thefe things being known, fuch as had the procuration of the kingdome, in the minoritie of the Boy, whether they were induced through feare of gaining the Armie, vvhoreby Pompey might eafily feize vpon Alexandria & Egypt; or whether defpifing his fortune (as for the moft part, in time of miferie, a mans friends doe become his enemies) did giue a good anfwere publicly to fuch as were fent, and willed him to come vnto the King: but, secretly plotting amongst themfelues, fent Achilles, a chiefe Commander, and a man of fingular audacitie, together with L. Septimius, Tribune of the fouldiers, to kill Pompey. They, giuing him good words, and hee himfelfe alfo knowing Septimius to haue led a Company vnder him in the vwarre againft the Pirates, went aboard a little Barke, with a few of his followers: and there was flaine, by Achilles and Septimius. In like manner, L. Lentulus was apprehended by commaundement from the King, and killed in prifon.

# Obferuations vpon the third

## THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

**I**F it be now demanded, Where was Cæſars deſire of Peace? and Why hee purſued not a treatie of Compoſition, at this time when as his tale would haue been heard with gladneſſe, and any conditions of attonement very acceptable to the vanquiſhed? The aunſwer is already made in the beginning of this Commentarie: That there was one time of making peace: and that was, when both Parties were equall, which was now paſt; and Cæſar too farre gone, to looke back vpon any thing that might worke a reconciliation. The one was crept ſo high, and the other ſo lowe, that they ſeemed not comparable in any Medium, although were to the ſauing of the Empire. Howbeit, it is not denied, but that Pompey gaue great ocaſion of theſe warres. For, Seneca ſaith: Hee had brought Common-wealth to that paſſe, that it could not longer ſtand, but by the benefit of ſeruitude. And he that will looke into the reaſons of this conſuſion, ſhall find all thoſe *Cauſæ corruptentes*, which are noted by Ariſtotele to threaten the well-fare of a State, in the exceſſe of Pompeis exorbitancie: for, hauing nothing in a Meane, hee held all his fortunes by the tenure of *Nimium*; and was ouer-growne, firſt, with too much honour: ſecondly, with too much wealth: thirdly, with too much power: whereby he exceeded the proportion of his fellow Cittizens; and ſo blemiſhed the beautie of that State, whoſe chiefſt graces were in a ſuting equalitie. And, adding to theſe the conuulſions of warre, he made no difficultie to ingage Rome in a bloody warre; as hauing no other hope, but in the conſuſion of Armes.

It is ſaid, that at his arriuall at Mitylene, he had much conference with Cræſpus, whom Tully mentioneth in his Offices: wherein, amongſt other reſontrances, the Philoſopher made it plaine, that his courſe of gouernment, had brought a neceſſitie of changing that State, from the liberty of a Common-wealth, to the condition of a iuſt Monarchie. And ſith it fell to Cæſars fortune, if there were any errout committed in the ſeizure, he may take the benefit of the generall pardon, exemplified by Trebellius Polix: That no Nation can ſhew a Man that is altogether blameleſſe.

## THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

**O**ncerning the ſtate of Egypt, wee are to note, that Alexander the Great being cut off by death, his Captaines laid hold vpon ſuch Provinces and kingdoms as were vnder their commands: amongſt whom one Ptolomeus, the ſonne of Lagus a Macedonian, ſeized vpon Egypt, where he reigned 40 yeres; & of him were all his ſucceſſors called by the name of Ptolomy. This firſt Ptolomy, poſſeſſed himſelfe of Egypt, about the yeere of the world 3640: which was 275 yeres before Pompeis ouerthrow. His ſon that ſucceeded, by the name of Ptolomey Philadelphus, cauſed the Bible to be tranſlated out of Ebrew into Greeke by 70 Interpreters, which are called the *Septuagint*; and made the famous Librarie which was burned in theſe vvarres.

The Father of this young Ptolomey, was the ninth in ſucceſſion from the firſt; and at his death, made the people of Rome Tutors to his children. His

eldest

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eldest ſonne, and Cleopatra his daughter, raigned together fixteene yeres; but in the end, fell to ſtrife and warres, and were deeply ingaged therein, when Pompey arriued: but ſhortly after, Cæſar ſo ordered the differences, that hee ſette the Crowne vpon Cleopatras head; who held it peaceably, untill ſhe came to play that tragical part with Anthony: which being ended, the kingdom was then reduced to a Prouince, vnder the obedience of the Romaine Empire.

Concerning this miſerable end of Pompey, it is truly ſaid of Seneca, that Death is alike to all: for, although the waies are diuers by which it appeneth, yet they all meet in the ſame end. And, forasmuch as Plutarch hath deſcribed particularly the manner of this Cataſtrophe, it ſhall not be impertinent to inſert his relation thereof.

When Pompey heard newes that king Ptolomey was in the City of Peluſium with his Army, making warre againſt his ſiſter, hee went thither, and ſent a Meſſenger before, vnto the king, to aduertie him of his arriuall, and to intreat him to receiue him. K. Ptolomey was then but a young man, inſomuch, that one Photinus gouerned all the whole Realme vnder him. He aſſembled a Councell of the chiefſt & wiſeſt men of the Court, who had ſuch credit and authority, as it pleaſed him to giue them. They being aſſembled, he commanded euery man in the Kings name to ſay his mind, touching the receiuing of Pompey, whether the King ſhould receiue him or not. It was a miſerable thing to ſee Photinus, an Eunuch of the Kings, and Theodotus of Chio, an hired Schoole-maſter to teach the young king Rhetoricke, & Achilles, an Egyptian, to conſult among themſelues what they ſhould do with Pompey the great. Theſe were the chiefſt Councellors of al his Eunuches, & of thoſe that had brought him vp.

Now did Pompey ride at anchor vpon the ſhore ſide, expecting the reſolution of this Councell: in the which, the opinions of others were diuers, for, they would not haue receiued him; the other alſo that he ſhould be receiued. But the Rhetorician, Theodotus, to ſhew his eloquence, perſwaded them, that neither the one nor the other was to be accepted. For, quoth he, if wee receiue him, we ſhall haue Cæſar our enemy, and Pompey our Lord: and if they do denie him, on the other ſide, Pompey will blame them for reſuſing him, & Cæſar for not keeping of him; therefore this ſhould be the beſt reſolution, to ſend to kill him. For, thereby they ſhould win the good wil of the one, and not feare the diſpleaſure of the other: & ſome ſay moreover, that he added this mock withall, A dead man bites not. They, being determined of this among themſelues, gaue Achilles commiſſion to doe it. He, taking with him Septimius (who had charge afore-time vnder Pompey) and Saluius, another Centurion alſo, with three or foure ſouldiers beſides, they made towards Pompeis Gallies, about whom were at that time the chiefſt of his traine, to ſee what would become of this matter. But, when they ſaw the likelihood of their entertainment, & that it was not in Princely ſhew nor manner, nor nothing answerable to the hope which Theophanes had put them in, ſeeing ſo few men come to them in a fiſher boat; they beganne then to miſtruſt the ſmall account that was made of them, and counſelled Pompey to returne backe, and to launch againe into the ſea, being out of the danger of the hurtling of a Dart.

V 2

In

Mors omnium  
par eſt: per qua  
venit diues a  
ſunt, id in quod  
diſiunt rursuſ eſt  
Epist. 67.  
Hominuſ ſunt  
ſomni, aut matu-  
ra cadunt, aut  
accidit tuunt.  
Plutar. in vita  
Pompey.

the meane time, the fifter-boat drew neer, and Septimius role, and salu-  
ompey in the Romane tongue, by the name of Imperator, as much as fo-  
gne Captaine: and Achilles also spake to him in the Greek tongue, and  
him come into his boat: because that by the shore-side, there was a great  
of mud, & sand banks, so that his Galley should haue no water to bring  
in. At the very same time, they saw a farre off diuers of the Kings Gallies,  
h were arming with all speed possible, & all the shore besides, full of foul-  
e. Thus, though Pompey & his company would haue altered their minds,  
could not haue told how to haue escaped: and furthermore, shewing that  
had mistrusted them, then they had giuen the murderer occasion to haue  
uted his crueltie. So taking his leaue of his wife Cornelia, who lamented  
death before his end, hee commaunded two Centurions to goe downe be-  
him, into the Egyptians boat, & Philip, one of his slaues infranchised, with  
her slaue, called Scynes. When Achilles reached out his hand to receiue  
into his boat, he turned him to his wife and sonne, and said these verses of  
Sophocles vnto them;

*The man that into Court comes free,  
Must there in state of bondage bee.*

These were the last words he spake vnto his people, when hee left his owne  
ly, & went into the Egyptians boat, the land being a great way off from his  
ly. When he saw neuer a man in the boat speak friendly vnto him, behold-  
Septimius, he said vnto him: Methinks, my friend, I should know thee, for  
thou hast serued with me heretofore. The other nodded with his head,  
it was true, but gaue him no answer, nor shewed him any curtesie.

Pompey, seeing that no man spake to him, tooke a little booke he had in his  
d, in which hee had written an Oration, that hee meant to make vnto King  
ompey, and began to read it. When they came neer to the shore, Cornelia,  
h her seruants and friends about her, stood vp in her ship, in great feare, to  
what should become of Pompey. So, she hoped well, when she saw many  
of the Kings people on the shore, comming towards Pompey at his landing, as  
were to receiue and honor him. But euen as Pompey tooke Philip his hand  
arise more easily, Septimius came first behind him, and thrust him through  
with his sword: next vnto him also, Saluius & Achilles drew out their swords  
like manner. Pompey then did no more but tooke vp his gowne with his  
hands, and hid his face, and manly abid the wounds they gaue him, onely sigh-  
ing a little. Thus, being 59 yeeres old, hee ended his life the next day after the  
of his birth.

They that rode at anchor in their shippes, when they saw him murdered,  
e such a fearfull cry, that it was heard to the shore: then weying vp their  
thors with speed, they hoisted saile, and departed their way, hauing wind at  
all, that blew a lustie gale. As soone as they had gotten the maine Sea, the  
gyptians which prepared to rowe after them, when they saw they were past  
their reach, and vnpossible to be ouer-taken, they let them goe. Then, hauing  
aken off Pompeys head, they threw his body ouer-board, for a miserable  
spectacle to all those that were desirous to see him.

Philip,

Philip his enfranchised bond-man, remained cuer by it, vntill such time as  
the Egyptians had seen it their bellies full. Then, hauing washed his body with  
salt water, & wrapped it vp in an old shirt of his, because he had no other shift  
to lay it in, he fought vpon the sands, and found at length a peece of an old fi-  
shers boat, enough to serue to burn his naked bodie with, but not all fully out.  
As hee was busie, gathering the broken peeces of this boat together, thither  
came vnto him an old Romaine, who in his youth had serued vnder Pompey,  
& said vnto him; O friend, what art thou, that preparest the funeralls of Pom-  
pey the great? Philip answered, that he was a bond-man of his, infranchised.  
Well, said he, thou shalt not haue all this honor alone: I pray thee yet let mee  
accompany thee in so deuout a deed, that I may not altogether repent mee to  
haue dwelt so long in a strange Country, where I haue abidden such misery &  
trouble; but that to recompence me withall, I may haue this good hap, with  
mine owne hands to touch Pompeys body, and to help to burne the onelic and  
most famous Captaine of the Romaines.

The next day after, Lucius Lentulus (not knowing what had passed) com-  
ming out of Cyprus, sailed by the shore-side, and perceiued a fire made for fu-  
neralls, and Philip standing by it: whom he knew not at the first. So hee asked  
him, What is hee that is dead, and buried there? but straight fetching a great  
sigh, alas, said he, perhaps it is Pompey the great. Then he landed a litle, and  
was straight taken and slaine. This was the end of Pompey the great. Not long  
after, Caesar also came into Egypt, that was in great warres; where Pompeis  
head was presented vnto him: but he turned his head aside, and would not see  
it; & abhorred him that brought it, as a detestable murderer. Then, taking his  
Ring where-with he sealed his Letters, wherupon was grauen a Lyon holding  
a sword, he burst out a weeping. Achilles and Photinus he put to death. King  
Ptolomey himselfe also, being ouer-throwne in battaile, by the Riuer of Nilus,  
vanished away, & was neuer heard of after. Theodotus, the Rhetorician, es-  
caped Caesars hands, and wandered vp and downe Egypt in great misery, despi-  
sed of euery man. Afterwards, Marcus Brutus (who slew Caesar) conquering  
Asia, met with him by chaunce, and putting him to all the torments he could  
possibly deuise, at the length slew him. The ashes of Pompeis bodie, were af-  
terwards brought vnto his wife Cornelia; who buried the in a towne of hers,  
by the Citie of Alba.

And, hauing in this manner paid the tribute which the law of Nature doth  
exact, the law of the Twelue Tables did free his Sepulchre from any further  
disturbance; *Vbi corpus demortui hominis condasacer esto.* Onely this may  
be added; That as Fabius was called Maximus, Scipio Magnus, and Pompey  
Magnus, which titles they caried, as markes of speciall Nobleness, to raise the  
about the comon worth of men: so their ends made them euen with the lowest  
of the State. According to that of Seneca; *Intervallis distinguimur: exitu æ-  
quamus.*

*Mori Natura  
lex est. Mori tri-  
butum officium.  
que mortalium.  
Sic, natural.  
quesi. 6.  
Fabius dictus  
Maximus, Sci-  
pio magnus. Po-  
liani lib. 8.  
Epi. 100.*

CHAP. XXXVII.

Prodigious Accidents, happening vpon the Battell in Pharsalia. Caesar commeth into Egypt.



Caesar, comming into Asia, found T. Ampius going about to take the money out of the Temple of Diana, at Ephesus: and for that cause had called together all the Senators that were in the Prouince, that hee might use them as witnesses in the matter; but, beeing interrupted by Caesars arriuall, hee fled away: so that two severall times, the money was saved at Ephesus by Caesars meanes. It was further found very certaine, that in the Temple of Minerva at Elide (a iust calculation of the time beeing taken) the same day that Caesar ouer-threw Pompey, the Image of victorie stood before Minerva, & looked towards her portrature, did turne it selfe towards the Portall, and the Temple-gate. And the same day likewise, there was such a noise of an Armie, twice heard at Antioche in Syria, and such sounding of Trumpets, that the Cittie ranne in Armes to keepe the walles. The like happened at Ptolomaida. And likewise at Pergamum, in the remote and hidden places of the Temple, which are called *adtra*, into which it is not lawfull for a man to enter but the Priests, were belles heard to ring. Besides, at Tralibus, in the Temple of Victory (where they had consecrated an Image to Caesar) there was shewed a Palme-tree, which in those daies was growne from betweene the rents of the stones, out of the pavement.

Caesar, staying a few daies in Asia, hearing that Pompey was scene at Cyprus, and coniecturing he went into Egypt, for the amities and correspondencie beeing with that Kingdome, besides other opportunities of the places he came to Alexandria with two legions, one that hee commaunded to follow him out of Iessaly, and another which he had called out of Achaia, from Fustus a Legate, together with eight hundred horse, ten Gallies of Rhodes, and a few ships of Asia. These Legions, were not above three thousand two hundred men; the rest, were either wounded in the fights, or spent with trauell, and the length of the journey: but Caesar, trusting to the fame of his great exploits, did not doubt to go with these weak forces, thinking every place would entertaine him with safetie.

At Alexandria hee understood of Pompeis death: and as hee was going out of the shippe, he heard a clamour of the souldiers, which the King had left to keep the towne, and saw a concourse of people gathered about him, because the buriall of Rods was caried before him; all the multitude crying out, that the Kings authority was diminished. This tumult being appeased, there were often uproares and commotions of the people for every day after; and many souldiers were slain in diuers parts of the Cittie. Where-upon, Caesar gaue order, for other Legions to be brought him out of Asia, which he raised and inrolled of Pompeis souldiers.

He

He himselfe was staied by the winds, called Etesiae, which are against them that saile to Alexandria.

In the meane time, forasmuch as he conceived, that if controuersies between Kings, did appertaine to the people of Rome, then consequently, to him, as Consul; and so much the rather it concerned his office, for that in his former Consulship, there was a league made by the decree of Senate, with Ptolomey the Father: In regarde hereof, he signified, that his pleasure was, that both the king and his sister Cleopatra, should dismisse their Armies, and rather plead their Cause before him, then to decide it by Armes.

There was at that time, one Photinus an Eunuch, one that had the administration of the kingdome, during the minoritie of the Child; he first began to coplaine among his friends, and to take it in scorne, that the King should be called out to pleade his Cause: and afterwards, hauing gotten some assistance of the Kings friends, he drew the Armie secretly from Pelusium, to Alexandria, and made Achilles (formerly mentioned) General of all the forces, inciting him forward, as well by his owne promises, as from the King, and instructing him by Letters & Messengers, what he would haue done.

Ptolomey, the Father, by his last Will and testament, had left for heires, the eldest of two sonnes, and likewise the eldest of two daughters; and for the confirmation thereof, had in the same Will, charged and required the people of Rome, by all the gods & the league he made at Rome, to see this accomplished. For which purpose, he sent a copy of his Will to Rome, to be kept in the Treasury: and by reason of the publicke occasions, which admitted no such business for the present, were left with Pompey; and the Originall, signed and sealed up, was brought to Alexandria.

While Caesar was handling these things, beeing very desirous to end these controuersies by arbitrement, it was told him on a suddaine, that the Kings Army, and all the Cavalry, were come to Alexandria. Caesars forces were not such that he durst trust vpon them, to hazard battell without the towne; onely it remained, that he kept himselfe in such places, as were most fit & convenient for him, within the towne, and to learne what Achilles intended. Howsoever: he commaunded all the souldiers to Armes; and exhorted the King, that of those which were neereft vnto him, and of greatest authority, he would send some to Achilles, to knowe his meaning.

Dio Corides and Serapion, beeing deputed there-vnto, hauing bene both Embassadors at Rome, and in great place about Ptolomey the Father; they came to Achilles: whom as soone as they were come into his presence, & before he would heare or understand what they would, commaunded them to be taken away, and slaine. Of whom, one hauing received a wound, was caried away by his own people for dead. The other was slaine out-right. Whereupon, Caesar wrought to get the King into his owne hands; thinking that his Name & Title would preuaile much amongst his people: as also to make it appeare, that this warre was rather moued by the priuate practice of some seditious thieues, then by order & commandement from the King.

OBSER-

ding as it was writte in a Colonne of gold, at Memphis.

This the fisher, for the fish of the Nile.

The Priests of Egypt take that occasion, for the King and the buriall of Rods, called in to Alexandria, the power of the King should probably cease: according

OBSERVATIONS.

**T**He multiplicite of occasions and troubles, which happen to such as haue the ordering of any businesse of import, doth make that of Plinie often remembered: *Veteribus negotijs noua accrescunt, nec tamē priora peraguntur; tot nexibus, tot quasi Catenis, mains in dies nationum agmen extenditur.* For, albeit Pompey had now spent his ma- and was no more to appeare in Armes against Cæsar: yet his hap was by g, to draw him (as it were by way of reuenge) into a place, where hee was stailie to be intangled in a dangerous warre. To these prodigies heere mentioned, may be added that of Aulus Gellius. The same day the battell happened, there fell out a strange wonder at Pa- where a certaine Priest, called Cornelius, of Noble race, and holie life, ainsle fell into an extasie, and said, he saw a great battell asarre off; Darts Piles flie thicke in the ayre, some flying, and some pursuing, great slaugh- accompanied with many lamentable groanes and cries: and in the end, d out, that Cæsar had got the victorie. For which, he was mocked for the cent; but, afterwards, held in great admiration. Plinie maketh the small increase of Nilus, to bee a fore-teller of Pompei- ch; *Minimusque Pharsalico bello veluti necem magni prodigio quodam flu- mine auersante.*

CHAP. XXXVIII.

Cæsar landeth his forces, taketh Pharos, and causeth Photinus to be slaine.



**T**HE forces that were with Achilles, were nei- ther for their number, or fashion of men, or vse or experience in war, to be contemned, hauing twentie-two thousand men in Armes. These troops consisted of the Gabinian souldiers, which were now growne into a custome of life and li- berty of the Egyptians: and hauing forgot the name and discipline of the people of Rome, had there married vniues, and most of them had children. To these were added such as were ga- thered from the thieues and robbers of Syria, the Province of Cilicia, and other finitimate regions: besides many banished men, and others, condemned to die, that fledde thither. And for all our fugitiues, there was euer a sure and certaine receipt at Alexandria, and a certaine condition of life: for, vpon giuing vp of his name, he

he was presently inrolled a souldier: and if one chanced to be taken and appre- hended by his Maister, hee was presently rescued by the concourse of souldiers; vvhoe, being all in the same condition, did strue for him, as for themselves: these required the Kings friends to be slaine. These were accustomed to rob rich men of their goods to better their pay, to besiege the Kings house, to expell some out of their kingdom, and to send for others home, according to an old custome and priuilege of the Alexandrian Armie.

There were, besides, two thousand horse, that had bene of auncient continu- arce in many of the warres held at Alexandria, and had brought back Ptolomey the father, and restored him to his kingdom; had slaine Bibulus two sons, and had made warre with the Egyptians: and this vse and knowledge they had of vuarre. Achilles, trusting to these forces, and contemning the small number of Cæsars troopes, did take and possesse Alexandria; and further, assaulting that part of the towne which Cæsar held with his men, did first of all indeauour to breake into his house: but Cæsar, hauing disposed the cohorts in the streets & waies, did beare out the assault. At the same time, they fought likewise at the Port, and it came at length to a very forcible encounter: for, hauing drawne out their troopes, the sight began to be hot in diuers streets and lanes; and the Enemie (in great troopes) went about to possesse themselves of the Gallies, of which there were L. found there, that were sent to serue Pompey, and returned home againe after the battell in Thessalia. These were all Triremes, and Quinque- remes, rigged, and ready to goe to sea.

Besides these, there were twenty-two, which were alwaies accustomed to bee the best, for the defence of Alexandria, and were all furnished with decks: which if they had taken, together with Cæsars shipping, they would haue had the Hauen and the Sea at their command; and by that meanes, hindered Cæsar from succours and prouision of victuall: in regard whereof, they fought hard on both sides; Achilles expecting victory, and our men for their safetie. But Cæsar, obtained his purpose: and because he was not able to keepe so many seuerall things with so small forces, he set them all on fire, together with those that were in the Road, & presently landed some souldiers at Pharos; which is a tower in an island, of a great height, & built with strange workmanship, taking that name from the island: this island lieth ouer against Alexandria, and so maketh it a Hauen. But former Kings had enlarged it 9 hundred pases in length, by raising great mounts in the Sea: and by that meanes, had brought it so neere to the towne, that they ioyned them both together with a bridge.

In this island dwelt diuers Egyptians, and made a Village, of the bignesse of a Towne: and what shippes soeuer had fallen off their course, either by tempest or error, were there robbed by those Egyptians. For, by reason of the narrow entrance, no shippes can come into the Hauen, but by the fauour and leaue of them that hold Pharos. Cæsar, beeing afraid of this, while the Enemie was busie in fight, landed his souldiers, tooke the place, and there put a garnison. Whereby he brought it to passe, that both corne and succours might safely come by sea to supply him: for he had sent to all the confining Regions for aide. In other places of the towne they so fought, that they gaue ouer at length vpon equal conditions: which

# Observations vpon the third

happened by reason of the narrowness of the passages: And a few of each being slain, Caesar tooke in such places as were most convenient for him, and besieged them in the night. In this quarter of the Towne, was contained a little of the Kings house (wherein, hee himselfe at his first arrivall, was appointed to lodge) and a Theater ioyned to the house, which was instead of a Castle, and a passage to the Port, and to other parts of Road. The daies following, he improved these fortifications, to the end he might haue them as a wall against the City, and thereby need not fight against his will.

In the meane time, the younger daughter of King Ptolomey, hoping to obtaine the Crowne, now in question, found meanes to conuay herselfe out of the Kings house, to Achilles, and both ioynly together, undertooke the managing of that warre: but presently there grew a controuersie between the, who should command in chiefe; which was the cause of great largesse and rewards to the souldiers, either of them being at great charges and expences to gaine their good wills.

While the Enemy was busied in these things, Photinus, the Gouvernour of the King, and Superintendent of the kingdome on Caesars partie, sent Messengers to Achilles, exhorting him, not to desist in the business, or to bee discouraged. Vpon the discouering and apprehension of which Messengers, Caesar caused them to be slain. And these were the beginnings of the Alexandrian warre.

## OBSERVATIONS.

**A** Harus is a little Iland in the Sea, ouer-against Alexandria; in the midst whereof, Ptolomey Philadelphus built a tower of an exceeding height, all of white Marble. It contained many Stages, and had in the toppe many great Lanternes, to keepe light in the night, for a marke to such as were at Sea. The Architect engraued there vpon this inscription; *Sostrates Gnidiens, the sonne of Deximenos, to the Gods, Conservators, for the safety of Navigators.*

It was reckoned for one of the seauen Wonders of the world. The first whereof was the Temple of Diana, at Ephefus. The second, was the Sepulchre of Artemisia, Queene of Caria, made for her Husband, Mausolus, whole she dranke. The third, was the Colossus of the Sunne, at Rhodes. The fourth, was the Walls of Babylon. The fift, was the Pyramides of Egypt. The sixth, was the Image of Iupiter Olympian, at Elide, which was made by Phidias, and contained three-score cubites in height; and was all of luorie, and pure Gold. And the seauenth, was this Pharos.

FINIS.

L. DE 65  
ERRATA.

Page.	Line.	Faults.	Corrections.
41	2	Ensignes	easiness.
125	25	uncapable	uncapable.
133	30	ergo	ego.
150	3	sopken	spoken.
205	19	they	as they.